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This chapter introduces the problem of complicity through a conversation between an academic philosopher and practitioner of emergency medicine in conflict zones. It foreshadows our conclusions that complicity involves making a causal contribution to the wrongdoing of others, knowingly but not necessarily sharing the purposes of the wrongdoers. It illustrates how our analysis might provide a better account of the plight of humanitarian actors in conflict situations. It highlights the importance of adapting moral methodology to the complexities of the radically non-ideal world.

Many philosophers argue that non-sceptical moral realists cannot adequately explain the sort of moral disagreement that exists. This chapter responds to this argument, focusing on what might seem a particularly hard case for non-sceptical moral realists to explain – moral disagreement among philosophers. First, this apparent problem for non-sceptical moral realism is explored. Then an account is offered of the distinctive methods of moral theory. This account allows for two sources of error in moral theories: (a) in our pre-theoretical intuitions, and (b) in the way in which we articulate and evaluate theories by pursuing reflective equilibrium. In conclusion, it is argued that moral theorists are not entitled to very high levels of confidence that they have correctly identified the ultimate first principles of morality, but this is entirely compatible with ordinary thinkers’ knowing a large number of moral truths.

On the basis of the arguments in the proceeding chapters, this chapter derives three principles that should govern research in experimental moral psychology, if this research is to be both scientifically reliable and maintain its compatibility with philosophical ethics.

This chapter considers whether moral philosophers should accept as part of their moral methodology the study hypothetical cases, such as ticking bomb scenarios, in thinking about torture. In response to the criticism of such scenarios by Albie Sachs, this chapter argues that such cases are useful for thinking about the ethics of torture if their function is properly understood. Such thought experiments are quite typical of moral philosophy in general, and do not necessarily generate objections. Moreover, those who engage in evil actions render themselves liable to torture as a means of prevention or self-defense. Hence this chapter rejects any absolute moral prohibition on torture. Nonetheless, there are pragmatic, consequentialist considerations that can justify an absolute legal prohibition on torture. Such a legal rule would help prevent mistakes and help prevent the torture of the innocent and others not liable to attack on just war theory. An absolute legal prohibition on torture is justified because on balance no more flexible stricture on its use is likely to be as productive of good outcomes.

This chapter introduces the concept of pragmatic (non-goal-directed) progress and presents the proposed method for understanding problems of exclusion. It contrasts the pragmatist approach with that of scholars like Derek Parfit, Thomas Nagel, and T. M. Scanlon, who emphasize moral truth and (tacitly or explicitly) take progress to be the discovery of moral truths. The chapter argues that this conception is both incomplete and epistemologically problematic. The main work, however, is to show how to give substance to the notion of a moral problem and to describe procedures for addressing the case of exclusion, in which “the cries of the wounded” go unheard.

This introductory chapter contains a brief overview of the topics the book addresses, together with a discussion of the working hypothesis: that moral knowledge can be acquired in any of the ways in which we acquire ordinary empirical knowledge, and that our efforts to acquire and preserve such knowledge are subject to frustration in all of the same ways that our efforts to acquire and preserve ordinary empirical knowledge are. Section 1.2 discusses methodological preliminaries and assumptions concerning the relative priority of moral epistemology (as opposed to metaphysics or semantics), the standards of moral vs. non-moral knowledge, and the relationship between moral knowledge and justified belief. Section 1.3 introduces another theme that unifies many of the arguments and views presented in this book, namely that our access to moral knowledge has an important social dimension.