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Motivation and Agency

Alfred R. Mele

Published in print:
2003
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780195156171
eISBN:
9780199833467
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/019515617X.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

What is motivation, and what is its place in the lives of intelligent agents? This is Mele's guiding question. His search for an answer is sensitive to the theoretical concerns of philosophers of ... More


Motivated Belief and Motivational Explanations

Alfred R. Mele

in Motivation and Agency

Published in print:
2003
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780195156171
eISBN:
9780199833467
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/019515617X.003.0012
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Drawing on work in cognitive and social psychology, this chapter explains the bearing of motivationally biased beliefs on the project of producing an account of motivational explanation. It is argued ... More


The Ends of Explanation

Bryan Magee

in The Philosophy of Schopenhauer

Published in print:
1997
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780198237228
eISBN:
9780191706233
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0198237227.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, History of Philosophy

Investigates the contents of Schopenhauer's first book On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason. This is devoted to the nature of explanation. It concludes that all events in the ... More


Goal‐Directed Action

Alfred R. Mele

in Motivation and Agency

Published in print:
2003
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780195156171
eISBN:
9780199833467
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/019515617X.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Argues for a constraint on a proper theory of motivation – namely, that proper motivational explanations of goal‐directed actions are causal explanations. The chapter criticizes the thesis that ... More


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