Sean McKeever and Michael Ridge
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199290659
- eISBN:
- 9780191603617
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199290652.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Moral philosophy has long treated principles as indispensable for understanding its subject matter. However, the underlying assumption that this is the best approach has received almost no defence, ...
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Moral philosophy has long treated principles as indispensable for understanding its subject matter. However, the underlying assumption that this is the best approach has received almost no defence, and has been attacked by particularists who argue that the traditional link between morality and principles is little more than an unwarranted prejudice. This book meets this particularist challenge head on and defends a distinctive view called ‘generalism as a regulative ideal’. After cataloguing the wide array of views that have gone under the heading ‘particularism’, the reasons why the main particularist arguments fail to establish their conclusions are explained. Generalism as a regulative ideal incorporates what is most insightful in particularism (e.g., the possibility that reasons are context sensitive - ‘holism about reasons’) while rejecting every major particularist doctrine. The book resists the excesses of hyper-generalist views according to which moral thought is constituted by allegiance to a particular principle or set of principles. It argues that in so far as moral knowledge and wisdom are possible, all of morality can and should be codified in a manageable set of principles, even if we are not yet in possession of those principles. Such principles are not objects of mere curiosity, but play an important role in guiding the virtuous agent.Less
Moral philosophy has long treated principles as indispensable for understanding its subject matter. However, the underlying assumption that this is the best approach has received almost no defence, and has been attacked by particularists who argue that the traditional link between morality and principles is little more than an unwarranted prejudice. This book meets this particularist challenge head on and defends a distinctive view called ‘generalism as a regulative ideal’. After cataloguing the wide array of views that have gone under the heading ‘particularism’, the reasons why the main particularist arguments fail to establish their conclusions are explained. Generalism as a regulative ideal incorporates what is most insightful in particularism (e.g., the possibility that reasons are context sensitive - ‘holism about reasons’) while rejecting every major particularist doctrine. The book resists the excesses of hyper-generalist views according to which moral thought is constituted by allegiance to a particular principle or set of principles. It argues that in so far as moral knowledge and wisdom are possible, all of morality can and should be codified in a manageable set of principles, even if we are not yet in possession of those principles. Such principles are not objects of mere curiosity, but play an important role in guiding the virtuous agent.
Sean McKeever and Michael Ridge
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199290659
- eISBN:
- 9780191603617
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199290652.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter identifies moral particularism as a family of theses all of which involve some sort of negative assessment of moral principles. Family members are distinguished by the different negative ...
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This chapter identifies moral particularism as a family of theses all of which involve some sort of negative assessment of moral principles. Family members are distinguished by the different negative attitudes taken and by different conceptions of what a moral principle is. It argues that a proper evaluation of the arguments for moral particularism must be sensitive to these distinctions.Less
This chapter identifies moral particularism as a family of theses all of which involve some sort of negative assessment of moral principles. Family members are distinguished by the different negative attitudes taken and by different conceptions of what a moral principle is. It argues that a proper evaluation of the arguments for moral particularism must be sensitive to these distinctions.
Richard Dean
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199285723
- eISBN:
- 9780191603938
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199285721.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
The principle of respect for autonomy that is employed in medical ethics and other branches of applied ethics is widely taken to be a roughly Kantian principle, but there actually is no close ...
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The principle of respect for autonomy that is employed in medical ethics and other branches of applied ethics is widely taken to be a roughly Kantian principle, but there actually is no close connection between this currently influential principle and Kant’s ethics. Kant’s conception of autonomy differs from the conception prevalent in medical ethics, not only in its details but also in its fundamental role in moral theory. The principle of treating humanity as an end in itself does not closely resemble the contemporary principle of respect for autonomy, although the principles would in fact be similar if some minimal readings of the humanity formulation were correct. Furthermore, there is some reason to favour the moral principle of treating good will as an end in itself over any principle that gives central status to mere choice.Less
The principle of respect for autonomy that is employed in medical ethics and other branches of applied ethics is widely taken to be a roughly Kantian principle, but there actually is no close connection between this currently influential principle and Kant’s ethics. Kant’s conception of autonomy differs from the conception prevalent in medical ethics, not only in its details but also in its fundamental role in moral theory. The principle of treating humanity as an end in itself does not closely resemble the contemporary principle of respect for autonomy, although the principles would in fact be similar if some minimal readings of the humanity formulation were correct. Furthermore, there is some reason to favour the moral principle of treating good will as an end in itself over any principle that gives central status to mere choice.
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780195161243
- eISBN:
- 9780199950317
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195161243.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General, Moral Philosophy
Over the last several decades, advocates have championed a bewildering variety of methods for understanding and resolving difficult ethical problems in medicine, including principlism, wide ...
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Over the last several decades, advocates have championed a bewildering variety of methods for understanding and resolving difficult ethical problems in medicine, including principlism, wide reflective equilibrium, casuistry, feminism, virtue theory, narrative, and others. Much of this advocacy overlooks the limits of the favored method, and neglects the strengths found in the alternatives. In systematically uncovering and evaluating both the strengths and limits of a variety of ethical tools, Methods in Medical Ethics: Critical Perspectives develops a comprehensive appreciation of the roles that various methods can each play in deepening our understanding of ethical problems in medicine, and in supporting well-grounded judgments about what to do. Each method discussed is critically evaluated to identify both limits and advantages, which are then illustrated through discussion of specific cases or controversies. This review not only demonstrates that there is no single method adequate to the task. More importantly, it develops an informed eclecticism that knows how to pick the right tool for the right job.Less
Over the last several decades, advocates have championed a bewildering variety of methods for understanding and resolving difficult ethical problems in medicine, including principlism, wide reflective equilibrium, casuistry, feminism, virtue theory, narrative, and others. Much of this advocacy overlooks the limits of the favored method, and neglects the strengths found in the alternatives. In systematically uncovering and evaluating both the strengths and limits of a variety of ethical tools, Methods in Medical Ethics: Critical Perspectives develops a comprehensive appreciation of the roles that various methods can each play in deepening our understanding of ethical problems in medicine, and in supporting well-grounded judgments about what to do. Each method discussed is critically evaluated to identify both limits and advantages, which are then illustrated through discussion of specific cases or controversies. This review not only demonstrates that there is no single method adequate to the task. More importantly, it develops an informed eclecticism that knows how to pick the right tool for the right job.
Martin Wight
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- July 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199273676
- eISBN:
- 9780191602771
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199273677.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
Mazzini was a nationalist, a revolutionary, and a romantic. Although an ex-Catholic, he was deeply sympathetic to religion. He saw progress as the law of God, and duty as what man owed to God. He was ...
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Mazzini was a nationalist, a revolutionary, and a romantic. Although an ex-Catholic, he was deeply sympathetic to religion. He saw progress as the law of God, and duty as what man owed to God. He was a democratic socialist who had contempt for power politics, as in the diplomatic manoeuvrings of Cavour. His brief dictatorship over Rome was based on high moral principles. He believed that God had allotted roles for the major European nations, seeing in this a special destiny for Italy and Rome.Less
Mazzini was a nationalist, a revolutionary, and a romantic. Although an ex-Catholic, he was deeply sympathetic to religion. He saw progress as the law of God, and duty as what man owed to God. He was a democratic socialist who had contempt for power politics, as in the diplomatic manoeuvrings of Cavour. His brief dictatorship over Rome was based on high moral principles. He believed that God had allotted roles for the major European nations, seeing in this a special destiny for Italy and Rome.
Robert Audi
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195158427
- eISBN:
- 9780199871407
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195158427.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Much of what we want, such as food and entertainment and good company, we want for our own consumption or enjoyment; but we can also want those same sorts of things for other people. Indeed, if we ...
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Much of what we want, such as food and entertainment and good company, we want for our own consumption or enjoyment; but we can also want those same sorts of things for other people. Indeed, if we love other people, we must want certain kinds of things not only for them, but for their sake. This raises the question of whether we, as egoists hold, rationally want something for others only so far as it will lead to something we want for ourselves? Another question is whether given an ordinary knowledge of how others are like us, a kind of altruism is rationally demanded of us. If it is, then practical reason provides at least a limited foundation for ethics, in the sense that a rational person will, under certain conditions, have adequate reason to treat others in accordance with some basic moral principles. This chapter examines this issue and presents the general account of rationality.Less
Much of what we want, such as food and entertainment and good company, we want for our own consumption or enjoyment; but we can also want those same sorts of things for other people. Indeed, if we love other people, we must want certain kinds of things not only for them, but for their sake. This raises the question of whether we, as egoists hold, rationally want something for others only so far as it will lead to something we want for ourselves? Another question is whether given an ordinary knowledge of how others are like us, a kind of altruism is rationally demanded of us. If it is, then practical reason provides at least a limited foundation for ethics, in the sense that a rational person will, under certain conditions, have adequate reason to treat others in accordance with some basic moral principles. This chapter examines this issue and presents the general account of rationality.
Candace Vogler
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195311952
- eISBN:
- 9780199871070
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195311952.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter argues that Audi's ethical theory lacks the kind of grounding found in the theories of Ross and Kant, contrasting the “principles” of Audi's theory with Kant's categorical imperative and ...
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This chapter argues that Audi's ethical theory lacks the kind of grounding found in the theories of Ross and Kant, contrasting the “principles” of Audi's theory with Kant's categorical imperative and Ross's prima facie duties. The categorical imperative, it argues, is not a “principle” in Audi's sense. Instead, it is an abstract formula that expresses the common element of all duties and reveals the nature of the (human) will. Kant's imperatives are thus internal to humans in a way that Audi's principles are not. Likewise, Ross's prima facie duties are not like Audi's principles: they presuppose a social world of interpersonal claims, serving to summarize general aspects of prior practical knowledge, and are thus internal to us. This chapter concludes that Audi's reading of Ross and Kant leaves his theory unable to explain our interest in ethics and why it is not an accident.Less
This chapter argues that Audi's ethical theory lacks the kind of grounding found in the theories of Ross and Kant, contrasting the “principles” of Audi's theory with Kant's categorical imperative and Ross's prima facie duties. The categorical imperative, it argues, is not a “principle” in Audi's sense. Instead, it is an abstract formula that expresses the common element of all duties and reveals the nature of the (human) will. Kant's imperatives are thus internal to humans in a way that Audi's principles are not. Likewise, Ross's prima facie duties are not like Audi's principles: they presuppose a social world of interpersonal claims, serving to summarize general aspects of prior practical knowledge, and are thus internal to us. This chapter concludes that Audi's reading of Ross and Kant leaves his theory unable to explain our interest in ethics and why it is not an accident.
Tom Tomlinson
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780195161243
- eISBN:
- 9780199950317
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195161243.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General, Moral Philosophy
We are naturally attracted to the idea that moral reasoning uses rules, as premises in a deductive argument. This picture provides a straightforward way of responding to the demand for reasons ...
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We are naturally attracted to the idea that moral reasoning uses rules, as premises in a deductive argument. This picture provides a straightforward way of responding to the demand for reasons implicit in ethical discourse. It explains how our moral judgments might be brought within a system of ideals. And its deductive moral logic keeps ethical reasoning within a familiar analytical framework, offering advantages in the analysis of problems. Despite these advantages, there are no grounds for thinking that ethical reasons must always be in the form of rule. For example, the principle of universalizability doesn’t require that moral judgments be rule-based. At the other extreme, neither are there good grounds for thinking that there can be no rules at the bottom of moral judgments, as the moral particularists claim. Principles play important roles in moral discourse, and aren't to be lightly cast aside.Less
We are naturally attracted to the idea that moral reasoning uses rules, as premises in a deductive argument. This picture provides a straightforward way of responding to the demand for reasons implicit in ethical discourse. It explains how our moral judgments might be brought within a system of ideals. And its deductive moral logic keeps ethical reasoning within a familiar analytical framework, offering advantages in the analysis of problems. Despite these advantages, there are no grounds for thinking that ethical reasons must always be in the form of rule. For example, the principle of universalizability doesn’t require that moral judgments be rule-based. At the other extreme, neither are there good grounds for thinking that there can be no rules at the bottom of moral judgments, as the moral particularists claim. Principles play important roles in moral discourse, and aren't to be lightly cast aside.
Tom Tomlinson
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780195161243
- eISBN:
- 9780199950317
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195161243.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General, Moral Philosophy
In this chapter I canvas the reasons commonly given for claiming that principles can’t be all there is to moral reasoning: there is no conclusive agreement on a single normative theory; there is ...
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In this chapter I canvas the reasons commonly given for claiming that principles can’t be all there is to moral reasoning: there is no conclusive agreement on a single normative theory; there is insoluble conflict between principles; principles are inherently vague, requiring interpretative resources lying beyond the principles; principles provide only a façade of justification (the real work being done by intuition or a common morality); and principles leave out important features of morality. I point out that some of these are not effective criticisms of principles per se, but only of principles used in particular ways. Using the work of Peter Singer and Tristram Engelhardt, I then illustrate that some of these weaknesses are not merely theoretical, but infect the work of ethicists who rely on a principle-driven deductive system.Less
In this chapter I canvas the reasons commonly given for claiming that principles can’t be all there is to moral reasoning: there is no conclusive agreement on a single normative theory; there is insoluble conflict between principles; principles are inherently vague, requiring interpretative resources lying beyond the principles; principles provide only a façade of justification (the real work being done by intuition or a common morality); and principles leave out important features of morality. I point out that some of these are not effective criticisms of principles per se, but only of principles used in particular ways. Using the work of Peter Singer and Tristram Engelhardt, I then illustrate that some of these weaknesses are not merely theoretical, but infect the work of ethicists who rely on a principle-driven deductive system.
Matthew D. Adler
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780195384994
- eISBN:
- 9780199918348
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195384994.003.0008
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law, Constitutional and Administrative Law
The prior four chapters focused on developing tools for constructing and morally ranking an outcome set: tools that include an account of well-being, principles for measuring well-being using a set U ...
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The prior four chapters focused on developing tools for constructing and morally ranking an outcome set: tools that include an account of well-being, principles for measuring well-being using a set U of utility functions that operate on life-histories, and a continuous prioritarian SWF. This chapter turns to the topic of moral bridge principles. It argues that a continuous prioritarian SWF should be merged with a (refined version of) expected utility theory so as to generate a ranking of choices—notwithstanding violations of the ex ante Pareto and Pigou–Dalton principles. While the SWF framework defended here satisfies the Pareto and Pigou–Dalton principles in terms of the ranking of outcomes, the ex ante versions of these principles constitute an additional requirement which, on balance, should be rejected. The dilemmas that arise in specifying norms of fair distribution under conditions of uncertainty have been discussed by philosophers and social choice theorists.Less
The prior four chapters focused on developing tools for constructing and morally ranking an outcome set: tools that include an account of well-being, principles for measuring well-being using a set U of utility functions that operate on life-histories, and a continuous prioritarian SWF. This chapter turns to the topic of moral bridge principles. It argues that a continuous prioritarian SWF should be merged with a (refined version of) expected utility theory so as to generate a ranking of choices—notwithstanding violations of the ex ante Pareto and Pigou–Dalton principles. While the SWF framework defended here satisfies the Pareto and Pigou–Dalton principles in terms of the ranking of outcomes, the ex ante versions of these principles constitute an additional requirement which, on balance, should be rejected. The dilemmas that arise in specifying norms of fair distribution under conditions of uncertainty have been discussed by philosophers and social choice theorists.
MARCUS GEORGE SINGER
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198250210
- eISBN:
- 9780191681264
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198250210.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter explores the ideal of a rational morality. Topics discussed include the systematic ambiguity of ‘morality’, positive and rational ...
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This chapter explores the ideal of a rational morality. Topics discussed include the systematic ambiguity of ‘morality’, positive and rational morality, provisions of rational morality, proving moral principles, and the concept of moral freedom.Less
This chapter explores the ideal of a rational morality. Topics discussed include the systematic ambiguity of ‘morality’, positive and rational morality, provisions of rational morality, proving moral principles, and the concept of moral freedom.
Christopher Peacocke
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- April 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780199270729
- eISBN:
- 9780191600944
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199270724.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Argues for the thesis that basic moral principles are known to us a priori. The author argues that such moral principles have epistemic characteristics that are incompatible with all recent ...
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Argues for the thesis that basic moral principles are known to us a priori. The author argues that such moral principles have epistemic characteristics that are incompatible with all recent mind‐dependent, expressivist, and subjectivist treatments of moral thought. He elucidates these characteristics and argues for their incompatibility with many recent treatments in moral philosophy. The author further proposes a better theory, a moderate moral rationalism, which can explain the epistemic characteristics in question, and discusses what he calls the Subjectivist Fallacy, which is, according to the author, largely responsible for making mind‐dependent views of morality seem more attractive than they really are, and to which consequently much recent writing in the area has succumbed.Less
Argues for the thesis that basic moral principles are known to us a priori. The author argues that such moral principles have epistemic characteristics that are incompatible with all recent mind‐dependent, expressivist, and subjectivist treatments of moral thought. He elucidates these characteristics and argues for their incompatibility with many recent treatments in moral philosophy. The author further proposes a better theory, a moderate moral rationalism, which can explain the epistemic characteristics in question, and discusses what he calls the Subjectivist Fallacy, which is, according to the author, largely responsible for making mind‐dependent views of morality seem more attractive than they really are, and to which consequently much recent writing in the area has succumbed.
R. M. Hare
- Published in print:
- 1981
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198246602
- eISBN:
- 9780191597596
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198246609.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
The relation between the two levels of moral thinking, and how we know when to think at one level and when to think at the other is best explained in terms of our use of critical thinking to select ...
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The relation between the two levels of moral thinking, and how we know when to think at one level and when to think at the other is best explained in terms of our use of critical thinking to select the best set of prima facie principles for use in intuitive thinking. Critical thinking has epistemological priority over, and governs, the intuitive level. In moral reasoning, we need to select moral principles before we can establish substantial criteria of relevance for the principles—it is the principle that determines what is relevant. Hare argues that in addition to the properties of universalizability and prescriptivity for moral judgements, an additional distinguishing property of overridingness is required to differentiate evaluative judgements from moral judgements.Less
The relation between the two levels of moral thinking, and how we know when to think at one level and when to think at the other is best explained in terms of our use of critical thinking to select the best set of prima facie principles for use in intuitive thinking. Critical thinking has epistemological priority over, and governs, the intuitive level. In moral reasoning, we need to select moral principles before we can establish substantial criteria of relevance for the principles—it is the principle that determines what is relevant. Hare argues that in addition to the properties of universalizability and prescriptivity for moral judgements, an additional distinguishing property of overridingness is required to differentiate evaluative judgements from moral judgements.
Robert Audi
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199264933
- eISBN:
- 9780191718472
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199264933.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Moral disagreement — roughly, disagreement about what is right or wrong — is widely considered to be both common and sufficiently resistant to rational resolution to constitute a challenge to the ...
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Moral disagreement — roughly, disagreement about what is right or wrong — is widely considered to be both common and sufficiently resistant to rational resolution to constitute a challenge to the objectivity of ethics. This chapter distinguishes the kinds of disagreement in a way that is crucial for properly appraising both the extent and the epistemological significance of moral disagreement. It argues that certain kinds of disagreement are compatible not only with the objectivity of ethics but also with the self-evidence of a certain kind of moral principle.Less
Moral disagreement — roughly, disagreement about what is right or wrong — is widely considered to be both common and sufficiently resistant to rational resolution to constitute a challenge to the objectivity of ethics. This chapter distinguishes the kinds of disagreement in a way that is crucial for properly appraising both the extent and the epistemological significance of moral disagreement. It argues that certain kinds of disagreement are compatible not only with the objectivity of ethics but also with the self-evidence of a certain kind of moral principle.
Marcus George Singer
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198250210
- eISBN:
- 9780191681264
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198250210.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This book collects the most important essays by the distinguished moral philosopher Marcus G. Singer. Its guiding theme is the concept of a morality based in reason, ...
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This book collects the most important essays by the distinguished moral philosopher Marcus G. Singer. Its guiding theme is the concept of a morality based in reason, which is presupposed in ordinary moral contexts and provides an ideal for improving ordinary morality and correcting moral judgements. The book makes compelling claims that certain fundamental presuppositions are inescapable in moral thought, that fundamental moral principles can be proved, and that the concepts of truth and ‘common sense’ are essential to ethics. Subsequent chapters proceed to analyse the nature of value judgements and of moral judgements, emphasising the vital importance of certain basic distinctions. There is a discussion of race and racism, presenting new ideas about the nature of both. The relation of law to morality is considered, as are the relations between moral judgements of individual persons and the actions and moral judgements of institutions, leading to an examination of the relations between moral issues and social problems. A particularly well-known essay on the Golden Rule is reproduced in one of the chapters, where the analysis shows it to be applicable and defensible as it stands, and finally the nature of happiness is explored through a discussion of John Stuart Mill’s moral philosophy.Less
This book collects the most important essays by the distinguished moral philosopher Marcus G. Singer. Its guiding theme is the concept of a morality based in reason, which is presupposed in ordinary moral contexts and provides an ideal for improving ordinary morality and correcting moral judgements. The book makes compelling claims that certain fundamental presuppositions are inescapable in moral thought, that fundamental moral principles can be proved, and that the concepts of truth and ‘common sense’ are essential to ethics. Subsequent chapters proceed to analyse the nature of value judgements and of moral judgements, emphasising the vital importance of certain basic distinctions. There is a discussion of race and racism, presenting new ideas about the nature of both. The relation of law to morality is considered, as are the relations between moral judgements of individual persons and the actions and moral judgements of institutions, leading to an examination of the relations between moral issues and social problems. A particularly well-known essay on the Golden Rule is reproduced in one of the chapters, where the analysis shows it to be applicable and defensible as it stands, and finally the nature of happiness is explored through a discussion of John Stuart Mill’s moral philosophy.
R. M. Hare
- Published in print:
- 1965
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198810926
- eISBN:
- 9780191597589
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019881092X.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Further examines the sense in which moral judgements are universalizable. Distinguishes between moral and logical theses of universalizability and shows how the moral does not follow from the ...
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Further examines the sense in which moral judgements are universalizable. Distinguishes between moral and logical theses of universalizability and shows how the moral does not follow from the logical. Universalizability, in the form maintained in this book, is a logical, not a moral, thesis; furthermore, nothing substantially moral follows from the logical thesis. The chapter presents the exact import of the thesis and considers the role of moral principles.Less
Further examines the sense in which moral judgements are universalizable. Distinguishes between moral and logical theses of universalizability and shows how the moral does not follow from the logical. Universalizability, in the form maintained in this book, is a logical, not a moral, thesis; furthermore, nothing substantially moral follows from the logical thesis. The chapter presents the exact import of the thesis and considers the role of moral principles.
Christine M. Korsgaard
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199552795
- eISBN:
- 9780191720550
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199552795.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter lays out the principles of practical reason whose normativity the book defends, and distinguishes them from other proposed principles of practical reason. The principle of instrumental ...
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This chapter lays out the principles of practical reason whose normativity the book defends, and distinguishes them from other proposed principles of practical reason. The principle of instrumental reason is interpreted broadly as the general principle of practical judgment or application. Substantive moral principles, identified in terms of their distinctively moral content, are distinguished from formal moral principles, which dictate a certain form of practical deliberation, and some results of confusing the two are examined. The chapter argues that maximizing principles, such as the traditional principle of prudence or self-interest, are substantive rather than formal, and that this creates problems for establishing their normativity. They are set aside, and the book defends the principle of instrumental reason and the categorical imperative, as formal principles governing practical deliberation.Less
This chapter lays out the principles of practical reason whose normativity the book defends, and distinguishes them from other proposed principles of practical reason. The principle of instrumental reason is interpreted broadly as the general principle of practical judgment or application. Substantive moral principles, identified in terms of their distinctively moral content, are distinguished from formal moral principles, which dictate a certain form of practical deliberation, and some results of confusing the two are examined. The chapter argues that maximizing principles, such as the traditional principle of prudence or self-interest, are substantive rather than formal, and that this creates problems for establishing their normativity. They are set aside, and the book defends the principle of instrumental reason and the categorical imperative, as formal principles governing practical deliberation.
David McNaughton and Piers Rawling
David Copp (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195147797
- eISBN:
- 9780199785841
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195147790.003.0016
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter proposes a novel form of deontology that, while it contrasts with consequentialism in defending duties of special relationship and options, is allied with consequentialism in denying ...
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This chapter proposes a novel form of deontology that, while it contrasts with consequentialism in defending duties of special relationship and options, is allied with consequentialism in denying that there are moral constraints. It devotes considerable attention to distinguishing between various consequentialist doctrines, and the distinction between them and deontology. The distinction between agent-relativity and agent-neutrality plays a crucial role here. It also discusses and rejects contractualism. The same applies to particularism in its most radical form: despite the sympathy for the particularist’s skepticism concerning strict moral principles, it is argued that there are principles of a weaker, Rossian form.Less
This chapter proposes a novel form of deontology that, while it contrasts with consequentialism in defending duties of special relationship and options, is allied with consequentialism in denying that there are moral constraints. It devotes considerable attention to distinguishing between various consequentialist doctrines, and the distinction between them and deontology. The distinction between agent-relativity and agent-neutrality plays a crucial role here. It also discusses and rejects contractualism. The same applies to particularism in its most radical form: despite the sympathy for the particularist’s skepticism concerning strict moral principles, it is argued that there are principles of a weaker, Rossian form.
Daniel Finn (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199739813
- eISBN:
- 9780199866120
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199739813.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, History of Christianity
Roman Catholic social thought has had much to say about economic life: about virtues and moral principles, about individuals, communities, and institutions. Catholic social thought (CST) is a complex ...
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Roman Catholic social thought has had much to say about economic life: about virtues and moral principles, about individuals, communities, and institutions. Catholic social thought (CST) is a complex body of ideas that has real consequences, well-described by Hans Urs von Balthasar as “symphonic” in its multiple principles and approaches, nonetheless producing an integrated vision. This tradition can best be understood if it is taken most seriously. This book begins with a fundamental proposition: that the economic and cultural criteria identified in the tradition of Catholic social thought provide an effective path to sustainable prosperity for all. Two chapters undertake the challenge of specifying the means CST recommends and the goals for which it aims. Five are historical studies: of the change in worldview from the medieval to the present, of the medieval Franciscan roots of markets, of the empirical impact that Christian democratic parties and labor unions have had on European society, and of the legal and moral analysis of “the unjust contract”. Six chapters examine CST and the fundamental proposition from diverse perspectives: from Africa, Latin America, sociology, the economics view of women, and eco-feminism. Finally, two chapters provide an introduction and a conclusion addressing the question of how practically to think of the potential implementation of CST in a world rarely open to change.Less
Roman Catholic social thought has had much to say about economic life: about virtues and moral principles, about individuals, communities, and institutions. Catholic social thought (CST) is a complex body of ideas that has real consequences, well-described by Hans Urs von Balthasar as “symphonic” in its multiple principles and approaches, nonetheless producing an integrated vision. This tradition can best be understood if it is taken most seriously. This book begins with a fundamental proposition: that the economic and cultural criteria identified in the tradition of Catholic social thought provide an effective path to sustainable prosperity for all. Two chapters undertake the challenge of specifying the means CST recommends and the goals for which it aims. Five are historical studies: of the change in worldview from the medieval to the present, of the medieval Franciscan roots of markets, of the empirical impact that Christian democratic parties and labor unions have had on European society, and of the legal and moral analysis of “the unjust contract”. Six chapters examine CST and the fundamental proposition from diverse perspectives: from Africa, Latin America, sociology, the economics view of women, and eco-feminism. Finally, two chapters provide an introduction and a conclusion addressing the question of how practically to think of the potential implementation of CST in a world rarely open to change.
Stephen Stich
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199733477
- eISBN:
- 9780199949823
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199733477.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This chapter attempts to sharpen our perception of the moral issues underlying the controversy over recombinant DNA research by clearing away some frivolous arguments that have deflected attention ...
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This chapter attempts to sharpen our perception of the moral issues underlying the controversy over recombinant DNA research by clearing away some frivolous arguments that have deflected attention from more serious issues. It begins by considering three untenable arguments, each of which has surfaced with considerable frequency in the public debate over recombinant DNA research. The first argument concludes that recombinant DNA research should not be controlled or restricted. The second argument aims at establishing just the opposite conclusion from the first. The particular moral judgment being defended is that there should be a total ban on recombinant DNA research. The third argument provides a striking illustration of how important it is, in normative thinking, to make clear the moral principles being invoked. The argument begins with a factual claim about recombinant DNA research and concludes that stringent restrictions, perhaps even a moratorium, should be imposed. The chapter then discusses the risk and benefits of DNA research.Less
This chapter attempts to sharpen our perception of the moral issues underlying the controversy over recombinant DNA research by clearing away some frivolous arguments that have deflected attention from more serious issues. It begins by considering three untenable arguments, each of which has surfaced with considerable frequency in the public debate over recombinant DNA research. The first argument concludes that recombinant DNA research should not be controlled or restricted. The second argument aims at establishing just the opposite conclusion from the first. The particular moral judgment being defended is that there should be a total ban on recombinant DNA research. The third argument provides a striking illustration of how important it is, in normative thinking, to make clear the moral principles being invoked. The argument begins with a factual claim about recombinant DNA research and concludes that stringent restrictions, perhaps even a moratorium, should be imposed. The chapter then discusses the risk and benefits of DNA research.
