Michael P. Lynch
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199218738
- eISBN:
- 9780191711794
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199218738.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Language
What is truth? This book defends a new answer to this question. Traditional theories of truth hold that truth has only a single uniform nature. All truths are true in the same way. More recent ...
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What is truth? This book defends a new answer to this question. Traditional theories of truth hold that truth has only a single uniform nature. All truths are true in the same way. More recent deflationary theories claim that truth has no nature at all. This book rejects both extremes and defends the thesis that truth is a functional property. To understand truth we must understand what it does, its function in our cognitive economy. Once we do that, we'll see that this function can be performed in more than one way. And that in turn opens the door to an appealing pluralism. Beliefs about the concrete physical world needn't be true in the same way as our thoughts about matters — like morality — where the human stain is deepest.Less
What is truth? This book defends a new answer to this question. Traditional theories of truth hold that truth has only a single uniform nature. All truths are true in the same way. More recent deflationary theories claim that truth has no nature at all. This book rejects both extremes and defends the thesis that truth is a functional property. To understand truth we must understand what it does, its function in our cognitive economy. Once we do that, we'll see that this function can be performed in more than one way. And that in turn opens the door to an appealing pluralism. Beliefs about the concrete physical world needn't be true in the same way as our thoughts about matters — like morality — where the human stain is deepest.
Katerina Deligiorgi
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199646159
- eISBN:
- 9780191741142
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199646159.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Chapter 2 focuses on moral knowledge and examines the epistemic component of autonomy that supports a cognitivist, objectivist, and Kantian realist interpretation of right. The argument is set up ...
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Chapter 2 focuses on moral knowledge and examines the epistemic component of autonomy that supports a cognitivist, objectivist, and Kantian realist interpretation of right. The argument is set up against contemporary challenges to the very idea of moral knowledge. It addresses two main questions: how we know right and wrong, and how we can justify such knowledge on Kantian grounds. The central moral concept discussed in this chapter is ‘right’; that is, a ‘thin’ concept that captures core features of Kant’s term of art ‘duty’. It is shown that ‘right’ is knowable and that propositions that contain it are true without the need to refer to any facts. In his universalizability formulation, Kant gives a definition of ‘right’ that is also at the same time a test for ‘rightness’. It is argued that Kant adduces epistemic support for the formulation from analysis of ordinary moral ideas, whereas justification follows an a priori path. The a priori justificatory procedure, as reconstructed here, offers us an insight into the practical employment Kant envisages for pure reason.Less
Chapter 2 focuses on moral knowledge and examines the epistemic component of autonomy that supports a cognitivist, objectivist, and Kantian realist interpretation of right. The argument is set up against contemporary challenges to the very idea of moral knowledge. It addresses two main questions: how we know right and wrong, and how we can justify such knowledge on Kantian grounds. The central moral concept discussed in this chapter is ‘right’; that is, a ‘thin’ concept that captures core features of Kant’s term of art ‘duty’. It is shown that ‘right’ is knowable and that propositions that contain it are true without the need to refer to any facts. In his universalizability formulation, Kant gives a definition of ‘right’ that is also at the same time a test for ‘rightness’. It is argued that Kant adduces epistemic support for the formulation from analysis of ordinary moral ideas, whereas justification follows an a priori path. The a priori justificatory procedure, as reconstructed here, offers us an insight into the practical employment Kant envisages for pure reason.
Catherine Osborne
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199282067
- eISBN:
- 9780191712944
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199282067.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
This brief chapter draws out the implications of the earlier chapters, particularly in respect of the fact that even where it appears that morality is responsive to natural facts which can be ...
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This brief chapter draws out the implications of the earlier chapters, particularly in respect of the fact that even where it appears that morality is responsive to natural facts which can be determined first by biology, in reality there are no such facts, and their relevance is not given in nature. The relevance of certain facts is determined by our moral outlook, and different moral outlooks seem to be available. However, the chapter suggests that not all moral outlooks are equally sound. This is not because one is more true to some independent facts of nature, but one is more true to independent facts of moral truth, about the more noble and generous outlook towards our fellow creatures; this is where the distinction between the humane and the sentimental is drawn.Less
This brief chapter draws out the implications of the earlier chapters, particularly in respect of the fact that even where it appears that morality is responsive to natural facts which can be determined first by biology, in reality there are no such facts, and their relevance is not given in nature. The relevance of certain facts is determined by our moral outlook, and different moral outlooks seem to be available. However, the chapter suggests that not all moral outlooks are equally sound. This is not because one is more true to some independent facts of nature, but one is more true to independent facts of moral truth, about the more noble and generous outlook towards our fellow creatures; this is where the distinction between the humane and the sentimental is drawn.
Jesse J. Prinz
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199571543
- eISBN:
- 9780191702075
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199571543.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
The sensibility theory of morals is a subjectivist theory. To some, this is a sufficient reason for rejection. They insist that morality is objective. It is an objective fact that killing innocent ...
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The sensibility theory of morals is a subjectivist theory. To some, this is a sufficient reason for rejection. They insist that morality is objective. It is an objective fact that killing innocent people is wrong. Subjectivism loses sight of this. It makes morality too dependent on us. Subjectivists can respond to this objection in one of two ways. One strategy is to deny that objectivity and subjectivity are incompatible. Another is to deny that morality is objective. The former strategy has been more popular, but the latter is more viable. This chapter argues that objectivity and subjectivity are compatible, but that morality is not objective. It surveys leading ethical theories that have defended objectivism in one or another sense. Some of these objectivist theories are compatible with subjectivism, and others are not. This chapter contends that all of them have insurmountable flaws. It concludes by pointing out that a flight from objectivism need not be a flight from realism. There are moral facts; they are just purely subjective facts.Less
The sensibility theory of morals is a subjectivist theory. To some, this is a sufficient reason for rejection. They insist that morality is objective. It is an objective fact that killing innocent people is wrong. Subjectivism loses sight of this. It makes morality too dependent on us. Subjectivists can respond to this objection in one of two ways. One strategy is to deny that objectivity and subjectivity are incompatible. Another is to deny that morality is objective. The former strategy has been more popular, but the latter is more viable. This chapter argues that objectivity and subjectivity are compatible, but that morality is not objective. It surveys leading ethical theories that have defended objectivism in one or another sense. Some of these objectivist theories are compatible with subjectivism, and others are not. This chapter contends that all of them have insurmountable flaws. It concludes by pointing out that a flight from objectivism need not be a flight from realism. There are moral facts; they are just purely subjective facts.
Colin McGinn
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198238775
- eISBN:
- 9780191598005
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198238770.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Aesthetics
In this chapter, McGinn argues that ethical knowledge belongs to a distinct epistemological category from scientific knowledge. Pursuing an analogy with mathematics and modern linguistics, McGinn ...
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In this chapter, McGinn argues that ethical knowledge belongs to a distinct epistemological category from scientific knowledge. Pursuing an analogy with mathematics and modern linguistics, McGinn argues that ethical truths are a priori, innate truths, and in this respect ethics is at least as respectable as science; indeed, epistemologically, it is on a par with logic and mathematics. A key difference between science and ethics is that moral truth, unlike scientific truth, is not coercive. Therefore, moral truth has no pragmatic justification but is something we pursue for its own sake. McGinn concludes the chapter with the suggestion that our moral sensibility is a by‐product of our innate grasp of folk psychology.Less
In this chapter, McGinn argues that ethical knowledge belongs to a distinct epistemological category from scientific knowledge. Pursuing an analogy with mathematics and modern linguistics, McGinn argues that ethical truths are a priori, innate truths, and in this respect ethics is at least as respectable as science; indeed, epistemologically, it is on a par with logic and mathematics. A key difference between science and ethics is that moral truth, unlike scientific truth, is not coercive. Therefore, moral truth has no pragmatic justification but is something we pursue for its own sake. McGinn concludes the chapter with the suggestion that our moral sensibility is a by‐product of our innate grasp of folk psychology.
R. M. Hare
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198250326
- eISBN:
- 9780191597602
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198250320.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Intuitionism, the second type of descriptivism, is the theory that the truth conditions of moral statements depend on irreducible moral properties, which must be defined in moral terms. The ...
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Intuitionism, the second type of descriptivism, is the theory that the truth conditions of moral statements depend on irreducible moral properties, which must be defined in moral terms. The intuitionist claims that we have knowledge of moral truths derived from moral intuition. However, because it is a subjective experience, one person's intuition may differ from another's, and the theory offers no way to decide between them. Intuitionism, Hare argues, is really a kind of Subjectivist Naturalism, or Subjectivism; and, as with Naturalism, it also leads to relativism. Therefore, because it is exhausted by these two theories, descriptivism in general must be abandoned if we are to attain the sort of objectivity that will allow us to avoid relativism.Less
Intuitionism, the second type of descriptivism, is the theory that the truth conditions of moral statements depend on irreducible moral properties, which must be defined in moral terms. The intuitionist claims that we have knowledge of moral truths derived from moral intuition. However, because it is a subjective experience, one person's intuition may differ from another's, and the theory offers no way to decide between them. Intuitionism, Hare argues, is really a kind of Subjectivist Naturalism, or Subjectivism; and, as with Naturalism, it also leads to relativism. Therefore, because it is exhausted by these two theories, descriptivism in general must be abandoned if we are to attain the sort of objectivity that will allow us to avoid relativism.
Jessica Waldoff
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195151978
- eISBN:
- 9780199870387
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195151978.003.0006
- Subject:
- Music, Opera
This chapter shows how critical thinking about recognition makes it possible to reframe the questions that have dominated the reception of this opera. Is Don Giovanni a hero or a villain? Is the ...
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This chapter shows how critical thinking about recognition makes it possible to reframe the questions that have dominated the reception of this opera. Is Don Giovanni a hero or a villain? Is the opera a comedy or a tragedy? Does the conclusion dramatize moral triumph or heroic defiance? At the climax of the opera, the moral truth towards which its recognition scenes have been pointing comes into conflict with the titanic defiance of its protagonist: recognition is denied. This ending creates a disjunction between dénouement (Don Giovanni's damnation) and lieto fine (the other characters' recognition of the moral of his tale). Critical thinking about recognition makes it possible to understand the problems surrounding the ending — including the performance tradition of omitting the scena ultima and lieto fine to conclude the opera with fire and brimstone — in a new way.Less
This chapter shows how critical thinking about recognition makes it possible to reframe the questions that have dominated the reception of this opera. Is Don Giovanni a hero or a villain? Is the opera a comedy or a tragedy? Does the conclusion dramatize moral triumph or heroic defiance? At the climax of the opera, the moral truth towards which its recognition scenes have been pointing comes into conflict with the titanic defiance of its protagonist: recognition is denied. This ending creates a disjunction between dénouement (Don Giovanni's damnation) and lieto fine (the other characters' recognition of the moral of his tale). Critical thinking about recognition makes it possible to understand the problems surrounding the ending — including the performance tradition of omitting the scena ultima and lieto fine to conclude the opera with fire and brimstone — in a new way.
MARCUS GEORGE SINGER
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198250210
- eISBN:
- 9780191681264
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198250210.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter proposes that ethical statements or judgements are ‘capable of truth’. It outlines the three formal properties of truth and argues that ...
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This chapter proposes that ethical statements or judgements are ‘capable of truth’. It outlines the three formal properties of truth and argues that although truth may be ascertained differently in ethics, and the obstacles to obtaining it may be greater or of a different dimension, its formal properties are the same regardless. It concludes that truth in ethics is what it is elsewhere in its formal properties; that is, in its essential respects.Less
This chapter proposes that ethical statements or judgements are ‘capable of truth’. It outlines the three formal properties of truth and argues that although truth may be ascertained differently in ethics, and the obstacles to obtaining it may be greater or of a different dimension, its formal properties are the same regardless. It concludes that truth in ethics is what it is elsewhere in its formal properties; that is, in its essential respects.
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195187724
- eISBN:
- 9780199786121
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195187725.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter surveys traditional responses to the skeptical regress problem for justified moral belief. It looks at naturalism, which attempts to derive “ought” from “is” or, more precisely, to ...
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This chapter surveys traditional responses to the skeptical regress problem for justified moral belief. It looks at naturalism, which attempts to derive “ought” from “is” or, more precisely, to formulate a deductively valid argument from non-normative premises to a moral conclusion. An example from Nelson is discussed, and it is shown that this argument, though logically valid, cannot be used to solve the skeptical regress problem.Less
This chapter surveys traditional responses to the skeptical regress problem for justified moral belief. It looks at naturalism, which attempts to derive “ought” from “is” or, more precisely, to formulate a deductively valid argument from non-normative premises to a moral conclusion. An example from Nelson is discussed, and it is shown that this argument, though logically valid, cannot be used to solve the skeptical regress problem.
Thomas L. Carson
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199577415
- eISBN:
- 9780191722813
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577415.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General
The rationality and consistency tests defended in Chapter 6 can be used to discredit and rule out certain moral principles and moral judgments and, thus, indirectly establish the truth of certain ...
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The rationality and consistency tests defended in Chapter 6 can be used to discredit and rule out certain moral principles and moral judgments and, thus, indirectly establish the truth of certain other moral judgments and moral principles. This chapter argues that there is a large overlap or convergence in the moral judgments about lying and deception of people whose judgments satisfy rationality/consistency requirements. The moral principles and moral judgments about lying and deception that survive rationality and consistency tests support a moral presumption against harmful lying and deception that is at least as strong as that endorsed by (welfare maximizing versions of) act-utilitarianism. Moral principles and moral judgments that claim or imply that lying or deception is permissible in cases in which it harms others and the harm it causes outweighs the benefits it produces fail rationality/consistency tests. In addition, the view that lying and/or deception are always wrong no matter what does not survive consistency and rationality tests.Less
The rationality and consistency tests defended in Chapter 6 can be used to discredit and rule out certain moral principles and moral judgments and, thus, indirectly establish the truth of certain other moral judgments and moral principles. This chapter argues that there is a large overlap or convergence in the moral judgments about lying and deception of people whose judgments satisfy rationality/consistency requirements. The moral principles and moral judgments about lying and deception that survive rationality and consistency tests support a moral presumption against harmful lying and deception that is at least as strong as that endorsed by (welfare maximizing versions of) act-utilitarianism. Moral principles and moral judgments that claim or imply that lying or deception is permissible in cases in which it harms others and the harm it causes outweighs the benefits it produces fail rationality/consistency tests. In addition, the view that lying and/or deception are always wrong no matter what does not survive consistency and rationality tests.
Joseph Raz
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199248001
- eISBN:
- 9780191598272
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199248001.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
The fact of multiculturalism cannot have much bearing on moral epistemology unless it bears on moral truths. It is argued that the existence of some values is dependent on the practices that sustain ...
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The fact of multiculturalism cannot have much bearing on moral epistemology unless it bears on moral truths. It is argued that the existence of some values is dependent on the practices that sustain them, and as a result, these practices will figure in an explanation of why we value particular values. If this is true, it is also considered to what extent such an account is consistent with the universality of values.Less
The fact of multiculturalism cannot have much bearing on moral epistemology unless it bears on moral truths. It is argued that the existence of some values is dependent on the practices that sustain them, and as a result, these practices will figure in an explanation of why we value particular values. If this is true, it is also considered to what extent such an account is consistent with the universality of values.
Sarah McGrath
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199606375
- eISBN:
- 9780191729478
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199606375.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter explores how one might attempt to reconcile two widely held ideas about morality that stand in prima facie tension with one another. The first idea is that moral knowledge — whatever ...
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This chapter explores how one might attempt to reconcile two widely held ideas about morality that stand in prima facie tension with one another. The first idea is that moral knowledge — whatever else is true of it and even whether it exists at all — is not empirical knowledge. If there are moral truths, then the most fundamental of those truths are, like the truths of pure mathematics, available from the armchair. The second idea is that lack of experience can be a handicap in the acquisition of moral knowledge, and that experience of the world often proves crucial in its attainment.Less
This chapter explores how one might attempt to reconcile two widely held ideas about morality that stand in prima facie tension with one another. The first idea is that moral knowledge — whatever else is true of it and even whether it exists at all — is not empirical knowledge. If there are moral truths, then the most fundamental of those truths are, like the truths of pure mathematics, available from the armchair. The second idea is that lack of experience can be a handicap in the acquisition of moral knowledge, and that experience of the world often proves crucial in its attainment.
Alan Ryan
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691148403
- eISBN:
- 9781400841950
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691148403.003.0033
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy
This chapter examines exploitation—what it is for somebody to be exploited, in what ways people can be and are exploited, whether exploitation necessarily involves coercion, what Karl Marx's ...
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This chapter examines exploitation—what it is for somebody to be exploited, in what ways people can be and are exploited, whether exploitation necessarily involves coercion, what Karl Marx's understanding of exploitation was and whether it was adequate. In particular, it considers whether Marx thought capitalist exploitation unjust and how the answer to that question illuminates his conception of morality in general. It also explores the nature of morality and asks what Marx proposes to put in the place of moral judgment, and what kind of assessment of the horrors of capitalism he provides if not a moral assessment. The chapter argues that Marx's denial of eternal moral truths, and of justice eternelle along with them, makes the status of his own distributive principle “from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs” problematic.Less
This chapter examines exploitation—what it is for somebody to be exploited, in what ways people can be and are exploited, whether exploitation necessarily involves coercion, what Karl Marx's understanding of exploitation was and whether it was adequate. In particular, it considers whether Marx thought capitalist exploitation unjust and how the answer to that question illuminates his conception of morality in general. It also explores the nature of morality and asks what Marx proposes to put in the place of moral judgment, and what kind of assessment of the horrors of capitalism he provides if not a moral assessment. The chapter argues that Marx's denial of eternal moral truths, and of justice eternelle along with them, makes the status of his own distributive principle “from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs” problematic.
Charles Taliaferro
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199243006
- eISBN:
- 9780191697203
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199243006.003.0014
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law
This chapter discusses a framework for theistic moral arguments with respect to objective moral truths. The chapter also puts forward a proposal for how a successful argument can be constructed where ...
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This chapter discusses a framework for theistic moral arguments with respect to objective moral truths. The chapter also puts forward a proposal for how a successful argument can be constructed where the nature of God is employed to account for the existence of objective moral values. The chapter is concluded by considering two aspects where theism may contribute to moral reflection. The concept of God that has taken shape in the great monotheistic traditions of Islam, Christianity, and Judaism is used in this chapter.Less
This chapter discusses a framework for theistic moral arguments with respect to objective moral truths. The chapter also puts forward a proposal for how a successful argument can be constructed where the nature of God is employed to account for the existence of objective moral values. The chapter is concluded by considering two aspects where theism may contribute to moral reflection. The concept of God that has taken shape in the great monotheistic traditions of Islam, Christianity, and Judaism is used in this chapter.
Peter Unger
- Published in print:
- 1996
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195108590
- eISBN:
- 9780199868261
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195108590.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
It is very costly, far more than is usually supposed, for well‐off people to lead a morally decent life in a world in which suffering may easily be prevented. The amount a person must contribute is ...
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It is very costly, far more than is usually supposed, for well‐off people to lead a morally decent life in a world in which suffering may easily be prevented. The amount a person must contribute is determined not only by moral truths but also by nonmoral truths about her particular circumstances, financial situation and prospects, and number of dependants as well as truths about the things that a person easily can do in modern society efficiently to lessen serious suffering. These considerations complement a certain kind of reasoning that endorses highly demanding moral dictates. According to one principle of ethical integrity that grounds this reasoning, other things being nearly equal, if it is acceptable to impose some losses on others with the result that it will significantly lessen the serious losses suffered by others overall, then one cannot fail either to impose upon oneself or to accept lesser or equal losses when they have this result. For this reason, from a Liberationist perspective, the conduct of most well‐off Westerners falls far short of what morality requires.Less
It is very costly, far more than is usually supposed, for well‐off people to lead a morally decent life in a world in which suffering may easily be prevented. The amount a person must contribute is determined not only by moral truths but also by nonmoral truths about her particular circumstances, financial situation and prospects, and number of dependants as well as truths about the things that a person easily can do in modern society efficiently to lessen serious suffering. These considerations complement a certain kind of reasoning that endorses highly demanding moral dictates. According to one principle of ethical integrity that grounds this reasoning, other things being nearly equal, if it is acceptable to impose some losses on others with the result that it will significantly lessen the serious losses suffered by others overall, then one cannot fail either to impose upon oneself or to accept lesser or equal losses when they have this result. For this reason, from a Liberationist perspective, the conduct of most well‐off Westerners falls far short of what morality requires.
David Baggett and Jerry L. Walls
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- March 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780199931194
- eISBN:
- 9780190464165
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199931194.003.0007
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
This chapter considers an array of challenges posed to moral knowledge by secular ethical theories predicated on an unguided process of evolution. Evolutionary moral psychology is thought by some to ...
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This chapter considers an array of challenges posed to moral knowledge by secular ethical theories predicated on an unguided process of evolution. Evolutionary moral psychology is thought by some to constitute a defeater for moral knowledge, since the latter can be explained without reference to moral truth. Efforts by naturalistic ethicists to overcome such a challenge with a direct tracking account are discussed, but remain at best promissory notes, largely owing to the difficulty naturalists face to account for the truth-tracking ability of our moral cognitive apparatus. Efforts by contemporary Platonists Enoch and Wielenberg opt instead for a “third factor” approach that explains a correlation of moral belief and truth without appeal to a direct tracking account, since they consider moral facts to be causally inert. The chapter considers such efforts to have some merit, and will return to their suggestions in the summative chapter.Less
This chapter considers an array of challenges posed to moral knowledge by secular ethical theories predicated on an unguided process of evolution. Evolutionary moral psychology is thought by some to constitute a defeater for moral knowledge, since the latter can be explained without reference to moral truth. Efforts by naturalistic ethicists to overcome such a challenge with a direct tracking account are discussed, but remain at best promissory notes, largely owing to the difficulty naturalists face to account for the truth-tracking ability of our moral cognitive apparatus. Efforts by contemporary Platonists Enoch and Wielenberg opt instead for a “third factor” approach that explains a correlation of moral belief and truth without appeal to a direct tracking account, since they consider moral facts to be causally inert. The chapter considers such efforts to have some merit, and will return to their suggestions in the summative chapter.
Samuel Scheffler
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- May 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780199572816
- eISBN:
- 9780191809873
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199572816.003.0022
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter presents a philosophical discussion of agreement. It is often argued that we cannot rationally believe that there are moral truths, given the facts of deep and widespread moral ...
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This chapter presents a philosophical discussion of agreement. It is often argued that we cannot rationally believe that there are moral truths, given the facts of deep and widespread moral disagreement, and the cultural origin of many moral beliefs. To introduce this argument, the chapter considers the following claims: there are some irreducibly normative reason-involving truths, some of which are moral truths; since these truths are not about natural properties, our knowledge of these truths cannot be based on perception, or on evidence provided by empirical facts; positive substantive normative truths cannot be analytic, in the sense that their truth follows from their meaning; our normative beliefs cannot be therefore justified unless we are able to recognise in some other way that these beliefs are true. The chapter then examines the Convergence Claim, Metaphysical Naturalism, Error Theories, and the double badness of suffering.Less
This chapter presents a philosophical discussion of agreement. It is often argued that we cannot rationally believe that there are moral truths, given the facts of deep and widespread moral disagreement, and the cultural origin of many moral beliefs. To introduce this argument, the chapter considers the following claims: there are some irreducibly normative reason-involving truths, some of which are moral truths; since these truths are not about natural properties, our knowledge of these truths cannot be based on perception, or on evidence provided by empirical facts; positive substantive normative truths cannot be analytic, in the sense that their truth follows from their meaning; our normative beliefs cannot be therefore justified unless we are able to recognise in some other way that these beliefs are true. The chapter then examines the Convergence Claim, Metaphysical Naturalism, Error Theories, and the double badness of suffering.
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- June 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780804761284
- eISBN:
- 9780804772884
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Stanford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.11126/stanford/9780804761284.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter presents the English translation of one of Zhang's essays, which explores what it is to arrive at legitimate moral judgments. It begins by arguing that all convictions begin with doubt, ...
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This chapter presents the English translation of one of Zhang's essays, which explores what it is to arrive at legitimate moral judgments. It begins by arguing that all convictions begin with doubt, but then takes several interesting and unexpected turns. Zhang argues that most people “know” in a shallow sense the same moral truths that morally wise people know, but that only the latter know the justifying reasons behind such judgments. Nevertheless, those who attain this deeper understanding must be on guard for a peculiar kind of moral failure. They must not succumb to the temptation to take their well-grounded moral knowledge as a private discovery or personal achievement; to do so distorts both the true character of any truth—that it is simply part of the dao and thereby belongs to everyone—and threatens to undermine the value of such truths—when people try to hide away such insights, control their dissemination, or use them to gain personal fame, wealth, or power.Less
This chapter presents the English translation of one of Zhang's essays, which explores what it is to arrive at legitimate moral judgments. It begins by arguing that all convictions begin with doubt, but then takes several interesting and unexpected turns. Zhang argues that most people “know” in a shallow sense the same moral truths that morally wise people know, but that only the latter know the justifying reasons behind such judgments. Nevertheless, those who attain this deeper understanding must be on guard for a peculiar kind of moral failure. They must not succumb to the temptation to take their well-grounded moral knowledge as a private discovery or personal achievement; to do so distorts both the true character of any truth—that it is simply part of the dao and thereby belongs to everyone—and threatens to undermine the value of such truths—when people try to hide away such insights, control their dissemination, or use them to gain personal fame, wealth, or power.
Michael Goodhart
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- April 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780199376414
- eISBN:
- 9780190259853
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199376414.003.0002
- Subject:
- Law, Human Rights and Immigration
This chapter illuminates the politics of contestation engendered by human rights by offering an alternative ontology of human rights. It argues that human rights are not propositions about moral ...
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This chapter illuminates the politics of contestation engendered by human rights by offering an alternative ontology of human rights. It argues that human rights are not propositions about moral truth. To view them as such is to misapprehend what people do in claiming human rights and to mistake the struggles that these claims initiate for disputes about morality. Treating human rights as truth claims also makes it difficult to understand their global appeal and their sociocultural “origins”, and to grasp the distinctive ways in which they are sometimes (mis)used as tools of domination. It further argues that human rights are political demands—specifically, demands for emancipation, for an end to domination and oppression. As such they are highly partisan or ideological in character—a fact which is central to understanding the politics of contestation that frequently accompanies human rights and to resolving several important and seemingly intractable theoretical debates about them.Less
This chapter illuminates the politics of contestation engendered by human rights by offering an alternative ontology of human rights. It argues that human rights are not propositions about moral truth. To view them as such is to misapprehend what people do in claiming human rights and to mistake the struggles that these claims initiate for disputes about morality. Treating human rights as truth claims also makes it difficult to understand their global appeal and their sociocultural “origins”, and to grasp the distinctive ways in which they are sometimes (mis)used as tools of domination. It further argues that human rights are political demands—specifically, demands for emancipation, for an end to domination and oppression. As such they are highly partisan or ideological in character—a fact which is central to understanding the politics of contestation that frequently accompanies human rights and to resolving several important and seemingly intractable theoretical debates about them.
Anne Sweeney
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- July 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780719074189
- eISBN:
- 9781781701195
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Manchester University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7228/manchester/9780719074189.003.0006
- Subject:
- Literature, 16th-century and Renaissance Literature
This chapter discusses Southwell's efforts to rewrite the landscape of English lyrics, first examining English courtly poetry, which was introduced during the 1580s. It was also during this time that ...
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This chapter discusses Southwell's efforts to rewrite the landscape of English lyrics, first examining English courtly poetry, which was introduced during the 1580s. It was also during this time that the poetic landscape reflects the lack of cosmic order and moral truth. The chapter shows that Southwell was trying to improve the imaginary landscape of the English national poetic agenda, and notes how the changes in his environment affected his poetry. It also compares Southwell with Nicholas Breton, which reveals the layers of hidden meaning in Southwell's obvious simplicity.Less
This chapter discusses Southwell's efforts to rewrite the landscape of English lyrics, first examining English courtly poetry, which was introduced during the 1580s. It was also during this time that the poetic landscape reflects the lack of cosmic order and moral truth. The chapter shows that Southwell was trying to improve the imaginary landscape of the English national poetic agenda, and notes how the changes in his environment affected his poetry. It also compares Southwell with Nicholas Breton, which reveals the layers of hidden meaning in Southwell's obvious simplicity.
