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Moral Fictionalism

Mark Eli Kalderon

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
September 2010
ISBN:
9780199275977
eISBN:
9780191706066
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199275977.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Language

Moral realists maintain that morality has a distinctive subject matter. Specifically, realists maintain that moral discourse is representational, that moral sentences express moral propositions — ... More


Aspects of Value

A. E. Denham

in Metaphor and Moral Experience

Published in print:
2000
Published Online:
October 2011
ISBN:
9780198240105
eISBN:
9780191680076
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198240105.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Moral Philosophy

The analogy between experience of value and experience of secondary qualities raises as many questions as it answers. This chapter suggests that moral experience, like much perceptual experience, is ... More


Goodness

Colin McGinn

in Ethics, Evil, and Fiction

Published in print:
1999
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780198238775
eISBN:
9780191598005
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0198238770.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Aesthetics

This chapter is an extensive critique of the thesis of moral psychologism. Appealing to the Naturalistic Fallacy, McGinn argues that moral psychologism, as instanced in emotivism, the dispositional ... More


Emotionism

Jesse J. Prinz

in The Emotional Construction of Morals

Published in print:
2009
Published Online:
October 2011
ISBN:
9780199571543
eISBN:
9780191702075
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199571543.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Moral judgements are anything but indifferent and this is exemplified in this chapter through the comparison of asking opinion about capital punishment in which a common answer would be the feeling ... More


Moral Perception: Causal, Phenomenological, and Epistemological Elements

Robert Audi

in Moral Perception

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
October 2017
ISBN:
9780691156484
eISBN:
9781400846320
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Princeton University Press
DOI:
10.23943/princeton/9780691156484.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

This chapter analyzes how perception is a kind of experiential information-bearing relation between the perceiver and the object perceived. It argues that even if moral properties are not themselves ... More


The Location Problem for Ethics: Moral Properties and Moral Content

Frank Jackson

in From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis

Published in print:
2000
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780198250616
eISBN:
9780191597787
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0198250614.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, General

This chapter gives an account of what cognitivism in ethics is and argues that the a priori global nature of the supervenience of the ethical on the descriptive requires cognitivists in ethics to ... More


Conclusion

Robert Audi

in Moral Perception

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
October 2017
ISBN:
9780691156484
eISBN:
9781400846320
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Princeton University Press
DOI:
10.23943/princeton/9780691156484.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

This concluding chapter explains how the theory of moral perception takes full account of the causal element in perception but does not require naturalizing moral properties. However, the theory does ... More


Intuitionism

R. M. Hare

in Sorting Out Ethics

Published in print:
2000
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780198250326
eISBN:
9780191597602
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0198250320.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

Intuitionism, the second type of descriptivism, is the theory that the truth conditions of moral statements depend on irreducible moral properties, which must be defined in moral terms. The ... More


The Instrumental Values of Property

J. W. HARRIS

in Property and Justice

Published in print:
2002
Published Online:
January 2010
ISBN:
9780199251407
eISBN:
9780191681998
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199251407.003.0015
Subject:
Law, Philosophy of Law

This chapter considers the ways putative instrumental values of property institutions may be factored in, to yield a clearer idea of the kind of institution people have a right to have in place. ... More


Moral Vagueness: A Dilemma for Non-Naturalism

Cristian Constantinescu

in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 9

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
June 2014
ISBN:
9780198709299
eISBN:
9780191781056
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198709299.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

This chapter explores the implications of moral vagueness (namely, the vagueness of moral predicates) for non-naturalist metaethical theories like those recently championed by Shafer-Landau, Parfit, ... More


Good Without God

Michael S. Moore

in Natural Law, Liberalism, and Morality: Contemporary Essays

Published in print:
2001
Published Online:
March 2012
ISBN:
9780199243006
eISBN:
9780191697203
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199243006.003.0012
Subject:
Law, Philosophy of Law

This chapter discusses an examination of a question regarding God and morality. The question is stated as: ‘can there be objective moral properties like goodness in a world without God?’. The ... More


Property and Freedom

J. W. HARRIS

in Property and Justice

Published in print:
2002
Published Online:
January 2010
ISBN:
9780199251407
eISBN:
9780191681998
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199251407.003.0013
Subject:
Law, Philosophy of Law

This chapter considers whether there are moral property rights falling within the last of the seven categories set out in section (ii) of Chapter 10 — that is the moral standing of a person or group ... More


Properties for Nothing, Facts for Free? Expressivism’s Deflationary Gambit

Terence Cuneo

in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 8

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
September 2013
ISBN:
9780199678044
eISBN:
9780191757457
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199678044.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Philosophers accept the deflationary package when they maintain that moral propositional content, properties, facts, and truth admit of a deflationary (or minimalist) treatment. Expressivists often ... More


Doubts about Moral Perception

Pekka Väyrynen

in Evaluative Perception

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
June 2018
ISBN:
9780198786054
eISBN:
9780191827747
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198786054.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Moral Philosophy

This chapter defends doubts about the existence of genuine moral perception, understood as the claim that at least some moral properties figure in the contents of perceptual experience. The doubts ... More


Moral Perception and Moral Knowledge

Robert Audi

in Rational Belief: Structure, Grounds, and Intellectual Virtue

Published in print:
2015
Published Online:
August 2015
ISBN:
9780190221843
eISBN:
9780190221867
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190221843.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, General

This chapter addresses in detail the questions, What is moral perception? and How does it provide a basis for moral knowledge? Moral perception cannot be well understood, however, apart from an ... More


Moral Metaphor and Thick Concepts: What Moral Philosophy Can Learn from Aesthetics

Nick Zangwill

in Thick Concepts

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
May 2013
ISBN:
9780199672349
eISBN:
9780191751325
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672349.003.0011
Subject:
Philosophy, Aesthetics, Moral Philosophy

In this paper it is argued that we can embrace thick properties and thick concepts in moral philosophy as well as aesthetics-on three conditions: (1) that thick concepts are not supposed to function ... More


Subsentential Metasemantics

Neil Sinclair

in Practical Expressivism

Published in print:
2021
Published Online:
February 2021
ISBN:
9780198866107
eISBN:
9780191898327
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198866107.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

A subsentential metasemantics provides an explanation of the meaning of subsentential parts. Practical expressivism holds that moral predicates’ contribution to the explanation of meaning is a ... More


Moral Explanation for Moral Anti-Realism

Alexander Miller

in Explanation in Ethics and Mathematics: Debunking and Dispensability

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
August 2016
ISBN:
9780198778592
eISBN:
9780191824326
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198778592.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics

This chapter aims to undermine the ‘explanationist’ argument according to which the availability of true empirical explanations of moral judgements in terms of moral facts and properties provides ... More


Grounding, Explanation, and Multiple Realization in Mathematics and Ethics

David Liggins

in Explanation in Ethics and Mathematics: Debunking and Dispensability

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
August 2016
ISBN:
9780198778592
eISBN:
9780191824326
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198778592.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics

According to a popular ‘explanationist’ argument for moral or mathematical realism the best explanation of some phenomena are moral or mathematical, and this implies the relevant form of realism. One ... More


Against the Mixed View: Part II

Terence Cuneo

in Speech and Morality: On the Metaethical Implications of Speaking

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
August 2014
ISBN:
9780198712725
eISBN:
9780191781063
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198712725.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Moral Philosophy

The argument in Chapter 3 hinges on the assumption that moral concepts function descriptively, standing for moral properties. Some philosophers, such as expressivists, reject this assumption, holding ... More


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