Alison Hills
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199213306
- eISBN:
- 9780191594212
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199213306.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Common sense morality is in a better epistemic position than Egoism, for those who accept common sense morality can modestly vindicate it – they can defend it to their own satisfaction – whereas most ...
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Common sense morality is in a better epistemic position than Egoism, for those who accept common sense morality can modestly vindicate it – they can defend it to their own satisfaction – whereas most Egoists cannot defend Egoism, even modestly. The key to this defence of morality is the importance of moral understanding. What are the implications of recognizing that the focus of moral epistemology should be moral understanding rather than moral knowledge? Moral philosophers already act as if they are aiming for moral understanding, but there are many unanswered questions about moral understanding that need to be addressed in the future.Less
Common sense morality is in a better epistemic position than Egoism, for those who accept common sense morality can modestly vindicate it – they can defend it to their own satisfaction – whereas most Egoists cannot defend Egoism, even modestly. The key to this defence of morality is the importance of moral understanding. What are the implications of recognizing that the focus of moral epistemology should be moral understanding rather than moral knowledge? Moral philosophers already act as if they are aiming for moral understanding, but there are many unanswered questions about moral understanding that need to be addressed in the future.
Frank Palmer
- Published in print:
- 1992
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198242321
- eISBN:
- 9780191680441
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198242321.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Aesthetics, Moral Philosophy
Recent philosophical discussion about the relation between fiction and reality pays little heed to our moral involvement with literature. This book investigates how our appreciation of literary works ...
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Recent philosophical discussion about the relation between fiction and reality pays little heed to our moral involvement with literature. This book investigates how our appreciation of literary works calls upon and develops our capacity for moral understanding. The book explores a wide range of philosophical questions about the relation of art to morality, and challenges theories which the book regards as incompatible with a humane view of literary art. The book considers, in particular, the extent to which the values and moral concepts involved in our understanding of human beings can be said to enter into our understanding of, and response to, fictional characters. The scope of this discussion encompasses literary aesthetics, ethics, and epistemology, and extensive use is made of reference to literary examples.Less
Recent philosophical discussion about the relation between fiction and reality pays little heed to our moral involvement with literature. This book investigates how our appreciation of literary works calls upon and develops our capacity for moral understanding. The book explores a wide range of philosophical questions about the relation of art to morality, and challenges theories which the book regards as incompatible with a humane view of literary art. The book considers, in particular, the extent to which the values and moral concepts involved in our understanding of human beings can be said to enter into our understanding of, and response to, fictional characters. The scope of this discussion encompasses literary aesthetics, ethics, and epistemology, and extensive use is made of reference to literary examples.
Alison Hills
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199213306
- eISBN:
- 9780191594212
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199213306.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The Beloved Self is about the ‘holy grail’ of moral philosophy: an argument against Egoism, that we all have reasons to be moral. The first part of the book introduces three versions of ...
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The Beloved Self is about the ‘holy grail’ of moral philosophy: an argument against Egoism, that we all have reasons to be moral. The first part of the book introduces three versions of Egoism, each paralleling a different moral theory, and sheds new light on the concept of self-interest in virtue ethics and especially in Kant's moral theory. Part Two looks at attempts to prove that Egoism is false, and shows that even modest arguments against Egoist appear to fail. Part Three discusses the relationship between knowledge and action and defends a new conception of moral epistemology, centred on the importance of moral understanding, which has wide-ranging implications regarding not only moral testimony and moral disagreement but also the nature of virtue and morally worthy action. This final part of the book culminates in a vindication of morality, an argument that it is not epistemically rational to believe the most plausible versions of Egoism.Less
The Beloved Self is about the ‘holy grail’ of moral philosophy: an argument against Egoism, that we all have reasons to be moral. The first part of the book introduces three versions of Egoism, each paralleling a different moral theory, and sheds new light on the concept of self-interest in virtue ethics and especially in Kant's moral theory. Part Two looks at attempts to prove that Egoism is false, and shows that even modest arguments against Egoist appear to fail. Part Three discusses the relationship between knowledge and action and defends a new conception of moral epistemology, centred on the importance of moral understanding, which has wide-ranging implications regarding not only moral testimony and moral disagreement but also the nature of virtue and morally worthy action. This final part of the book culminates in a vindication of morality, an argument that it is not epistemically rational to believe the most plausible versions of Egoism.
Alison Hills
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199213306
- eISBN:
- 9780191594212
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199213306.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
What is it to understand why a moral proposition is true? Moral understanding, in this sense, differs from moral knowledge (both knowledge that p is true and knowledge why it is true). Moral ...
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What is it to understand why a moral proposition is true? Moral understanding, in this sense, differs from moral knowledge (both knowledge that p is true and knowledge why it is true). Moral understanding involves a number of related abilities and is more similar to ‘knowledge how’. Moral understanding is important, moreover, because it is a vital component of morally worthy action: doing the right thing on the basis of moral knowledge (even on the basis of knowledge why an action is right) is not sufficient for the action to have moral worth.Less
What is it to understand why a moral proposition is true? Moral understanding, in this sense, differs from moral knowledge (both knowledge that p is true and knowledge why it is true). Moral understanding involves a number of related abilities and is more similar to ‘knowledge how’. Moral understanding is important, moreover, because it is a vital component of morally worthy action: doing the right thing on the basis of moral knowledge (even on the basis of knowledge why an action is right) is not sufficient for the action to have moral worth.
Alison Hills
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199213306
- eISBN:
- 9780191594212
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199213306.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
If you want to have and to use moral understanding in a way that could result in morally worthy action, you must not place your trust in moral testimony, defer to moral experts, or suspend judgement ...
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If you want to have and to use moral understanding in a way that could result in morally worthy action, you must not place your trust in moral testimony, defer to moral experts, or suspend judgement in response to moral disagreements. This is significant for the epistemic rationality of responses to disagreement and to testimony, because one of the functions of beliefs about moral matters is to play a role in morally worthy action. If this were their only important function, it would not be epistemically rational to trust moral testimony or to suspend judgment in response to moral disagreements. However, the epistemic rationality of moral beliefs is more complex, because moral beliefs have another function: they play a role in morally right action too. Yet it is still typically not epistemically rational to suspend judgement in response to moral disagreements.Less
If you want to have and to use moral understanding in a way that could result in morally worthy action, you must not place your trust in moral testimony, defer to moral experts, or suspend judgement in response to moral disagreements. This is significant for the epistemic rationality of responses to disagreement and to testimony, because one of the functions of beliefs about moral matters is to play a role in morally worthy action. If this were their only important function, it would not be epistemically rational to trust moral testimony or to suspend judgment in response to moral disagreements. However, the epistemic rationality of moral beliefs is more complex, because moral beliefs have another function: they play a role in morally right action too. Yet it is still typically not epistemically rational to suspend judgement in response to moral disagreements.
Frank Palmer
- Published in print:
- 1992
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198242321
- eISBN:
- 9780191680441
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198242321.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Aesthetics, Moral Philosophy
When asked what is learned in literature, the most often given answer is that it is dependent upon what is read, by whom, and in what spirit. However, the point in question in this chapter focuses on ...
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When asked what is learned in literature, the most often given answer is that it is dependent upon what is read, by whom, and in what spirit. However, the point in question in this chapter focuses on two aspects: what literature can contribute to education and what literature can contribute to moral education. In exploring these two points, there is a risk of conflating two different things: the importance or value of literature and its educative power and the independent value or importance it has regardless of its educative function. While the distinction between the educational value and moral education value is not totally separate and there are indeed some relations in some way, certainly literature should not be considered as mere device for moral instruction or a fuel for the cause.Less
When asked what is learned in literature, the most often given answer is that it is dependent upon what is read, by whom, and in what spirit. However, the point in question in this chapter focuses on two aspects: what literature can contribute to education and what literature can contribute to moral education. In exploring these two points, there is a risk of conflating two different things: the importance or value of literature and its educative power and the independent value or importance it has regardless of its educative function. While the distinction between the educational value and moral education value is not totally separate and there are indeed some relations in some way, certainly literature should not be considered as mere device for moral instruction or a fuel for the cause.
Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199936472
- eISBN:
- 9780199980697
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199936472.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter applies the arguments of previous chapters to the domain of moral belief. The chapter defends the existence of epistemic authority in the moral domain against objections from three ...
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This chapter applies the arguments of previous chapters to the domain of moral belief. The chapter defends the existence of epistemic authority in the moral domain against objections from three directions: (1) there is no moral truth to be discovered, (2) there are no moral experts, and (3) taking a moral belief on authority conflicts with the autonomy of the self. However, the chapter identifies limitations of moral testimony for moral motivation and moral understanding. These limitations reveal the importance of moral communities for the transmission of practically useful and praiseworthy moral beliefs.Less
This chapter applies the arguments of previous chapters to the domain of moral belief. The chapter defends the existence of epistemic authority in the moral domain against objections from three directions: (1) there is no moral truth to be discovered, (2) there are no moral experts, and (3) taking a moral belief on authority conflicts with the autonomy of the self. However, the chapter identifies limitations of moral testimony for moral motivation and moral understanding. These limitations reveal the importance of moral communities for the transmission of practically useful and praiseworthy moral beliefs.
Catherine Osborne
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199282067
- eISBN:
- 9780191712944
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199282067.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
This introductory chapter presents a discussion of Blake's ‘Auguries of Innocence’ and ‘The Fly’, and of an extract from Shakespeare's Henry IV Part One. It illustrates the claim that not all ...
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This introductory chapter presents a discussion of Blake's ‘Auguries of Innocence’ and ‘The Fly’, and of an extract from Shakespeare's Henry IV Part One. It illustrates the claim that not all philosophical persuasion takes the form of academic argument; that literature can be more effective in this role; that moral understanding involves having one's sensibilities aligned with genuine value, so as to be able to see it right; and that science cannot tell us what to value, or how to construct a moral taxonomy. The chapter compares the appreciation of value in nature with the appreciation of value in art, and questions the idea that human life is of supreme value, just in virtue of being human.Less
This introductory chapter presents a discussion of Blake's ‘Auguries of Innocence’ and ‘The Fly’, and of an extract from Shakespeare's Henry IV Part One. It illustrates the claim that not all philosophical persuasion takes the form of academic argument; that literature can be more effective in this role; that moral understanding involves having one's sensibilities aligned with genuine value, so as to be able to see it right; and that science cannot tell us what to value, or how to construct a moral taxonomy. The chapter compares the appreciation of value in nature with the appreciation of value in art, and questions the idea that human life is of supreme value, just in virtue of being human.
Alison Hills
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- November 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780199357703
- eISBN:
- 9780199357734
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199357703.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Discussions of virtue often center on the non-cognitive aspects of virtue. But as this chapter argues, there is something special about the virtuous person’s cognition as well. How is this special ...
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Discussions of virtue often center on the non-cognitive aspects of virtue. But as this chapter argues, there is something special about the virtuous person’s cognition as well. How is this special element is to be understood? One common suggestion is that the virtuous person has knowledge of what to do. But a person can have knowledge by testimony. Intuitively, such a person lacks virtue. The chapter argues that what is characteristic of the virtuous person’s way of making moral judgments is not knowledge but moral understanding. Hills gives a number of reasons for this: moral understanding helps the agent who has it do the right thing reliably; a grasp of the morally relevant factors helps an agent in a complex situation achieve her goals without violating any moral norms; the agent with moral understanding is better able to justify her actions and give advice.Less
Discussions of virtue often center on the non-cognitive aspects of virtue. But as this chapter argues, there is something special about the virtuous person’s cognition as well. How is this special element is to be understood? One common suggestion is that the virtuous person has knowledge of what to do. But a person can have knowledge by testimony. Intuitively, such a person lacks virtue. The chapter argues that what is characteristic of the virtuous person’s way of making moral judgments is not knowledge but moral understanding. Hills gives a number of reasons for this: moral understanding helps the agent who has it do the right thing reliably; a grasp of the morally relevant factors helps an agent in a complex situation achieve her goals without violating any moral norms; the agent with moral understanding is better able to justify her actions and give advice.
Diana Tietjens Meyers
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- April 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780199930388
- eISBN:
- 9780190490102
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199930388.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
J. David Velleman’s account of emotion as the glue that unifies stories and endows them with meaning is rejected in favor of Jenefer Robinson’s account of the role of responding emotionally to ...
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J. David Velleman’s account of emotion as the glue that unifies stories and endows them with meaning is rejected in favor of Jenefer Robinson’s account of the role of responding emotionally to narratives in imparting moral understanding. Robinson’s view is used to expose some pitfalls of emotionally responding to a former child soldier’s story—Ishmael Beah’s A Long Way Gone—and to explain how that text counteracts emotionally overwrought misinterpretation. Two episodes in Beah’s story are apt to provoke imaginative resistance, but a careful reading of his text defuses these responses. Beah’s morally open-ended text is defended as superior to the moral didacticism of an episode in Rousseau’s Emile.Less
J. David Velleman’s account of emotion as the glue that unifies stories and endows them with meaning is rejected in favor of Jenefer Robinson’s account of the role of responding emotionally to narratives in imparting moral understanding. Robinson’s view is used to expose some pitfalls of emotionally responding to a former child soldier’s story—Ishmael Beah’s A Long Way Gone—and to explain how that text counteracts emotionally overwrought misinterpretation. Two episodes in Beah’s story are apt to provoke imaginative resistance, but a careful reading of his text defuses these responses. Beah’s morally open-ended text is defended as superior to the moral didacticism of an episode in Rousseau’s Emile.
Paul Bloom and Karen Wynn
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- August 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780190467630
- eISBN:
- 9780190611965
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190467630.003.0019
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
Developmental psychologists have long been interested in conceptual change theories of the nature and the development of certain fundamental human capacities, including our understanding of objects, ...
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Developmental psychologists have long been interested in conceptual change theories of the nature and the development of certain fundamental human capacities, including our understanding of objects, of number, and of intentional agency. How well does this theory apply to morality? There is some evidence for an innate core of morality, and surely our moral understanding develops over time, both in individuals and within societies. And so the prospects seem promising. This chapter provides a state-of-the-art summary of research into the innate foundations of morality, relating this to the conceptual change framework outlined by Susan Carey and her colleagues.Less
Developmental psychologists have long been interested in conceptual change theories of the nature and the development of certain fundamental human capacities, including our understanding of objects, of number, and of intentional agency. How well does this theory apply to morality? There is some evidence for an innate core of morality, and surely our moral understanding develops over time, both in individuals and within societies. And so the prospects seem promising. This chapter provides a state-of-the-art summary of research into the innate foundations of morality, relating this to the conceptual change framework outlined by Susan Carey and her colleagues.
Katrin Flikschuh
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- June 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780199688623
- eISBN:
- 9780191768101
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199688623.003.0038
- Subject:
- Law, Human Rights and Immigration, Philosophy of Law
This chapter sketches a transcendent human rights conception, the distinguishing feature of which is its acknowledgement of human cognitive and moral fallibility. It begins by setting out Kant’s ...
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This chapter sketches a transcendent human rights conception, the distinguishing feature of which is its acknowledgement of human cognitive and moral fallibility. It begins by setting out Kant’s division of the domain of ordinary morality in general, treating his systematic approach as emblematic of his general philosophical non-foundationalism. It then sketches a non-foundationalist interpretation of innate Right before turning to the idea of human rights as a critically transcendent idea of pure practical (moral) reasoning. It concludes with some remarks on what is distinctive about the proposed transcendent human rights conception.Less
This chapter sketches a transcendent human rights conception, the distinguishing feature of which is its acknowledgement of human cognitive and moral fallibility. It begins by setting out Kant’s division of the domain of ordinary morality in general, treating his systematic approach as emblematic of his general philosophical non-foundationalism. It then sketches a non-foundationalist interpretation of innate Right before turning to the idea of human rights as a critically transcendent idea of pure practical (moral) reasoning. It concludes with some remarks on what is distinctive about the proposed transcendent human rights conception.
