James Halteman and Edd Noell
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199763702
- eISBN:
- 9780199932252
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199763702.003.0004
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Financial Economics
This chapter begins with a description of changes that were occurring in the European world and the way they led to the Enlightenment climate of scientific discovery. Most of the chapter develops ...
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This chapter begins with a description of changes that were occurring in the European world and the way they led to the Enlightenment climate of scientific discovery. Most of the chapter develops the moral philosophy of Smith by showing how sympathy, the impartial spectator, and the “all-seeing eye” filter the human passions to make behavior virtuous and workable in an economy based on self-regard. But Smith had a role for rules that evolve and become accepted, forming effective social glue. Ultimately Smith’s economic system was a complex arrangement of conformity to moral principles and the pursuit of self-interest. Two vignettes conclude the chapter: “Adam Smith and the Moral Prerequisite of Markets” and “Adam Smith and Deceitful Conspiracy in the Marketplace.”Less
This chapter begins with a description of changes that were occurring in the European world and the way they led to the Enlightenment climate of scientific discovery. Most of the chapter develops the moral philosophy of Smith by showing how sympathy, the impartial spectator, and the “all-seeing eye” filter the human passions to make behavior virtuous and workable in an economy based on self-regard. But Smith had a role for rules that evolve and become accepted, forming effective social glue. Ultimately Smith’s economic system was a complex arrangement of conformity to moral principles and the pursuit of self-interest. Two vignettes conclude the chapter: “Adam Smith and the Moral Prerequisite of Markets” and “Adam Smith and Deceitful Conspiracy in the Marketplace.”
Roger Crisp
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199290338
- eISBN:
- 9780191710476
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199290338.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This book answers some of the oldest questions in moral philosophy. Claiming that a fundamental issue in normative ethics is what ultimate reasons for action we might have, it argues that the best ...
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This book answers some of the oldest questions in moral philosophy. Claiming that a fundamental issue in normative ethics is what ultimate reasons for action we might have, it argues that the best statements of such reasons will not employ moral concepts. The book investigates and explains the nature of reasons themselves; its account of how we come to know them combines an intuitionist epistemology with elements of Pyrrhonist scepticism. It defends a hedonistic theory of well-being and an account of practical reason according to which we can give some, though not overriding, priority to our own good over that of others. The book develops original lines of argument within a framework of some traditional but currently less popular views.Less
This book answers some of the oldest questions in moral philosophy. Claiming that a fundamental issue in normative ethics is what ultimate reasons for action we might have, it argues that the best statements of such reasons will not employ moral concepts. The book investigates and explains the nature of reasons themselves; its account of how we come to know them combines an intuitionist epistemology with elements of Pyrrhonist scepticism. It defends a hedonistic theory of well-being and an account of practical reason according to which we can give some, though not overriding, priority to our own good over that of others. The book develops original lines of argument within a framework of some traditional but currently less popular views.
Katerina Deligiorgi
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199646159
- eISBN:
- 9780191741142
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199646159.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Autonomy is a key concept in contemporary moral philosophy with deep roots in the history of the subject. However, there is still no agreed view about the correct way to formulate an account of ...
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Autonomy is a key concept in contemporary moral philosophy with deep roots in the history of the subject. However, there is still no agreed view about the correct way to formulate an account of autonomy that adequately captures both our capacity for self-determination and our responsiveness to reasons. This book develops a theory of autonomy that is Kantian in orientation but which engages closely with recent arguments about agency, morality, and practical reasoning. There are two aspects in which the theory defended in this book is distinctive. First, whereas autonomy has primarily been understood in terms of our relation to ourselves, the theory defended here shows that it also centrally involves our relation to others. Identifying the intersubjective dimension of autonomy is crucial for the defence of autonomy as a morality of freedom. Second, autonomy must be treated as a composite concept and hence not capturable in simple definitions such as acting on one’s higher order desires or on principles one endorses. One of the virtues of the composite picture is that it shows autonomy at the intersection of concerns with morality, practical rationality, and freedom. Autonomy pertains to all these areas, though it does not exactly coincide with any of them. Showing this, and so tracing the scope of autonomy, is an essential part of the project. The aim is to show that autonomy is theoretically plausible, psychologically realistic, and morally attractive.Less
Autonomy is a key concept in contemporary moral philosophy with deep roots in the history of the subject. However, there is still no agreed view about the correct way to formulate an account of autonomy that adequately captures both our capacity for self-determination and our responsiveness to reasons. This book develops a theory of autonomy that is Kantian in orientation but which engages closely with recent arguments about agency, morality, and practical reasoning. There are two aspects in which the theory defended in this book is distinctive. First, whereas autonomy has primarily been understood in terms of our relation to ourselves, the theory defended here shows that it also centrally involves our relation to others. Identifying the intersubjective dimension of autonomy is crucial for the defence of autonomy as a morality of freedom. Second, autonomy must be treated as a composite concept and hence not capturable in simple definitions such as acting on one’s higher order desires or on principles one endorses. One of the virtues of the composite picture is that it shows autonomy at the intersection of concerns with morality, practical rationality, and freedom. Autonomy pertains to all these areas, though it does not exactly coincide with any of them. Showing this, and so tracing the scope of autonomy, is an essential part of the project. The aim is to show that autonomy is theoretically plausible, psychologically realistic, and morally attractive.
Gerald Mckenny
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199582679
- eISBN:
- 9780191722981
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199582679.003.0004
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
If ethics is to attest God's grace to humanity (the ethics of human confirmation of divine grace) rather than betraying it (the ethics of human self‐assertion), then it must be carried out as the ...
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If ethics is to attest God's grace to humanity (the ethics of human confirmation of divine grace) rather than betraying it (the ethics of human self‐assertion), then it must be carried out as the investigation of human life and conduct from the standpoint of the revelation of the Word and work of God's grace in Jesus Christ and thus as a part of dogmatics. This approach differs from most contemporary approaches in moral theology, which ground ethics either in reason or nature in relative independence from dogmatics or in the life of the church. This chapter reconstructs Barth's position in response to criticisms that it is remote from the concrete contexts in which moral issues arise, that it does violence to ethics, and that it accords no legitimacy to nontheological approaches to ethics.Less
If ethics is to attest God's grace to humanity (the ethics of human confirmation of divine grace) rather than betraying it (the ethics of human self‐assertion), then it must be carried out as the investigation of human life and conduct from the standpoint of the revelation of the Word and work of God's grace in Jesus Christ and thus as a part of dogmatics. This approach differs from most contemporary approaches in moral theology, which ground ethics either in reason or nature in relative independence from dogmatics or in the life of the church. This chapter reconstructs Barth's position in response to criticisms that it is remote from the concrete contexts in which moral issues arise, that it does violence to ethics, and that it accords no legitimacy to nontheological approaches to ethics.
Roger Teichmann
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199299331
- eISBN:
- 9780191715068
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199299331.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
One of the most important philosophers of recent times, Elizabeth Anscombe wrote books and articles on a wide range of topics, including the ground-breaking monograph Intention. This book studies ...
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One of the most important philosophers of recent times, Elizabeth Anscombe wrote books and articles on a wide range of topics, including the ground-breaking monograph Intention. This book studies Anscombe's philosophical oeuvre. It presents Anscombe's main ideas, bringing out their interconnections, elaborating and discussing their implications, pointing out objections and difficulties, and aims to give a unified overview of her philosophy. Many of Anscombe's arguments are relevant to contemporary debates, and on a number of topics, what Anscombe has to say constitutes a powerful alternative to dominant or popular views. Among the writings discussed are Intention, ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’, ‘Rules, Rights and Promises’, ‘On Brute Facts’, ‘The First Person’, ‘The Intentionality of Sensation’, ‘Causality and Determination’, An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus, ‘The Question of Linguistic Idealism’, and a number of other pieces, including some that are little known or hard to obtain. A complete bibliography of Anscombe's writings is also included. Ranging from the philosophy of action, through ethics, to philosophy of mind, metaphysics, and the philosophy of logic and language, this book is a study of one of the most significant bodies of work in modern philosophy, spanning more than fifty years, and one which is as pertinent today as ever.Less
One of the most important philosophers of recent times, Elizabeth Anscombe wrote books and articles on a wide range of topics, including the ground-breaking monograph Intention. This book studies Anscombe's philosophical oeuvre. It presents Anscombe's main ideas, bringing out their interconnections, elaborating and discussing their implications, pointing out objections and difficulties, and aims to give a unified overview of her philosophy. Many of Anscombe's arguments are relevant to contemporary debates, and on a number of topics, what Anscombe has to say constitutes a powerful alternative to dominant or popular views. Among the writings discussed are Intention, ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’, ‘Rules, Rights and Promises’, ‘On Brute Facts’, ‘The First Person’, ‘The Intentionality of Sensation’, ‘Causality and Determination’, An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus, ‘The Question of Linguistic Idealism’, and a number of other pieces, including some that are little known or hard to obtain. A complete bibliography of Anscombe's writings is also included. Ranging from the philosophy of action, through ethics, to philosophy of mind, metaphysics, and the philosophy of logic and language, this book is a study of one of the most significant bodies of work in modern philosophy, spanning more than fifty years, and one which is as pertinent today as ever.
Allen Buchanan
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- April 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780198295358
- eISBN:
- 9780191600982
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198295359.003.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Explains why a moral theory of international law is needed, refutes several prominent views that purport to rule out the possibility of such a theory, sets out the criteria that the needed theory ...
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Explains why a moral theory of international law is needed, refutes several prominent views that purport to rule out the possibility of such a theory, sets out the criteria that the needed theory should satisfy, previews the main outlines of the theory developed in the remainder of the book, and explains and supports the thesis that institutional moral reasoning is needed to develop such a theory. There are nine sections: I. The Need for a Theory; II. Curious Neglect—the neglect of international relations in contemporary moral philosophy; III. Institutional Moral Reasoning; IV. The Realist Challenge; V. The Moral Minimalist Challenge; VI. Legal Nihilism; VII. The Moral Legitimacy of the State System; VIII. The Nature and Scope of a Moral Theory of International Law; and IX. An Overview of a Proto‐theory—a summary of the moral theory of international law presented in the book, pointing out its limitations and theoretical essentials.Less
Explains why a moral theory of international law is needed, refutes several prominent views that purport to rule out the possibility of such a theory, sets out the criteria that the needed theory should satisfy, previews the main outlines of the theory developed in the remainder of the book, and explains and supports the thesis that institutional moral reasoning is needed to develop such a theory. There are nine sections: I. The Need for a Theory; II. Curious Neglect—the neglect of international relations in contemporary moral philosophy; III. Institutional Moral Reasoning; IV. The Realist Challenge; V. The Moral Minimalist Challenge; VI. Legal Nihilism; VII. The Moral Legitimacy of the State System; VIII. The Nature and Scope of a Moral Theory of International Law; and IX. An Overview of a Proto‐theory—a summary of the moral theory of international law presented in the book, pointing out its limitations and theoretical essentials.
Alison Hills
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199213306
- eISBN:
- 9780191594212
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199213306.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Common sense morality is in a better epistemic position than Egoism, for those who accept common sense morality can modestly vindicate it – they can defend it to their own satisfaction – whereas most ...
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Common sense morality is in a better epistemic position than Egoism, for those who accept common sense morality can modestly vindicate it – they can defend it to their own satisfaction – whereas most Egoists cannot defend Egoism, even modestly. The key to this defence of morality is the importance of moral understanding. What are the implications of recognizing that the focus of moral epistemology should be moral understanding rather than moral knowledge? Moral philosophers already act as if they are aiming for moral understanding, but there are many unanswered questions about moral understanding that need to be addressed in the future.Less
Common sense morality is in a better epistemic position than Egoism, for those who accept common sense morality can modestly vindicate it – they can defend it to their own satisfaction – whereas most Egoists cannot defend Egoism, even modestly. The key to this defence of morality is the importance of moral understanding. What are the implications of recognizing that the focus of moral epistemology should be moral understanding rather than moral knowledge? Moral philosophers already act as if they are aiming for moral understanding, but there are many unanswered questions about moral understanding that need to be addressed in the future.
David DeGrazia
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780195389630
- eISBN:
- 9780199949731
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195389630.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
The ethics of creating—or declining to create—people has been addressed in several contexts: debates over abortion and embryo research; literature on “self-creation”; discussions of procreative ...
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The ethics of creating—or declining to create—people has been addressed in several contexts: debates over abortion and embryo research; literature on “self-creation”; discussions of procreative rights and responsibilities, genetic engineering, and future generations. Here, for the first time, is a sustained, scholarly analysis of all of these issues—a discussion combining breadth of topics with philosophical depth, imagination with current scientific understanding, argumentative rigor with accessibility. The overarching aim of this book is to illuminate a broad array of issues connected with reproduction and genetics, through the lens of moral philosophy. With novel frameworks for understanding prenatal moral status and human identity, and exceptional fairness to those holding different views, the author sheds new light on the ethics of abortion and embryo research, genetic enhancement and prenatal genetic interventions, procreation and parenting, as well as decisions that affect the quality of life of future generations. Along the way, he helpfully introduces personal identity theory and value theory as well as such complex topics as moral status, wrongful life, and the “nonidentity problem.” The results include a subjective account of human well-being, a standard for responsible procreation and parenting, and a theoretical bridge between consequentialist and nonconsequentialist ethical theories. The upshot is a synoptic, mostly liberal vision of the ethics of creating human beings.Less
The ethics of creating—or declining to create—people has been addressed in several contexts: debates over abortion and embryo research; literature on “self-creation”; discussions of procreative rights and responsibilities, genetic engineering, and future generations. Here, for the first time, is a sustained, scholarly analysis of all of these issues—a discussion combining breadth of topics with philosophical depth, imagination with current scientific understanding, argumentative rigor with accessibility. The overarching aim of this book is to illuminate a broad array of issues connected with reproduction and genetics, through the lens of moral philosophy. With novel frameworks for understanding prenatal moral status and human identity, and exceptional fairness to those holding different views, the author sheds new light on the ethics of abortion and embryo research, genetic enhancement and prenatal genetic interventions, procreation and parenting, as well as decisions that affect the quality of life of future generations. Along the way, he helpfully introduces personal identity theory and value theory as well as such complex topics as moral status, wrongful life, and the “nonidentity problem.” The results include a subjective account of human well-being, a standard for responsible procreation and parenting, and a theoretical bridge between consequentialist and nonconsequentialist ethical theories. The upshot is a synoptic, mostly liberal vision of the ethics of creating human beings.
Athol Fitzgibbons
- Published in print:
- 1990
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198283201
- eISBN:
- 9780191596254
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198283202.003.0001
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, History of Economic Thought
The Introduction provides an overview of J. M. Keynes's system, incorporating his moral and political philosophies, his philosophy of probability, and his economic theories and objectives.
The Introduction provides an overview of J. M. Keynes's system, incorporating his moral and political philosophies, his philosophy of probability, and his economic theories and objectives.
R. M. Hare
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198250326
- eISBN:
- 9780191597602
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198250320.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This book is divided into three parts: in Part I, R. M. Hare offers a justification for the use of philosophy of language in the treatment of moral questions, together with an overview of his moral ...
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This book is divided into three parts: in Part I, R. M. Hare offers a justification for the use of philosophy of language in the treatment of moral questions, together with an overview of his moral philosophy of ‘universal prescriptivism’. The second part, and the core of the book, consists of five chapters originally presented as a lecture series under the title ‘A Taxonomy of Ethical Theories’. Hare identifies descriptivism and non‐descriptivism as the two main positions in modern moral philosophy. The former he divides into Naturalism and Intuitionism, and the latter into Emotivism and Rationalism. Hare argues that all forms of descriptivism tend to lead to Relativism because the truth conditions of moral statements are culturally variant. Of the positions discussed, only Hare's own position, a form of Rationalism, which he calls Universal Prescriptivism, meets all of the requirements that an adequate ethical theory should meet. Part III consists of Hare's previously published essay ‘Could Kant have been a Utilitarian?’ (Utilitas 5, 1993). Here, Hare puts forward the controversial thesis that Kant's moral philosophy is, in its basic principles, compatible with utilitarianism.Less
This book is divided into three parts: in Part I, R. M. Hare offers a justification for the use of philosophy of language in the treatment of moral questions, together with an overview of his moral philosophy of ‘universal prescriptivism’. The second part, and the core of the book, consists of five chapters originally presented as a lecture series under the title ‘A Taxonomy of Ethical Theories’. Hare identifies descriptivism and non‐descriptivism as the two main positions in modern moral philosophy. The former he divides into Naturalism and Intuitionism, and the latter into Emotivism and Rationalism. Hare argues that all forms of descriptivism tend to lead to Relativism because the truth conditions of moral statements are culturally variant. Of the positions discussed, only Hare's own position, a form of Rationalism, which he calls Universal Prescriptivism, meets all of the requirements that an adequate ethical theory should meet. Part III consists of Hare's previously published essay ‘Could Kant have been a Utilitarian?’ (Utilitas 5, 1993). Here, Hare puts forward the controversial thesis that Kant's moral philosophy is, in its basic principles, compatible with utilitarianism.
Colin McGinn
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198238775
- eISBN:
- 9780191598005
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198238770.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Aesthetics
The main thesis of this book is that literature can enrich the study of ethics, because it provides the resources for the study of ethical problems that contemporary analytical moral philosophy fails ...
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The main thesis of this book is that literature can enrich the study of ethics, because it provides the resources for the study of ethical problems that contemporary analytical moral philosophy fails to address. In Chapters 2 and 3, McGinn offers a discussion of analytical moral philosophy, in which he argues that moral goodness is an objective fact, and furthermore that ethical knowledge is not inferior to scientific knowledge. In Chapter 4, drawing on Hermann Melville's Billy Budd, McGinn proceeds to examine the nature of the evil character. In Chapter 5, McGinn discusses the notion of the Beautiful Soul, and he sets out his ‘aesthetic theory of virtue’, or the theory that aesthetic properties supervene on ethical attributes. Chapters 6 and 7 consist of close readings of two literary works, Oscar Wilde's The Picture of Dorian Gray and Mary Shelley's Frankenstein, respectively. In his conclusion, McGinn reiterates his view that moral philosophy is too narrow in its focus. It investigates words and propositions, using what McGinn calls the ‘commandment’ paradigm. McGinn advocates that the study of ethics pursues the ‘parable’ paradigm, as afforded by works of fictional narrative.Less
The main thesis of this book is that literature can enrich the study of ethics, because it provides the resources for the study of ethical problems that contemporary analytical moral philosophy fails to address. In Chapters 2 and 3, McGinn offers a discussion of analytical moral philosophy, in which he argues that moral goodness is an objective fact, and furthermore that ethical knowledge is not inferior to scientific knowledge. In Chapter 4, drawing on Hermann Melville's Billy Budd, McGinn proceeds to examine the nature of the evil character. In Chapter 5, McGinn discusses the notion of the Beautiful Soul, and he sets out his ‘aesthetic theory of virtue’, or the theory that aesthetic properties supervene on ethical attributes. Chapters 6 and 7 consist of close readings of two literary works, Oscar Wilde's The Picture of Dorian Gray and Mary Shelley's Frankenstein, respectively. In his conclusion, McGinn reiterates his view that moral philosophy is too narrow in its focus. It investigates words and propositions, using what McGinn calls the ‘commandment’ paradigm. McGinn advocates that the study of ethics pursues the ‘parable’ paradigm, as afforded by works of fictional narrative.
Philippa Foot
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199252848
- eISBN:
- 9780191597411
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019925284X.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Moral Dilemmas is the second volume of collected essays by the eminent moral philosopher Philippa Foot. It fills the gap between her 1978 collection Virtues and Vices and her acclaimed monograph ...
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Moral Dilemmas is the second volume of collected essays by the eminent moral philosopher Philippa Foot. It fills the gap between her 1978 collection Virtues and Vices and her acclaimed monograph Natural Goodness, published in 2001. Moral Dilemmas contains the best of Prof. Foot's work from the late 1970s to the 1990s. In these essays, she develops further her influential critique of the ’non‐cognitivist’ approaches that have dominated moral philosophy over the last fifty years. She shows why it is a mistake to think of evaluations in general (or moral judgements in particular) as distinguished from ‘statements of fact’ by a special connection with the feelings, attitudes, or commitments of an individual speaker. Instead, she portrays thoughts about the goodness or badness of human action as like (though also unlike) the evaluation of other operations of human beings, and those of all living things. She also discusses moral relativism, utilitarianism, and moral dilemmas, as well as some subjects of special relevance to medical ethics. This work contains a select bibliography of the publications of Philippa Foot. With Prof. Foot's other two books, these essays present her distinctive and lasting contributions to twentieth‐century moral philosophy.Less
Moral Dilemmas is the second volume of collected essays by the eminent moral philosopher Philippa Foot. It fills the gap between her 1978 collection Virtues and Vices and her acclaimed monograph Natural Goodness, published in 2001. Moral Dilemmas contains the best of Prof. Foot's work from the late 1970s to the 1990s. In these essays, she develops further her influential critique of the ’non‐cognitivist’ approaches that have dominated moral philosophy over the last fifty years. She shows why it is a mistake to think of evaluations in general (or moral judgements in particular) as distinguished from ‘statements of fact’ by a special connection with the feelings, attitudes, or commitments of an individual speaker. Instead, she portrays thoughts about the goodness or badness of human action as like (though also unlike) the evaluation of other operations of human beings, and those of all living things. She also discusses moral relativism, utilitarianism, and moral dilemmas, as well as some subjects of special relevance to medical ethics. This work contains a select bibliography of the publications of Philippa Foot. With Prof. Foot's other two books, these essays present her distinctive and lasting contributions to twentieth‐century moral philosophy.
Christopher M. Cullen
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195149258
- eISBN:
- 9780199785131
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195149258.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
This book is a brief introduction to the thought of the great Franciscan theologian St. Bonaventure (c.1217-74). It focuses on the long-debated relation between philosophy and theology in the work of ...
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This book is a brief introduction to the thought of the great Franciscan theologian St. Bonaventure (c.1217-74). It focuses on the long-debated relation between philosophy and theology in the work of this important but neglected thinker, revealing Bonaventure as a great synthesizer. The book's exposition shows in a new and more nuanced way Bonaventure's debt to Augustine, while making clear how he was influenced by Aristotle. The book is organized according to the categories of Bonaventure's own classic text: De reductione artium ad theologiam. Part I is devoted to the definition of Christian Wisdom. In Part II, individual chapters are devoted to Bonaventure's physics, metaphysics, and moral philosophy. Part III includes chapters on the Trinity, Creation, Sin, the Incarnation, Grace, the Sacraments, and the Last Things.Less
This book is a brief introduction to the thought of the great Franciscan theologian St. Bonaventure (c.1217-74). It focuses on the long-debated relation between philosophy and theology in the work of this important but neglected thinker, revealing Bonaventure as a great synthesizer. The book's exposition shows in a new and more nuanced way Bonaventure's debt to Augustine, while making clear how he was influenced by Aristotle. The book is organized according to the categories of Bonaventure's own classic text: De reductione artium ad theologiam. Part I is devoted to the definition of Christian Wisdom. In Part II, individual chapters are devoted to Bonaventure's physics, metaphysics, and moral philosophy. Part III includes chapters on the Trinity, Creation, Sin, the Incarnation, Grace, the Sacraments, and the Last Things.
David Phillips
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199778911
- eISBN:
- 9780199919093
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199778911.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Henry Sidgwick’s The Methods of Ethics is one of the most important books in the history of moral philosophy. But it has not hitherto received the kind of sustained scholarly attention its stature ...
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Henry Sidgwick’s The Methods of Ethics is one of the most important books in the history of moral philosophy. But it has not hitherto received the kind of sustained scholarly attention its stature merits. In this book the author aims to do something that has (surprisingly) not been done before: to interpret and evaluate the central argument of the Methods, in a way that brings out the important conceptual and historical connections between Sidgwick’s views and contemporary moral philosophy.Sidgwick distinguished three basic methods: utilitarianism, egoism, and dogmatic intuitionism. And he focused on two conflicts: between utilitarianism and dogmatic intuitionism and between utilitarianism and egoism. Sidgwick believed he could largely resolve the conflict between utilitarianism and dogmatic intuitionism, but could not resolve the conflict between utilitarianism and egoism. Phillips suggests that the best way to approach Sidgwick’s ideas is to start with his views on these two conflicts, and with the metaethical and epistemological ideas on which they depend. Phillips interprets and largely defends Sidgwick’s non-naturalist metaethics and moderate intuitionist moral epistemology. But he argues for a verdict on the two conflicts different from Sidgwick’s own. Phillips claims that Sidgwick is less successful than he thinks in resolving the conflict between utilitarianism and dogmatic intuitionism, and that Sidgwick’s treatment of the conflict between utilitarianism and egoism is more successful than he thinks in that it provides the model for a plausible view of practical reason.Phillips’s book will be of interest to two different groups of readers: to students seeking a brief introduction to Sidgwick’s most important ideas and a guidebook to the Methods, and to scholars in ethics and the history of ideas concerned with Sidgwick’s seminal contribution to moral philosophy.Less
Henry Sidgwick’s The Methods of Ethics is one of the most important books in the history of moral philosophy. But it has not hitherto received the kind of sustained scholarly attention its stature merits. In this book the author aims to do something that has (surprisingly) not been done before: to interpret and evaluate the central argument of the Methods, in a way that brings out the important conceptual and historical connections between Sidgwick’s views and contemporary moral philosophy.Sidgwick distinguished three basic methods: utilitarianism, egoism, and dogmatic intuitionism. And he focused on two conflicts: between utilitarianism and dogmatic intuitionism and between utilitarianism and egoism. Sidgwick believed he could largely resolve the conflict between utilitarianism and dogmatic intuitionism, but could not resolve the conflict between utilitarianism and egoism. Phillips suggests that the best way to approach Sidgwick’s ideas is to start with his views on these two conflicts, and with the metaethical and epistemological ideas on which they depend. Phillips interprets and largely defends Sidgwick’s non-naturalist metaethics and moderate intuitionist moral epistemology. But he argues for a verdict on the two conflicts different from Sidgwick’s own. Phillips claims that Sidgwick is less successful than he thinks in resolving the conflict between utilitarianism and dogmatic intuitionism, and that Sidgwick’s treatment of the conflict between utilitarianism and egoism is more successful than he thinks in that it provides the model for a plausible view of practical reason.Phillips’s book will be of interest to two different groups of readers: to students seeking a brief introduction to Sidgwick’s most important ideas and a guidebook to the Methods, and to scholars in ethics and the history of ideas concerned with Sidgwick’s seminal contribution to moral philosophy.
Henry E. Allison
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199691531
- eISBN:
- 9780191731808
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199691531.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter examines two major challenges to Kant’s project of providing the foundation for a future metaphysics of morals: the Wolffian universal practical philosophy and the popular moral ...
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This chapter examines two major challenges to Kant’s project of providing the foundation for a future metaphysics of morals: the Wolffian universal practical philosophy and the popular moral philosophy associated primarily with Garve. It argues that Kant’s concern with the former was that it might be assumed that to have already offered a metaphysics of morals, thereby rendering his superfluous and that he responded by pointing out that, since it concerned with what is common to all intentional action (practice), it ignores what pertains distinctively to morality. It also argues that Kant’s main concern was with the latter, because its empiricism, eudaemonism, and eclecticism precluded both the need for and the possibility of a metaphysics of morals. It further argues that Kant’s main target was Garve’s translation of and commentary on Cicero’s De officiis.Less
This chapter examines two major challenges to Kant’s project of providing the foundation for a future metaphysics of morals: the Wolffian universal practical philosophy and the popular moral philosophy associated primarily with Garve. It argues that Kant’s concern with the former was that it might be assumed that to have already offered a metaphysics of morals, thereby rendering his superfluous and that he responded by pointing out that, since it concerned with what is common to all intentional action (practice), it ignores what pertains distinctively to morality. It also argues that Kant’s main concern was with the latter, because its empiricism, eudaemonism, and eclecticism precluded both the need for and the possibility of a metaphysics of morals. It further argues that Kant’s main target was Garve’s translation of and commentary on Cicero’s De officiis.
Andrew Vincent (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199271665
- eISBN:
- 9780191709364
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199271665.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Political Philosophy
This chapter focuses on the relationship between T. H. Green's metaphysics and ethics. It sketches a distinction between philosophical ethics and ethical practice. It explores two of Green's ...
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This chapter focuses on the relationship between T. H. Green's metaphysics and ethics. It sketches a distinction between philosophical ethics and ethical practice. It explores two of Green's arguments which characterise that relationship (between ethics and metaphysics) in markedly different ways: the ‘grey on grey’ and ‘injunctive’ arguments. Both arguments can appear as necessary (if contradictory) aspects of Green's general system of philosophy. The discussion elucidates the metaphysical underpinnings to the ‘grey on grey’ thesis and its relation to Green's doctrine of the eternal consciousness. It then turns to the philosophical repercussions of holding firmly to the ‘injunctive’ moral argument. The final section of the chapter sketches an alternative way of articulating Green's ethics. It concludes on a sceptical note with regards to how Green himself viewed the issue.Less
This chapter focuses on the relationship between T. H. Green's metaphysics and ethics. It sketches a distinction between philosophical ethics and ethical practice. It explores two of Green's arguments which characterise that relationship (between ethics and metaphysics) in markedly different ways: the ‘grey on grey’ and ‘injunctive’ arguments. Both arguments can appear as necessary (if contradictory) aspects of Green's general system of philosophy. The discussion elucidates the metaphysical underpinnings to the ‘grey on grey’ thesis and its relation to Green's doctrine of the eternal consciousness. It then turns to the philosophical repercussions of holding firmly to the ‘injunctive’ moral argument. The final section of the chapter sketches an alternative way of articulating Green's ethics. It concludes on a sceptical note with regards to how Green himself viewed the issue.
David Ross
Philip Stratton-Lake (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199252657
- eISBN:
- 9780191598333
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199252653.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
The Right and the Good is a classic of 20th‐century philosophy by the great scholar Sir David Ross, which is now presented in a new edition with a substantial introduction by Philip Stratton–Lake, a ...
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The Right and the Good is a classic of 20th‐century philosophy by the great scholar Sir David Ross, which is now presented in a new edition with a substantial introduction by Philip Stratton–Lake, a leading expert on Ross. Ross's book was originally published in 1930, and is the pinnacle of ethical intuitionism, which was the dominant moral theory in British philosophy for much of the 19th and early 20th century. The central concern of the book is with rightness and goodness, and their relation to one another. Ross argues against notable rival ethical theories. The right act, he holds, cannot be derived from the moral value of the motive from which it is done; furthermore, rightness is not wholly determined by the value of the consequences of one's action, whether this value is some benefit for the agent, or some agent‐neutral good. Rather, the right act is determined by a plurality of self‐evident prima facie duties. Ross portrayed rightness and goodness as simple non‐natural properties. Philip Stratton provides a substantial introduction to the book, in which he discusses its central themes and clears up some common misunderstandings. A new bibliography and index are also included, along with editorial notes that aim to clarify certain points and indicate where Ross later changed his mind on particular issues. Intuitionism is now enjoying a considerable revival, and this new edition provides the context for a proper modern understanding of Ross's great work.Less
The Right and the Good is a classic of 20th‐century philosophy by the great scholar Sir David Ross, which is now presented in a new edition with a substantial introduction by Philip Stratton–Lake, a leading expert on Ross. Ross's book was originally published in 1930, and is the pinnacle of ethical intuitionism, which was the dominant moral theory in British philosophy for much of the 19th and early 20th century. The central concern of the book is with rightness and goodness, and their relation to one another. Ross argues against notable rival ethical theories. The right act, he holds, cannot be derived from the moral value of the motive from which it is done; furthermore, rightness is not wholly determined by the value of the consequences of one's action, whether this value is some benefit for the agent, or some agent‐neutral good. Rather, the right act is determined by a plurality of self‐evident prima facie duties. Ross portrayed rightness and goodness as simple non‐natural properties. Philip Stratton provides a substantial introduction to the book, in which he discusses its central themes and clears up some common misunderstandings. A new bibliography and index are also included, along with editorial notes that aim to clarify certain points and indicate where Ross later changed his mind on particular issues. Intuitionism is now enjoying a considerable revival, and this new edition provides the context for a proper modern understanding of Ross's great work.
John Gardner
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199239351
- eISBN:
- 9780191716959
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239351.001.0001
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law, Criminal Law and Criminology
This book collects together a selection of John Gardner's best-known and most provocative writings on the theory of criminal law. Gardner tackles persistent and troublesome questions about the ...
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This book collects together a selection of John Gardner's best-known and most provocative writings on the theory of criminal law. Gardner tackles persistent and troublesome questions about the philosophical foundations of the criminal law. Which wrongs are suitable to be crimes and why? What are the conditions of criminal responsibility, and how do they relate to the conditions of moral responsibility? What does it take to be complicit in another's wrongdoing? Should crimes ever be excused, and if so, on what basis? How, if at all, should the criminal law adapt to conditions of social and cultural diversity? The issues raised in these essays have a significance extending beyond the law. What does it mean to be a responsible agent and why does it matter? Is my moral character only or mostly my own business? Is there a difference between being reasonable and being rational? These and many other moral problems lurk in the background of the criminal law, and the pieces in this book bring them into the foreground. Theoretical writings on the criminal law have often been dominated by a preoccupation with the justification of criminal punishment. This work is different. Although it discusses the legitimacy of criminal punishment, it proceeds on the footing that the criminal law does many important things apart from punishing people. In particular, Gardner argues that the criminal law provides an important forum for people to explain themselves. Such a forum would be important, argues Gardner, even if criminal punishment were to be abolished.Less
This book collects together a selection of John Gardner's best-known and most provocative writings on the theory of criminal law. Gardner tackles persistent and troublesome questions about the philosophical foundations of the criminal law. Which wrongs are suitable to be crimes and why? What are the conditions of criminal responsibility, and how do they relate to the conditions of moral responsibility? What does it take to be complicit in another's wrongdoing? Should crimes ever be excused, and if so, on what basis? How, if at all, should the criminal law adapt to conditions of social and cultural diversity? The issues raised in these essays have a significance extending beyond the law. What does it mean to be a responsible agent and why does it matter? Is my moral character only or mostly my own business? Is there a difference between being reasonable and being rational? These and many other moral problems lurk in the background of the criminal law, and the pieces in this book bring them into the foreground. Theoretical writings on the criminal law have often been dominated by a preoccupation with the justification of criminal punishment. This work is different. Although it discusses the legitimacy of criminal punishment, it proceeds on the footing that the criminal law does many important things apart from punishing people. In particular, Gardner argues that the criminal law provides an important forum for people to explain themselves. Such a forum would be important, argues Gardner, even if criminal punishment were to be abolished.
Gloria Vivenza
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198296669
- eISBN:
- 9780191597008
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198296665.003.0003
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, History of Economic Thought
Deals with Smith's moral philosophy and singles out the influences of the main classical philosophies on Smith's treatise. There are clearly recognizable echoes from Greek philosophy (Plato and ...
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Deals with Smith's moral philosophy and singles out the influences of the main classical philosophies on Smith's treatise. There are clearly recognizable echoes from Greek philosophy (Plato and Aristotle), from the Hellenistic philosophies (Stoicism and Epicureanism), and from Roman Stoicism. This chapter shows the relationship of Smith's well‐known moral concepts (prudence, self‐interest, self‐control, justice, benevolence) with their classical antecedents.Less
Deals with Smith's moral philosophy and singles out the influences of the main classical philosophies on Smith's treatise. There are clearly recognizable echoes from Greek philosophy (Plato and Aristotle), from the Hellenistic philosophies (Stoicism and Epicureanism), and from Roman Stoicism. This chapter shows the relationship of Smith's well‐known moral concepts (prudence, self‐interest, self‐control, justice, benevolence) with their classical antecedents.
Annika Thiem
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- March 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780823228980
- eISBN:
- 9780823235865
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Fordham University Press
- DOI:
- 10.5422/fso/9780823228980.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Moral philosophy and poststructuralism have long been considered two antithetical enterprises. Moral philosophy is invested in securing norms, whereas poststructuralism attempts to ...
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Moral philosophy and poststructuralism have long been considered two antithetical enterprises. Moral philosophy is invested in securing norms, whereas poststructuralism attempts to unclench the grip of norms on our lives. Moreover, poststructuralism is often suspected of undoing the possibility of ethical knowledge by emphasizing the unstable, socially constructed nature of our practices and knowledge. This book argues that Judith Butler's work makes possible a productive encounter between moral philosophy and poststructuralism, rethinking responsibility and critique as key concepts at the juncture of ethics and politics. Putting into conversation Butler's earlier and most recent work, this book begins by examining how Butler's critique of the subject as nontransparent to itself, formed thoroughly through relations of power and in subjection to norms and social practices, poses a challenge to ethics and ethical agency. The book argues, in conversation with Butler, Levinas, and Laplanche, that responsibility becomes possible only when we do not know what to do or how to respond, yet find ourselves under a demand to respond, and even more, to respond well to others. Drawing on the work of Butler, Adorno, and Foucault, the book examines critique as a central practice for moral philosophy. It interrogates the limits of moral and political knowledge and probes methods of social criticism to uncover and oppose injustices.Less
Moral philosophy and poststructuralism have long been considered two antithetical enterprises. Moral philosophy is invested in securing norms, whereas poststructuralism attempts to unclench the grip of norms on our lives. Moreover, poststructuralism is often suspected of undoing the possibility of ethical knowledge by emphasizing the unstable, socially constructed nature of our practices and knowledge. This book argues that Judith Butler's work makes possible a productive encounter between moral philosophy and poststructuralism, rethinking responsibility and critique as key concepts at the juncture of ethics and politics. Putting into conversation Butler's earlier and most recent work, this book begins by examining how Butler's critique of the subject as nontransparent to itself, formed thoroughly through relations of power and in subjection to norms and social practices, poses a challenge to ethics and ethical agency. The book argues, in conversation with Butler, Levinas, and Laplanche, that responsibility becomes possible only when we do not know what to do or how to respond, yet find ourselves under a demand to respond, and even more, to respond well to others. Drawing on the work of Butler, Adorno, and Foucault, the book examines critique as a central practice for moral philosophy. It interrogates the limits of moral and political knowledge and probes methods of social criticism to uncover and oppose injustices.
