Peter de Marneffe
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195383249
- eISBN:
- 9780199870554
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195383249.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy
Civil libertarians characterize prostitution as a “victimless crime,” and argue that it ought to be legalized. Feminist critics counter that prostitution is not victimless, since it harms the people ...
More
Civil libertarians characterize prostitution as a “victimless crime,” and argue that it ought to be legalized. Feminist critics counter that prostitution is not victimless, since it harms the people who do it. Civil libertarians respond that most women freely choose to do this work, and that it is paternalistic for the government to limit a person's liberty for her own good. This book argues that although most prostitution is voluntary, paternalistic prostitution laws in some form are nonetheless morally justifiable. If prostitution is commonly harmful in the way that feminist critics maintain, this argument for prostitution laws is not objectionably moralistic and some prostitution laws violate no one's rights. Paternalistic prostitution laws in some form are therefore consistent with the fundamental principles of contemporary liberalism.Less
Civil libertarians characterize prostitution as a “victimless crime,” and argue that it ought to be legalized. Feminist critics counter that prostitution is not victimless, since it harms the people who do it. Civil libertarians respond that most women freely choose to do this work, and that it is paternalistic for the government to limit a person's liberty for her own good. This book argues that although most prostitution is voluntary, paternalistic prostitution laws in some form are nonetheless morally justifiable. If prostitution is commonly harmful in the way that feminist critics maintain, this argument for prostitution laws is not objectionably moralistic and some prostitution laws violate no one's rights. Paternalistic prostitution laws in some form are therefore consistent with the fundamental principles of contemporary liberalism.
Lawrence McNamara
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199231454
- eISBN:
- 9780191710858
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231454.001.0001
- Subject:
- Law, Law of Obligations
The first study of what reputation is, how it functions, and how it is and should be protected under the law, Reputation and Defamation addresses the inconsistencies and failures of the common law ...
More
The first study of what reputation is, how it functions, and how it is and should be protected under the law, Reputation and Defamation addresses the inconsistencies and failures of the common law that have been observed for over a century. It develops a theory of reputation and uses it to analyse, evaluate and propose a revision of the law. Using the concept of reputation as the vehicle for a study of the history and theory of libel, slander and honour it becomes apparent that, contrary to the legal orthodoxy, defamation law did not aim and function to protect reputation until the early 19th century. Consequently, the historically derived tests for what is defamatory do not always protect reputation adequately or appropriately. The ‘shun and avoid’ and ‘ridicule’ tests should be discarded. The principal ‘lowering the estimation’ test is more appropriate but needs re-working. Christian tradition and Victorian moralism are embedded in the idea of ‘the right-thinking person’ that provides the test's conceptual foundations, but these are problematic in an era of moral diversity. Instead, ‘the right-thinking person’ should be associated with an inclusive liberal premise of equal moral worth and a shared commitment to moral diversity; any departure from this must be justified on sound, expressly stated ethical grounds. That demand serves to protect reputation appropriately and effectively in an age of moral diversity.Less
The first study of what reputation is, how it functions, and how it is and should be protected under the law, Reputation and Defamation addresses the inconsistencies and failures of the common law that have been observed for over a century. It develops a theory of reputation and uses it to analyse, evaluate and propose a revision of the law. Using the concept of reputation as the vehicle for a study of the history and theory of libel, slander and honour it becomes apparent that, contrary to the legal orthodoxy, defamation law did not aim and function to protect reputation until the early 19th century. Consequently, the historically derived tests for what is defamatory do not always protect reputation adequately or appropriately. The ‘shun and avoid’ and ‘ridicule’ tests should be discarded. The principal ‘lowering the estimation’ test is more appropriate but needs re-working. Christian tradition and Victorian moralism are embedded in the idea of ‘the right-thinking person’ that provides the test's conceptual foundations, but these are problematic in an era of moral diversity. Instead, ‘the right-thinking person’ should be associated with an inclusive liberal premise of equal moral worth and a shared commitment to moral diversity; any departure from this must be justified on sound, expressly stated ethical grounds. That demand serves to protect reputation appropriately and effectively in an age of moral diversity.
Joel Feinberg
- Published in print:
- 1987
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195046649
- eISBN:
- 9780199868728
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195046641.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Harm to Others is the first volume in a four‐volume work entitled The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law that addresses the question, What acts may the state rightly make criminal? ...
More
Harm to Others is the first volume in a four‐volume work entitled The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law that addresses the question, What acts may the state rightly make criminal? Feinberg identifies four liberty‐limiting, or coercion‐legitimizing, principles, each of which is the subject of a volume of his book. In the first volume, Feinberg looks at the principle of harm to others – or the harm principle – which John Stuart Mill identified as the only liberty‐limiting principle. The other principles that Feinberg considers in subsequent volumes are (1) the offense principle: it is necessary to prevent hurt or offense (as opposed to harm) to others; (2) legal paternalism: it is necessary to prevent harm to the actor herself; and (3) legal moralism: it is necessary to prevent immoral conduct whether or not it harms anyone. As a thinker who favors liberalism, Feinberg rejects legal paternalism and legal moralism, maintaining that the harm principle and the offense principle exhaust the class of morally relevant reasons for criminal prohibitions. Feinberg's examination of the harm principle begins with an account of the concept of harm and its relation to other concepts like interests, wants, hurts, offenses, rights, and consent. After addressing difficult examples such as moral harm, vicious harm, prenatal harm, and posthumous harm, Feinberg considers both the moral status of a failure to prevent harm and the problems related to assessing, comparing, and imputing harms.Less
Harm to Others is the first volume in a four‐volume work entitled The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law that addresses the question, What acts may the state rightly make criminal? Feinberg identifies four liberty‐limiting, or coercion‐legitimizing, principles, each of which is the subject of a volume of his book. In the first volume, Feinberg looks at the principle of harm to others – or the harm principle – which John Stuart Mill identified as the only liberty‐limiting principle. The other principles that Feinberg considers in subsequent volumes are (1) the offense principle: it is necessary to prevent hurt or offense (as opposed to harm) to others; (2) legal paternalism: it is necessary to prevent harm to the actor herself; and (3) legal moralism: it is necessary to prevent immoral conduct whether or not it harms anyone. As a thinker who favors liberalism, Feinberg rejects legal paternalism and legal moralism, maintaining that the harm principle and the offense principle exhaust the class of morally relevant reasons for criminal prohibitions. Feinberg's examination of the harm principle begins with an account of the concept of harm and its relation to other concepts like interests, wants, hurts, offenses, rights, and consent. After addressing difficult examples such as moral harm, vicious harm, prenatal harm, and posthumous harm, Feinberg considers both the moral status of a failure to prevent harm and the problems related to assessing, comparing, and imputing harms.
Anatol Lieven
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199571833
- eISBN:
- 9780191722264
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199571833.003.0013
- Subject:
- Religion, Religion and Society
This chapter examines the tension between realists and progressives in American policy. It argues that Niebuhr's approach is still needed to avoid a triumphalist moralism on the one hand, and an ...
More
This chapter examines the tension between realists and progressives in American policy. It argues that Niebuhr's approach is still needed to avoid a triumphalist moralism on the one hand, and an inadequate realism on the other.Less
This chapter examines the tension between realists and progressives in American policy. It argues that Niebuhr's approach is still needed to avoid a triumphalist moralism on the one hand, and an inadequate realism on the other.
Berys Gaut
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199263219
- eISBN:
- 9780191718854
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199263219.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Aesthetics
This chapter discusses the usual formulations of the three standard positions concerning the intrinsic issue: autonomism, moralism, and immoralism. It argues that some of these formulations are ...
More
This chapter discusses the usual formulations of the three standard positions concerning the intrinsic issue: autonomism, moralism, and immoralism. It argues that some of these formulations are unsatisfactory, and that the best formulation of the more plausible positions in the debate is in terms of autonomism, ethicism, and contextualism. Ethicism holds that a work is always aesthetically flawed in so far as it possesses an aesthetically relevant ethical flaw. Contextualism holds that a work is sometimes aesthetically flawed in so far as it possesses an aesthetically relevant ethical flaw, and is sometimes aesthetically meritorious in so far as it possesses an aesthetically relevant ethical flaw. The chapter also argues that these positions are best stated using pro tanto principles, rather than overall principles.Less
This chapter discusses the usual formulations of the three standard positions concerning the intrinsic issue: autonomism, moralism, and immoralism. It argues that some of these formulations are unsatisfactory, and that the best formulation of the more plausible positions in the debate is in terms of autonomism, ethicism, and contextualism. Ethicism holds that a work is always aesthetically flawed in so far as it possesses an aesthetically relevant ethical flaw. Contextualism holds that a work is sometimes aesthetically flawed in so far as it possesses an aesthetically relevant ethical flaw, and is sometimes aesthetically meritorious in so far as it possesses an aesthetically relevant ethical flaw. The chapter also argues that these positions are best stated using pro tanto principles, rather than overall principles.
Patricia Owens
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199299362
- eISBN:
- 9780191715051
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199299362.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory, International Relations and Politics
Arendt articulated the dangers of moralism in the political realm that avoids realist cynicism. She is better placed to challenge the neoconservative vision of international affairs, ideological ...
More
Arendt articulated the dangers of moralism in the political realm that avoids realist cynicism. She is better placed to challenge the neoconservative vision of international affairs, ideological conviction, and their relationship to democratic society. Reading Arendt against Leo Strauss suggests that the fundamental problem with neoconservative ideology concerns its understanding of the place of philosophy in the public realm, the relationship between political thought and practice, ideas, and action. This sheds light on contemporary neoconservative claims about the power of ideas to change the world (through the invasion and occupation of Iraq), and widespread, but misguided, claims about their propensity to condone political lies. There is always a temptation to lie in politics because the lie is an intervention into the common world. This is only made worse by ideological thinking. Neoconservatives may be experts at selling wars but seem less adept at winning them.Less
Arendt articulated the dangers of moralism in the political realm that avoids realist cynicism. She is better placed to challenge the neoconservative vision of international affairs, ideological conviction, and their relationship to democratic society. Reading Arendt against Leo Strauss suggests that the fundamental problem with neoconservative ideology concerns its understanding of the place of philosophy in the public realm, the relationship between political thought and practice, ideas, and action. This sheds light on contemporary neoconservative claims about the power of ideas to change the world (through the invasion and occupation of Iraq), and widespread, but misguided, claims about their propensity to condone political lies. There is always a temptation to lie in politics because the lie is an intervention into the common world. This is only made worse by ideological thinking. Neoconservatives may be experts at selling wars but seem less adept at winning them.
Ann Lee Bressler
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195129861
- eISBN:
- 9780199834013
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195129865.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, History of Christianity
This book offers the first cultural history of Universalism and the Universalist idea – the idea that an all-good and all-powerful God saves all souls. Ann Bressler argues that Universalism began as ...
More
This book offers the first cultural history of Universalism and the Universalist idea – the idea that an all-good and all-powerful God saves all souls. Ann Bressler argues that Universalism began as a radical, eschatological, and communally oriented faith, and only later became a “comfortably established” progressive and individualistic one. Although Universalists are usually classed with Unitarians as pioneering Protestant liberals, the author argues that they were in fact quite different from both contemporary and later liberalism in their ideas and goals. Unitarians began by rejecting the Calvinist idea of sin as corporate, universal, and absolute, replacing it with their moral self-cultivation. Universalists, on the other hand, accepted the Calvinist view of absolute corporeal sinfulness but insisted on absolute corporeal salvation. Bressler’s claim is that Universalists, in their defiance of individualistic moralism, were for much of the nineteenth century the only consistent Calvinists in America. She traces the emergence of the Universalists’ “improved” Calvinism and its gradual erosion over the course of the nineteenth century, when the effort to maintain the early synthesis of Calvinist and Enlightenment ideals failed as the Universalists were swept up in the tide of American religious individualism and moralism. By the late nineteenth century they increasingly extolled moral responsibility and self-cultivation.Less
This book offers the first cultural history of Universalism and the Universalist idea – the idea that an all-good and all-powerful God saves all souls. Ann Bressler argues that Universalism began as a radical, eschatological, and communally oriented faith, and only later became a “comfortably established” progressive and individualistic one. Although Universalists are usually classed with Unitarians as pioneering Protestant liberals, the author argues that they were in fact quite different from both contemporary and later liberalism in their ideas and goals. Unitarians began by rejecting the Calvinist idea of sin as corporate, universal, and absolute, replacing it with their moral self-cultivation. Universalists, on the other hand, accepted the Calvinist view of absolute corporeal sinfulness but insisted on absolute corporeal salvation. Bressler’s claim is that Universalists, in their defiance of individualistic moralism, were for much of the nineteenth century the only consistent Calvinists in America. She traces the emergence of the Universalists’ “improved” Calvinism and its gradual erosion over the course of the nineteenth century, when the effort to maintain the early synthesis of Calvinist and Enlightenment ideals failed as the Universalists were swept up in the tide of American religious individualism and moralism. By the late nineteenth century they increasingly extolled moral responsibility and self-cultivation.
Mark Weston Janis
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199579341
- eISBN:
- 9780191722653
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579341.003.0003
- Subject:
- Law, Public International Law, Legal History
This chapter reopens the early 19th-century treatises of James Kent and Henry Wheaton, the first Americans to systematically describe and analyze international law. It remarks on the importance that ...
More
This chapter reopens the early 19th-century treatises of James Kent and Henry Wheaton, the first Americans to systematically describe and analyze international law. It remarks on the importance that both authors assigned to the law of nations, and explores why Kent and Wheaton paid such homage to Hugo Grotius and what they saw as the Dutch jurist's Protestant fashioning of what Wheaton called ‘the international law of Christendom’. The international law of Kent and Wheaton was a law necessarily limited to a circle of like-minded states bound by a common tradition of culture, law, and morals, a characterization which departed from Grotius's own universalistic preferences. It is argued that Kent and Wheaton rejected the universalism in the Grotian tradition for two of the very reasons that motivated them to emphasize international law in the first place. First, like the Founding Fathers, they were anxious to use the law of nations to secure the recently won independence and sovereignty of the United States. Second and more originally, Kent and Wheaton sought to answer new positivist critiques of international law by John Austin and to affirm the efficacy of international law in international relations. Finally, it is argued that in so doing, Kent and Wheaton were not guilty of the sins of legalism-moralism sometimes ascribed by George Kennan and other ‘realists’ to American international lawyers in general. Rather Kent and Wheaton presaged a realism about international law that would later characterize some, though not all, Americans who came to practice and profess the discipline.Less
This chapter reopens the early 19th-century treatises of James Kent and Henry Wheaton, the first Americans to systematically describe and analyze international law. It remarks on the importance that both authors assigned to the law of nations, and explores why Kent and Wheaton paid such homage to Hugo Grotius and what they saw as the Dutch jurist's Protestant fashioning of what Wheaton called ‘the international law of Christendom’. The international law of Kent and Wheaton was a law necessarily limited to a circle of like-minded states bound by a common tradition of culture, law, and morals, a characterization which departed from Grotius's own universalistic preferences. It is argued that Kent and Wheaton rejected the universalism in the Grotian tradition for two of the very reasons that motivated them to emphasize international law in the first place. First, like the Founding Fathers, they were anxious to use the law of nations to secure the recently won independence and sovereignty of the United States. Second and more originally, Kent and Wheaton sought to answer new positivist critiques of international law by John Austin and to affirm the efficacy of international law in international relations. Finally, it is argued that in so doing, Kent and Wheaton were not guilty of the sins of legalism-moralism sometimes ascribed by George Kennan and other ‘realists’ to American international lawyers in general. Rather Kent and Wheaton presaged a realism about international law that would later characterize some, though not all, Americans who came to practice and profess the discipline.
Ann Lee Bressler
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195129861
- eISBN:
- 9780199834013
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195129865.003.0003
- Subject:
- Religion, History of Christianity
In the first decades of the nineteenth century, the Universalist movement gained both momentum and attention. Although still a small minority, Universalists stirred up widespread controversy with ...
More
In the first decades of the nineteenth century, the Universalist movement gained both momentum and attention. Although still a small minority, Universalists stirred up widespread controversy with their improved version of Calvinism. They faced massive opposition, even persecution, with almost all who denounced them united in a single fundamental criticism: their teaching ignored the basic lesson that all people were responsible before God for their actions, that goodness would be rewarded, and evil punished. Universalists responded by trying to show that “the larger hope” of their faith transcended such “carnal”concerns and was conducive to social concord, and for at least a generation after the turn of the century, the Universalist vision represented a genuine challenge to the religious and moral norms that accommodated the needs of a burgeoning capitalist society. However, the movement as a whole did not continue to sustain and develop the sort of spirituality that was reflected in Hosea Ballou’s teaching; the communal piety of early Universalism proved an unsatisfactory foundation, and the movement ultimately moved toward the moralism against which its early adherents had struggled. Ironically, the form of non-moralistic spirituality that gained lasting recognition in American religious history was not the popular preaching of Universalism but the Transcendentalism of Ralph Waldo Emerson, which while sharing certain themes with early Universalism, ultimately reflected a profoundly different orientation that was more closely in line with the broader tendencies of nineteenth-century American culture.Less
In the first decades of the nineteenth century, the Universalist movement gained both momentum and attention. Although still a small minority, Universalists stirred up widespread controversy with their improved version of Calvinism. They faced massive opposition, even persecution, with almost all who denounced them united in a single fundamental criticism: their teaching ignored the basic lesson that all people were responsible before God for their actions, that goodness would be rewarded, and evil punished. Universalists responded by trying to show that “the larger hope” of their faith transcended such “carnal”concerns and was conducive to social concord, and for at least a generation after the turn of the century, the Universalist vision represented a genuine challenge to the religious and moral norms that accommodated the needs of a burgeoning capitalist society. However, the movement as a whole did not continue to sustain and develop the sort of spirituality that was reflected in Hosea Ballou’s teaching; the communal piety of early Universalism proved an unsatisfactory foundation, and the movement ultimately moved toward the moralism against which its early adherents had struggled. Ironically, the form of non-moralistic spirituality that gained lasting recognition in American religious history was not the popular preaching of Universalism but the Transcendentalism of Ralph Waldo Emerson, which while sharing certain themes with early Universalism, ultimately reflected a profoundly different orientation that was more closely in line with the broader tendencies of nineteenth-century American culture.
John Kekes
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199546923
- eISBN:
- 9780191720109
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199546923.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter is about Cato whose moralizing style of life made him and those around him utterly miserable. His attitude was vanity, his manner self-righteous, and his dominant activity was to try to ...
More
This chapter is about Cato whose moralizing style of life made him and those around him utterly miserable. His attitude was vanity, his manner self-righteous, and his dominant activity was to try to shore up the crumbling Roman Republic. His rigidity, refusal to compromise, and unfeeling moralism made him a precursor of a Kantian life that defeated his own purpose. The moral importance of self-knowledge and affection can be learnt here.Less
This chapter is about Cato whose moralizing style of life made him and those around him utterly miserable. His attitude was vanity, his manner self-righteous, and his dominant activity was to try to shore up the crumbling Roman Republic. His rigidity, refusal to compromise, and unfeeling moralism made him a precursor of a Kantian life that defeated his own purpose. The moral importance of self-knowledge and affection can be learnt here.
Douglas Husak
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195328714
- eISBN:
- 9780199869947
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195328714.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
The seven constraints defended in chapters two and three combine to form a minimalist theory of criminalization. This chapter argues that minimalism is better than any of the alternatives defended by ...
More
The seven constraints defended in chapters two and three combine to form a minimalist theory of criminalization. This chapter argues that minimalism is better than any of the alternatives defended by legal philosophers. Three competitive theories are surveyed, and judged to be inferior to a minimalist account: economic analysis as favored by Richard Posner; utilitarianism as explicated most famously by Jeremy Bentham; and legal moralism as defended by Michael Moore. The similarities and differences between my theory and each of these three alternatives are identified and examined. The chapter describes the remaining work that must be done if a minimalist theory is to succeed in reducing the injustice caused by overcriminalization. Even though criminal law minimalism is problematic, it represents major progress in our thinking about the moral limits of the penal sanction.Less
The seven constraints defended in chapters two and three combine to form a minimalist theory of criminalization. This chapter argues that minimalism is better than any of the alternatives defended by legal philosophers. Three competitive theories are surveyed, and judged to be inferior to a minimalist account: economic analysis as favored by Richard Posner; utilitarianism as explicated most famously by Jeremy Bentham; and legal moralism as defended by Michael Moore. The similarities and differences between my theory and each of these three alternatives are identified and examined. The chapter describes the remaining work that must be done if a minimalist theory is to succeed in reducing the injustice caused by overcriminalization. Even though criminal law minimalism is problematic, it represents major progress in our thinking about the moral limits of the penal sanction.
Michael Suk-Young Chwe
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691162447
- eISBN:
- 9781400851331
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691162447.003.0008
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This chapter examines Jane Austen's views on what strategic thinking is not. Austen distinguishes strategic thinking from concepts possibly confused with it, such as selfishness, moralistic notions ...
More
This chapter examines Jane Austen's views on what strategic thinking is not. Austen distinguishes strategic thinking from concepts possibly confused with it, such as selfishness, moralistic notions of what a person “should” do, economistic values, and winning inconsequential games. While Austen seeks conceptual clarity, she also emphasizes that she is not advocating selfishness or money-centrism or one-upmanship or anything as vulgar as telling young women “how to behave.” For Austen, strategic thinking should not be confused with a set of hackneyed prescriptions. The chapter explains Austen's claims that strategic thinking is not about selfishness, moralism, economics or economism, and winning inconsequential games.Less
This chapter examines Jane Austen's views on what strategic thinking is not. Austen distinguishes strategic thinking from concepts possibly confused with it, such as selfishness, moralistic notions of what a person “should” do, economistic values, and winning inconsequential games. While Austen seeks conceptual clarity, she also emphasizes that she is not advocating selfishness or money-centrism or one-upmanship or anything as vulgar as telling young women “how to behave.” For Austen, strategic thinking should not be confused with a set of hackneyed prescriptions. The chapter explains Austen's claims that strategic thinking is not about selfishness, moralism, economics or economism, and winning inconsequential games.
Julian Le Grand and Bill New
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691164373
- eISBN:
- 9781400866298
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691164373.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, Public Policy
This chapter considers some of the confusions in the literature over the different terminologies used to describe various kinds of government paternalism, including legal paternalism, soft and hard ...
More
This chapter considers some of the confusions in the literature over the different terminologies used to describe various kinds of government paternalism, including legal paternalism, soft and hard paternalism, and means- and ends-related paternalism. More specifically, it discusses paternalistic interventions whose intention is to replace the individual's judgment because the government does not approve of the individual's ends—the aims or outcomes that he/she seeks to achieve. It also examines paternalistic interventions that arise because the government perceives problems with the judgment that the individual has made concerning the means that are appropriate for achieving those ends. The chapter concludes by describing the relationship between ends-related paternalism and perfectionism, Ronald Dworkin's understanding of “volitional” and “critical” forms of paternalism as they relate to the means-ends distinction, and moral paternalism and legal moralism.Less
This chapter considers some of the confusions in the literature over the different terminologies used to describe various kinds of government paternalism, including legal paternalism, soft and hard paternalism, and means- and ends-related paternalism. More specifically, it discusses paternalistic interventions whose intention is to replace the individual's judgment because the government does not approve of the individual's ends—the aims or outcomes that he/she seeks to achieve. It also examines paternalistic interventions that arise because the government perceives problems with the judgment that the individual has made concerning the means that are appropriate for achieving those ends. The chapter concludes by describing the relationship between ends-related paternalism and perfectionism, Ronald Dworkin's understanding of “volitional” and “critical” forms of paternalism as they relate to the means-ends distinction, and moral paternalism and legal moralism.
John Kekes
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199546923
- eISBN:
- 9780191720109
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199546923.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Enjoyment is an essential part of good lives. The development of a style of life is one way of achieving it. Moralism that stresses responsibility and ignores enjoyment makes good lives impossible ...
More
Enjoyment is an essential part of good lives. The development of a style of life is one way of achieving it. Moralism that stresses responsibility and ignores enjoyment makes good lives impossible and gives a bad name to morality. Although styles of life vary with individuals, reasonable and unreasonable ones can be distinguished. Styles of life described by Drabble, Trollope, and Woolf are examined.Less
Enjoyment is an essential part of good lives. The development of a style of life is one way of achieving it. Moralism that stresses responsibility and ignores enjoyment makes good lives impossible and gives a bad name to morality. Although styles of life vary with individuals, reasonable and unreasonable ones can be distinguished. Styles of life described by Drabble, Trollope, and Woolf are examined.
John Kekes
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199546923
- eISBN:
- 9780191720109
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199546923.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Morality has universal, social, and personal dimensions. The context of enjoyment and styles of life is the personal dimension. The goods and conventions of these dimensions often conflict and none ...
More
Morality has universal, social, and personal dimensions. The context of enjoyment and styles of life is the personal dimension. The goods and conventions of these dimensions often conflict and none is overriding. There is no universally and impartially applicable blueprint for the reasonable resolution of such conflicts. Reasonable conflict-resolutions differ from case to case. The moralist, relativist, and egoist approaches to conflict-resolution are flawed. The right approach is pluralist and particularist. The conflicts of Eleazar and Flaubert are discussed.Less
Morality has universal, social, and personal dimensions. The context of enjoyment and styles of life is the personal dimension. The goods and conventions of these dimensions often conflict and none is overriding. There is no universally and impartially applicable blueprint for the reasonable resolution of such conflicts. Reasonable conflict-resolutions differ from case to case. The moralist, relativist, and egoist approaches to conflict-resolution are flawed. The right approach is pluralist and particularist. The conflicts of Eleazar and Flaubert are discussed.
John Plamenatz
Mark Philp and Zbigniew Pelczynski (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199645060
- eISBN:
- 9780191741616
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199645060.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This book’s chapters present a series of lectures which John Plamenatz wrote but was unable to deliver in Cambridge in 1975. The chapters cover the political thought of Machiavelli, Hobbes, and ...
More
This book’s chapters present a series of lectures which John Plamenatz wrote but was unable to deliver in Cambridge in 1975. The chapters cover the political thought of Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Rousseau, in each case combining textual analysis and argument and using the texts as a springboard for discussion of issues that remain central to the way in which we think of politics, especially concerning the relationship between morality and politics, the character of natural law, the nature of sovereignty, the place of religion in the state, and the links between the psychological, the social, and the political. These discussions extend and revise Plamenatz’s work in his Man and Society and offer a set of challenging readings of three of the major figures in the canon of political thought. An introduction sets the lectures in context and linking them to more recent scholarship.Less
This book’s chapters present a series of lectures which John Plamenatz wrote but was unable to deliver in Cambridge in 1975. The chapters cover the political thought of Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Rousseau, in each case combining textual analysis and argument and using the texts as a springboard for discussion of issues that remain central to the way in which we think of politics, especially concerning the relationship between morality and politics, the character of natural law, the nature of sovereignty, the place of religion in the state, and the links between the psychological, the social, and the political. These discussions extend and revise Plamenatz’s work in his Man and Society and offer a set of challenging readings of three of the major figures in the canon of political thought. An introduction sets the lectures in context and linking them to more recent scholarship.
Lieve Van Hoof
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199583263
- eISBN:
- 9780191723131
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199583263.003.0003
- Subject:
- Classical Studies, Ancient Greek, Roman, and Early Christian Philosophy
This chapter examines how Plutarch tries to convince his reader to adopt a more philosophical attitude. In addition to explicit, philosophical statements about how the reader should behave, he ...
More
This chapter examines how Plutarch tries to convince his reader to adopt a more philosophical attitude. In addition to explicit, philosophical statements about how the reader should behave, he deploys a wide range of discursive strategies and rhetorical techniques, which all play heavily on the reader's sense of honour in order to promote philosophy. Once the reader is convinced, Plutarch offers him an elaborate combination of different kinds of exercises that will help him to put Plutarch's advice into practice. These exercises not only implement the Platonic-Peripatetic pattern of education in an original way, they also distinguish themselves from contemporary Stoic ethics and set Plutarch's practical ethics apart from his other philosophical works. Thus, this chapter does away with the idea that the practical ethical writings, as opposed to other Plutarchean writings, offer a simple and straightforward kind of moralism.Less
This chapter examines how Plutarch tries to convince his reader to adopt a more philosophical attitude. In addition to explicit, philosophical statements about how the reader should behave, he deploys a wide range of discursive strategies and rhetorical techniques, which all play heavily on the reader's sense of honour in order to promote philosophy. Once the reader is convinced, Plutarch offers him an elaborate combination of different kinds of exercises that will help him to put Plutarch's advice into practice. These exercises not only implement the Platonic-Peripatetic pattern of education in an original way, they also distinguish themselves from contemporary Stoic ethics and set Plutarch's practical ethics apart from his other philosophical works. Thus, this chapter does away with the idea that the practical ethical writings, as opposed to other Plutarchean writings, offer a simple and straightforward kind of moralism.
Michael Moore
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199599493
- eISBN:
- 9780191594649
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199599493.003.0016
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law, Criminal Law and Criminology
A theory of criminal legislation should tell us what the criminal law should prohibit. Part of that theory should give an answer to the question of legislative motivation: what should the legislative ...
More
A theory of criminal legislation should tell us what the criminal law should prohibit. Part of that theory should give an answer to the question of legislative motivation: what should the legislative be trying to achieve by prohibiting some actions and not others? A taxonomy of such theories is developed from John Stuart Mill, and then a different, and simpler, taxonomy is substituted for Mill’s. I argue in favour of one entrant in this revised taxonomy, the ‘non-exclusionary’ entrant, concluding that a retributivist legislator should be aiming to prohibit all and only moral wrongdoing in his legislation (for only such wrongdoing is the fit subject of retributive punishment).Less
A theory of criminal legislation should tell us what the criminal law should prohibit. Part of that theory should give an answer to the question of legislative motivation: what should the legislative be trying to achieve by prohibiting some actions and not others? A taxonomy of such theories is developed from John Stuart Mill, and then a different, and simpler, taxonomy is substituted for Mill’s. I argue in favour of one entrant in this revised taxonomy, the ‘non-exclusionary’ entrant, concluding that a retributivist legislator should be aiming to prohibit all and only moral wrongdoing in his legislation (for only such wrongdoing is the fit subject of retributive punishment).
Peter de Marneffe
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195383249
- eISBN:
- 9780199870554
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195383249.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy
The paternalistic argument for prostitution laws does not presuppose that it is inherently wrong or immoral to exchange sex for money. Nor does it presuppose that prostitution laws could be justified ...
More
The paternalistic argument for prostitution laws does not presuppose that it is inherently wrong or immoral to exchange sex for money. Nor does it presuppose that prostitution laws could be justified on this ground if it were true. Nor does this argument imply that the government is justified in limiting our sexual freedom in other ways. Prostitution laws justified on paternalistic grounds are therefore not objectionably moralistic. Although the paternalistic argument stated in chapter 1 presupposes that prostitution is “degrading,” and although John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin have argued that the fact that a form of sexual conduct is degrading cannot justify the government in prohibiting it, the paternalistic argument for prostitution laws is nonetheless compatible with liberal principles of liberty. It is misleading to characterize U.S. prostitution laws as “morals legislation” because in U.S. history, the paternalistic justification has been more influential than any purely moralistic one.Less
The paternalistic argument for prostitution laws does not presuppose that it is inherently wrong or immoral to exchange sex for money. Nor does it presuppose that prostitution laws could be justified on this ground if it were true. Nor does this argument imply that the government is justified in limiting our sexual freedom in other ways. Prostitution laws justified on paternalistic grounds are therefore not objectionably moralistic. Although the paternalistic argument stated in chapter 1 presupposes that prostitution is “degrading,” and although John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin have argued that the fact that a form of sexual conduct is degrading cannot justify the government in prohibiting it, the paternalistic argument for prostitution laws is nonetheless compatible with liberal principles of liberty. It is misleading to characterize U.S. prostitution laws as “morals legislation” because in U.S. history, the paternalistic justification has been more influential than any purely moralistic one.
Christopher DeMuth
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199764013
- eISBN:
- 9780199897186
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199764013.003.0014
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics
This chapter explores the tension between conservatives’ opposition to the growth of government regulation in principle and their willingness to accommodate it in practice. It focuses especially on ...
More
This chapter explores the tension between conservatives’ opposition to the growth of government regulation in principle and their willingness to accommodate it in practice. It focuses especially on this clash in the context of the period of Republican ascendency (1998–2008). The chapter explains why conservatives are hostile to regulation and the various efforts to limit growth as well as reasons for the failure to do so. It offers suggestions for developing conservative ideas and policies on regulation.Less
This chapter explores the tension between conservatives’ opposition to the growth of government regulation in principle and their willingness to accommodate it in practice. It focuses especially on this clash in the context of the period of Republican ascendency (1998–2008). The chapter explains why conservatives are hostile to regulation and the various efforts to limit growth as well as reasons for the failure to do so. It offers suggestions for developing conservative ideas and policies on regulation.
