Feldman Fred
- Published in print:
- 1994
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195089288
- eISBN:
- 9780199852963
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195089288.003.0013
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This chapter discusses different applications towards a view of the morality of abortion. It also includes a rationale behind a fairly responsible position about the morality of abortion. There are ...
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This chapter discusses different applications towards a view of the morality of abortion. It also includes a rationale behind a fairly responsible position about the morality of abortion. There are three examples that highlight special features of abortion: the murder example, the abortion example, and the nonconception example.Less
This chapter discusses different applications towards a view of the morality of abortion. It also includes a rationale behind a fairly responsible position about the morality of abortion. There are three examples that highlight special features of abortion: the murder example, the abortion example, and the nonconception example.
Anja J. Karnein
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199782475
- eISBN:
- 9780199933297
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199782475.001.0001
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law
In light of new biomedical technologies, such as artificial reproduction, stem cell research, genetic selection and design, the question of what we owe to future persons and unborn life more ...
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In light of new biomedical technologies, such as artificial reproduction, stem cell research, genetic selection and design, the question of what we owe to future persons and unborn life more generally, is as contested as ever. This book offers a new theory by showing how our commitments to persons can help us make sense of our obligations to unborn life. These commitments give us reasons to treat embryos that will develop into persons in anticipation of these persons. By contrast, embryos, which women want to abort or refuse to implant, can be discarded or used for research purposes. How viable is this theory? The book explores its attractiveness for Germany and the U.S.—two countries with very different approaches to valuing unborn life. However, another question raised by modern biomedical technologies concerns the legitimacy of genetically selecting and manipulating embryos. Parents might want to create persons with particular genetic properties. The book maintains that only some uses of these technologies do not violate what respect for persons, including those of the future, requires. Genetic interventions can only be legitimate if used to insure future persons’ independence. With this claim the book’s theory runs counter to liberal eugenic approaches that give parents wide-ranging entitlements to interfere with their future child’s genome, in the names of reproductive freedom, enhancing the species or social justice.Less
In light of new biomedical technologies, such as artificial reproduction, stem cell research, genetic selection and design, the question of what we owe to future persons and unborn life more generally, is as contested as ever. This book offers a new theory by showing how our commitments to persons can help us make sense of our obligations to unborn life. These commitments give us reasons to treat embryos that will develop into persons in anticipation of these persons. By contrast, embryos, which women want to abort or refuse to implant, can be discarded or used for research purposes. How viable is this theory? The book explores its attractiveness for Germany and the U.S.—two countries with very different approaches to valuing unborn life. However, another question raised by modern biomedical technologies concerns the legitimacy of genetically selecting and manipulating embryos. Parents might want to create persons with particular genetic properties. The book maintains that only some uses of these technologies do not violate what respect for persons, including those of the future, requires. Genetic interventions can only be legitimate if used to insure future persons’ independence. With this claim the book’s theory runs counter to liberal eugenic approaches that give parents wide-ranging entitlements to interfere with their future child’s genome, in the names of reproductive freedom, enhancing the species or social justice.
Anja J. Karnein
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199782475
- eISBN:
- 9780199933297
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199782475.003.0001
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law
This chapter develops an account of how our normative commitment to persons should inform our treatment of embryos. Embryos that develop into persons ought to be protected in anticipation of these ...
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This chapter develops an account of how our normative commitment to persons should inform our treatment of embryos. Embryos that develop into persons ought to be protected in anticipation of these persons from the moment of conception. This is referred to as the so-called Personhood-Dependent Principle (PDP). Furthermore, this chapter offers a plausible understanding of when personhood begins, namely at birth. Abortion is shown to be legitimate as women have the right to end their assistance, without which the embryo has no potential of developing into a person. However, our commitment to persons asks us to adopt a positive attitude toward the creation of persons. In cases in which there are women willing to carry leftover embryos to term, they should not be hindered in their pursuit.Less
This chapter develops an account of how our normative commitment to persons should inform our treatment of embryos. Embryos that develop into persons ought to be protected in anticipation of these persons from the moment of conception. This is referred to as the so-called Personhood-Dependent Principle (PDP). Furthermore, this chapter offers a plausible understanding of when personhood begins, namely at birth. Abortion is shown to be legitimate as women have the right to end their assistance, without which the embryo has no potential of developing into a person. However, our commitment to persons asks us to adopt a positive attitude toward the creation of persons. In cases in which there are women willing to carry leftover embryos to term, they should not be hindered in their pursuit.
