T. A. Cavanaugh
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199272198
- eISBN:
- 9780191604157
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199272190.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
Consequentialists oppose while absolutists and deontologists rely upon double-effect reasoning (DER) to address hard cases in which good inextricably binds with evil (such as destroying a legitimate ...
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Consequentialists oppose while absolutists and deontologists rely upon double-effect reasoning (DER) to address hard cases in which good inextricably binds with evil (such as destroying a legitimate military target while concomitantly and foreseeably killing innocents). This book addresses the history, application, and philosophical controversy concerning DER. It traces both the origin of DER in the thought of Aquinas and its development by subsequent ethicists. Considering consequentialist criticisms, proportionalism, and recent revisions of double effect, the book argues at length for the reasonableness of DER, particularly the intended/foreseen distinction. Intent is distinguished from foresight, and this distinction is applied to the classic cases of terror and tactical bombing. Most importantly, the book establishes the ethical relevance of this distinction, grounding its import both in broadly Aristotelian-Thomistic features of action as voluntary, and in a Kantian focus on the victim as an end in himself. The book also considers typically neglected albeit intriguing issues such as DER’s application to allowings and how constitutional legal systems that incorporate exceptionless norms employ a legal analogue to DER.Less
Consequentialists oppose while absolutists and deontologists rely upon double-effect reasoning (DER) to address hard cases in which good inextricably binds with evil (such as destroying a legitimate military target while concomitantly and foreseeably killing innocents). This book addresses the history, application, and philosophical controversy concerning DER. It traces both the origin of DER in the thought of Aquinas and its development by subsequent ethicists. Considering consequentialist criticisms, proportionalism, and recent revisions of double effect, the book argues at length for the reasonableness of DER, particularly the intended/foreseen distinction. Intent is distinguished from foresight, and this distinction is applied to the classic cases of terror and tactical bombing. Most importantly, the book establishes the ethical relevance of this distinction, grounding its import both in broadly Aristotelian-Thomistic features of action as voluntary, and in a Kantian focus on the victim as an end in himself. The book also considers typically neglected albeit intriguing issues such as DER’s application to allowings and how constitutional legal systems that incorporate exceptionless norms employ a legal analogue to DER.
Chandra Sekhar Sripada and Stephen Stich
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195310139
- eISBN:
- 9780199871209
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195310139.003.0017
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Human social life is regulated by an extensive network of informal social rules and principles often called norms. This chapter offers an account of the psychological mechanisms and processes ...
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Human social life is regulated by an extensive network of informal social rules and principles often called norms. This chapter offers an account of the psychological mechanisms and processes underlying norms that integrates findings from a number of disciplines, and can serve as a framework for future research. It begins by discussing a number of social-level and individual-level generalizations about norms that place constraints on possible accounts of norm psychology. After proposing its own model of the psychological processes by which norms are acquired and utilized, it discusses a number of open questions about the psychology of norms. These include questions about the role of social learning, emotions, and various reasoning processes in norm psychology.Less
Human social life is regulated by an extensive network of informal social rules and principles often called norms. This chapter offers an account of the psychological mechanisms and processes underlying norms that integrates findings from a number of disciplines, and can serve as a framework for future research. It begins by discussing a number of social-level and individual-level generalizations about norms that place constraints on possible accounts of norm psychology. After proposing its own model of the psychological processes by which norms are acquired and utilized, it discusses a number of open questions about the psychology of norms. These include questions about the role of social learning, emotions, and various reasoning processes in norm psychology.
Andrews Reath
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199288830
- eISBN:
- 9780191603648
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199288836.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter analyzes the structure and underlying rationale of Kant's principles of imputation (Zurechnung), with particular concern for his principles governing the moral imputation of bad ...
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This chapter analyzes the structure and underlying rationale of Kant's principles of imputation (Zurechnung), with particular concern for his principles governing the moral imputation of bad consequences. It shows how Kant's principles make the imputation of actions and consequences a question for practical reason, rather than a straightforward factual, causal, or metaphysical issue. For Kant, the imputation of actions and consequences is made within the context of, and depends upon, the application of first-order moral norms governing conduct (those setting out strict moral requirements). It suggests that Kant's principles of imputation are generally sound, though they need to be qualified in important ways.Less
This chapter analyzes the structure and underlying rationale of Kant's principles of imputation (Zurechnung), with particular concern for his principles governing the moral imputation of bad consequences. It shows how Kant's principles make the imputation of actions and consequences a question for practical reason, rather than a straightforward factual, causal, or metaphysical issue. For Kant, the imputation of actions and consequences is made within the context of, and depends upon, the application of first-order moral norms governing conduct (those setting out strict moral requirements). It suggests that Kant's principles of imputation are generally sound, though they need to be qualified in important ways.
Jean‐Marie Baland and Jean‐Philippe Platteau
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780198290612
- eISBN:
- 9780191601613
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198290616.003.0007
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Development, Growth, and Environmental
This chapter analyses the role of moral norms in shaping individual preferences and expectations in a way that is conducive to cooperation. It covers norms as constraints on the pursuit of ...
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This chapter analyses the role of moral norms in shaping individual preferences and expectations in a way that is conducive to cooperation. It covers norms as constraints on the pursuit of self-interest, norms as social devices shaping preferences and expectations, and the emergence and erosion of moral norms.Less
This chapter analyses the role of moral norms in shaping individual preferences and expectations in a way that is conducive to cooperation. It covers norms as constraints on the pursuit of self-interest, norms as social devices shaping preferences and expectations, and the emergence and erosion of moral norms.
Daniel Kelly and Stephen Stich
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199733477
- eISBN:
- 9780199949823
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199733477.003.0014
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This chapter compares two theories about the cognitive architecture underlying morality. One theory, proposed by Sripada and Stich (2006), posits an interlocking set of innate mechanisms that ...
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This chapter compares two theories about the cognitive architecture underlying morality. One theory, proposed by Sripada and Stich (2006), posits an interlocking set of innate mechanisms that internalize moral norms from the surrounding community and generate intrinsic motivation to comply with these norms and to punish violators. The other theory—called the M/C model—posits two distinct mental domains, the moral and the conventional, each of which gives rise to a characteristic suite of judgments about rules in that domain and about transgressions of those rules. The chapter gives an overview of both theories and of the data each was designed to explain. It goes on to consider a growing body of evidence that suggests the M/C model is mistaken. That same evidence, however, is consistent with the Sripada and Stich theory. Thus, the M/C model does not pose a serious challenge for the Sripada and Stich theory.Less
This chapter compares two theories about the cognitive architecture underlying morality. One theory, proposed by Sripada and Stich (2006), posits an interlocking set of innate mechanisms that internalize moral norms from the surrounding community and generate intrinsic motivation to comply with these norms and to punish violators. The other theory—called the M/C model—posits two distinct mental domains, the moral and the conventional, each of which gives rise to a characteristic suite of judgments about rules in that domain and about transgressions of those rules. The chapter gives an overview of both theories and of the data each was designed to explain. It goes on to consider a growing body of evidence that suggests the M/C model is mistaken. That same evidence, however, is consistent with the Sripada and Stich theory. Thus, the M/C model does not pose a serious challenge for the Sripada and Stich theory.
Dennis L. Krebs
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199778232
- eISBN:
- 9780199897261
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199778232.003.0032
- Subject:
- Psychology, Evolutionary Psychology, Social Psychology
This chapter contains an account of how culturally universal and culturally specific moral norms evolved. Norms evolve when members of groups make rules to formalize agreements about how they should ...
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This chapter contains an account of how culturally universal and culturally specific moral norms evolved. Norms evolve when members of groups make rules to formalize agreements about how they should behave in order to uphold the social order. The rules and sanctions that members of groups create to control the behavior of others end up controlling their own behavior. People serve as agents of selection, determining which standards and customs get repeated and develop into moral norms. Norms such as the norm of reciprocity and the Golden Rule that prescribe fair and reversible solutions to social conflicts are universal because they uphold mutually-beneficial forms of cooperation and enable people to resolve their conflicts of interest in optimal ways. However, the content of specific moral norms may vary within and across cultures for a variety of adaptive and maladaptive reasons.Less
This chapter contains an account of how culturally universal and culturally specific moral norms evolved. Norms evolve when members of groups make rules to formalize agreements about how they should behave in order to uphold the social order. The rules and sanctions that members of groups create to control the behavior of others end up controlling their own behavior. People serve as agents of selection, determining which standards and customs get repeated and develop into moral norms. Norms such as the norm of reciprocity and the Golden Rule that prescribe fair and reversible solutions to social conflicts are universal because they uphold mutually-beneficial forms of cooperation and enable people to resolve their conflicts of interest in optimal ways. However, the content of specific moral norms may vary within and across cultures for a variety of adaptive and maladaptive reasons.
James Griffin
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198752318
- eISBN:
- 9780191597541
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198752318.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Turns to more complex moral norms than the ‘simple’ ones discussed in Ch. 5: e.g. the prohibition ‘Don’t deliberately kill the innocent’ and the injunction ‘save more people's lives rather than ...
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Turns to more complex moral norms than the ‘simple’ ones discussed in Ch. 5: e.g. the prohibition ‘Don’t deliberately kill the innocent’ and the injunction ‘save more people's lives rather than fewer’. Some morality consists ultimately of various independent moral norms; or is there some system behind this variety? The chapter expresses doubts about three major systematic traditions in ethics: utilitarianism, deontology, and virtue ethics. It ends with the proposal of a less systematic alternative, one that takes seriously the limits of human motivation and knowledge, along with the demand that ethics be effective in society, and constrains the content of moral norms and the extent of the system.Less
Turns to more complex moral norms than the ‘simple’ ones discussed in Ch. 5: e.g. the prohibition ‘Don’t deliberately kill the innocent’ and the injunction ‘save more people's lives rather than fewer’. Some morality consists ultimately of various independent moral norms; or is there some system behind this variety? The chapter expresses doubts about three major systematic traditions in ethics: utilitarianism, deontology, and virtue ethics. It ends with the proposal of a less systematic alternative, one that takes seriously the limits of human motivation and knowledge, along with the demand that ethics be effective in society, and constrains the content of moral norms and the extent of the system.
Jennifer Prah Ruger
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199559978
- eISBN:
- 9780191721489
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199559978.003.0010
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Public and Welfare
Many countries, including the United States, lack consensus about the core ethical principles concerning health and health care, beyond a market‐based approach to resource allocation. This chapter ...
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Many countries, including the United States, lack consensus about the core ethical principles concerning health and health care, beyond a market‐based approach to resource allocation. This chapter offers a normative theory for analyzing health policy decisions and recognizes that norms need fundamental restructuring to address existing health problems. Substantive normative principles (moral legitimacy) should be introduced into deliberative democratic process (political legitimacy) for a comprehensive, integrative theory of health and social justice. The chapter reviews the role of moral values in motivating citizens' support for public policies, and explores differences between social agreement frameworks such as incompletely theorized agreements (ITAs) and overlapping consensus and more traditional political bargaining models. ITA analysis of the American Clinton health care reform attempts reveals agreement on the mid‐level concept of universal coverage, but disagreement on both high‐ and low‐level principles. The chapter concludes that high‐level principle (e.g. health for all) or low‐level principle (e.g. willingness to pay for other's and future selves' health insurance) agreement, arising from internalization of shared public moral norms, might lead to more stable support for reform.Less
Many countries, including the United States, lack consensus about the core ethical principles concerning health and health care, beyond a market‐based approach to resource allocation. This chapter offers a normative theory for analyzing health policy decisions and recognizes that norms need fundamental restructuring to address existing health problems. Substantive normative principles (moral legitimacy) should be introduced into deliberative democratic process (political legitimacy) for a comprehensive, integrative theory of health and social justice. The chapter reviews the role of moral values in motivating citizens' support for public policies, and explores differences between social agreement frameworks such as incompletely theorized agreements (ITAs) and overlapping consensus and more traditional political bargaining models. ITA analysis of the American Clinton health care reform attempts reveals agreement on the mid‐level concept of universal coverage, but disagreement on both high‐ and low‐level principles. The chapter concludes that high‐level principle (e.g. health for all) or low‐level principle (e.g. willingness to pay for other's and future selves' health insurance) agreement, arising from internalization of shared public moral norms, might lead to more stable support for reform.
Rebekah L. Miles
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195144161
- eISBN:
- 9780199834495
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195144163.003.0005
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
An examination is made of Sharon Welch's political realist position. Welch, in contrast to Ruether, locates moral norms and the divine in particular human communities, and all moral claims are ...
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An examination is made of Sharon Welch's political realist position. Welch, in contrast to Ruether, locates moral norms and the divine in particular human communities, and all moral claims are radically relative to those particular contexts. Appeals to an experience or reality that transcends our interactions in communities are illusory justifications of our own relative positions, since only within community interaction can we transcend ourselves as we see the limitations of our understandings through the criticism of others. Welch is a political realist in the sense that she is suspicious of the power interests hidden behind truth claims, and she is cynical in her skepticism of any substantive grounding for moral claims. It is shown that each of these proposals undercuts a crucial aspect of feminist moral judgment and, thus, does not lessen, but rather unintentionally supports, further domination.Less
An examination is made of Sharon Welch's political realist position. Welch, in contrast to Ruether, locates moral norms and the divine in particular human communities, and all moral claims are radically relative to those particular contexts. Appeals to an experience or reality that transcends our interactions in communities are illusory justifications of our own relative positions, since only within community interaction can we transcend ourselves as we see the limitations of our understandings through the criticism of others. Welch is a political realist in the sense that she is suspicious of the power interests hidden behind truth claims, and she is cynical in her skepticism of any substantive grounding for moral claims. It is shown that each of these proposals undercuts a crucial aspect of feminist moral judgment and, thus, does not lessen, but rather unintentionally supports, further domination.
Hans Kelsen
- Published in print:
- 1991
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780198252177
- eISBN:
- 9780191681363
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198252177.003.0026
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law
The normative function of empowering means: conferring on an individual the power to posit and apply norms. A moral norm empowers a father to issue commands binding on his child. A legal norm ...
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The normative function of empowering means: conferring on an individual the power to posit and apply norms. A moral norm empowers a father to issue commands binding on his child. A legal norm empowers certain individuals to create legal norms or to apply legal norms. In such cases it is said that the law confers a legal power on certain individuals. Since the law regulates its own creation and application, the normative function of empowering plays a particularly important role in law. Only individuals on whom the legal order confers this power can create or apply legal norms.Less
The normative function of empowering means: conferring on an individual the power to posit and apply norms. A moral norm empowers a father to issue commands binding on his child. A legal norm empowers certain individuals to create legal norms or to apply legal norms. In such cases it is said that the law confers a legal power on certain individuals. Since the law regulates its own creation and application, the normative function of empowering plays a particularly important role in law. Only individuals on whom the legal order confers this power can create or apply legal norms.
Geoffrey Brennan, Lina Eriksson, Robert E. Goodin, and Nicholas Southwood
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- September 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199654680
- eISBN:
- 9780191747960
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199654680.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Political Philosophy
This chapter examines two kinds of non-formal norms: moral norms and social norms. Paradigmatic examples of moral norms include the norms that exist in most societies forbidding murder, rape, and ...
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This chapter examines two kinds of non-formal norms: moral norms and social norms. Paradigmatic examples of moral norms include the norms that exist in most societies forbidding murder, rape, and torture, norms of truth-telling and promise-keeping, and norms of beneficence. Paradigmatic examples of social norms include norms forbidding nudity in public places, norms of gift-giving, and norms of address. The chapter proposes a radically different account of what makes moral norms and social norms fundamentally different. According to this view — the Grounds View — what makes moral norms and social norms different is not the form or content of any principle but the grounds of the normative attitudes that constitute them. The grounds of a normative judgement are the considerations that justify the relevant normative principle in the mind of the judge.Less
This chapter examines two kinds of non-formal norms: moral norms and social norms. Paradigmatic examples of moral norms include the norms that exist in most societies forbidding murder, rape, and torture, norms of truth-telling and promise-keeping, and norms of beneficence. Paradigmatic examples of social norms include norms forbidding nudity in public places, norms of gift-giving, and norms of address. The chapter proposes a radically different account of what makes moral norms and social norms fundamentally different. According to this view — the Grounds View — what makes moral norms and social norms different is not the form or content of any principle but the grounds of the normative attitudes that constitute them. The grounds of a normative judgement are the considerations that justify the relevant normative principle in the mind of the judge.
Jennifer Prah Ruger
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199559978
- eISBN:
- 9780191721489
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199559978.001.0001
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Public and Welfare
Envision a society in which all people have the ability to achieve the central health capabilities of avoiding premature death and escapable morbidity, and where everyone has comprehensive health ...
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Envision a society in which all people have the ability to achieve the central health capabilities of avoiding premature death and escapable morbidity, and where everyone has comprehensive health insurance and access to high‐quality health care. This vision is the animating principle behind the health capability paradigm, a unique new approach where not just health care, or the right to health alone, but health and the capability for health itself are moral imperatives. Ruger has been developing this health capability paradigm for over 15 years. Her innovative approach bridges the gaps at the interdisciplinary intersection of ethics, economics, political science, law and human rights, with practical and theoretical applications for the financing and delivery of health care and public health. The health capability paradigm provides philosophical justification for the direct moral importance of health, health capability, and the right to health, as well as a theoretical basis for prioritizing needs and allocating resources. There are no guarantees of good health, but society can, if it will, design and build effective institutions and social systems, structures and practices, that support all citizens in the pursuit of central health capabilities. Key tenets of this theory, which emphasizes responsibility and choice for health, include health agency, shared health governance, incompletely theorized agreements, internalized public moral norms to guide social choice and collective action, and a joint scientific and deliberative approach to decision-making that incorporates medical necessity, medical appropriateness, and shortfall equality. This paradigm integrates both proceduralist and consequentialist approaches to justice, and emphasizes the critical roles of both moral and political legitimacy. We can no longer afford to ignore human suffering. This book weaves together a number of disparate constructs and original insights to produce a foundational new framework for thinking about and taking action to achieve health and social justice— the health capability paradigm.Less
Envision a society in which all people have the ability to achieve the central health capabilities of avoiding premature death and escapable morbidity, and where everyone has comprehensive health insurance and access to high‐quality health care. This vision is the animating principle behind the health capability paradigm, a unique new approach where not just health care, or the right to health alone, but health and the capability for health itself are moral imperatives. Ruger has been developing this health capability paradigm for over 15 years. Her innovative approach bridges the gaps at the interdisciplinary intersection of ethics, economics, political science, law and human rights, with practical and theoretical applications for the financing and delivery of health care and public health. The health capability paradigm provides philosophical justification for the direct moral importance of health, health capability, and the right to health, as well as a theoretical basis for prioritizing needs and allocating resources. There are no guarantees of good health, but society can, if it will, design and build effective institutions and social systems, structures and practices, that support all citizens in the pursuit of central health capabilities. Key tenets of this theory, which emphasizes responsibility and choice for health, include health agency, shared health governance, incompletely theorized agreements, internalized public moral norms to guide social choice and collective action, and a joint scientific and deliberative approach to decision-making that incorporates medical necessity, medical appropriateness, and shortfall equality. This paradigm integrates both proceduralist and consequentialist approaches to justice, and emphasizes the critical roles of both moral and political legitimacy. We can no longer afford to ignore human suffering. This book weaves together a number of disparate constructs and original insights to produce a foundational new framework for thinking about and taking action to achieve health and social justice— the health capability paradigm.
Dennis L. Krebs
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199794393
- eISBN:
- 9780199919338
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199794393.003.0017
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General, Philosophy of Science
Refinements in Darwin's theory of the origin of morality create a framework equipped to organize and integrate relevant contemporary theory and research. Morality originated in social instincts or ...
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Refinements in Darwin's theory of the origin of morality create a framework equipped to organize and integrate relevant contemporary theory and research. Morality originated in social instincts or decision-making strategies that enabled early humans to maximize their gains from social exchanges and resolve their conflicts of interest in adaptive ways. Moral judgments and moral norms originated from strategic interactions among members of groups who experienced confluences and conflicts of interest. Moral argumentation buttressed by moral reasoning is equipped to generate universal and impartial moral standards. Moral beliefs and standards are products of automatic and controlled information-processing and decision-making mechanisms. To understand how people make moral decisions, we must understand how early-evolved mechanisms in the old brain and recently evolved mechanisms in the new brain are activated, and how they interact.Less
Refinements in Darwin's theory of the origin of morality create a framework equipped to organize and integrate relevant contemporary theory and research. Morality originated in social instincts or decision-making strategies that enabled early humans to maximize their gains from social exchanges and resolve their conflicts of interest in adaptive ways. Moral judgments and moral norms originated from strategic interactions among members of groups who experienced confluences and conflicts of interest. Moral argumentation buttressed by moral reasoning is equipped to generate universal and impartial moral standards. Moral beliefs and standards are products of automatic and controlled information-processing and decision-making mechanisms. To understand how people make moral decisions, we must understand how early-evolved mechanisms in the old brain and recently evolved mechanisms in the new brain are activated, and how they interact.
Richard Crouter
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195379679
- eISBN:
- 9780199869169
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195379679.003.0003
- Subject:
- Religion, Religion and Society
Chapter 3 shows how St. Paul, Augustine, and Kierkegaard inform Niebuhr’s Christian anthropology by insisting on our human ambiguity and sinful nature, the ways that self-interest constantly works ...
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Chapter 3 shows how St. Paul, Augustine, and Kierkegaard inform Niebuhr’s Christian anthropology by insisting on our human ambiguity and sinful nature, the ways that self-interest constantly works among individuals. This tendency toward self-preoccupied moral blindness is greater in our social relationships and in relations among nations than in our individual lives. Power has consequences in all aspects of our lives: religious as well as political. Love remains the norm of the moral life, even if its selfless aims conflict with the struggle toward approximations of justice in the larger political and economic world. Classical Christian teaching on “sin” has been in retreat among secular and religious minds since the 18th-century Enlightenment. Yet Niebuhr never deviates from thinking that the doctrine of sin yields great insight into human affairs. As a result, his hopes for future human achievements are marked by a sober realism that places our hopes within the reach of limited and fallible human beings.Less
Chapter 3 shows how St. Paul, Augustine, and Kierkegaard inform Niebuhr’s Christian anthropology by insisting on our human ambiguity and sinful nature, the ways that self-interest constantly works among individuals. This tendency toward self-preoccupied moral blindness is greater in our social relationships and in relations among nations than in our individual lives. Power has consequences in all aspects of our lives: religious as well as political. Love remains the norm of the moral life, even if its selfless aims conflict with the struggle toward approximations of justice in the larger political and economic world. Classical Christian teaching on “sin” has been in retreat among secular and religious minds since the 18th-century Enlightenment. Yet Niebuhr never deviates from thinking that the doctrine of sin yields great insight into human affairs. As a result, his hopes for future human achievements are marked by a sober realism that places our hopes within the reach of limited and fallible human beings.
Geoffrey Brennan, Lina Eriksson, Robert E. Goodin, and Nicholas Southwood
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- September 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199654680
- eISBN:
- 9780191747960
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199654680.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Political Philosophy
Norms are a pervasive yet mysterious feature of social life. This book aims to grapple with some of the many mysteries, offering an account of norms: what they are; how and why they emerge, persist, ...
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Norms are a pervasive yet mysterious feature of social life. This book aims to grapple with some of the many mysteries, offering an account of norms: what they are; how and why they emerge, persist, and change; and how they work. Norms, the book argues, should be understood in non-reductive terms as clusters of normative attitudes that serve the function of making us accountable to one another — with the different kinds of norms (legal, moral, and social norms) differing in virtue of being constituted by different kinds of normative attitudes that serve to make us accountable in different ways. Explanations of and by norms should be seen as thoroughly pluralist in character. Explanations of norms should appeal to the ways that norms help us to pursue projects and goals, individually and collectively, as well as to enable us to constitute social meanings. Explanations by norms should recognize the multiplicity of ways in which norms may bear upon the actions we perform, the attitudes we form and the modes of deliberation in which we engage: following, merely conforming with, and even breaching norms.Less
Norms are a pervasive yet mysterious feature of social life. This book aims to grapple with some of the many mysteries, offering an account of norms: what they are; how and why they emerge, persist, and change; and how they work. Norms, the book argues, should be understood in non-reductive terms as clusters of normative attitudes that serve the function of making us accountable to one another — with the different kinds of norms (legal, moral, and social norms) differing in virtue of being constituted by different kinds of normative attitudes that serve to make us accountable in different ways. Explanations of and by norms should be seen as thoroughly pluralist in character. Explanations of norms should appeal to the ways that norms help us to pursue projects and goals, individually and collectively, as well as to enable us to constitute social meanings. Explanations by norms should recognize the multiplicity of ways in which norms may bear upon the actions we perform, the attitudes we form and the modes of deliberation in which we engage: following, merely conforming with, and even breaching norms.
Jennifer Prah Ruger
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199559978
- eISBN:
- 9780191721489
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199559978.003.0001
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Public and Welfare
The introduction summarizes the theoretical foundations of the health capability paradigm and distinguishes it from prevailing frameworks, which represent clear deficiencies in thinking and action ...
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The introduction summarizes the theoretical foundations of the health capability paradigm and distinguishes it from prevailing frameworks, which represent clear deficiencies in thinking and action about health and health care. The theory is rooted in a particular view of the good life —— Aristotelian human flourishing —— that values health intrinsically. An overview presents other components of the health capability paradigm, including incompletely theorized agreements, shortfall inequality, the role of internalized public moral norms in collective choice, and a joint scientific and deliberative approach, with medical necessity and medical appropriateness informing decision-making in a shared health governance framework. Health agency —— the ability to engage with and navigate one's environment and the health care system to meet health needs —— is an integral part of the health capability paradigm.Less
The introduction summarizes the theoretical foundations of the health capability paradigm and distinguishes it from prevailing frameworks, which represent clear deficiencies in thinking and action about health and health care. The theory is rooted in a particular view of the good life —— Aristotelian human flourishing —— that values health intrinsically. An overview presents other components of the health capability paradigm, including incompletely theorized agreements, shortfall inequality, the role of internalized public moral norms in collective choice, and a joint scientific and deliberative approach, with medical necessity and medical appropriateness informing decision-making in a shared health governance framework. Health agency —— the ability to engage with and navigate one's environment and the health care system to meet health needs —— is an integral part of the health capability paradigm.
Geoffrey Brennan, Lina Eriksson, Robert E. Goodin, and Nicholas Southwood
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- September 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199654680
- eISBN:
- 9780191747960
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199654680.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Political Philosophy
This chapter considers how to make sense of the notion of norms following within a broadly rational-choice-theoretic framework. It begins by providing a general characterization of the notion of ...
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This chapter considers how to make sense of the notion of norms following within a broadly rational-choice-theoretic framework. It begins by providing a general characterization of the notion of internalizing a norm. It then proposes a conative or desire-based account that can provide the foundation for a rational-choice-theoretic interpretation of the notion of norm following. Next, it discusses how norms figure in the kind of augmented utility function that this suggests. Finally, it considers the application of norm following to the different kinds of norms: formal norms, moral norms, and social norms.Less
This chapter considers how to make sense of the notion of norms following within a broadly rational-choice-theoretic framework. It begins by providing a general characterization of the notion of internalizing a norm. It then proposes a conative or desire-based account that can provide the foundation for a rational-choice-theoretic interpretation of the notion of norm following. Next, it discusses how norms figure in the kind of augmented utility function that this suggests. Finally, it considers the application of norm following to the different kinds of norms: formal norms, moral norms, and social norms.
Jennifer Prah Ruger
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199559978
- eISBN:
- 9780191721489
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199559978.003.0006
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Public and Welfare
This chapter offers a philosophical justification for the elusive ‘right to health’. It provides a framework for health reform efforts and covers the degree to which the right to health is ...
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This chapter offers a philosophical justification for the elusive ‘right to health’. It provides a framework for health reform efforts and covers the degree to which the right to health is ‘justiciable’ and enforceable as prescribed in international law. The health capability paradigm argues for the right to health as a meaningful and operational right, and recognizes that realizing it requires a commitment to, and internalization of, public moral norms on the part of self and society, in addition to legal instruments for enforcement. This chapter compares positive and negative rights in the Abigail Alliance v. Eschenbach case study of the constitutional right to medical self‐defence. The chapter concludes that a right to health cannot be framed in an absolute libertarian framework of wholly individualistic rights against the state, but requires the more positive conceptualization of freedom as human flourishing.Less
This chapter offers a philosophical justification for the elusive ‘right to health’. It provides a framework for health reform efforts and covers the degree to which the right to health is ‘justiciable’ and enforceable as prescribed in international law. The health capability paradigm argues for the right to health as a meaningful and operational right, and recognizes that realizing it requires a commitment to, and internalization of, public moral norms on the part of self and society, in addition to legal instruments for enforcement. This chapter compares positive and negative rights in the Abigail Alliance v. Eschenbach case study of the constitutional right to medical self‐defence. The chapter concludes that a right to health cannot be framed in an absolute libertarian framework of wholly individualistic rights against the state, but requires the more positive conceptualization of freedom as human flourishing.
Christian Miller
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- May 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199674350
- eISBN:
- 9780191760761
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199674350.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter introduces two more enhancers, and follows a similar course as the previous two chapters. The one significant twist, though, is the kind of motivation to which these enhancers seem to ...
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This chapter introduces two more enhancers, and follows a similar course as the previous two chapters. The one significant twist, though, is the kind of motivation to which these enhancers seem to give rise, which is moralistic and not egoistic. The first section of the chapter focuses on elevation, the second on activated moral norms, and the third on the implications for character.Less
This chapter introduces two more enhancers, and follows a similar course as the previous two chapters. The one significant twist, though, is the kind of motivation to which these enhancers seem to give rise, which is moralistic and not egoistic. The first section of the chapter focuses on elevation, the second on activated moral norms, and the third on the implications for character.
Geoffrey Brennan, Lina Eriksson, Robert E. Goodin, and Nicholas Southwood
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- September 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199654680
- eISBN:
- 9780191747960
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199654680.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Political Philosophy
This chapter examines the notion of norm conforming within a broadly rational-choice-theoretic perspective. It begins by discussing the notion of externalizing a norm in more detail. It then presents ...
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This chapter examines the notion of norm conforming within a broadly rational-choice-theoretic perspective. It begins by discussing the notion of externalizing a norm in more detail. It then presents some examples of salient considerations that undergird our disposition to treat norms as instrumental reasons. It focuses, in particular, on the desire to avoid sanctions: both tangible sanctions and intangible sanctions. Finally, this account of norm conforming is applied to formal norms, moral norms, and social norms.Less
This chapter examines the notion of norm conforming within a broadly rational-choice-theoretic perspective. It begins by discussing the notion of externalizing a norm in more detail. It then presents some examples of salient considerations that undergird our disposition to treat norms as instrumental reasons. It focuses, in particular, on the desire to avoid sanctions: both tangible sanctions and intangible sanctions. Finally, this account of norm conforming is applied to formal norms, moral norms, and social norms.
