Sean McKeever and Michael Ridge
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199290659
- eISBN:
- 9780191603617
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199290652.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Moral philosophy has long treated principles as indispensable for understanding its subject matter. However, the underlying assumption that this is the best approach has received almost no defence, ...
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Moral philosophy has long treated principles as indispensable for understanding its subject matter. However, the underlying assumption that this is the best approach has received almost no defence, and has been attacked by particularists who argue that the traditional link between morality and principles is little more than an unwarranted prejudice. This book meets this particularist challenge head on and defends a distinctive view called ‘generalism as a regulative ideal’. After cataloguing the wide array of views that have gone under the heading ‘particularism’, the reasons why the main particularist arguments fail to establish their conclusions are explained. Generalism as a regulative ideal incorporates what is most insightful in particularism (e.g., the possibility that reasons are context sensitive - ‘holism about reasons’) while rejecting every major particularist doctrine. The book resists the excesses of hyper-generalist views according to which moral thought is constituted by allegiance to a particular principle or set of principles. It argues that in so far as moral knowledge and wisdom are possible, all of morality can and should be codified in a manageable set of principles, even if we are not yet in possession of those principles. Such principles are not objects of mere curiosity, but play an important role in guiding the virtuous agent.Less
Moral philosophy has long treated principles as indispensable for understanding its subject matter. However, the underlying assumption that this is the best approach has received almost no defence, and has been attacked by particularists who argue that the traditional link between morality and principles is little more than an unwarranted prejudice. This book meets this particularist challenge head on and defends a distinctive view called ‘generalism as a regulative ideal’. After cataloguing the wide array of views that have gone under the heading ‘particularism’, the reasons why the main particularist arguments fail to establish their conclusions are explained. Generalism as a regulative ideal incorporates what is most insightful in particularism (e.g., the possibility that reasons are context sensitive - ‘holism about reasons’) while rejecting every major particularist doctrine. The book resists the excesses of hyper-generalist views according to which moral thought is constituted by allegiance to a particular principle or set of principles. It argues that in so far as moral knowledge and wisdom are possible, all of morality can and should be codified in a manageable set of principles, even if we are not yet in possession of those principles. Such principles are not objects of mere curiosity, but play an important role in guiding the virtuous agent.
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780195161243
- eISBN:
- 9780199950317
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195161243.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General, Moral Philosophy
Over the last several decades, advocates have championed a bewildering variety of methods for understanding and resolving difficult ethical problems in medicine, including principlism, wide ...
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Over the last several decades, advocates have championed a bewildering variety of methods for understanding and resolving difficult ethical problems in medicine, including principlism, wide reflective equilibrium, casuistry, feminism, virtue theory, narrative, and others. Much of this advocacy overlooks the limits of the favored method, and neglects the strengths found in the alternatives. In systematically uncovering and evaluating both the strengths and limits of a variety of ethical tools, Methods in Medical Ethics: Critical Perspectives develops a comprehensive appreciation of the roles that various methods can each play in deepening our understanding of ethical problems in medicine, and in supporting well-grounded judgments about what to do. Each method discussed is critically evaluated to identify both limits and advantages, which are then illustrated through discussion of specific cases or controversies. This review not only demonstrates that there is no single method adequate to the task. More importantly, it develops an informed eclecticism that knows how to pick the right tool for the right job.Less
Over the last several decades, advocates have championed a bewildering variety of methods for understanding and resolving difficult ethical problems in medicine, including principlism, wide reflective equilibrium, casuistry, feminism, virtue theory, narrative, and others. Much of this advocacy overlooks the limits of the favored method, and neglects the strengths found in the alternatives. In systematically uncovering and evaluating both the strengths and limits of a variety of ethical tools, Methods in Medical Ethics: Critical Perspectives develops a comprehensive appreciation of the roles that various methods can each play in deepening our understanding of ethical problems in medicine, and in supporting well-grounded judgments about what to do. Each method discussed is critically evaluated to identify both limits and advantages, which are then illustrated through discussion of specific cases or controversies. This review not only demonstrates that there is no single method adequate to the task. More importantly, it develops an informed eclecticism that knows how to pick the right tool for the right job.
Allen Buchanan
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- April 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780198295358
- eISBN:
- 9780191600982
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198295359.003.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Explains why a moral theory of international law is needed, refutes several prominent views that purport to rule out the possibility of such a theory, sets out the criteria that the needed theory ...
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Explains why a moral theory of international law is needed, refutes several prominent views that purport to rule out the possibility of such a theory, sets out the criteria that the needed theory should satisfy, previews the main outlines of the theory developed in the remainder of the book, and explains and supports the thesis that institutional moral reasoning is needed to develop such a theory. There are nine sections: I. The Need for a Theory; II. Curious Neglect—the neglect of international relations in contemporary moral philosophy; III. Institutional Moral Reasoning; IV. The Realist Challenge; V. The Moral Minimalist Challenge; VI. Legal Nihilism; VII. The Moral Legitimacy of the State System; VIII. The Nature and Scope of a Moral Theory of International Law; and IX. An Overview of a Proto‐theory—a summary of the moral theory of international law presented in the book, pointing out its limitations and theoretical essentials.Less
Explains why a moral theory of international law is needed, refutes several prominent views that purport to rule out the possibility of such a theory, sets out the criteria that the needed theory should satisfy, previews the main outlines of the theory developed in the remainder of the book, and explains and supports the thesis that institutional moral reasoning is needed to develop such a theory. There are nine sections: I. The Need for a Theory; II. Curious Neglect—the neglect of international relations in contemporary moral philosophy; III. Institutional Moral Reasoning; IV. The Realist Challenge; V. The Moral Minimalist Challenge; VI. Legal Nihilism; VII. The Moral Legitimacy of the State System; VIII. The Nature and Scope of a Moral Theory of International Law; and IX. An Overview of a Proto‐theory—a summary of the moral theory of international law presented in the book, pointing out its limitations and theoretical essentials.
Alan Thomas
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780198250173
- eISBN:
- 9780191604072
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198250177.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter explains how a contextualist can argue for rationality both within a tradition of moral enquiry and, equally importantly, across such traditions. An essential part of the latter task is ...
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This chapter explains how a contextualist can argue for rationality both within a tradition of moral enquiry and, equally importantly, across such traditions. An essential part of the latter task is reiterating why, in some cases, an apparent challenge to our ethical outlook does not constitute a challenge at all. The work of Alasdair MacIntyre and Charles Taylor are considered, in order to argue that in so far as their tradition-based models of moral reasoning are plausible, they instantiate contextualism.Less
This chapter explains how a contextualist can argue for rationality both within a tradition of moral enquiry and, equally importantly, across such traditions. An essential part of the latter task is reiterating why, in some cases, an apparent challenge to our ethical outlook does not constitute a challenge at all. The work of Alasdair MacIntyre and Charles Taylor are considered, in order to argue that in so far as their tradition-based models of moral reasoning are plausible, they instantiate contextualism.
Russ Shafer-Landau
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199259755
- eISBN:
- 9780191601835
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199259755.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This is a book in metaethics that defends a brand of moral realism known as non‐naturalism. The book has five Parts. Part I outlines the sort of moral realism that the author wishes to defend, and ...
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This is a book in metaethics that defends a brand of moral realism known as non‐naturalism. The book has five Parts. Part I outlines the sort of moral realism that the author wishes to defend, and then offers critiques of expressivism and constructivism. Part II is devoted to issues in metaphysics. It argues that moral realists have adequate replies to worries based on supervenience and the alleged causal inefficacy of moral facts. Part III is devoted to issues of moral motivation. It argues that motivational internalism is false, and that a Humean theory of action is also mistaken. Part IV is devoted to an extended discussion of moral reasons. It argues that externalism about reasons is true, that moral rationalism is true, and that moral realism has an adequate account of moral disagreement. Part V is devoted to moral epistemology. It argues for the self‐evidence of pro tanto moral principles, and for a version of reliabilism about ethical knowledge.Less
This is a book in metaethics that defends a brand of moral realism known as non‐naturalism. The book has five Parts. Part I outlines the sort of moral realism that the author wishes to defend, and then offers critiques of expressivism and constructivism. Part II is devoted to issues in metaphysics. It argues that moral realists have adequate replies to worries based on supervenience and the alleged causal inefficacy of moral facts. Part III is devoted to issues of moral motivation. It argues that motivational internalism is false, and that a Humean theory of action is also mistaken. Part IV is devoted to an extended discussion of moral reasons. It argues that externalism about reasons is true, that moral rationalism is true, and that moral realism has an adequate account of moral disagreement. Part V is devoted to moral epistemology. It argues for the self‐evidence of pro tanto moral principles, and for a version of reliabilism about ethical knowledge.
Gerald Mckenny
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199582679
- eISBN:
- 9780191722981
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199582679.003.0003
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
Barth's formulation of the problem of ethics contrasts an ethic in which God summons human beings to active participation in the good God has established and accomplished with an ethic in which it is ...
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Barth's formulation of the problem of ethics contrasts an ethic in which God summons human beings to active participation in the good God has established and accomplished with an ethic in which it is left to human beings to identify the good and accomplish it. Does this contrast between ethics as human confirmation of divine grace and ethics as human self‐assertion indicate that Barth's moral theology is embedded in a distinctively modern set of problems, concerns, and assumptions about ethics? This chapter explores Barth's complex relationship to modernity, showing how he treats modernity as the visible culmination of tendencies that were latent in Western society for centuries and are in fact perennial features of fallen humanity and how his own moral theology addresses modernity neither by opposing or accepting its human self‐assertion but by finding in the latter distorted traces of God's profound affirmation of humanity.Less
Barth's formulation of the problem of ethics contrasts an ethic in which God summons human beings to active participation in the good God has established and accomplished with an ethic in which it is left to human beings to identify the good and accomplish it. Does this contrast between ethics as human confirmation of divine grace and ethics as human self‐assertion indicate that Barth's moral theology is embedded in a distinctively modern set of problems, concerns, and assumptions about ethics? This chapter explores Barth's complex relationship to modernity, showing how he treats modernity as the visible culmination of tendencies that were latent in Western society for centuries and are in fact perennial features of fallen humanity and how his own moral theology addresses modernity neither by opposing or accepting its human self‐assertion but by finding in the latter distorted traces of God's profound affirmation of humanity.
Carl Wellman
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199744787
- eISBN:
- 9780199827138
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199744787.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This book discusses all three species of human rights—moral, international, and national—at length, but it pays special attention to the moral reasons that are relevant to each species. The first ...
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This book discusses all three species of human rights—moral, international, and national—at length, but it pays special attention to the moral reasons that are relevant to each species. The first part develops an original view of the nature and grounds of moral human rights based on the author’s previous publications in the general theory of rights. If respected, they confer some sphere of dominion on the right-holder in some potential confrontation and are grounded on specifically moral reasons. The second part explains how moral human rights are relevant to both the justification and the interpretation of human rights in international law and identifies several other relevant moral considerations, such as peace and social justice. The third part argues that different kinds of moral and international human rights ought to be incorporated into national legal systems in four distinct ways: in a written constitution, judicial decisions, legislation, and human rights treaties. Finally it explains how the moral dimensions of human rights are relevant to the alleged use of torture in the interrogation of detainees in the Bush administration war on terrorism.Less
This book discusses all three species of human rights—moral, international, and national—at length, but it pays special attention to the moral reasons that are relevant to each species. The first part develops an original view of the nature and grounds of moral human rights based on the author’s previous publications in the general theory of rights. If respected, they confer some sphere of dominion on the right-holder in some potential confrontation and are grounded on specifically moral reasons. The second part explains how moral human rights are relevant to both the justification and the interpretation of human rights in international law and identifies several other relevant moral considerations, such as peace and social justice. The third part argues that different kinds of moral and international human rights ought to be incorporated into national legal systems in four distinct ways: in a written constitution, judicial decisions, legislation, and human rights treaties. Finally it explains how the moral dimensions of human rights are relevant to the alleged use of torture in the interrogation of detainees in the Bush administration war on terrorism.
Gerald McKenny
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199582679
- eISBN:
- 9780191722981
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199582679.003.0007
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
How and by whom is it decided which among the possible courses of action available to the agent in a situation of choice is the one that God commands? This question is made both difficult and urgent ...
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How and by whom is it decided which among the possible courses of action available to the agent in a situation of choice is the one that God commands? This question is made both difficult and urgent by Barth's rejection of casuistry, that is, the rational procedure of specifying a general norm drawn from scripture, reason, or tradition in light of particular circumstances. Barth argues that the command of God comes to us already specified and calls only for our obedience. He seems thereby to deny that there are any rational constraints on what God might command or on what we might take to be God's command. This chapter examines Barth's portrayal of the encounter of human beings with the command of God as a prayerful hearing that includes the rational evaluation of possible courses of action and is preceded by instruction which offers approximate knowledge of what God will command based on the revealed history of God's encounter with humanity.Less
How and by whom is it decided which among the possible courses of action available to the agent in a situation of choice is the one that God commands? This question is made both difficult and urgent by Barth's rejection of casuistry, that is, the rational procedure of specifying a general norm drawn from scripture, reason, or tradition in light of particular circumstances. Barth argues that the command of God comes to us already specified and calls only for our obedience. He seems thereby to deny that there are any rational constraints on what God might command or on what we might take to be God's command. This chapter examines Barth's portrayal of the encounter of human beings with the command of God as a prayerful hearing that includes the rational evaluation of possible courses of action and is preceded by instruction which offers approximate knowledge of what God will command based on the revealed history of God's encounter with humanity.
Alan H. Goldman
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199576906
- eISBN:
- 9780191722288
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199576906.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General
Elijah Millgram claims that we learn what reasons we have from experience or practical induction, not from our own motives. Derek Parfit and others claim that internalists cannot explain reasons for ...
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Elijah Millgram claims that we learn what reasons we have from experience or practical induction, not from our own motives. Derek Parfit and others claim that internalists cannot explain reasons for having particular desires. Kantians claim that we all have reasons to be moral and prudent, independently of our motivations. Joshua Gert argues that we have moral reasons that can justify our actions without presupposing or requiring motivation from us. This chapter counters these claims by arguing that what we learn in Millgram's examples is what we are actually disposed to enjoy or care about; that deeper concerns provide reasons for having particular desires; that we are not rationally required to be morally or prudentially motivated except by other concerns that we have; and that we are rationally required to act on the strongest reasons we have, but not on all (moral) reasons there are.Less
Elijah Millgram claims that we learn what reasons we have from experience or practical induction, not from our own motives. Derek Parfit and others claim that internalists cannot explain reasons for having particular desires. Kantians claim that we all have reasons to be moral and prudent, independently of our motivations. Joshua Gert argues that we have moral reasons that can justify our actions without presupposing or requiring motivation from us. This chapter counters these claims by arguing that what we learn in Millgram's examples is what we are actually disposed to enjoy or care about; that deeper concerns provide reasons for having particular desires; that we are not rationally required to be morally or prudentially motivated except by other concerns that we have; and that we are rationally required to act on the strongest reasons we have, but not on all (moral) reasons there are.
Roberta Bosisio
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199652501
- eISBN:
- 9780191739217
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199652501.003.0013
- Subject:
- Law, Family Law, Human Rights and Immigration
The results of many studies show children's competence in terms of moral reasoning and action, and also their awareness of the discrepancy between their moral competence and the low moral status ...
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The results of many studies show children's competence in terms of moral reasoning and action, and also their awareness of the discrepancy between their moral competence and the low moral status attributed to them by adults. These findings confirm that teenagers internalize a developmental model of moral growth and that the low social position attributed by adults to them also influences children's self-image. This chapter presents some examples drawn from the findings of three studies on normative and legal socialization, which show that young people possess high moral and legal reasoning skills. Boys and girls who participated in interviews and focus groups showed high competencies and a good ability to use different justice and moral criteria as well as a strong and realistic sense of the complexity of different moral situations. Moreover, they displayed a considerable ability to draw on a vast array of rules and moral principles and also normative and legal systems, which they chose in a selective and complementary way according to each given situation.Less
The results of many studies show children's competence in terms of moral reasoning and action, and also their awareness of the discrepancy between their moral competence and the low moral status attributed to them by adults. These findings confirm that teenagers internalize a developmental model of moral growth and that the low social position attributed by adults to them also influences children's self-image. This chapter presents some examples drawn from the findings of three studies on normative and legal socialization, which show that young people possess high moral and legal reasoning skills. Boys and girls who participated in interviews and focus groups showed high competencies and a good ability to use different justice and moral criteria as well as a strong and realistic sense of the complexity of different moral situations. Moreover, they displayed a considerable ability to draw on a vast array of rules and moral principles and also normative and legal systems, which they chose in a selective and complementary way according to each given situation.
Anita M. Superson
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195376623
- eISBN:
- 9780199871551
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195376623.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Feminist Philosophy
This chapter examines and rejects several internalist arguments defending the view that we need not address the skeptic who believes that amoralism is a tenable position for the reason that the ...
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This chapter examines and rejects several internalist arguments defending the view that we need not address the skeptic who believes that amoralism is a tenable position for the reason that the amoralist is either inconceivable, irrational, or simply lacks a reason to act morally. The amoralist recognizes that he has a reason to act morally but denies the force of moral reasons. This chapter defends the weak externalist view, according to which recognizing a reason to act morally might, but does not necessarily, motivate the agent. The failure of internalist arguments leaves open the possibility of a rational amoralist. Thus, we should address the amoralist in attempting to defeat skepticism, and broaden the skeptic's position accordingly. But even if we do not defeat the amoralist, we do not fail to defeat skepticism wholesale, because being motivated by reasons is a psychological issue.Less
This chapter examines and rejects several internalist arguments defending the view that we need not address the skeptic who believes that amoralism is a tenable position for the reason that the amoralist is either inconceivable, irrational, or simply lacks a reason to act morally. The amoralist recognizes that he has a reason to act morally but denies the force of moral reasons. This chapter defends the weak externalist view, according to which recognizing a reason to act morally might, but does not necessarily, motivate the agent. The failure of internalist arguments leaves open the possibility of a rational amoralist. Thus, we should address the amoralist in attempting to defeat skepticism, and broaden the skeptic's position accordingly. But even if we do not defeat the amoralist, we do not fail to defeat skepticism wholesale, because being motivated by reasons is a psychological issue.
Paul Hurley
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199559305
- eISBN:
- 9780191721212
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199559305.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Consequentialism has since its inception faced persistent challenges of excess: it is, critics charge, too demanding, too confining, and too alienating to offer a plausible alternative moral theory. ...
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Consequentialism has since its inception faced persistent challenges of excess: it is, critics charge, too demanding, too confining, and too alienating to offer a plausible alternative moral theory. This chapter argues that the deeper challenge confronting consequentialism is not one of excess but of defect; in particular, of defects along precisely these dimensions upon which it is taken to be excessive. Developing a line of thought introduced in Chapter 1, the arguments in this chapter draw upon the work of Shelly Kagan and others to demonstrate that consequentialism, as it is typically presented, is a theory of exacting moral standards, but not of decisive reasons for agents to conform to these standards. As a result, this theory of exacting moral standards can, with perfect consistency, be incorporated within an overall account upon which there are few, if any, rational demands upon agents to heed such standards. These challenges of defect confronting consequentialism are far more formidable than the traditional challenges of excess.Less
Consequentialism has since its inception faced persistent challenges of excess: it is, critics charge, too demanding, too confining, and too alienating to offer a plausible alternative moral theory. This chapter argues that the deeper challenge confronting consequentialism is not one of excess but of defect; in particular, of defects along precisely these dimensions upon which it is taken to be excessive. Developing a line of thought introduced in Chapter 1, the arguments in this chapter draw upon the work of Shelly Kagan and others to demonstrate that consequentialism, as it is typically presented, is a theory of exacting moral standards, but not of decisive reasons for agents to conform to these standards. As a result, this theory of exacting moral standards can, with perfect consistency, be incorporated within an overall account upon which there are few, if any, rational demands upon agents to heed such standards. These challenges of defect confronting consequentialism are far more formidable than the traditional challenges of excess.
Chandra Sekhar Sripada and Stephen Stich
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195310139
- eISBN:
- 9780199871209
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195310139.003.0017
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Human social life is regulated by an extensive network of informal social rules and principles often called norms. This chapter offers an account of the psychological mechanisms and processes ...
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Human social life is regulated by an extensive network of informal social rules and principles often called norms. This chapter offers an account of the psychological mechanisms and processes underlying norms that integrates findings from a number of disciplines, and can serve as a framework for future research. It begins by discussing a number of social-level and individual-level generalizations about norms that place constraints on possible accounts of norm psychology. After proposing its own model of the psychological processes by which norms are acquired and utilized, it discusses a number of open questions about the psychology of norms. These include questions about the role of social learning, emotions, and various reasoning processes in norm psychology.Less
Human social life is regulated by an extensive network of informal social rules and principles often called norms. This chapter offers an account of the psychological mechanisms and processes underlying norms that integrates findings from a number of disciplines, and can serve as a framework for future research. It begins by discussing a number of social-level and individual-level generalizations about norms that place constraints on possible accounts of norm psychology. After proposing its own model of the psychological processes by which norms are acquired and utilized, it discusses a number of open questions about the psychology of norms. These include questions about the role of social learning, emotions, and various reasoning processes in norm psychology.
A. E. Denham
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198240105
- eISBN:
- 9780191680076
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198240105.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Moral Philosophy
The epistemic status of moral discourse turns in part on the explanation of divergent moral beliefs. Whether differences of moral opinion there are best explained by a failure accurately to represent ...
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The epistemic status of moral discourse turns in part on the explanation of divergent moral beliefs. Whether differences of moral opinion there are best explained by a failure accurately to represent specifically moral features of actions and characters, or whether they are better explained by cognitively blameless differences of preference and desire, not only matters to the cognitive claims of moral discourse. The answer to this question should also shed light on the phenomenology of moral experience and the epistemology of moral judgement. Crispin Wright's arguments suggest that an inferential account of moral belief can only be avoided by positing some anomalous faculty of moral perception. This chapter argues that the genesis of moral experience is one in which cognition and affect are jointly implicated, but that their cooperation does nothing to undermine the thought that moral discourse is, for the most part, both conceptually autonomous and genuinely representational. The concepts of moral reasons, rational conflict, moral competence, imagination, and basic moral judgements are also discussed.Less
The epistemic status of moral discourse turns in part on the explanation of divergent moral beliefs. Whether differences of moral opinion there are best explained by a failure accurately to represent specifically moral features of actions and characters, or whether they are better explained by cognitively blameless differences of preference and desire, not only matters to the cognitive claims of moral discourse. The answer to this question should also shed light on the phenomenology of moral experience and the epistemology of moral judgement. Crispin Wright's arguments suggest that an inferential account of moral belief can only be avoided by positing some anomalous faculty of moral perception. This chapter argues that the genesis of moral experience is one in which cognition and affect are jointly implicated, but that their cooperation does nothing to undermine the thought that moral discourse is, for the most part, both conceptually autonomous and genuinely representational. The concepts of moral reasons, rational conflict, moral competence, imagination, and basic moral judgements are also discussed.
Mark A. Noll
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195151114
- eISBN:
- 9780199834532
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195151119.003.0006
- Subject:
- Religion, History of Christianity
By 1790, American Christians also embraced the “new moral philosophy,” a way of understanding their faith through “commonsense moral reasoning.” Because they came to believe that God had created ...
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By 1790, American Christians also embraced the “new moral philosophy,” a way of understanding their faith through “commonsense moral reasoning.” Because they came to believe that God had created humans with a capacity for moral reasoning, American Christians largely gave up the traditional, hierarchical arbiters of truth found in the established churches of Europe and took into their own hands the determination of religious truth and control of the churches.Less
By 1790, American Christians also embraced the “new moral philosophy,” a way of understanding their faith through “commonsense moral reasoning.” Because they came to believe that God had created humans with a capacity for moral reasoning, American Christians largely gave up the traditional, hierarchical arbiters of truth found in the established churches of Europe and took into their own hands the determination of religious truth and control of the churches.
Christian Smith
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199828029
- eISBN:
- 9780199919475
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199828029.003.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Religion and Society
This chapter begins the exploration of some of the more unsettling aspects of contemporary emerging adult life by focusing on the question of morality, moral beliefs, and moral reasoning. What do ...
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This chapter begins the exploration of some of the more unsettling aspects of contemporary emerging adult life by focusing on the question of morality, moral beliefs, and moral reasoning. What do emerging adults think about morality? How do they know what is moral? How do they make moral decisions? Where do they think moral rights and wrongs, goods and bads, even come from? What is the source or basis of morality? And how important is it to emerging adults to choose what is morally good? The chapter examines their answers to these and other questions, and then ponders what this all may tell us not only about contemporary emerging adults’ own moral imaginations but also about the larger culture and society that has formed them morally.Less
This chapter begins the exploration of some of the more unsettling aspects of contemporary emerging adult life by focusing on the question of morality, moral beliefs, and moral reasoning. What do emerging adults think about morality? How do they know what is moral? How do they make moral decisions? Where do they think moral rights and wrongs, goods and bads, even come from? What is the source or basis of morality? And how important is it to emerging adults to choose what is morally good? The chapter examines their answers to these and other questions, and then ponders what this all may tell us not only about contemporary emerging adults’ own moral imaginations but also about the larger culture and society that has formed them morally.
Tom Tomlinson
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780195161243
- eISBN:
- 9780199950317
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195161243.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General, Moral Philosophy
We are naturally attracted to the idea that moral reasoning uses rules, as premises in a deductive argument. This picture provides a straightforward way of responding to the demand for reasons ...
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We are naturally attracted to the idea that moral reasoning uses rules, as premises in a deductive argument. This picture provides a straightforward way of responding to the demand for reasons implicit in ethical discourse. It explains how our moral judgments might be brought within a system of ideals. And its deductive moral logic keeps ethical reasoning within a familiar analytical framework, offering advantages in the analysis of problems. Despite these advantages, there are no grounds for thinking that ethical reasons must always be in the form of rule. For example, the principle of universalizability doesn’t require that moral judgments be rule-based. At the other extreme, neither are there good grounds for thinking that there can be no rules at the bottom of moral judgments, as the moral particularists claim. Principles play important roles in moral discourse, and aren't to be lightly cast aside.Less
We are naturally attracted to the idea that moral reasoning uses rules, as premises in a deductive argument. This picture provides a straightforward way of responding to the demand for reasons implicit in ethical discourse. It explains how our moral judgments might be brought within a system of ideals. And its deductive moral logic keeps ethical reasoning within a familiar analytical framework, offering advantages in the analysis of problems. Despite these advantages, there are no grounds for thinking that ethical reasons must always be in the form of rule. For example, the principle of universalizability doesn’t require that moral judgments be rule-based. At the other extreme, neither are there good grounds for thinking that there can be no rules at the bottom of moral judgments, as the moral particularists claim. Principles play important roles in moral discourse, and aren't to be lightly cast aside.
Carl Wellman
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199744787
- eISBN:
- 9780199827138
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199744787.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This chapter explains the grounds of moral human rights. Basal rights are grounded on moral reasons other than some prior right but often ground derived rights. Their grounds are primarily the harms ...
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This chapter explains the grounds of moral human rights. Basal rights are grounded on moral reasons other than some prior right but often ground derived rights. Their grounds are primarily the harms that the individual right-holder normally suffers when they are violated. Thus, they presuppose basic human needs. Secondarily, basal human rights are often grounded on their value to society as a whole. Other moral human rights are indirectly grounded on the same moral reasons because they are derived from some basal human right by subsumption, as a necessary condition for its exercise or enjoyment, or as being conducive to its secure exercise or enjoyment.Less
This chapter explains the grounds of moral human rights. Basal rights are grounded on moral reasons other than some prior right but often ground derived rights. Their grounds are primarily the harms that the individual right-holder normally suffers when they are violated. Thus, they presuppose basic human needs. Secondarily, basal human rights are often grounded on their value to society as a whole. Other moral human rights are indirectly grounded on the same moral reasons because they are derived from some basal human right by subsumption, as a necessary condition for its exercise or enjoyment, or as being conducive to its secure exercise or enjoyment.
Douglas W. Portmore
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199794539
- eISBN:
- 9780199919260
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199794539.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
The chapter argues that in order to accommodate many typical agent-centered options and to resolve the paradox of supererogation, we should accept that non-moral reasons can, and sometimes do, ...
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The chapter argues that in order to accommodate many typical agent-centered options and to resolve the paradox of supererogation, we should accept that non-moral reasons can, and sometimes do, prevent moral reasons, even those with considerable moral requiring strength, from generating moral requirements. What's more, we should accept that an agent's performing a given act is morally permissible if and only if there is no available alternative that she has both more (moral) requiring reason and more reason, all things considered, to perform. And it is argued that, given this account of moral permissibility, the consequentialist has no choice but to adopt a dual-ranking version of consequentialism—one that ranks outcomes both in terms of how much moral reason the agent has to want them to obtain and in terms of how much reason, all things considered, the agent has to want them to obtain.Less
The chapter argues that in order to accommodate many typical agent-centered options and to resolve the paradox of supererogation, we should accept that non-moral reasons can, and sometimes do, prevent moral reasons, even those with considerable moral requiring strength, from generating moral requirements. What's more, we should accept that an agent's performing a given act is morally permissible if and only if there is no available alternative that she has both more (moral) requiring reason and more reason, all things considered, to perform. And it is argued that, given this account of moral permissibility, the consequentialist has no choice but to adopt a dual-ranking version of consequentialism—one that ranks outcomes both in terms of how much moral reason the agent has to want them to obtain and in terms of how much reason, all things considered, the agent has to want them to obtain.
Thomas L. Carson
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199577415
- eISBN:
- 9780191722813
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577415.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General
This chapter develops a theory of moral reasoning in the form of rationality conditions for moral judgments. The chapter argues that moral judges must be: 1) consistent, 2) adequately informed by ...
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This chapter develops a theory of moral reasoning in the form of rationality conditions for moral judgments. The chapter argues that moral judges must be: 1) consistent, 2) adequately informed by knowledge of relevant facts (this requires vividly understanding relevant considerations, including the feelings of others), and 3) able to reason properly and have properly functioning cognitive abilities. The chapter argues that requirements of consistency commit us to the following version of the golden rule: “If I think it would be morally permissible for someone to do a certain act to another person, then I must not object to someone doing the same act to me (or someone I love) in relevantly similar circumstances.” The chapter answers several well-known objections to the golden rule and illustrate how it can be applied to cases.Less
This chapter develops a theory of moral reasoning in the form of rationality conditions for moral judgments. The chapter argues that moral judges must be: 1) consistent, 2) adequately informed by knowledge of relevant facts (this requires vividly understanding relevant considerations, including the feelings of others), and 3) able to reason properly and have properly functioning cognitive abilities. The chapter argues that requirements of consistency commit us to the following version of the golden rule: “If I think it would be morally permissible for someone to do a certain act to another person, then I must not object to someone doing the same act to me (or someone I love) in relevantly similar circumstances.” The chapter answers several well-known objections to the golden rule and illustrate how it can be applied to cases.
