Robert Hanna
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199285549
- eISBN:
- 9780191713965
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199285549.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter examines Kant's much-criticized views on mathematics in general and arithmetic in particular. It makes a case for the claim that Kant's theory of arithmetic is not subject to the most ...
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This chapter examines Kant's much-criticized views on mathematics in general and arithmetic in particular. It makes a case for the claim that Kant's theory of arithmetic is not subject to the most familiar and forceful objection against it, namely, that his doctrine of the dependence of arithmetic on time is plainly false, or even worse, simply unintelligible. It is argued that Kant's doctrine about time and arithmetic is highly original, fully intelligible, and with qualifications due to the inherent limitations of his conceptions of arithmetic and logic, to an important extent defensible. The most philosophically striking thing about Kant's doctrine is the fact that arithmetic turns out to be a paradigm of the exact sciences (exacten Naturwissenschaften) only by virtue of its ultimately being one of the human or moral sciences (Geisteswissenschaften).Less
This chapter examines Kant's much-criticized views on mathematics in general and arithmetic in particular. It makes a case for the claim that Kant's theory of arithmetic is not subject to the most familiar and forceful objection against it, namely, that his doctrine of the dependence of arithmetic on time is plainly false, or even worse, simply unintelligible. It is argued that Kant's doctrine about time and arithmetic is highly original, fully intelligible, and with qualifications due to the inherent limitations of his conceptions of arithmetic and logic, to an important extent defensible. The most philosophically striking thing about Kant's doctrine is the fact that arithmetic turns out to be a paradigm of the exact sciences (exacten Naturwissenschaften) only by virtue of its ultimately being one of the human or moral sciences (Geisteswissenschaften).
Stephen Gaukroger
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199594931
- eISBN:
- 9780191595745
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199594931.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, General
The mid‐eighteenth century rethinking of the aims of natural philosophy was one in which the central role accorded to rationality in the first half of the century now comes to be translated into ...
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The mid‐eighteenth century rethinking of the aims of natural philosophy was one in which the central role accorded to rationality in the first half of the century now comes to be translated into terms of sensibility. The task was seen as not just one of understanding the natural world but also that of understanding our place in that natural world, and the move to sensibility brings with it a new degree of success in this enterprise. Sensibility allows connections to be made between natural‐philosophical and moral, political, and psychological theories in a new way, shaping a new field of the ‘moral sciences’. The chapter examines the rise of a concern with sensibility in the Republic of Letters, the development of notions of sensibility and irritability in physiology, and the emergence of philosophical discussion of moral sensibility and the unity of sensibility.Less
The mid‐eighteenth century rethinking of the aims of natural philosophy was one in which the central role accorded to rationality in the first half of the century now comes to be translated into terms of sensibility. The task was seen as not just one of understanding the natural world but also that of understanding our place in that natural world, and the move to sensibility brings with it a new degree of success in this enterprise. Sensibility allows connections to be made between natural‐philosophical and moral, political, and psychological theories in a new way, shaping a new field of the ‘moral sciences’. The chapter examines the rise of a concern with sensibility in the Republic of Letters, the development of notions of sensibility and irritability in physiology, and the emergence of philosophical discussion of moral sensibility and the unity of sensibility.
Stephen Buckle
- Published in print:
- 1993
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198240945
- eISBN:
- 9780191680304
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198240945.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy
This chapter focuses on Samuel Pufendorf, who was, in the latter stages of the 17th century, the best known and, by and large, the most respected, writer on natural law, not least because he was ...
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This chapter focuses on Samuel Pufendorf, who was, in the latter stages of the 17th century, the best known and, by and large, the most respected, writer on natural law, not least because he was recognized as an authoritative interpreter and defender of Grotius. It considers Leibniz's main criticism against Pufendorf, which helps to reveal an important and influential feature of Pufendorf's account of natural law.Less
This chapter focuses on Samuel Pufendorf, who was, in the latter stages of the 17th century, the best known and, by and large, the most respected, writer on natural law, not least because he was recognized as an authoritative interpreter and defender of Grotius. It considers Leibniz's main criticism against Pufendorf, which helps to reveal an important and influential feature of Pufendorf's account of natural law.
Stephen Buckle
- Published in print:
- 1993
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198240945
- eISBN:
- 9780191680304
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198240945.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy
Locke bequeathed to his successors a complex inheritance. The Two Treatises hinged on the inalienability of the property in one's person. Not only did this rule out the more explicit forms of ...
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Locke bequeathed to his successors a complex inheritance. The Two Treatises hinged on the inalienability of the property in one's person. Not only did this rule out the more explicit forms of slavery, it also excluded political slavery: any political system which placed its citizens under an unregulated, or arbitrary, will. The Essay concerning Human Understanding left an equally powerful impression. Its concern with both the foundations of knowledge and the efficient causes of human action led to an upsurge of interest in moral epistemology and psychology, and thereby to the first attempts to give a sophisticated account of the natural jurists' commonplace that the natural law has its foundations in human nature. The complex task faced by Locke's inheritors was to find a way to unify these different themes from the Two Treatises and the Essay, and it is in this context that the work of Francis Hutcheson (1694–1746) is such a striking achievement. This chapter outlines Hutcheson's synthesis of Lockian and other themes, concluding with an analysis of the crucial weakness in his account of justice — a weakness which throws substantial light on Hume's purposes in Book III of the Treatise.Less
Locke bequeathed to his successors a complex inheritance. The Two Treatises hinged on the inalienability of the property in one's person. Not only did this rule out the more explicit forms of slavery, it also excluded political slavery: any political system which placed its citizens under an unregulated, or arbitrary, will. The Essay concerning Human Understanding left an equally powerful impression. Its concern with both the foundations of knowledge and the efficient causes of human action led to an upsurge of interest in moral epistemology and psychology, and thereby to the first attempts to give a sophisticated account of the natural jurists' commonplace that the natural law has its foundations in human nature. The complex task faced by Locke's inheritors was to find a way to unify these different themes from the Two Treatises and the Essay, and it is in this context that the work of Francis Hutcheson (1694–1746) is such a striking achievement. This chapter outlines Hutcheson's synthesis of Lockian and other themes, concluding with an analysis of the crucial weakness in his account of justice — a weakness which throws substantial light on Hume's purposes in Book III of the Treatise.
Bruce Kuklick
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199260164
- eISBN:
- 9780191597893
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199260168.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
For most of the nineteenth century, the study of theology dominated philosophy in American colleges. But collegiate philosophy did begin the process of professionalization, and had an enormous social ...
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For most of the nineteenth century, the study of theology dominated philosophy in American colleges. But collegiate philosophy did begin the process of professionalization, and had an enormous social impact in its elaboration of the moral sciences, a mixture of social science taught from an explicitly normative point of view, grounded in Christianity. The college philosophers, including Francis Bowen at Harvard, Noah Porter at Yale, and James McCosh at Princeton, also purveyed a version of Scottish Realism, which gave ground to German idealism as the century wore on.Less
For most of the nineteenth century, the study of theology dominated philosophy in American colleges. But collegiate philosophy did begin the process of professionalization, and had an enormous social impact in its elaboration of the moral sciences, a mixture of social science taught from an explicitly normative point of view, grounded in Christianity. The college philosophers, including Francis Bowen at Harvard, Noah Porter at Yale, and James McCosh at Princeton, also purveyed a version of Scottish Realism, which gave ground to German idealism as the century wore on.
Philip S. Gorski
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- March 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780814738726
- eISBN:
- 9780814738733
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- NYU Press
- DOI:
- 10.18574/nyu/9780814738726.003.0004
- Subject:
- Sociology, Politics, Social Movements and Social Change
This chapter examines what Émile Durkheim could have meant by his statement that sociology is a “moral science” and whether the project it implied is a defensible one. Durkheim's goal was not only to ...
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This chapter examines what Émile Durkheim could have meant by his statement that sociology is a “moral science” and whether the project it implied is a defensible one. Durkheim's goal was not only to study morality scientifically; he also proposed to put morality on a scientific footing—a goal that most contemporary sociologists would be uncomfortable with. This chapter argues that Durkheim's vision of “moral science” was inspired primarily by Aristotelian ethics and that it anticipated many of the ideas of virtue ethics and related schools of thought and research. It considers a number of reasons why there is a connection between Durkheim and Aristotle and why that connection has received so little attention. Finally, it explains why Aristotelian ethics was much better suited to Durkheim's purposes than was Kantianism or utilitarianism.Less
This chapter examines what Émile Durkheim could have meant by his statement that sociology is a “moral science” and whether the project it implied is a defensible one. Durkheim's goal was not only to study morality scientifically; he also proposed to put morality on a scientific footing—a goal that most contemporary sociologists would be uncomfortable with. This chapter argues that Durkheim's vision of “moral science” was inspired primarily by Aristotelian ethics and that it anticipated many of the ideas of virtue ethics and related schools of thought and research. It considers a number of reasons why there is a connection between Durkheim and Aristotle and why that connection has received so little attention. Finally, it explains why Aristotelian ethics was much better suited to Durkheim's purposes than was Kantianism or utilitarianism.
Lawrence Dewan
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- March 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780823227969
- eISBN:
- 9780823237210
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Fordham University Press
- DOI:
- 10.5422/fso/9780823227969.003.0028
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
In treating the question, “what is philosophy?” in the Republic, Plato carefully set forth the technique for developing an answer. He had to say what he meant by the ...
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In treating the question, “what is philosophy?” in the Republic, Plato carefully set forth the technique for developing an answer. He had to say what he meant by the “knowledge” that the philosopher is said to love. To do so, he presented the general domain of “powers,” readily exemplified by the senses of hearing and sight. He explained that these must be defined in function of that which they are “toward,” as sight is toward light and color, hearing toward sound. Aristotle later presented this as defining a power and an operation in terms of its “opposite,” as he says in the De anima. This chapter looks at some use made of that technique by Thomas Aquinas in presenting moral science. It begins by discussing the first question of the prima secundae, and then moves to question 18, the general discussion of the good and the bad in human acts. Lastly, it looks at one article that is the climax of question 19, on the general intention that should command the ethical domain.Less
In treating the question, “what is philosophy?” in the Republic, Plato carefully set forth the technique for developing an answer. He had to say what he meant by the “knowledge” that the philosopher is said to love. To do so, he presented the general domain of “powers,” readily exemplified by the senses of hearing and sight. He explained that these must be defined in function of that which they are “toward,” as sight is toward light and color, hearing toward sound. Aristotle later presented this as defining a power and an operation in terms of its “opposite,” as he says in the De anima. This chapter looks at some use made of that technique by Thomas Aquinas in presenting moral science. It begins by discussing the first question of the prima secundae, and then moves to question 18, the general discussion of the good and the bad in human acts. Lastly, it looks at one article that is the climax of question 19, on the general intention that should command the ethical domain.
Hans Kelsen
- Published in print:
- 1991
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780198252177
- eISBN:
- 9780191681363
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198252177.003.0058
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law
This chapter discusses whether the syllogism of traditional propositional logic is applicable — directly or indirectly — to norms. The question is whether the logical thought-process of the syllogism ...
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This chapter discusses whether the syllogism of traditional propositional logic is applicable — directly or indirectly — to norms. The question is whether the logical thought-process of the syllogism occurs in morality and in law, that is, in the process of creating and applying morality and law, and not whether it occurs in moral science and legal science. The latter is beyond question (it is obvious), since inferences have their place in all thought-processes, and thus in all sciences, and so in moral and legal science. But the extremely frequent confusion of morality and moral science and of law and legal science obscures the problem and prevents a clear answer being given to the question being considered.Less
This chapter discusses whether the syllogism of traditional propositional logic is applicable — directly or indirectly — to norms. The question is whether the logical thought-process of the syllogism occurs in morality and in law, that is, in the process of creating and applying morality and law, and not whether it occurs in moral science and legal science. The latter is beyond question (it is obvious), since inferences have their place in all thought-processes, and thus in all sciences, and so in moral and legal science. But the extremely frequent confusion of morality and moral science and of law and legal science obscures the problem and prevents a clear answer being given to the question being considered.
John Basl and Christian Coons
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- July 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198805076
- eISBN:
- 9780191843174
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198805076.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
While many doubt that purely empirical claims can entail any moral claim, moral premises often appear to have empirical entailments. However, unless the moral premises are treated as stipulated ...
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While many doubt that purely empirical claims can entail any moral claim, moral premises often appear to have empirical entailments. However, unless the moral premises are treated as stipulated assumptions, it seems like a serious mistake to infer empirical conclusions from moral premises that entail them. The puzzle is trying to plausibly explain why this is so. This chapter surveys and rejects some proposed solutions. Learning what we can from these failed solutions, a proposal is advanced. The chapter argues that every attempted moral science inference faces a dilemma. The moral premise(s), if true, will be contingent on some empirical fact or not. If not, the moral scientist must employ a false premise or rely on non-moral assumptions that already entail the conclusion. On the other horn, if the moral premises are independent of empirical facts, the premises will entail that some fact we know to be contingent is necessary.Less
While many doubt that purely empirical claims can entail any moral claim, moral premises often appear to have empirical entailments. However, unless the moral premises are treated as stipulated assumptions, it seems like a serious mistake to infer empirical conclusions from moral premises that entail them. The puzzle is trying to plausibly explain why this is so. This chapter surveys and rejects some proposed solutions. Learning what we can from these failed solutions, a proposal is advanced. The chapter argues that every attempted moral science inference faces a dilemma. The moral premise(s), if true, will be contingent on some empirical fact or not. If not, the moral scientist must employ a false premise or rely on non-moral assumptions that already entail the conclusion. On the other horn, if the moral premises are independent of empirical facts, the premises will entail that some fact we know to be contingent is necessary.
Matthew Stanley
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- May 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780226164878
- eISBN:
- 9780226164908
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226164908.003.0005
- Subject:
- History, History of Science, Technology, and Medicine
The myth of inevitable conflict between science and religion grew out of a genuine battleground - the control of educational institutions in Britain. Huxley and the scientific naturalists were ...
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The myth of inevitable conflict between science and religion grew out of a genuine battleground - the control of educational institutions in Britain. Huxley and the scientific naturalists were frustrated by the close alliance between the universities and the established church, and fought tirelessly to create a space for science education free of any theological control. Figures such as the evangelical Maxwell moved comfortably in these Anglican institutions and saw it as critical that science be taught in the larger context of traditional liberal arts. Despite this deep split, Maxwell and Huxley found themselves at one point volunteering to teach for the same school - the Working Men’s College, a project of the controversial theologian F.D. Maurice. The surprising circumstance of the agnostic and the evangelical teaching science under the guidance of Christian Socialists helps tease out the actual issues involved in the control of Victorian science education.Less
The myth of inevitable conflict between science and religion grew out of a genuine battleground - the control of educational institutions in Britain. Huxley and the scientific naturalists were frustrated by the close alliance between the universities and the established church, and fought tirelessly to create a space for science education free of any theological control. Figures such as the evangelical Maxwell moved comfortably in these Anglican institutions and saw it as critical that science be taught in the larger context of traditional liberal arts. Despite this deep split, Maxwell and Huxley found themselves at one point volunteering to teach for the same school - the Working Men’s College, a project of the controversial theologian F.D. Maurice. The surprising circumstance of the agnostic and the evangelical teaching science under the guidance of Christian Socialists helps tease out the actual issues involved in the control of Victorian science education.
Craig Smith
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- September 2019
- ISBN:
- 9781474413275
- eISBN:
- 9781474460187
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Edinburgh University Press
- DOI:
- 10.3366/edinburgh/9781474413275.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter outlines Ferguson’s commitment to an empirical, observation based, form of moral science. It begins by looking at Ferguson’s critique of the philosophical vices of existing schools of ...
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This chapter outlines Ferguson’s commitment to an empirical, observation based, form of moral science. It begins by looking at Ferguson’s critique of the philosophical vices of existing schools of thought. Ferguson criticises these as being excessively abstract, imprecise in the use of language and overly complex, or subtle, in their arguments. The chapter argues that Ferguson sought to create a practical philosophy for use in the real world and was in the mainstream of the Scottish Enlightenment’s attempts to use history as data for social theory. The chapter then discusses the various underlying universals of human nature and social life that form the basis of Ferguson’s moral science. A central claim is that Ferguson believed it to be a fact that all humans are censorial creatures who pass judgement on each other leading to the claim that morality is a human universal even while humans disagree on its content.Less
This chapter outlines Ferguson’s commitment to an empirical, observation based, form of moral science. It begins by looking at Ferguson’s critique of the philosophical vices of existing schools of thought. Ferguson criticises these as being excessively abstract, imprecise in the use of language and overly complex, or subtle, in their arguments. The chapter argues that Ferguson sought to create a practical philosophy for use in the real world and was in the mainstream of the Scottish Enlightenment’s attempts to use history as data for social theory. The chapter then discusses the various underlying universals of human nature and social life that form the basis of Ferguson’s moral science. A central claim is that Ferguson believed it to be a fact that all humans are censorial creatures who pass judgement on each other leading to the claim that morality is a human universal even while humans disagree on its content.
Barbara K. Redman
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- May 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780262019811
- eISBN:
- 9780262317757
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262019811.003.0007
- Subject:
- Biology, Bioethics
Policy supporting moral science must be constantly renewed in light of changing conditions, societal expectations, and ongoing discussions of what is involved with protecting science morality. ...
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Policy supporting moral science must be constantly renewed in light of changing conditions, societal expectations, and ongoing discussions of what is involved with protecting science morality. Evidence of the effectiveness of current research misconduct policy and of alternatives is urgently needed but must follow clarification of the goals of such policy. Particular attention must be paid to resource allocation within science, toward realignment of incentives both for individual scientists and for institutions, that support scientific integrity. Large scale corruption of scientific knowledge production by commercial groups has been documented but as yet is not effectively regulated. And moral science requires that research institutions and sponsors take far more decisive roles in reinventing a more responsible science.Less
Policy supporting moral science must be constantly renewed in light of changing conditions, societal expectations, and ongoing discussions of what is involved with protecting science morality. Evidence of the effectiveness of current research misconduct policy and of alternatives is urgently needed but must follow clarification of the goals of such policy. Particular attention must be paid to resource allocation within science, toward realignment of incentives both for individual scientists and for institutions, that support scientific integrity. Large scale corruption of scientific knowledge production by commercial groups has been documented but as yet is not effectively regulated. And moral science requires that research institutions and sponsors take far more decisive roles in reinventing a more responsible science.
Roger Ariew
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- January 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780199563517
- eISBN:
- 9780191791208
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563517.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
For Descartes a person “should above all try to form for himself a code of morals sufficient to regulate the actions of his life.” After that, he should also study logic and practice for a long time ...
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For Descartes a person “should above all try to form for himself a code of morals sufficient to regulate the actions of his life.” After that, he should also study logic and practice for a long time with some easy and simple questions, such as mathematical ones. This is all a prelude to applying oneself to true philosophy, which Descartes likens to a tree “whose roots are metaphysics, whose trunk is physics, and whose branches, which issue from this trunk, are all the other sciences. These reduce themselves to three principal ones, namely, medicine, mechanics, and morals.” So Descartes’ order of self-instruction is first the formulation of a code of morals, then the study and practice of logic, followed by the study of metaphysics, physics, and the ultimate moral science. This chapter discusses Descartes’ views in that order, although it groups Descartes’ two morals together into a single section.Less
For Descartes a person “should above all try to form for himself a code of morals sufficient to regulate the actions of his life.” After that, he should also study logic and practice for a long time with some easy and simple questions, such as mathematical ones. This is all a prelude to applying oneself to true philosophy, which Descartes likens to a tree “whose roots are metaphysics, whose trunk is physics, and whose branches, which issue from this trunk, are all the other sciences. These reduce themselves to three principal ones, namely, medicine, mechanics, and morals.” So Descartes’ order of self-instruction is first the formulation of a code of morals, then the study and practice of logic, followed by the study of metaphysics, physics, and the ultimate moral science. This chapter discusses Descartes’ views in that order, although it groups Descartes’ two morals together into a single section.
Craig Smith
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- September 2019
- ISBN:
- 9781474413275
- eISBN:
- 9781474460187
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Edinburgh University Press
- DOI:
- 10.3366/edinburgh/9781474413275.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Chapter 1 includes a biography of Adam Ferguson and examines the various critical interpretations of his thought. It concludes that each of these, stoic, civic republican, natural jurisprudence, ...
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Chapter 1 includes a biography of Adam Ferguson and examines the various critical interpretations of his thought. It concludes that each of these, stoic, civic republican, natural jurisprudence, Marxist sociological, Highlander, and conservative, are partial accounts that miss important features of his thought. The introduction makes the case for downplaying the importance of the Essay on the History of Civil Society and for moving beyond the idea of Ferguson as an outlier to the mainstream of the Scottish Enlightenment. It argues that the proper context for understanding Ferguson is to be found in his intellectual project of building a moral pedagogy upon secure empirical and philosophical foundations.Less
Chapter 1 includes a biography of Adam Ferguson and examines the various critical interpretations of his thought. It concludes that each of these, stoic, civic republican, natural jurisprudence, Marxist sociological, Highlander, and conservative, are partial accounts that miss important features of his thought. The introduction makes the case for downplaying the importance of the Essay on the History of Civil Society and for moving beyond the idea of Ferguson as an outlier to the mainstream of the Scottish Enlightenment. It argues that the proper context for understanding Ferguson is to be found in his intellectual project of building a moral pedagogy upon secure empirical and philosophical foundations.
Alan S. Kahan
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- August 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780199681150
- eISBN:
- 9780191761256
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199681150.003.0002
- Subject:
- History, American History: 19th Century, Political History
An analysis of the Introduction to Democracy in America shows how, from the beginning, moral concerns and question of human character and greatness were central to Tocqueville, and that he ...
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An analysis of the Introduction to Democracy in America shows how, from the beginning, moral concerns and question of human character and greatness were central to Tocqueville, and that he constructed a new moral science alongside his famous “new political science.” This new moral science had its origins in the seventeenth-century French moraliste tradition. In this tradition, Tocqueville most resembled the heroic moralism of writers like Corneille, concerned above all with greatness and independence although his analytical and rhetorical techniques borrowed much from La Bruyère, Nicole, and Pascal. His relationship to Pascal has been largely misunderstood. While Tocqueville borrowed much from Nicole and Pascal’s Christian moralism, he turned its meaning upside-down.Less
An analysis of the Introduction to Democracy in America shows how, from the beginning, moral concerns and question of human character and greatness were central to Tocqueville, and that he constructed a new moral science alongside his famous “new political science.” This new moral science had its origins in the seventeenth-century French moraliste tradition. In this tradition, Tocqueville most resembled the heroic moralism of writers like Corneille, concerned above all with greatness and independence although his analytical and rhetorical techniques borrowed much from La Bruyère, Nicole, and Pascal. His relationship to Pascal has been largely misunderstood. While Tocqueville borrowed much from Nicole and Pascal’s Christian moralism, he turned its meaning upside-down.
Craig Smith
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- September 2019
- ISBN:
- 9781474413275
- eISBN:
- 9781474460187
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Edinburgh University Press
- DOI:
- 10.3366/edinburgh/9781474413275.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Adam Ferguson was a Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh and a leading member of the Scottish Enlightenment. A friend of David Hume and Adam Smith, Ferguson was among the ...
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Adam Ferguson was a Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh and a leading member of the Scottish Enlightenment. A friend of David Hume and Adam Smith, Ferguson was among the leading exponents of the Scottish Enlightenment’s attempts to develop a science of man and was among the first in the English speaking world to make use of the terms civilization, civil society, and political science.
This book challenges many of the prevailing assumptions about Ferguson’s thinking. It explores how Ferguson sought to create a methodology for moral science that combined empirically based social theory with normative moralising with a view to supporting the virtuous education of the British elite. The Ferguson that emerges is far from the stereotyped image of a nostalgic republican sceptical about modernity, and instead is one much closer to the mainstream Scottish Enlightenment’s defence of eighteenth century British commercial society.Less
Adam Ferguson was a Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh and a leading member of the Scottish Enlightenment. A friend of David Hume and Adam Smith, Ferguson was among the leading exponents of the Scottish Enlightenment’s attempts to develop a science of man and was among the first in the English speaking world to make use of the terms civilization, civil society, and political science.
This book challenges many of the prevailing assumptions about Ferguson’s thinking. It explores how Ferguson sought to create a methodology for moral science that combined empirically based social theory with normative moralising with a view to supporting the virtuous education of the British elite. The Ferguson that emerges is far from the stereotyped image of a nostalgic republican sceptical about modernity, and instead is one much closer to the mainstream Scottish Enlightenment’s defence of eighteenth century British commercial society.
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- March 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780226720784
- eISBN:
- 9780226720852
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226720852.003.0008
- Subject:
- History, History of Science, Technology, and Medicine
The claims of sentimental empiricists have shaped the understanding of the Enlightenment, the Revolution, French culture, and the history and nature of modern science. They have seen the Revolution ...
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The claims of sentimental empiricists have shaped the understanding of the Enlightenment, the Revolution, French culture, and the history and nature of modern science. They have seen the Revolution as the triumph of an abstract, analytical, and mathematical cast of mind. Modern heirs to sentimental empiricism have lamented a French lack of “soul.” And the charges of sentimental empiricists against the sciences of their day must surely have contributed to the belief that the history of modern science has been the straightforward unfolding of an impersonal, dispassionate way of knowing the world. Sentimental empiricism has provided the medium for an ongoing interaction between natural and moral science, and between scientific ideas and social concerns. The ideals of sensibility engaged the physiology of the senses with the problem of moral solipsism; electrical physics with the economy of the grain trade; chemical nomenclature with civic educational policy; the authority of an observed fact with the authority of a town magistracy; scientific with political revolution.Less
The claims of sentimental empiricists have shaped the understanding of the Enlightenment, the Revolution, French culture, and the history and nature of modern science. They have seen the Revolution as the triumph of an abstract, analytical, and mathematical cast of mind. Modern heirs to sentimental empiricism have lamented a French lack of “soul.” And the charges of sentimental empiricists against the sciences of their day must surely have contributed to the belief that the history of modern science has been the straightforward unfolding of an impersonal, dispassionate way of knowing the world. Sentimental empiricism has provided the medium for an ongoing interaction between natural and moral science, and between scientific ideas and social concerns. The ideals of sensibility engaged the physiology of the senses with the problem of moral solipsism; electrical physics with the economy of the grain trade; chemical nomenclature with civic educational policy; the authority of an observed fact with the authority of a town magistracy; scientific with political revolution.
Alan S. Kahan
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- August 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780199681150
- eISBN:
- 9780191761256
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199681150.001.0001
- Subject:
- History, American History: 19th Century, Political History
The relationship between democracy and religion is as important today as it was in Alexis de Tocqueville’s time. Tocqueville, Democracy, and Religion: Checks and Balances for Democratic Souls is a ...
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The relationship between democracy and religion is as important today as it was in Alexis de Tocqueville’s time. Tocqueville, Democracy, and Religion: Checks and Balances for Democratic Souls is a ground-breaking study of the views of the greatest theorist of democracy on one of today’s most crucial problems. A well-known Tocqueville scholar, Kahan shows how Tocqueville’s analysis of religion is simultaneously deeply rooted in his analysis of nineteenth-century France and America and pertinent today. Tocqueville thought that the role of religion was to provide checks and balances for democracies in the spiritual realm, just as secular forces should provide them in the political realm, and that in the long run secular checks and balances were dependent on the success of spiritual checks and balances. Kahan examines how Tocqueville thought religion had succeeded in checking and balancing democracy in America, and failed in France, as well as Tocqueville’s less well-known analyses of religion in Ireland and England, and his perspective on Islam and Hinduism. He shows how Tocqueville’s “post-secular” account of religion can help us come to terms with religion today. More than a study of Tocqueville on religion in democratic society, Kahan offers us a reinterpretation of Tocqueville as a moralist and a student of human nature in democratic society, a thinker whose new political science was in the service of a new moral science aimed at encouraging democratic people to attain greatness as human beings. Tocqueville, Democracy, and Religion gives us a new Tocqueville for the twenty-first century.Less
The relationship between democracy and religion is as important today as it was in Alexis de Tocqueville’s time. Tocqueville, Democracy, and Religion: Checks and Balances for Democratic Souls is a ground-breaking study of the views of the greatest theorist of democracy on one of today’s most crucial problems. A well-known Tocqueville scholar, Kahan shows how Tocqueville’s analysis of religion is simultaneously deeply rooted in his analysis of nineteenth-century France and America and pertinent today. Tocqueville thought that the role of religion was to provide checks and balances for democracies in the spiritual realm, just as secular forces should provide them in the political realm, and that in the long run secular checks and balances were dependent on the success of spiritual checks and balances. Kahan examines how Tocqueville thought religion had succeeded in checking and balancing democracy in America, and failed in France, as well as Tocqueville’s less well-known analyses of religion in Ireland and England, and his perspective on Islam and Hinduism. He shows how Tocqueville’s “post-secular” account of religion can help us come to terms with religion today. More than a study of Tocqueville on religion in democratic society, Kahan offers us a reinterpretation of Tocqueville as a moralist and a student of human nature in democratic society, a thinker whose new political science was in the service of a new moral science aimed at encouraging democratic people to attain greatness as human beings. Tocqueville, Democracy, and Religion gives us a new Tocqueville for the twenty-first century.
