Mary Briody Mahowald
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195176179
- eISBN:
- 9780199786558
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195176170.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Feminist Philosophy
This book deals with bioethical issues relevant to women across the life span. “Gender justice” is the starting point and the end point of the author’s approach to the issues addressed. The first ...
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This book deals with bioethical issues relevant to women across the life span. “Gender justice” is the starting point and the end point of the author’s approach to the issues addressed. The first section offers an overview of bioethics, critiques prevalent approaches to bioethics and models of the physician-patient relationship, and sketches distinguishing aspects of women’s health care. Classical pragmatists and feminist standpoint theorists are enlisted in support of “an egalitarian perspective”, and positions on the moral status of fetuses and those already born are examined. The second section identifies topics that are directly or indirectly related to women’s health; these include prenatal testing, childbirth and newborn decisions, treatment of minors and the elderly, assisted reproduction, abortion, eating disorders, domestic violence, breast and gynecological cancer, end of life care, and research on women. Brief cases illustrate variables related to each topic. Empirical and theoretical considerations follow each set of cases; these are intended to precipitate more expansive and critical examination of the questions raised. The book concludes with discussion of an egalitarian ideal to be pursued through an ethic of virtue or supererogation rather than obligation. By embracing this ideal, according to the author, moral agents support a more demanding level of morality than guidelines or laws require.Less
This book deals with bioethical issues relevant to women across the life span. “Gender justice” is the starting point and the end point of the author’s approach to the issues addressed. The first section offers an overview of bioethics, critiques prevalent approaches to bioethics and models of the physician-patient relationship, and sketches distinguishing aspects of women’s health care. Classical pragmatists and feminist standpoint theorists are enlisted in support of “an egalitarian perspective”, and positions on the moral status of fetuses and those already born are examined. The second section identifies topics that are directly or indirectly related to women’s health; these include prenatal testing, childbirth and newborn decisions, treatment of minors and the elderly, assisted reproduction, abortion, eating disorders, domestic violence, breast and gynecological cancer, end of life care, and research on women. Brief cases illustrate variables related to each topic. Empirical and theoretical considerations follow each set of cases; these are intended to precipitate more expansive and critical examination of the questions raised. The book concludes with discussion of an egalitarian ideal to be pursued through an ethic of virtue or supererogation rather than obligation. By embracing this ideal, according to the author, moral agents support a more demanding level of morality than guidelines or laws require.
Mary Briody Mahowald
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195176179
- eISBN:
- 9780199786558
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195176170.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Feminist Philosophy
Terms crucial to bioethical debate are examined: these include life, death, human, person, moral status, and moral agency. The moral relevance of the gestational tie between a woman and her fetus as ...
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Terms crucial to bioethical debate are examined: these include life, death, human, person, moral status, and moral agency. The moral relevance of the gestational tie between a woman and her fetus as well as other relationships is discussed. In light of their relevance to ethical decisions after birth as well as prior to birth, different positions on moral status or personhood are considered. These range from the view that full moral status occurs through union of human egg and sperm to the view that it requires the ability to make moral decisions, a capacity lacking in infants and adults who are comatose.Less
Terms crucial to bioethical debate are examined: these include life, death, human, person, moral status, and moral agency. The moral relevance of the gestational tie between a woman and her fetus as well as other relationships is discussed. In light of their relevance to ethical decisions after birth as well as prior to birth, different positions on moral status or personhood are considered. These range from the view that full moral status occurs through union of human egg and sperm to the view that it requires the ability to make moral decisions, a capacity lacking in infants and adults who are comatose.
David DeGrazia
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780195389630
- eISBN:
- 9780199949731
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195389630.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
This chapter addresses the question of how we should understand the moral status of the prenatal human being and the attendant ethical issues of abortion and embryo research. The first section ...
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This chapter addresses the question of how we should understand the moral status of the prenatal human being and the attendant ethical issues of abortion and embryo research. The first section defends a framework for understanding prenatal moral status, a framework that supports liberal views about abortion and embryo research. The next section rebuts the three strongest arguments in favor of a pro-life approach. It is argued in the next section, perhaps surprisingly, that one might reasonably doubt the author’s framework. Hence a sort of pluralism regarding prenatal moral status. In view of this stalemate, the discussion is redirected to the level of political philosophy and social policy; a liberal approach to policy is defended. The final section sketches and defends such an approach to abortion and embryo research.Less
This chapter addresses the question of how we should understand the moral status of the prenatal human being and the attendant ethical issues of abortion and embryo research. The first section defends a framework for understanding prenatal moral status, a framework that supports liberal views about abortion and embryo research. The next section rebuts the three strongest arguments in favor of a pro-life approach. It is argued in the next section, perhaps surprisingly, that one might reasonably doubt the author’s framework. Hence a sort of pluralism regarding prenatal moral status. In view of this stalemate, the discussion is redirected to the level of political philosophy and social policy; a liberal approach to policy is defended. The final section sketches and defends such an approach to abortion and embryo research.
Robert Noggle
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199242689
- eISBN:
- 9780191598715
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199242682.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Cognitive incompetence cannot adequately explain the special character of children's moral status. It is, in fact, because children lack preference structures that are sufficiently stable over time ...
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Cognitive incompetence cannot adequately explain the special character of children's moral status. It is, in fact, because children lack preference structures that are sufficiently stable over time that they are not ’temporally extended agents’. They are best viewed as 'special agents’, and parents have the responsibility of fostering the development of temporally extended agency and other necessary related moral capacities. Parental authority should be exercised with the view to assisting children to acquire the capacities that facilitate their transition from 'special agents’ to full and functioning members of the moral community.Less
Cognitive incompetence cannot adequately explain the special character of children's moral status. It is, in fact, because children lack preference structures that are sufficiently stable over time that they are not ’temporally extended agents’. They are best viewed as 'special agents’, and parents have the responsibility of fostering the development of temporally extended agency and other necessary related moral capacities. Parental authority should be exercised with the view to assisting children to acquire the capacities that facilitate their transition from 'special agents’ to full and functioning members of the moral community.
Mary Anne Warren
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198250401
- eISBN:
- 9780191681295
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198250401.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter presents a few concluding remarks about the goal of achieving a greater consensus in our judgements of moral status. It argues that adopting a multi-criterial theory of moral status does ...
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This chapter presents a few concluding remarks about the goal of achieving a greater consensus in our judgements of moral status. It argues that adopting a multi-criterial theory of moral status does not make it easy to solve all of the moral problems arising from uncertainties about what we owe to other entities. However, it gives us a more adequate set of tools than any of the uni-criterial theories. On the multi-criterial account there are many types of moral status, and many of these come in varying degrees of strength. Moral agents, sentient human beings who are not moral agents, sentient nonhuman animals, non-sentient living things, and such other elements of the natural world as species and ecosystems — all have legitimate claims to moral consideration. Of all the entities with which we interact, only moral agents have full moral status based solely upon their mental and behavioural capacities. The rest have moral status that is partially determined by their social and other relationships to moral agents, and — in the case of entities that are not sentient human beings — by their roles within terrestrial ecosystems.Less
This chapter presents a few concluding remarks about the goal of achieving a greater consensus in our judgements of moral status. It argues that adopting a multi-criterial theory of moral status does not make it easy to solve all of the moral problems arising from uncertainties about what we owe to other entities. However, it gives us a more adequate set of tools than any of the uni-criterial theories. On the multi-criterial account there are many types of moral status, and many of these come in varying degrees of strength. Moral agents, sentient human beings who are not moral agents, sentient nonhuman animals, non-sentient living things, and such other elements of the natural world as species and ecosystems — all have legitimate claims to moral consideration. Of all the entities with which we interact, only moral agents have full moral status based solely upon their mental and behavioural capacities. The rest have moral status that is partially determined by their social and other relationships to moral agents, and — in the case of entities that are not sentient human beings — by their roles within terrestrial ecosystems.
David Archard and Colin M. Macleod
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199242689
- eISBN:
- 9780191598715
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199242682.003.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
In the history of philosophy, children have been seen as the property of their parents and as beings who must develop into adults. Both views provide some kind of warrant for the exercise of parental ...
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In the history of philosophy, children have been seen as the property of their parents and as beings who must develop into adults. Both views provide some kind of warrant for the exercise of parental authority. There is renewed interest today in the moral and political status of the child. The principal areas of interest are rights, autonomy and education, families, and justice.Less
In the history of philosophy, children have been seen as the property of their parents and as beings who must develop into adults. Both views provide some kind of warrant for the exercise of parental authority. There is renewed interest today in the moral and political status of the child. The principal areas of interest are rights, autonomy and education, families, and justice.
Mary Anne Warren
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198250401
- eISBN:
- 9780191681295
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198250401.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter reviews the principles proposed in Chapter 6. The first three principles refer to nested classes of entities: living organisms, sentient beings, and moral agents. Beings of each class ...
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This chapter reviews the principles proposed in Chapter 6. The first three principles refer to nested classes of entities: living organisms, sentient beings, and moral agents. Beings of each class have some moral status based upon their intrinsic properties. Organic life confers only a modest moral status; sentience confers a stronger moral status; and moral agency is sufficient (but not necessary) for full moral status. The fourth principle expands the community of moral equals to include sentient human beings who are not moral agents. Finally, the last three principles require the acceptance of special obligations to plants and animals of ecosystemically important species, and animal members of our social communities; and permit the acceptance of obligations to some non-living things that have ecosystemic importance, or that have special religious or spiritual value to some people.Less
This chapter reviews the principles proposed in Chapter 6. The first three principles refer to nested classes of entities: living organisms, sentient beings, and moral agents. Beings of each class have some moral status based upon their intrinsic properties. Organic life confers only a modest moral status; sentience confers a stronger moral status; and moral agency is sufficient (but not necessary) for full moral status. The fourth principle expands the community of moral equals to include sentient human beings who are not moral agents. Finally, the last three principles require the acceptance of special obligations to plants and animals of ecosystemically important species, and animal members of our social communities; and permit the acceptance of obligations to some non-living things that have ecosystemic importance, or that have special religious or spiritual value to some people.
David Archard and Colin M. Macleod (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199242689
- eISBN:
- 9780191598715
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199242682.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
There is a trend towards taking children seriously as distinct subjects of moral and political theory who have complex and evolving interests. Children are developing beings whose moral status ...
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There is a trend towards taking children seriously as distinct subjects of moral and political theory who have complex and evolving interests. Children are developing beings whose moral status gradually changes. This view is now generally accepted but its implications are variously understood. It is no longer possible to assume a simple harmony between the interests of children and those charged with the responsibility of rearing them. Indeed, the challenge is to deepen our understanding of children's interest and to explore how the conceptualization of these interests affects the character of the moral claims they have. This book addresses various dimensions of this challenge. Although the precise emphasis in each chapter varies, the overall collection is animated by a concern with four principal interrelated but distinguishable themes. These are rights, autonomy, education, and distributive justice.Less
There is a trend towards taking children seriously as distinct subjects of moral and political theory who have complex and evolving interests. Children are developing beings whose moral status gradually changes. This view is now generally accepted but its implications are variously understood. It is no longer possible to assume a simple harmony between the interests of children and those charged with the responsibility of rearing them. Indeed, the challenge is to deepen our understanding of children's interest and to explore how the conceptualization of these interests affects the character of the moral claims they have. This book addresses various dimensions of this challenge. Although the precise emphasis in each chapter varies, the overall collection is animated by a concern with four principal interrelated but distinguishable themes. These are rights, autonomy, education, and distributive justice.
Gerald Lang
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199599325
- eISBN:
- 9780191741500
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199599325.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Drawing on some of Bernard Williams's work, especially his essays ‘The Idea of Equality’ and ‘The Human Prejudice’, this chapter argues that ‘speciesism’ is very unlike racism or sexism, and that ...
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Drawing on some of Bernard Williams's work, especially his essays ‘The Idea of Equality’ and ‘The Human Prejudice’, this chapter argues that ‘speciesism’ is very unlike racism or sexism, and that much of the philosophical apparatus which has been mobilized on behalf of anti-speciesism, such as moral individualism and the argument from marginal cases, is unsound. Moral individualists hold that the standards of appropriate ethical treatment of a creature must display fundamental sensitivity to only the intrinsic non-relational properties exemplified by that creature. But this doctrine cannot tell us, all by itself, when a creature has been unfortunate, and hence deserving of protection or compensation. Those questions can only be settled by locating the creature in a community of fellow creatures, which define the relevant standards of flourishing and misfortune. It is further contended that there is nothing unintelligible or morally obnoxious about defining these communities in species-sensitive ways, and that our understanding of the wrongness of racism and sexism is actually dependent on the background thought that those individuals who are victimized by racist or sexist treatment belong to a particular community: the human community.Less
Drawing on some of Bernard Williams's work, especially his essays ‘The Idea of Equality’ and ‘The Human Prejudice’, this chapter argues that ‘speciesism’ is very unlike racism or sexism, and that much of the philosophical apparatus which has been mobilized on behalf of anti-speciesism, such as moral individualism and the argument from marginal cases, is unsound. Moral individualists hold that the standards of appropriate ethical treatment of a creature must display fundamental sensitivity to only the intrinsic non-relational properties exemplified by that creature. But this doctrine cannot tell us, all by itself, when a creature has been unfortunate, and hence deserving of protection or compensation. Those questions can only be settled by locating the creature in a community of fellow creatures, which define the relevant standards of flourishing and misfortune. It is further contended that there is nothing unintelligible or morally obnoxious about defining these communities in species-sensitive ways, and that our understanding of the wrongness of racism and sexism is actually dependent on the background thought that those individuals who are victimized by racist or sexist treatment belong to a particular community: the human community.
Mary Anne Warren
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198250401
- eISBN:
- 9780191681295
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198250401.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter comments on moral status as an intuitive or common-sense concept, and on two widespread — though not universal — beliefs about which things have moral status and which do not. It ...
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This chapter comments on moral status as an intuitive or common-sense concept, and on two widespread — though not universal — beliefs about which things have moral status and which do not. It elaborates somewhat upon the concept of moral status, and considers why we need such a concept in order to make sense of our moral obligations towards human beings and the rest of the natural world. Next, it reviews some of the major positions on current issues that relate to moral status, outlines the book's chapters, and previews some of its conclusions. The chapter closes with two responses to what is probably the most common objection to the type of account being defended.Less
This chapter comments on moral status as an intuitive or common-sense concept, and on two widespread — though not universal — beliefs about which things have moral status and which do not. It elaborates somewhat upon the concept of moral status, and considers why we need such a concept in order to make sense of our moral obligations towards human beings and the rest of the natural world. Next, it reviews some of the major positions on current issues that relate to moral status, outlines the book's chapters, and previews some of its conclusions. The chapter closes with two responses to what is probably the most common objection to the type of account being defended.
Mary Briody Mahowald
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195176179
- eISBN:
- 9780199786558
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195176170.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Feminist Philosophy
Cases illustrating variables relevant to the decisions of pregnant women about methods of childbirth, elective cesarean delivery, impaired newborns, and sex assignment at birth are presented. For ...
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Cases illustrating variables relevant to the decisions of pregnant women about methods of childbirth, elective cesarean delivery, impaired newborns, and sex assignment at birth are presented. For each topic, empirical and theoretical factors relevant to the cases are discussed from an “egalitarian perspective” that imputes privileged status to the standpoint of those who are “nondominant”. Implications of different positions about moral status of fetuses and newborns are also considered.Less
Cases illustrating variables relevant to the decisions of pregnant women about methods of childbirth, elective cesarean delivery, impaired newborns, and sex assignment at birth are presented. For each topic, empirical and theoretical factors relevant to the cases are discussed from an “egalitarian perspective” that imputes privileged status to the standpoint of those who are “nondominant”. Implications of different positions about moral status of fetuses and newborns are also considered.
Mary Anne Warren
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198250401
- eISBN:
- 9780191681295
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198250401.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter presents an account that ties moral status both to certain intrinsic properties and to certain relational ones. Three key intrinsic properties — life, sentience, and moral agency — are ...
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This chapter presents an account that ties moral status both to certain intrinsic properties and to certain relational ones. Three key intrinsic properties — life, sentience, and moral agency — are directly relevant to moral status, each in a different way. It suggests three principles that express the general nature of that relevance. At the same time, our nature and circumstances, as individuals who exist within both social communities and terrestrial ecosystems, require us to make our judgements of moral status consistent with the demands of important social and ecological relationships. The chapter suggests four principles that govern the way in which this is commonly and appropriately done.Less
This chapter presents an account that ties moral status both to certain intrinsic properties and to certain relational ones. Three key intrinsic properties — life, sentience, and moral agency — are directly relevant to moral status, each in a different way. It suggests three principles that express the general nature of that relevance. At the same time, our nature and circumstances, as individuals who exist within both social communities and terrestrial ecosystems, require us to make our judgements of moral status consistent with the demands of important social and ecological relationships. The chapter suggests four principles that govern the way in which this is commonly and appropriately done.
Bonnie Steinbock
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195341621
- eISBN:
- 9780199897131
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195341621.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
This book provides a coherent framework for addressing bioethical issues in which the moral status of embryos and fetuses is relevant. It is based on the “interest view,” which ascribes moral ...
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This book provides a coherent framework for addressing bioethical issues in which the moral status of embryos and fetuses is relevant. It is based on the “interest view,” which ascribes moral standing to beings with interests, and connects the possession of interests with the capacity for conscious awareness or sentience. The theoretical framework is applied to up-to-date ethical and legal topics, including abortion, prenatal torts, wrongful life, the crime of feticide, substance abuse by pregnant women, compulsory cesareans, assisted reproduction, and stem cell research. Along the way, difficult philosophical problems, such as identity and the nonidentity problem are thoroughly explored.Less
This book provides a coherent framework for addressing bioethical issues in which the moral status of embryos and fetuses is relevant. It is based on the “interest view,” which ascribes moral standing to beings with interests, and connects the possession of interests with the capacity for conscious awareness or sentience. The theoretical framework is applied to up-to-date ethical and legal topics, including abortion, prenatal torts, wrongful life, the crime of feticide, substance abuse by pregnant women, compulsory cesareans, assisted reproduction, and stem cell research. Along the way, difficult philosophical problems, such as identity and the nonidentity problem are thoroughly explored.
Mary Anne Warren
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198250401
- eISBN:
- 9780191681295
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198250401.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter examines two variants of the concept of a person, and considers the arguments for regarding personhood, in either of these two senses, as the sole criterion of moral status. The first, ...
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This chapter examines two variants of the concept of a person, and considers the arguments for regarding personhood, in either of these two senses, as the sole criterion of moral status. The first, and more exclusive, concept of personhood emphasizes the mental capacities that are essential for moral agency, such as the capacity to deliberate about moral questions, and voluntarily to conform to moral standards. The less exclusive ‘subject-of-a-life’ criterion proposed by Tom Regan emphasizes the capacity to have beliefs and desires, to remember the past, to anticipate the future, and to act intentionally. It argues that personhood, in the full-blooded sense that requires the capacity for moral agency, is indeed a sufficient condition for full moral status. It is not, however, a necessary condition; infants and mentally disabled human beings ought to have the same basic moral rights as other sentient human beings, even though they may not be persons in this sense.Less
This chapter examines two variants of the concept of a person, and considers the arguments for regarding personhood, in either of these two senses, as the sole criterion of moral status. The first, and more exclusive, concept of personhood emphasizes the mental capacities that are essential for moral agency, such as the capacity to deliberate about moral questions, and voluntarily to conform to moral standards. The less exclusive ‘subject-of-a-life’ criterion proposed by Tom Regan emphasizes the capacity to have beliefs and desires, to remember the past, to anticipate the future, and to act intentionally. It argues that personhood, in the full-blooded sense that requires the capacity for moral agency, is indeed a sufficient condition for full moral status. It is not, however, a necessary condition; infants and mentally disabled human beings ought to have the same basic moral rights as other sentient human beings, even though they may not be persons in this sense.
Jonathan Quong
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199594870
- eISBN:
- 9780191723513
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199594870.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics, Political Theory
This chapter argues that liberal perfectionism is almost entirely unable to escape the charge of paternalism. This is true because liberal perfectionism has no satisfactory answer to a simple but ...
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This chapter argues that liberal perfectionism is almost entirely unable to escape the charge of paternalism. This is true because liberal perfectionism has no satisfactory answer to a simple but important question: why is state action necessary at all to achieve perfectionist objectives? Even non-coercive action, the author argues, can be paternalistic when motivated by a negative judgement about the ability of others to run their own lives. The author claims that it is this negative judgement regarding others that captures the distinctive nature of paternalism. In its efforts to be less coercive, liberal perfectionism has therefore failed to address the problem of paternalism that besets perfectionism. Furthermore, the author argues that paternalism is presumptively wrong because of the way it denies someone's moral status as a free and equal citizen. This means perfectionism, even when pursued by non-coercive means, is presumptively wrong.Less
This chapter argues that liberal perfectionism is almost entirely unable to escape the charge of paternalism. This is true because liberal perfectionism has no satisfactory answer to a simple but important question: why is state action necessary at all to achieve perfectionist objectives? Even non-coercive action, the author argues, can be paternalistic when motivated by a negative judgement about the ability of others to run their own lives. The author claims that it is this negative judgement regarding others that captures the distinctive nature of paternalism. In its efforts to be less coercive, liberal perfectionism has therefore failed to address the problem of paternalism that besets perfectionism. Furthermore, the author argues that paternalism is presumptively wrong because of the way it denies someone's moral status as a free and equal citizen. This means perfectionism, even when pursued by non-coercive means, is presumptively wrong.
Mary Anne Warren
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198250401
- eISBN:
- 9780191681295
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198250401.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter examines the sentience criterion, which has been defended by such utilitarian theorists as Jeremy Bentham and Peter Singer. It argues that a being's capacity to experience pleasure and ...
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This chapter examines the sentience criterion, which has been defended by such utilitarian theorists as Jeremy Bentham and Peter Singer. It argues that a being's capacity to experience pleasure and pain provides a sound reason for recognizing a moral obligation not to kill it, or inflict pain or suffering upon it, without good reason. Nevertheless, sentience is not a sufficient condition for full moral status. There are sound reasons for recognizing stronger obligations towards some sentient beings, such as those that are moral agents, those that are members of our social communities, and those that belong to ecologically important species that are endangered by human activities.Less
This chapter examines the sentience criterion, which has been defended by such utilitarian theorists as Jeremy Bentham and Peter Singer. It argues that a being's capacity to experience pleasure and pain provides a sound reason for recognizing a moral obligation not to kill it, or inflict pain or suffering upon it, without good reason. Nevertheless, sentience is not a sufficient condition for full moral status. There are sound reasons for recognizing stronger obligations towards some sentient beings, such as those that are moral agents, those that are members of our social communities, and those that belong to ecologically important species that are endangered by human activities.
Mary Anne Warren
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198250401
- eISBN:
- 9780191681295
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198250401.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter examines the ethic of Reverence for Life developed by Albert Schweitzer, and defended in modified form by some contemporary environmental ethicists. It argues that, although life is a ...
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This chapter examines the ethic of Reverence for Life developed by Albert Schweitzer, and defended in modified form by some contemporary environmental ethicists. It argues that, although life is a plausible basis for according an entity a moral status that precludes killing it without good reason, it is not a sufficient condition for the full moral status that we want for ourselves and those we care about. Depending upon the definition of ‘life’ which we employ, it may not even be a necessary condition for full moral status. Should we someday meet or manufacture machines that were sentient and self-aware, we might or might not classify them as alive; but in either case we would probably be morally obliged to accord them a moral status as strong as that of naturally evolved organisms with comparable mental and behavioural capacities.Less
This chapter examines the ethic of Reverence for Life developed by Albert Schweitzer, and defended in modified form by some contemporary environmental ethicists. It argues that, although life is a plausible basis for according an entity a moral status that precludes killing it without good reason, it is not a sufficient condition for the full moral status that we want for ourselves and those we care about. Depending upon the definition of ‘life’ which we employ, it may not even be a necessary condition for full moral status. Should we someday meet or manufacture machines that were sentient and self-aware, we might or might not classify them as alive; but in either case we would probably be morally obliged to accord them a moral status as strong as that of naturally evolved organisms with comparable mental and behavioural capacities.
Mary Anne Warren
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198250401
- eISBN:
- 9780191681295
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198250401.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter examines two theories of moral status which are based upon relational rather than intrinsic properties. Some deep ecologists, such as J. Baird Callicott, hold that the moral status of a ...
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This chapter examines two theories of moral status which are based upon relational rather than intrinsic properties. Some deep ecologists, such as J. Baird Callicott, hold that the moral status of a member of a particular biological species depends entirely upon that species' role — positive or negative — within a social or biotic community. Feminist ethicists, such as Nel Noddings, have argued that the moral status of living things always depends upon our emotional connections to them. The chapter argues that both these theories contain insights that need to be incorporated into an adequate account of moral status; but that neither membership in a social or biological community nor emotional connectedness can serve as the sole criterion of moral status.Less
This chapter examines two theories of moral status which are based upon relational rather than intrinsic properties. Some deep ecologists, such as J. Baird Callicott, hold that the moral status of a member of a particular biological species depends entirely upon that species' role — positive or negative — within a social or biotic community. Feminist ethicists, such as Nel Noddings, have argued that the moral status of living things always depends upon our emotional connections to them. The chapter argues that both these theories contain insights that need to be incorporated into an adequate account of moral status; but that neither membership in a social or biological community nor emotional connectedness can serve as the sole criterion of moral status.
Mary Anne Warren
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198250401
- eISBN:
- 9780191681295
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198250401.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This book explores a theoretical question that lies at the heart of practical ethics: what are the criteria for having moral status? In other words, what are the criteria for being an entity towards ...
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This book explores a theoretical question that lies at the heart of practical ethics: what are the criteria for having moral status? In other words, what are the criteria for being an entity towards which people have moral obligations? Some philosophers maintain that there is one intrinsic property — for instance, life, sentience, humanity, or moral agency. Others believe that relational properties, such as belonging to a human community, are more important. In Part I of the book, the author argues that no single property can serve as the sole criterion for moral status; instead, life, sentience, moral agency, and social and biotic relationships are all relevant, each in a different way. The author presents seven basic principles, each focusing on a property that can, in combination with others, legitimately affect an agent's moral obligations towards entities of a given type. In Part II, these principles are applied in an examination of three controversial ethical issues: voluntary euthanasia, abortion, and animal rights.Less
This book explores a theoretical question that lies at the heart of practical ethics: what are the criteria for having moral status? In other words, what are the criteria for being an entity towards which people have moral obligations? Some philosophers maintain that there is one intrinsic property — for instance, life, sentience, humanity, or moral agency. Others believe that relational properties, such as belonging to a human community, are more important. In Part I of the book, the author argues that no single property can serve as the sole criterion for moral status; instead, life, sentience, moral agency, and social and biotic relationships are all relevant, each in a different way. The author presents seven basic principles, each focusing on a property that can, in combination with others, legitimately affect an agent's moral obligations towards entities of a given type. In Part II, these principles are applied in an examination of three controversial ethical issues: voluntary euthanasia, abortion, and animal rights.
Paola Cavalieri
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195143805
- eISBN:
- 9780199833122
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195143809.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
After defending the idea that ethics is a theoretical enquiry endowed with autonomous standards of justification and criticism, within which criteria coming from other domains have no direct ...
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After defending the idea that ethics is a theoretical enquiry endowed with autonomous standards of justification and criticism, within which criteria coming from other domains have no direct relevance, I dwell on the structure of the moral community. The notions of moral agent and moral patient are clarified, and a distinction is drawn between possible levels in moral status. Within this framework, I consider a set of often quoted criteria for inclusion into the moral community. My conclusion, which is widely shared within contemporary moral philosophy, is that, thanks to its connection with the role‐shift test, the criterion of consciousness remains the only plausible candidate criterion for the status of moral patient.Less
After defending the idea that ethics is a theoretical enquiry endowed with autonomous standards of justification and criticism, within which criteria coming from other domains have no direct relevance, I dwell on the structure of the moral community. The notions of moral agent and moral patient are clarified, and a distinction is drawn between possible levels in moral status. Within this framework, I consider a set of often quoted criteria for inclusion into the moral community. My conclusion, which is widely shared within contemporary moral philosophy, is that, thanks to its connection with the role‐shift test, the criterion of consciousness remains the only plausible candidate criterion for the status of moral patient.
