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Moral Action: Motivation, Normativity, and Autonomous Willing

Katerina Deligiorgi

in The Scope of Autonomy: Kant and the Morality of Freedom

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
September 2012
ISBN:
9780199646159
eISBN:
9780191741142
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199646159.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, History of Philosophy

Chapter 3 focuses on moral action and its conditions. It fulfils both a negative and a positive task. The negative task consists in contextualizing the questions of moral psychology, which have ... More


Moral Realism: A Defence

Russ Shafer-Landau

Published in print:
2003
Published Online:
January 2005
ISBN:
9780199259755
eISBN:
9780191601835
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199259755.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

This is a book in metaethics that defends a brand of moral realism known as non‐naturalism. The book has five Parts. Part I outlines the sort of moral realism that the author wishes to defend, and ... More


Motivational Internalism: Contemporary Debates

Gunnar Björnsson, Caj Strandberg, Ragnar Francén Olinder, John Eriksson, and Fredrik Björklund

in Motivational Internalism

Published in print:
2015
Published Online:
January 2015
ISBN:
9780199367955
eISBN:
9780199367979
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199367955.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General

Motivational internalism—the idea that moral judgments are intrinsically or necessarily connected to motivation—has played a central role in metaethical debates. In conjunction with a Humean picture ... More


An Empirical Case for Motivational Internalism

Jesse Prinz

in Motivational Internalism

Published in print:
2015
Published Online:
January 2015
ISBN:
9780199367955
eISBN:
9780199367979
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199367955.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General

Motivational internalism is often defined as a conceptual thesis about the entailments of moral concepts. It can also be defined as a psychological thesis about the motivational impact of making ... More


Naturalistic Moral Realism and Motivational Internalism: From Negative to Positive

Jon Tresan

in Motivational Internalism

Published in print:
2015
Published Online:
January 2015
ISBN:
9780199367955
eISBN:
9780199367979
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199367955.003.0010
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General

Motivational internalists say there are necessary attitudinal conditions on moral judgment. Internalists typically explain these necessities by citing moral semantics, properties, or beliefs. But ... More


Unconditional Motivational Internalism and Hume’s Lesson

Daniel Eggers

in Motivational Internalism

Published in print:
2015
Published Online:
January 2015
ISBN:
9780199367955
eISBN:
9780199367979
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199367955.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General

This chapter critically discusses the widespread rejection of unconditional motivational internalism (UMI). It begins with the attempt to specify the commitments of UMI by drawing on a thought ... More


Motivational Internalism

Gunnar Björnsson, Caj Strandberg, Ragnar Francén Olinder, John Eriksson, and Fredrik Björklund (eds)

Published in print:
2015
Published Online:
January 2015
ISBN:
9780199367955
eISBN:
9780199367979
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199367955.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General

Motivational internalism—the thesis that there is an intrinsic or necessary connection between moral judgment and moral motivation—is a central thesis in a number of metaethical debates. In ... More


Tempered Internalism and the Participatory Stance

Kate Manne

in Motivational Internalism

Published in print:
2015
Published Online:
January 2015
ISBN:
9780199367955
eISBN:
9780199367979
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199367955.003.0013
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General

This chapter explores a way of tempering motivational internalism that is held to render it more plausible, while preserving at least something of the spirit of the original position. According to ... More


(How) Is Ethical Neo-Expressivism a Hybrid View?

Dorit Bar-On, Matthew Chrisman, and James Sias

in Having It Both Ways: Hybrid Theories and Modern Metaethics

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
October 2014
ISBN:
9780199347582
eISBN:
9780199347605
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199347582.003.0010
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General

According to ethical neo-expressivism, all declarative sentences, including those used to make ethical claims, have propositions as their semantic contents, and acts of making an ethical claim are ... More


Pragmatics and Practicality

Stephen Finlay

in Confusion of Tongues: A Theory of Normative Language

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
April 2014
ISBN:
9780199347490
eISBN:
9780199347513
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199347490.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Language

This chapter first introduces a distinction between semantics and pragmatics, and proposes that the basic principle of pragmatics is instrumental, in the place of Grice’s principle of cooperation. A ... More


Practical Rationality

Joshua Gert

in Normative Bedrock: Response-Dependence, Rationality, and Reasons

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
January 2013
ISBN:
9780199657544
eISBN:
9780191742217
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199657544.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter presents a response-dependence account of the basic normative property of rationality. It argues that a certain sort of puzzlement, rather than desire or some other affective response, ... More


Pure Expressivism and Motivational Internalism

Teemu Toppinen

in Motivational Internalism

Published in print:
2015
Published Online:
January 2015
ISBN:
9780199367955
eISBN:
9780199367979
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199367955.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General

This chapter examines pure expressivists’ prospects with regard to capturing the following form of motivational (or judgment) internalism: Necessarily, if one judges that φ-ing would be desirable, ... More


Expression: Acts, Products, and Meaning

Dorit Bar-On

in Meaning Without Representation: Essays on Truth, Expression, Normativity, and Naturalism

Published in print:
2015
Published Online:
September 2015
ISBN:
9780198722199
eISBN:
9780191789045
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198722199.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Aesthetics

The notion of expression has been put to many uses in philosophy, yet it has received surprisingly little direct theoretical attention. Drawing on certain distinctions as employed in earlier work, ... More


Morality and Neuroscience: Past and Future

S. Matthew Liao

in Moral Brains: The Neuroscience of Morality

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
September 2016
ISBN:
9780199357666
eISBN:
9780199357697
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199357666.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter identifies some of the central topics in the field of moral neuroscience, takes stock of some of the key discussions, and recommends ways of taking these discussions further. It first ... More


Attitudinal Requirements for Moral Thought and Language: Noncognitive Type-Generality

Ryan Hay

in Having It Both Ways: Hybrid Theories and Modern Metaethics

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
October 2014
ISBN:
9780199347582
eISBN:
9780199347605
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199347582.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General

This chapter discusses the features of a hybrid expressivist view that has the resources to straightforwardly address issues about logical embedding and the connection between moral judgment and ... More


Diachronic Hybrid Moral Realism

Jon Tresan

in Having It Both Ways: Hybrid Theories and Modern Metaethics

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
October 2014
ISBN:
9780199347582
eISBN:
9780199347605
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199347582.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General

A classic metaethical challenge is capturing the ways morality is objective and the ways it is practical, without extravagance: the best balance of objectivity, practicality, and frugality. Hybrid ... More


Is Empathy Required for Making Moral Judgments?

John Deigh

in From Psychology to Morality: Essays in Ethical Naturalism

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
July 2018
ISBN:
9780190878597
eISBN:
9780190878627
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780190878597.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

This essay is a study of the nature of moral judgment. Its main thesis is that moral judgment is a type of judgment defined by its content and not its psychological profile. The essay arrives at this ... More


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