Russ Shafer-Landau
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199259755
- eISBN:
- 9780191601835
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199259755.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This is a book in metaethics that defends a brand of moral realism known as non‐naturalism. The book has five Parts. Part I outlines the sort of moral realism that the author wishes to defend, and ...
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This is a book in metaethics that defends a brand of moral realism known as non‐naturalism. The book has five Parts. Part I outlines the sort of moral realism that the author wishes to defend, and then offers critiques of expressivism and constructivism. Part II is devoted to issues in metaphysics. It argues that moral realists have adequate replies to worries based on supervenience and the alleged causal inefficacy of moral facts. Part III is devoted to issues of moral motivation. It argues that motivational internalism is false, and that a Humean theory of action is also mistaken. Part IV is devoted to an extended discussion of moral reasons. It argues that externalism about reasons is true, that moral rationalism is true, and that moral realism has an adequate account of moral disagreement. Part V is devoted to moral epistemology. It argues for the self‐evidence of pro tanto moral principles, and for a version of reliabilism about ethical knowledge.Less
This is a book in metaethics that defends a brand of moral realism known as non‐naturalism. The book has five Parts. Part I outlines the sort of moral realism that the author wishes to defend, and then offers critiques of expressivism and constructivism. Part II is devoted to issues in metaphysics. It argues that moral realists have adequate replies to worries based on supervenience and the alleged causal inefficacy of moral facts. Part III is devoted to issues of moral motivation. It argues that motivational internalism is false, and that a Humean theory of action is also mistaken. Part IV is devoted to an extended discussion of moral reasons. It argues that externalism about reasons is true, that moral rationalism is true, and that moral realism has an adequate account of moral disagreement. Part V is devoted to moral epistemology. It argues for the self‐evidence of pro tanto moral principles, and for a version of reliabilism about ethical knowledge.
Christian F. R. Illies
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198238324
- eISBN:
- 9780191679612
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198238324.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter examines the debate about moral realism which can be found in current analytic philosophy and outlines the position of moral realism and anti-realism and the main arguments raised by ...
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This chapter examines the debate about moral realism which can be found in current analytic philosophy and outlines the position of moral realism and anti-realism and the main arguments raised by proponents of both sides. It seems that a rational solution of the conflict between these very different perspectives is not possible, since realists and anti-realists not only disagree heavily about whether moral facts are ‘real’ in any meaningful sense, but also about the criteria for deciding upon this question. Moral realism has the burden of proof in this debate, and can only make a proper claim to be right if it can provide a rational justification of moral judgements. Traditional methodologies for such a justification of normative notions are considered and rejected as inappropriate to the task, including deduction, induction, and intuition.Less
This chapter examines the debate about moral realism which can be found in current analytic philosophy and outlines the position of moral realism and anti-realism and the main arguments raised by proponents of both sides. It seems that a rational solution of the conflict between these very different perspectives is not possible, since realists and anti-realists not only disagree heavily about whether moral facts are ‘real’ in any meaningful sense, but also about the criteria for deciding upon this question. Moral realism has the burden of proof in this debate, and can only make a proper claim to be right if it can provide a rational justification of moral judgements. Traditional methodologies for such a justification of normative notions are considered and rejected as inappropriate to the task, including deduction, induction, and intuition.
Michael Devitt
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199280803
- eISBN:
- 9780191723254
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199280803.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
This chapter argues for moral realism. What is moral realism? Standard answers in terms of truth and meaning are rejected. These answers are partly motivated by the phenomenon of noncognitivism. ...
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This chapter argues for moral realism. What is moral realism? Standard answers in terms of truth and meaning are rejected. These answers are partly motivated by the phenomenon of noncognitivism. Noncognitivism does indeed cause trouble for a straightforwardly metaphysical answer but still such an answer can be given. Moral realism should be accepted because it is prima facie plausible and its alternatives are not. But what about the arguments against moral realism? The chapter looks critically at the argument from ‘queerness’, the argument from relativity, the argument from explanation, and epistemological arguments. But there is a major worry for moral realism: How can it be accommodated in a naturalistic world view? The chapter concludes with some brief and inadequate remarks in response to this question.Less
This chapter argues for moral realism. What is moral realism? Standard answers in terms of truth and meaning are rejected. These answers are partly motivated by the phenomenon of noncognitivism. Noncognitivism does indeed cause trouble for a straightforwardly metaphysical answer but still such an answer can be given. Moral realism should be accepted because it is prima facie plausible and its alternatives are not. But what about the arguments against moral realism? The chapter looks critically at the argument from ‘queerness’, the argument from relativity, the argument from explanation, and epistemological arguments. But there is a major worry for moral realism: How can it be accommodated in a naturalistic world view? The chapter concludes with some brief and inadequate remarks in response to this question.
David Copp
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199653492
- eISBN:
- 9780191741661
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199653492.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Moral and political philosophers commonly appeal to moral “intuitions” at crucial points in their reasoning. This chapter considers recent challenges to this practice—here referred to as “the ...
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Moral and political philosophers commonly appeal to moral “intuitions” at crucial points in their reasoning. This chapter considers recent challenges to this practice—here referred to as “the Method”—based in empirical studies of moral intuitions. It contends that such studies do not justify radical or revisionary conclusions about the Method. A method is aimed at achieving certain goals. The key issue is the nature of the goals in relation to which the Method is to be evaluated. This chapter argues that the relevant goal is not the “realist goal” of discovering the truth about moral and political matters. The central point is that, the chapter argues, the systematic philosophical study of moral and political questions would be worthwhile even if it turned out that moral realism cannot be vindicated or that the Method cannot be vindicated in relation to the realist goal. If this is correct, then the goal relative to which it is crucial to vindicate the Method is not the realist goal. A Rawlsian view is more plausible, according to which the relevant goal is to “characterize our moral sensibility” as it would be in “reflective equilibrium.” It turns out, however, that this Rawlsian view has some, perhaps unwelcome, deflationary implications.Less
Moral and political philosophers commonly appeal to moral “intuitions” at crucial points in their reasoning. This chapter considers recent challenges to this practice—here referred to as “the Method”—based in empirical studies of moral intuitions. It contends that such studies do not justify radical or revisionary conclusions about the Method. A method is aimed at achieving certain goals. The key issue is the nature of the goals in relation to which the Method is to be evaluated. This chapter argues that the relevant goal is not the “realist goal” of discovering the truth about moral and political matters. The central point is that, the chapter argues, the systematic philosophical study of moral and political questions would be worthwhile even if it turned out that moral realism cannot be vindicated or that the Method cannot be vindicated in relation to the realist goal. If this is correct, then the goal relative to which it is crucial to vindicate the Method is not the realist goal. A Rawlsian view is more plausible, according to which the relevant goal is to “characterize our moral sensibility” as it would be in “reflective equilibrium.” It turns out, however, that this Rawlsian view has some, perhaps unwelcome, deflationary implications.
Justin Broackes (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199289905
- eISBN:
- 9780191728471
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199289905.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This book offers a detailed introduction to Iris Murdoch's philosophical work, especially the moral philosophy of The Sovereignty of Good (1970). Murdoch argued for an important and distinctive ...
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This book offers a detailed introduction to Iris Murdoch's philosophical work, especially the moral philosophy of The Sovereignty of Good (1970). Murdoch argued for an important and distinctive position, in opposition to the mid‐20th‐century analytic philosophers like R. M. Hare and Stuart Hampshire, and to existentialists like Sartre. Murdoch combined a form of moral realism or ‘naturalism’, allowing into the world cases of such properties as humility or generosity; an anti‐scientism; a rejection of Humean moral psychology; a sort of ‘particularism’; special attention to the virtues; and emphasis on the metaphor of moral perception or ‘seeing’ moral facts. (A similar combination of views is found in the work of John McDowell.) What we can choose depends on what we can see; what we can see depends in turn upon the conceptual scheme we have. This book presents some intellectual biography; the book investigates the arguments of The Sovereignty of Good and other articles; the book comments on the influence on Murdoch of Simone Weil, Plato, Kant and Wittgenstein; and on her historical approach; and the book introduces the contributions in the present volume.Less
This book offers a detailed introduction to Iris Murdoch's philosophical work, especially the moral philosophy of The Sovereignty of Good (1970). Murdoch argued for an important and distinctive position, in opposition to the mid‐20th‐century analytic philosophers like R. M. Hare and Stuart Hampshire, and to existentialists like Sartre. Murdoch combined a form of moral realism or ‘naturalism’, allowing into the world cases of such properties as humility or generosity; an anti‐scientism; a rejection of Humean moral psychology; a sort of ‘particularism’; special attention to the virtues; and emphasis on the metaphor of moral perception or ‘seeing’ moral facts. (A similar combination of views is found in the work of John McDowell.) What we can choose depends on what we can see; what we can see depends in turn upon the conceptual scheme we have. This book presents some intellectual biography; the book investigates the arguments of The Sovereignty of Good and other articles; the book comments on the influence on Murdoch of Simone Weil, Plato, Kant and Wittgenstein; and on her historical approach; and the book introduces the contributions in the present volume.
Catherine Wilson
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199267675
- eISBN:
- 9780191601859
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199267677.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Moral Animals offers a set of anthropological and conceptual foundations for moral theory before turning to the problem of overdemandingness or exigency as it afflicts contemporary ...
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Moral Animals offers a set of anthropological and conceptual foundations for moral theory before turning to the problem of overdemandingness or exigency as it afflicts contemporary egalitarianism. The first half of the book is devoted to a discussion of the bearing of evolutionary theory on ethics and metaethics. After arguing that morality presupposes and compensates for asymmetrical relations of advantage and social power, the author addresses the problem of objectivity, showing in what sense moral judgements are susceptible of confirmation, whether or not moral realism is tenable. In the second half of the book, a number of vexed issues in the theory of social justice, including the problems of affluence and the subordination of women, are examined. Taking the fair division of the co‐operative surplus as the basic problem of distributive justice, the author shows how most co‐operation between human beings fails to allocate goods to individuals and groups according to appropriate standards of need and merit. It is shown that neither the special nature of the first‐person standpoint, nor the importance of non‐moral projects and ambitions, nor the different needs, social understandings, competencies, and emotions of different persons and groups pose a serious challenge to the view that greater global equality in levels of well‐being, as well as greater equality between the sexes, is not only morally desirable but morally required.Less
Moral Animals offers a set of anthropological and conceptual foundations for moral theory before turning to the problem of overdemandingness or exigency as it afflicts contemporary egalitarianism. The first half of the book is devoted to a discussion of the bearing of evolutionary theory on ethics and metaethics. After arguing that morality presupposes and compensates for asymmetrical relations of advantage and social power, the author addresses the problem of objectivity, showing in what sense moral judgements are susceptible of confirmation, whether or not moral realism is tenable. In the second half of the book, a number of vexed issues in the theory of social justice, including the problems of affluence and the subordination of women, are examined. Taking the fair division of the co‐operative surplus as the basic problem of distributive justice, the author shows how most co‐operation between human beings fails to allocate goods to individuals and groups according to appropriate standards of need and merit. It is shown that neither the special nature of the first‐person standpoint, nor the importance of non‐moral projects and ambitions, nor the different needs, social understandings, competencies, and emotions of different persons and groups pose a serious challenge to the view that greater global equality in levels of well‐being, as well as greater equality between the sexes, is not only morally desirable but morally required.
Mark Eli Kalderon
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199275977
- eISBN:
- 9780191706066
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199275977.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter demonstrates that there are forms of noncognitivism that eschew nonfactualism. An important obstacle to standard noncognitivism has been its apparent commitment to an implausible ...
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This chapter demonstrates that there are forms of noncognitivism that eschew nonfactualism. An important obstacle to standard noncognitivism has been its apparent commitment to an implausible expressivist form of nonfactualism. However, noncognitivism — the claim that moral acceptance is some attitude other than belief — is not the exclusive province of nonfactualism. A novel alternative to moral realism, moral fictionalism, can vindicate noncognitivism as well and can do so without claiming that moral sentences are nonrepresentational. And if the problems for an expressivist nonfactualism prove intractable, then an adequate defence of noncognitivism necessarily involves the development of moral fictionalism. This involves rethinking the standard taxonomy of alternatives to moral realism.Less
This chapter demonstrates that there are forms of noncognitivism that eschew nonfactualism. An important obstacle to standard noncognitivism has been its apparent commitment to an implausible expressivist form of nonfactualism. However, noncognitivism — the claim that moral acceptance is some attitude other than belief — is not the exclusive province of nonfactualism. A novel alternative to moral realism, moral fictionalism, can vindicate noncognitivism as well and can do so without claiming that moral sentences are nonrepresentational. And if the problems for an expressivist nonfactualism prove intractable, then an adequate defence of noncognitivism necessarily involves the development of moral fictionalism. This involves rethinking the standard taxonomy of alternatives to moral realism.
David Copp
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195147797
- eISBN:
- 9780199785841
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195147790.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter begins by explaining the distinction between meta-ethics and normative ethics. It then introduces the main issues in the two fields and provides a critical overview of the chapters in ...
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This chapter begins by explaining the distinction between meta-ethics and normative ethics. It then introduces the main issues in the two fields and provides a critical overview of the chapters in the volume. In meta-ethics, it focuses on explaining the different kinds of moral realism and anti-realism, including the divine command theory, naturalism, non-naturalism, relativism, nihilism, and non-cognitivism. Quasi-realism illustrates how the distinction between anti-realism and realism can become blurred. A variety of views about the relation between morality and practical reason, including contractarianism, are discussed. In normative ethics, the chapter focuses on the distinction, among theories of right action, between consequentialism and non-consequentialism, as well as the distinction between theories of right action and other kinds of normative theory, such as rights theory, virtue theory, and the ethics of care. There is an overview of the debate between consequentialism and deontology regarding moral constraints, as well as a discussion of indirect consequentialist responses to deontological objections.Less
This chapter begins by explaining the distinction between meta-ethics and normative ethics. It then introduces the main issues in the two fields and provides a critical overview of the chapters in the volume. In meta-ethics, it focuses on explaining the different kinds of moral realism and anti-realism, including the divine command theory, naturalism, non-naturalism, relativism, nihilism, and non-cognitivism. Quasi-realism illustrates how the distinction between anti-realism and realism can become blurred. A variety of views about the relation between morality and practical reason, including contractarianism, are discussed. In normative ethics, the chapter focuses on the distinction, among theories of right action, between consequentialism and non-consequentialism, as well as the distinction between theories of right action and other kinds of normative theory, such as rights theory, virtue theory, and the ethics of care. There is an overview of the debate between consequentialism and deontology regarding moral constraints, as well as a discussion of indirect consequentialist responses to deontological objections.
Geoffrey Sayre-McCord
David Copp (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195147797
- eISBN:
- 9780199785841
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195147790.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter explores the attractions, problems, and prospects of moral realism. Special attention is given to Moore’s Open Question Argument, internalism, noncognitivism, and error theories. The ...
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This chapter explores the attractions, problems, and prospects of moral realism. Special attention is given to Moore’s Open Question Argument, internalism, noncognitivism, and error theories. The final section sketches a research program for moral realism that takes on and pursues Hume’s aim of explaining the ability to think in moral, and more broadly, normative, terms in a way that shows that the successful exercise of this ability is neither metaphysically nor epistemically mysterious.Less
This chapter explores the attractions, problems, and prospects of moral realism. Special attention is given to Moore’s Open Question Argument, internalism, noncognitivism, and error theories. The final section sketches a research program for moral realism that takes on and pursues Hume’s aim of explaining the ability to think in moral, and more broadly, normative, terms in a way that shows that the successful exercise of this ability is neither metaphysically nor epistemically mysterious.
Angus Ritchie
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199652518
- eISBN:
- 9780191745850
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199652518.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
This book offers an argument for theism. It claims only purposive accounts of the universe can do justice to our pre-philosophical moral commitment to objective moral truth and explain the human ...
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This book offers an argument for theism. It claims only purposive accounts of the universe can do justice to our pre-philosophical moral commitment to objective moral truth and explain the human acquisition of belief-generating and belief-evaluating capacities which track such truth.This book begins with a defence of moral realism, arguing for its ‘deliberative indispensability’. It claims that the practical deliberation human beings engage in on a daily basis only makes sense if they take themselves to be aiming at a normative truth — that is to say, a truth which goes beyond their own sentiments or the conventions of their culture. Furthermore, when humans engage in practical deliberation, they necessarily take their processes of reasoning to have some ability to track the truth.The central argument of the book builds on this first claim: arguing that we need an explanation as well as a justification of our cognitive capacities with respect to moral truth. It claims that evolutionary biology is not able to generate the kind of explanation which is required — and, in consequence, that all secular philosophical accounts are forced either to abandon moral objectivism or to render the human capacity for moral knowledge inexplicable. This case is made with discussions of a wide range of moral philosophers including Simon Blackburn, Thomas Scanlon, Philippa Foot, and John McDowell. The book concludes by arguing that only purposive accounts of the universe (such as theism and Platonism) can account for human moral knowledge. Among such purposive accounts, it makes the case for theism as the most satisfying, intelligible explanation of our capacity for moral knowledge.Less
This book offers an argument for theism. It claims only purposive accounts of the universe can do justice to our pre-philosophical moral commitment to objective moral truth and explain the human acquisition of belief-generating and belief-evaluating capacities which track such truth.This book begins with a defence of moral realism, arguing for its ‘deliberative indispensability’. It claims that the practical deliberation human beings engage in on a daily basis only makes sense if they take themselves to be aiming at a normative truth — that is to say, a truth which goes beyond their own sentiments or the conventions of their culture. Furthermore, when humans engage in practical deliberation, they necessarily take their processes of reasoning to have some ability to track the truth.The central argument of the book builds on this first claim: arguing that we need an explanation as well as a justification of our cognitive capacities with respect to moral truth. It claims that evolutionary biology is not able to generate the kind of explanation which is required — and, in consequence, that all secular philosophical accounts are forced either to abandon moral objectivism or to render the human capacity for moral knowledge inexplicable. This case is made with discussions of a wide range of moral philosophers including Simon Blackburn, Thomas Scanlon, Philippa Foot, and John McDowell. The book concludes by arguing that only purposive accounts of the universe (such as theism and Platonism) can account for human moral knowledge. Among such purposive accounts, it makes the case for theism as the most satisfying, intelligible explanation of our capacity for moral knowledge.
Michael Devitt
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199280803
- eISBN:
- 9780191723254
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199280803.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
The book has two parts: one metaphysical, the other epistemological. The metaphysical part is largely concerned with realism issues. It starts with realism about universals, dismissing Plato's ...
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The book has two parts: one metaphysical, the other epistemological. The metaphysical part is largely concerned with realism issues. It starts with realism about universals, dismissing Plato's notorious ‘one over many’ problem. Several chapters argue for a fairly uncompromisingly realist view of the external physical world of commonsense and science. Both the nonfactualism of moral noncognitivism and positivistic instrumentalism, and deflationism about truth, are found to rest on antirealisms about their subject matters that are hard to characterize. A case is presented for moral realism. Various biological realisms are considered. Finally, an argument is presented for an unfashionable biological essentialism. The epistemological part of the book argues against the a priori and for a Quinean naturalism. The intuitions that so dominate ‘armchair philosophy’ are empirical not a priori. There is an emphasis throughout the book on distinguishing metaphysical issues about what there is and what it's like from semantic issues about meaning, truth, and reference. Another central theme, captured in the title, is that we should ‘put metaphysics first’. We should approach epistemology and semantics from a metaphysical perspective rather than vice versa. The epistemological turn in modern philosophy and the linguistic turn in contemporary philosophy were something of disasters.Less
The book has two parts: one metaphysical, the other epistemological. The metaphysical part is largely concerned with realism issues. It starts with realism about universals, dismissing Plato's notorious ‘one over many’ problem. Several chapters argue for a fairly uncompromisingly realist view of the external physical world of commonsense and science. Both the nonfactualism of moral noncognitivism and positivistic instrumentalism, and deflationism about truth, are found to rest on antirealisms about their subject matters that are hard to characterize. A case is presented for moral realism. Various biological realisms are considered. Finally, an argument is presented for an unfashionable biological essentialism. The epistemological part of the book argues against the a priori and for a Quinean naturalism. The intuitions that so dominate ‘armchair philosophy’ are empirical not a priori. There is an emphasis throughout the book on distinguishing metaphysical issues about what there is and what it's like from semantic issues about meaning, truth, and reference. Another central theme, captured in the title, is that we should ‘put metaphysics first’. We should approach epistemology and semantics from a metaphysical perspective rather than vice versa. The epistemological turn in modern philosophy and the linguistic turn in contemporary philosophy were something of disasters.
Paul Bloomfield
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195137132
- eISBN:
- 9780199833092
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195137132.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
The book is a work in metaethics, constituting a defense of moral realism. The book begins with what I call a “modest transcendental argument” for the existence of the property of moral goodness ...
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The book is a work in metaethics, constituting a defense of moral realism. The book begins with what I call a “modest transcendental argument” for the existence of the property of moral goodness based on an acknowledgment of the possibility that personal moral failing may go forever undetected; as such this is an argument from error. The property of physical health, understood in terms of proper function, is used as a model for moral goodness. This anchors the moral ontology on foundations as solid as those found in the physical sciences. A moral epistemology is developed in which we may learn about goodness much in the way doctors and scientists may learn about healthiness. The semantics that emerges from this picture is multifaceted and nuanced enough to preserve complicated common sense semantic intuitions about how the word “good” is used in moral contexts. The position also implies a defense of an externalist theory about the relationship between the recognition of a moral consideration and motivation. The book closes with an appendix in which the reduction of thermodynamics to statistical mechanics is questioned, and a nonreducible ontology for entropy is considered as an ontological model for both physical health and moral goodness.Less
The book is a work in metaethics, constituting a defense of moral realism. The book begins with what I call a “modest transcendental argument” for the existence of the property of moral goodness based on an acknowledgment of the possibility that personal moral failing may go forever undetected; as such this is an argument from error. The property of physical health, understood in terms of proper function, is used as a model for moral goodness. This anchors the moral ontology on foundations as solid as those found in the physical sciences. A moral epistemology is developed in which we may learn about goodness much in the way doctors and scientists may learn about healthiness. The semantics that emerges from this picture is multifaceted and nuanced enough to preserve complicated common sense semantic intuitions about how the word “good” is used in moral contexts. The position also implies a defense of an externalist theory about the relationship between the recognition of a moral consideration and motivation. The book closes with an appendix in which the reduction of thermodynamics to statistical mechanics is questioned, and a nonreducible ontology for entropy is considered as an ontological model for both physical health and moral goodness.
Rebekah L. Miles
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195144161
- eISBN:
- 9780199834495
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195144163.003.0004
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
An examination is made of Rosemary Radford Ruether's naturalist moral realism, whose naturalist, ecofeminist ethic locates both God (divine presence) and human norms in natural processes, ...
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An examination is made of Rosemary Radford Ruether's naturalist moral realism, whose naturalist, ecofeminist ethic locates both God (divine presence) and human norms in natural processes, particularly in evolution. Transcendence of immediate context and experience is possible through conscious participation in natural evolutionary development into the future. Ruether's moral realism is evident in her confidence that humans can know the good by looking to nature, including human nature, and this same confidence makes her an idealist about the potential to eliminate domination by creating new selves, theologies, and social structures. Moreover, Ruether's description of normative human nature focuses on boundedness to nature and the self's unique faculty of consciousness as an expression of nature; it does not include the human capacity for radical transcendence of or freedom over nature and consciousness. Thus, it is argued, Ruether offers grounding for moral norms in her naturalist moral realism, but she lacks a mechanism to judge those norms and to account for the resilience of human sin and the potential of human creativity to transmute nature.Less
An examination is made of Rosemary Radford Ruether's naturalist moral realism, whose naturalist, ecofeminist ethic locates both God (divine presence) and human norms in natural processes, particularly in evolution. Transcendence of immediate context and experience is possible through conscious participation in natural evolutionary development into the future. Ruether's moral realism is evident in her confidence that humans can know the good by looking to nature, including human nature, and this same confidence makes her an idealist about the potential to eliminate domination by creating new selves, theologies, and social structures. Moreover, Ruether's description of normative human nature focuses on boundedness to nature and the self's unique faculty of consciousness as an expression of nature; it does not include the human capacity for radical transcendence of or freedom over nature and consciousness. Thus, it is argued, Ruether offers grounding for moral norms in her naturalist moral realism, but she lacks a mechanism to judge those norms and to account for the resilience of human sin and the potential of human creativity to transmute nature.
Panayot Butchvarov
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199269914
- eISBN:
- 9780191710032
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199269914.003.0017
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General
This chapter advocates a return to Moorean independence. One dominant metaethical trend is moral epistemology naturalized. Another metaethical trend has been conceptual analysis, often called ...
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This chapter advocates a return to Moorean independence. One dominant metaethical trend is moral epistemology naturalized. Another metaethical trend has been conceptual analysis, often called ‘analytic ethics’. It is argued that both trends are philosophically misguided. Ethics naturalized is un-philosophical in lacking the kind of supreme generality and abstractness that is distinctive of philosophical inquiry; it takes human beings to occupy moral centre stage. By contrast, we find in Moore a kind of cosmological ethics, focused on the value of all things in the universe as a basis for ethical inquiry. Moreover, ethics naturalized lacks competence in that its scientific pretensions are at odds with how philosophers go about their business. Analytic ethics, on the other hand, which is explicitly concerned with armchair, intuitive judgments about meanings, cannot overcome the lack of competence signaled by the philosophical lessons about conceptual analysis found in Kant, Quine, and Wittgenstein. In light of these failures, the chapter advocates returning to the cosmological orientation of Moore's ethics, which can be properly understood as avoiding the traditional metaethical debate between realism and anti-realism, as well as avoiding the battery of objections to the effect that Moore's ethics is not relevant to action. Such a return to a Moorean view of ethics would represent a version of ‘ethics dehumanized’: cosmological in its focus and thus properly philosophical.Less
This chapter advocates a return to Moorean independence. One dominant metaethical trend is moral epistemology naturalized. Another metaethical trend has been conceptual analysis, often called ‘analytic ethics’. It is argued that both trends are philosophically misguided. Ethics naturalized is un-philosophical in lacking the kind of supreme generality and abstractness that is distinctive of philosophical inquiry; it takes human beings to occupy moral centre stage. By contrast, we find in Moore a kind of cosmological ethics, focused on the value of all things in the universe as a basis for ethical inquiry. Moreover, ethics naturalized lacks competence in that its scientific pretensions are at odds with how philosophers go about their business. Analytic ethics, on the other hand, which is explicitly concerned with armchair, intuitive judgments about meanings, cannot overcome the lack of competence signaled by the philosophical lessons about conceptual analysis found in Kant, Quine, and Wittgenstein. In light of these failures, the chapter advocates returning to the cosmological orientation of Moore's ethics, which can be properly understood as avoiding the traditional metaethical debate between realism and anti-realism, as well as avoiding the battery of objections to the effect that Moore's ethics is not relevant to action. Such a return to a Moorean view of ethics would represent a version of ‘ethics dehumanized’: cosmological in its focus and thus properly philosophical.
Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199267989
- eISBN:
- 9780191708268
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199267989.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
In chapters 4 and 5 of his 1998 book From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis, Frank Jackson propounds and defends a form of moral realism that he calls both ‘moral functionalism’ ...
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In chapters 4 and 5 of his 1998 book From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis, Frank Jackson propounds and defends a form of moral realism that he calls both ‘moral functionalism’ and ‘analytical descriptivism’. This chapter argues that this metaethical position, referred to as ‘analytical moral functionalism’, is untenable. It does this by applying a generic thought-experimental deconstructive recipe that has been used against other views that posit moral properties and identify them with certain natural properties — a recipe that is applicable to virtually any metaphysically naturalist version of moral realism. The recipe deploys a scenario called Moral Twin Earth.Less
In chapters 4 and 5 of his 1998 book From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis, Frank Jackson propounds and defends a form of moral realism that he calls both ‘moral functionalism’ and ‘analytical descriptivism’. This chapter argues that this metaethical position, referred to as ‘analytical moral functionalism’, is untenable. It does this by applying a generic thought-experimental deconstructive recipe that has been used against other views that posit moral properties and identify them with certain natural properties — a recipe that is applicable to virtually any metaphysically naturalist version of moral realism. The recipe deploys a scenario called Moral Twin Earth.
Russ Shafer-Landau
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199259755
- eISBN:
- 9780191601835
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199259755.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Sets out the contours of the moral realism that the author wishes to defend, and provides an extended series of arguments against non‐cognitivism and expressivism. Seeks to establish a presumptive ...
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Sets out the contours of the moral realism that the author wishes to defend, and provides an extended series of arguments against non‐cognitivism and expressivism. Seeks to establish a presumptive case for moral cognitivism.Less
Sets out the contours of the moral realism that the author wishes to defend, and provides an extended series of arguments against non‐cognitivism and expressivism. Seeks to establish a presumptive case for moral cognitivism.
Philippa Foot
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199252848
- eISBN:
- 9780191597411
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019925284X.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Argues against two articles of Bernard Williams in which he attacks moral realism. In the first (Ethical Consistency), Williams finds a disanalogy between judgements of matters of fact and moral ...
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Argues against two articles of Bernard Williams in which he attacks moral realism. In the first (Ethical Consistency), Williams finds a disanalogy between judgements of matters of fact and moral judgements in that when two beliefs are irreconcilable one must simply cede: whereas an obligation that overrides another obligation does so only with ‘remainder.’ Foot argues that although the notion of obligation when understood in one way does indeed allow coexisting irreconcilable obligations, this no more supports anti‐realism here than the possibility of clashing social engagements supports an anti‐realistic account of judgements about them. In the second article (Consistency and Realism) Williams argues from the special case of irresolvable moral conflict, where there are as good reasons for doing a as for doing not a, suggesting that there cannot similarly be as good reasons for believing and disbelieving a proposition. Foot denies that this implies anti‐realism for propositions about reasons, suggesting an analogy in the case of propositions that are equally assertable or deniable relative to different grounds.Less
Argues against two articles of Bernard Williams in which he attacks moral realism. In the first (Ethical Consistency), Williams finds a disanalogy between judgements of matters of fact and moral judgements in that when two beliefs are irreconcilable one must simply cede: whereas an obligation that overrides another obligation does so only with ‘remainder.’ Foot argues that although the notion of obligation when understood in one way does indeed allow coexisting irreconcilable obligations, this no more supports anti‐realism here than the possibility of clashing social engagements supports an anti‐realistic account of judgements about them. In the second article (Consistency and Realism) Williams argues from the special case of irresolvable moral conflict, where there are as good reasons for doing a as for doing not a, suggesting that there cannot similarly be as good reasons for believing and disbelieving a proposition. Foot denies that this implies anti‐realism for propositions about reasons, suggesting an analogy in the case of propositions that are equally assertable or deniable relative to different grounds.
Jonathan Bennett
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198237914
- eISBN:
- 9780191597077
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019823791X.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This book employs philosophical analysis in an endeavour to grasp more firmly some concepts used in moral theory. Analysis is defended here against attackers, especially Rorty. Moral non‐realism is ...
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This book employs philosophical analysis in an endeavour to grasp more firmly some concepts used in moral theory. Analysis is defended here against attackers, especially Rorty. Moral non‐realism is presented as an underlying assumption of the book, and related to the desire for consistency and generality in moral theory. Hare's notion of two levels of morality is defended.Less
This book employs philosophical analysis in an endeavour to grasp more firmly some concepts used in moral theory. Analysis is defended here against attackers, especially Rorty. Moral non‐realism is presented as an underlying assumption of the book, and related to the desire for consistency and generality in moral theory. Hare's notion of two levels of morality is defended.
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195187724
- eISBN:
- 9780199786121
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195187725.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter explores moral nihilism and error theories, which hold that moral beliefs are truth-apt but never true. Arguments for such views from relativity, evolution, and epistemological, ...
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This chapter explores moral nihilism and error theories, which hold that moral beliefs are truth-apt but never true. Arguments for such views from relativity, evolution, and epistemological, psychological, and metaphysical queerness are all explained and critically assessed. The logical and semantic coherence of moral nihilism is then defended. The result is that moral nihilism is far from proven, but remains a serious contender in moral epistemology.Less
This chapter explores moral nihilism and error theories, which hold that moral beliefs are truth-apt but never true. Arguments for such views from relativity, evolution, and epistemological, psychological, and metaphysical queerness are all explained and critically assessed. The logical and semantic coherence of moral nihilism is then defended. The result is that moral nihilism is far from proven, but remains a serious contender in moral epistemology.
Shaun Nichols
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780195169348
- eISBN:
- 9780199835041
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195169344.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter turns to the genealogy of “harm norms,” norms against causing pain and suffering to others. The chapter sets out a range of historical and anthropological facts that need to be captured ...
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This chapter turns to the genealogy of “harm norms,” norms against causing pain and suffering to others. The chapter sets out a range of historical and anthropological facts that need to be captured by a genealogy of harm norms. In particular, an adequate genealogy needs to explain the broad similarities and differences in harm norms across cultures and the characteristic evolution of harm norms. One prominent explanation for these facts appeals to moral progress. This chapter proposes an alternative account of the genealogy of norms that draws on the central thesis of chapter 6, that norms which resonate with our emotions will be more likely to survive.Less
This chapter turns to the genealogy of “harm norms,” norms against causing pain and suffering to others. The chapter sets out a range of historical and anthropological facts that need to be captured by a genealogy of harm norms. In particular, an adequate genealogy needs to explain the broad similarities and differences in harm norms across cultures and the characteristic evolution of harm norms. One prominent explanation for these facts appeals to moral progress. This chapter proposes an alternative account of the genealogy of norms that draws on the central thesis of chapter 6, that norms which resonate with our emotions will be more likely to survive.
