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Belief in moral responsibility is held in place by a larger belief system in which moral responsibility is deeply embedded. When operating within the deep assumptions of that system moral responsibility seems secure and obvious, and challenges to that system often appear ridiculous. Advocates of the moral responsibility system regard the basic principles of that system as fixed and certain and assume that even critics of the moral responsibility system must adhere to its basic operating principles. The attempt to deal with the challenges of nonconscious choices shows the powerful grip of the moral responsibility belief system.

This chapter explores the moral responsibility system and the reasons why it has been an influential concept in intuition, common sense, the legal system, and philosophical reflections. It is hardly surprising when some of its supporters slide into question-begging arguments when they defend moral responsibility. These advocates of moral responsibility usually work from within the moral responsibility framework and assume that anyone who questions moral responsibility must also hold onto the assumption that people are morally responsible unless they meet a special excusing condition, which is the basic principle of the framework. Using this basic principle, denying moral responsibility is only possible in two ways—people are either excused in a specific case because of some special impediment or they are permanently excused because of insanity or senility or some other cause of severe incompetence.

This chapter concentrates on the fear of the unknown as the main deterrent to contemplating the abolition of moral responsibility. For a very long time, man has been invariably attached to the system of moral responsibility that they have developed a fear of a world existing without the practices and institutions of moral responsibility. In discussing these fears, this chapter hopes to alleviate them and show that it is possible to conceive of a world without moral responsibility. In many respects, such a world would not be so different; certainly not as disastrously different as many have supposed. It is still possible to make free choices, moral judgments, and sincere apologies; also, self-respect and sense of individual worth could still be retained in such a world. Smilansky, on the other hand, argues otherwise, claiming that man could not be worthy of self-respect if they were not the center of the universe or if they ceased to be special beings.

This chapter illustrates the desperation that is almost tangible in the attempts to support moral responsibility. Evidence of this desperation becomes apparent in the wide variety of distinctly different and often conflicting proposals for supporting moral responsibility. The moral responsibility system is deeply embedded in common sense, the legal system, and deeply entrenched in man’s natural strike-back emotions. Existentialists refer to concepts such as “being-for-itself” to demonstrate the great choices one makes sans constraints and conditions. Contemporary libertarians offer similar arguments, but with a hint of apprehension. Robert Kane is one such libertarian, and he rejects mystery and relies on quantum indeterminism amplified by chaos. Compatibilists, on the other hand, are united in their rejection of miracles but divided on almost everything else.