Andrews Reath
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199288830
- eISBN:
- 9780191603648
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199288836.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This book contains chapters on various features of Kant's moral psychology and moral theory, with particular emphasis on a conception of rational agency autonomy. The opening chapters explore ...
More
This book contains chapters on various features of Kant's moral psychology and moral theory, with particular emphasis on a conception of rational agency autonomy. The opening chapters explore different elements of Kant's views about motivation, including an account of respect for morality as the distinctive moral motive and a view of the principle of happiness as a representation of the shared structure of non-moral choice. These chapters stress the unity of Kant's moral psychology by arguing that moral and non-moral considerations motivate in essentially the same way. Several of the chapters develop an original approach to Kant's conception of autonomy that emphasizes the political metaphors found throughout Kant's writings on ethics. They argue that autonomy is best interpreted not as a psychological capacity, but as a kind of sovereignty: in claiming that moral agents have autonomy, Kant regards them as a kind of sovereign legislator with the power to give moral law through their willing. The final chapters explore some of the implications of this conception of autonomy elsewhere in Kant's moral thought, arguing that his Formula of Universal Law uses this conception of autonomy to generate substantive moral principles and exploring the connection between Kantian self-legislation and duties to oneself.Less
This book contains chapters on various features of Kant's moral psychology and moral theory, with particular emphasis on a conception of rational agency autonomy. The opening chapters explore different elements of Kant's views about motivation, including an account of respect for morality as the distinctive moral motive and a view of the principle of happiness as a representation of the shared structure of non-moral choice. These chapters stress the unity of Kant's moral psychology by arguing that moral and non-moral considerations motivate in essentially the same way. Several of the chapters develop an original approach to Kant's conception of autonomy that emphasizes the political metaphors found throughout Kant's writings on ethics. They argue that autonomy is best interpreted not as a psychological capacity, but as a kind of sovereignty: in claiming that moral agents have autonomy, Kant regards them as a kind of sovereign legislator with the power to give moral law through their willing. The final chapters explore some of the implications of this conception of autonomy elsewhere in Kant's moral thought, arguing that his Formula of Universal Law uses this conception of autonomy to generate substantive moral principles and exploring the connection between Kantian self-legislation and duties to oneself.
Andrews Reath
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199288830
- eISBN:
- 9780191603648
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199288836.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter explores two parallel topics in Kant's moral psychology: respect for the moral law as the motive to moral conduct, and the influence of inclinations on the will. It explains some of ...
More
This chapter explores two parallel topics in Kant's moral psychology: respect for the moral law as the motive to moral conduct, and the influence of inclinations on the will. It explains some of Kant's views about respect for the moral law and its role in moral motivation, and this leads to a consideration of the sensible motives that respect for the law limits, as well as the more general question of how Kant thinks that inclinations affect choice.Less
This chapter explores two parallel topics in Kant's moral psychology: respect for the moral law as the motive to moral conduct, and the influence of inclinations on the will. It explains some of Kant's views about respect for the moral law and its role in moral motivation, and this leads to a consideration of the sensible motives that respect for the law limits, as well as the more general question of how Kant thinks that inclinations affect choice.
Mark C. Murphy
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199693665
- eISBN:
- 9780191732010
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693665.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion, Moral Philosophy
There has been a revival in theistic ethics within mainstream contemporary moral philosophy. The characteristic methodology of this revival is to proceed by asking whether there are features of moral ...
More
There has been a revival in theistic ethics within mainstream contemporary moral philosophy. The characteristic methodology of this revival is to proceed by asking whether there are features of moral norms that can be adequately explained only if we hold that such norms have some sort of theistic foundation. But this methodology, fruitful as it has been, is one-sided. This book proceeds not from the side of the moral norms, so to speak, but from the God side of things: what sort of explanatory relationship should we expect between God and moral norms given the existence of the God of orthodox theism? This question asks whether orthodox theism's conception of God as an absolutely perfect being militates in favor of a particular view of the explanation of morality by appeal to theistic facts. This book puts this methodology to work and shows that, surprisingly, the two dominant theistic accounts of morality — natural law theory and theological voluntarism (divine command theory) — fail to offer the sort of explanation of morality that we would expect given the existence of the God of orthodox theism. Drawing on the discussion of a structurally similar problem — that of the relationship between God and the laws of nature — a third, more adequate account of the relationship between God and morality is articulated, one in which facts about God and facts about nature cooperate in the explanation of moral law.Less
There has been a revival in theistic ethics within mainstream contemporary moral philosophy. The characteristic methodology of this revival is to proceed by asking whether there are features of moral norms that can be adequately explained only if we hold that such norms have some sort of theistic foundation. But this methodology, fruitful as it has been, is one-sided. This book proceeds not from the side of the moral norms, so to speak, but from the God side of things: what sort of explanatory relationship should we expect between God and moral norms given the existence of the God of orthodox theism? This question asks whether orthodox theism's conception of God as an absolutely perfect being militates in favor of a particular view of the explanation of morality by appeal to theistic facts. This book puts this methodology to work and shows that, surprisingly, the two dominant theistic accounts of morality — natural law theory and theological voluntarism (divine command theory) — fail to offer the sort of explanation of morality that we would expect given the existence of the God of orthodox theism. Drawing on the discussion of a structurally similar problem — that of the relationship between God and the laws of nature — a third, more adequate account of the relationship between God and morality is articulated, one in which facts about God and facts about nature cooperate in the explanation of moral law.
Mark C. Murphy
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199693665
- eISBN:
- 9780191732010
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693665.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion, Moral Philosophy
This chapter provides an account of the nature of moral law. Some philosophers, most notably Anscombe, have held that moral law is a parochial notion, at home only within a very limited subset of ...
More
This chapter provides an account of the nature of moral law. Some philosophers, most notably Anscombe, have held that moral law is a parochial notion, at home only within a very limited subset of moral views. This chapter argues for an account of moral law that has a place within a wide variety of ethical views. It proceeds by asking what we can learn about how to characterize moral law from current philosophical treatments of the notion of a law of nature by Lewis, Armstrong, Dretske, and others. Drawing on discussions of the laws of nature in metaphysics and philosophy of science, this chapter defends a conception of moral law in which a moral law obtains when some set of descriptive properties morally necessitates an agential response (e.g. an action or attitude).Less
This chapter provides an account of the nature of moral law. Some philosophers, most notably Anscombe, have held that moral law is a parochial notion, at home only within a very limited subset of moral views. This chapter argues for an account of moral law that has a place within a wide variety of ethical views. It proceeds by asking what we can learn about how to characterize moral law from current philosophical treatments of the notion of a law of nature by Lewis, Armstrong, Dretske, and others. Drawing on discussions of the laws of nature in metaphysics and philosophy of science, this chapter defends a conception of moral law in which a moral law obtains when some set of descriptive properties morally necessitates an agential response (e.g. an action or attitude).
Henry E. Allison
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199691531
- eISBN:
- 9780191731808
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199691531.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This is the first of three chapters dealing with Kant’s attempt to provide a deduction (justification) of the categorical imperative. It suggests that this deduction occurs in stages, involving the ...
More
This is the first of three chapters dealing with Kant’s attempt to provide a deduction (justification) of the categorical imperative. It suggests that this deduction occurs in stages, involving the deductions of both the moral law, which describes the volition of a perfectly rational or holy will, and the presupposition of freedom. The foundation of this deduction and the central topic of the chapter is Kant’s claim that “a free will and a will under moral laws are one and the same thing,” which is called the “reciprocity thesis.” The argument for this thesis is analyzed and defended; and it is pointed out that its importance stems from the fact that it entails that freedom of the will is both a necessary and a sufficient condition for standing under the moral law.Less
This is the first of three chapters dealing with Kant’s attempt to provide a deduction (justification) of the categorical imperative. It suggests that this deduction occurs in stages, involving the deductions of both the moral law, which describes the volition of a perfectly rational or holy will, and the presupposition of freedom. The foundation of this deduction and the central topic of the chapter is Kant’s claim that “a free will and a will under moral laws are one and the same thing,” which is called the “reciprocity thesis.” The argument for this thesis is analyzed and defended; and it is pointed out that its importance stems from the fact that it entails that freedom of the will is both a necessary and a sufficient condition for standing under the moral law.
G. A. Cohen
Jonathan Wolff (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691149004
- eISBN:
- 9781400848713
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691149004.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter examines Immanuel Kant's ethics, and particularly his views on reason and faith. According to Thomas Aquinas, there were two avenues whereby men could come to possess knowledge: the way ...
More
This chapter examines Immanuel Kant's ethics, and particularly his views on reason and faith. According to Thomas Aquinas, there were two avenues whereby men could come to possess knowledge: the way of reason and the way of faith, of faith in revelation. Unlike Aquinas, Kant entertains not two faculties, but a single faculty in two employments. The chapter considers Kant's motives, and what he advanced as justifications, for treating the sources of knowledge and of moral behavior not as two separate faculties, but as different employments of a single faculty, reason. It offers a general account of Kant's moral philosophy, and more specifically his account of reason and his argument that men are obliged to obey the moral law. It also suggests that the duality of obligation and motivation is present in Kant's ethics and compares Kant's ideas with those of Richard Peters regarding human behavior.Less
This chapter examines Immanuel Kant's ethics, and particularly his views on reason and faith. According to Thomas Aquinas, there were two avenues whereby men could come to possess knowledge: the way of reason and the way of faith, of faith in revelation. Unlike Aquinas, Kant entertains not two faculties, but a single faculty in two employments. The chapter considers Kant's motives, and what he advanced as justifications, for treating the sources of knowledge and of moral behavior not as two separate faculties, but as different employments of a single faculty, reason. It offers a general account of Kant's moral philosophy, and more specifically his account of reason and his argument that men are obliged to obey the moral law. It also suggests that the duality of obligation and motivation is present in Kant's ethics and compares Kant's ideas with those of Richard Peters regarding human behavior.
Mark C. Murphy
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199693665
- eISBN:
- 9780191732010
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693665.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion, Moral Philosophy
This chapter is a treatment of standard natural law theory (Aquinas, Finnis, Lisska, MacIntyre), assessed in terms of its adequacy as a theistic explanation of moral law. This chapter argues that ...
More
This chapter is a treatment of standard natural law theory (Aquinas, Finnis, Lisska, MacIntyre), assessed in terms of its adequacy as a theistic explanation of moral law. This chapter argues that although natural law theory has flourished within theistic ethics, it is unsatisfactory as a theistic explanation of moral law: most natural law theories in fact have no role at all for theistic facts in their explanation of moral laws, and while there are ways to try to make room for facts about God in their explanations, the role for such facts turns out to be highly mediated. So natural law theory fails as an adequate theistic account of moral law. This chapter also shows that these arguments generalize to other broadly realist theories (utilitarianism, certain forms of Kantianism, virtue ethics) cast in a theistic way, and a fortiori to varieties of constructivism.Less
This chapter is a treatment of standard natural law theory (Aquinas, Finnis, Lisska, MacIntyre), assessed in terms of its adequacy as a theistic explanation of moral law. This chapter argues that although natural law theory has flourished within theistic ethics, it is unsatisfactory as a theistic explanation of moral law: most natural law theories in fact have no role at all for theistic facts in their explanation of moral laws, and while there are ways to try to make room for facts about God in their explanations, the role for such facts turns out to be highly mediated. So natural law theory fails as an adequate theistic account of moral law. This chapter also shows that these arguments generalize to other broadly realist theories (utilitarianism, certain forms of Kantianism, virtue ethics) cast in a theistic way, and a fortiori to varieties of constructivism.
Garrett Barden and Tim Murphy
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199592685
- eISBN:
- 9780191595653
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199592685.003.0002
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law
How did it come about that humans live together in a community? This chapter argues — in contrast to ‘social contract’ approaches — that human society is a spontaneous ordering of the natural ...
More
How did it come about that humans live together in a community? This chapter argues — in contrast to ‘social contract’ approaches — that human society is a spontaneous ordering of the natural sociability of humans. Civil society is a spontaneous order that gives rise to a spontaneous jural order made up of the ‘living law’ or communal moral law, which state or positive law expresses in part and develops. It emphasizes the similarity between the practice of language and the social and jural domains, and argues that the function of all law is to sustain a peaceful social order. The discussions in the chapter are drawn together with reference to Thomas Hobbes's De Cive (1642) and Leviathan (1651).Less
How did it come about that humans live together in a community? This chapter argues — in contrast to ‘social contract’ approaches — that human society is a spontaneous ordering of the natural sociability of humans. Civil society is a spontaneous order that gives rise to a spontaneous jural order made up of the ‘living law’ or communal moral law, which state or positive law expresses in part and develops. It emphasizes the similarity between the practice of language and the social and jural domains, and argues that the function of all law is to sustain a peaceful social order. The discussions in the chapter are drawn together with reference to Thomas Hobbes's De Cive (1642) and Leviathan (1651).
Mark C. Murphy
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199693665
- eISBN:
- 9780191732010
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693665.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion, Moral Philosophy
This chapter defends a particular strategy and set of constraints on an adequate theistic explanation of morality. It claims that God's status in orthodox theism as ultimate explainer of the states ...
More
This chapter defends a particular strategy and set of constraints on an adequate theistic explanation of morality. It claims that God's status in orthodox theism as ultimate explainer of the states of affairs that obtain is not satisfied by anything less than immediacy: that for any state of affairs that obtains, some theistic facts (facts about God's existence, nature, or activity) must enter immediately into that explanation. It also argues, drawing on a previous chapter's account of moral law and responding to recent work by Schroeder, that for every moral fact, that fact is explained by some moral law and is unexplained unless explained by a moral law. Thus, the way, and the only way, to provide an adequate account of God's explanatory role with respect to morality is for God to enter immediately into the explanation of all moral laws.Less
This chapter defends a particular strategy and set of constraints on an adequate theistic explanation of morality. It claims that God's status in orthodox theism as ultimate explainer of the states of affairs that obtain is not satisfied by anything less than immediacy: that for any state of affairs that obtains, some theistic facts (facts about God's existence, nature, or activity) must enter immediately into that explanation. It also argues, drawing on a previous chapter's account of moral law and responding to recent work by Schroeder, that for every moral fact, that fact is explained by some moral law and is unexplained unless explained by a moral law. Thus, the way, and the only way, to provide an adequate account of God's explanatory role with respect to morality is for God to enter immediately into the explanation of all moral laws.
Mark C. Murphy
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199693665
- eISBN:
- 9780191732010
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693665.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion, Moral Philosophy
This chapter is a treatment of divine command theory, or more generally, theological voluntarism (Quinn, Adams, Hare). After describing the trajectory that theological voluntarism has taken in recent ...
More
This chapter is a treatment of divine command theory, or more generally, theological voluntarism (Quinn, Adams, Hare). After describing the trajectory that theological voluntarism has taken in recent years to avoid the more obvious objections to that view, this chapter shows that recent versions of the view have the unsettling — and from a theistic perspective, entirely unsatisfactory — result that while natural facts cannot morally necessitate any human action, natural facts can morally necessitate God's action. In combination with the implausible implications that theological voluntarism has about the moral impotence of natural facts with respect to created rational beings, these implications mark the failure of theological voluntarism as an adequate theistic account of moral law. This chapter also shows that Adams's recent appeal to the ‘social’ character of obligation fails to provide any distinctive benefits for the voluntarist position.Less
This chapter is a treatment of divine command theory, or more generally, theological voluntarism (Quinn, Adams, Hare). After describing the trajectory that theological voluntarism has taken in recent years to avoid the more obvious objections to that view, this chapter shows that recent versions of the view have the unsettling — and from a theistic perspective, entirely unsatisfactory — result that while natural facts cannot morally necessitate any human action, natural facts can morally necessitate God's action. In combination with the implausible implications that theological voluntarism has about the moral impotence of natural facts with respect to created rational beings, these implications mark the failure of theological voluntarism as an adequate theistic account of moral law. This chapter also shows that Adams's recent appeal to the ‘social’ character of obligation fails to provide any distinctive benefits for the voluntarist position.
Henry E. Allison
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199691531
- eISBN:
- 9780191731808
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199691531.003.0013
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter deals with two issues: (1) Kant’s deduction of the categorical imperative and (2) the bounds of what can be claimed from a practical point of view. The task of the deduction is to ...
More
This chapter deals with two issues: (1) Kant’s deduction of the categorical imperative and (2) the bounds of what can be claimed from a practical point of view. The task of the deduction is to explain how the moral law can be unconditionally binding on the wills of finite beings with a sensuous as well as a rational nature. Kant’s argument turns on the proposition that the intelligible world is the ground of both the sensible world and its laws. Although the argument is problematic because it appears to be based on unwarranted metaphysical assumptions, it is suggested that it can be made more plausible, if read in a less blatantly metaphysical way. The boundary question concerns the limits of explanation. Kant claims that we are justified in presupposing freedom and a pure moral interest, both of which are required by the categorical imperative, even though neither is itself explicable.Less
This chapter deals with two issues: (1) Kant’s deduction of the categorical imperative and (2) the bounds of what can be claimed from a practical point of view. The task of the deduction is to explain how the moral law can be unconditionally binding on the wills of finite beings with a sensuous as well as a rational nature. Kant’s argument turns on the proposition that the intelligible world is the ground of both the sensible world and its laws. Although the argument is problematic because it appears to be based on unwarranted metaphysical assumptions, it is suggested that it can be made more plausible, if read in a less blatantly metaphysical way. The boundary question concerns the limits of explanation. Kant claims that we are justified in presupposing freedom and a pure moral interest, both of which are required by the categorical imperative, even though neither is itself explicable.
Mark C. Murphy
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199693665
- eISBN:
- 9780191732010
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693665.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion, Moral Philosophy
This chapter makes the case for a moral concurrentist account of moral law and shows how it escapes the difficulties raised against standard natural law theory and theological voluntarism. The ...
More
This chapter makes the case for a moral concurrentist account of moral law and shows how it escapes the difficulties raised against standard natural law theory and theological voluntarism. The strategy is to employ the natural law view's characteristic account of moral necessitation — that what morally necessitates are human goods — while rejecting standard natural law theory's nontheistic account of goods. Rather, goods are to be understood along the lines defended by Adams, as likenesses to God, though unlike on Adams's view this theory of the good is cast in an Aristotelian rather than a Platonist way. Thus the desiderata for an adequate theistic explanation of morality are met: facts about God enter immediately into the explanation of every moral fact. The chapter concludes by considering objections that moral concurrentism cannot handle the phenomenon of moral obligation and that it cannot handle what Quinn calls ‘the immoralities of the patriarchs,’ cases in which God reverses the moral status of certain actions by an act of divine will.Less
This chapter makes the case for a moral concurrentist account of moral law and shows how it escapes the difficulties raised against standard natural law theory and theological voluntarism. The strategy is to employ the natural law view's characteristic account of moral necessitation — that what morally necessitates are human goods — while rejecting standard natural law theory's nontheistic account of goods. Rather, goods are to be understood along the lines defended by Adams, as likenesses to God, though unlike on Adams's view this theory of the good is cast in an Aristotelian rather than a Platonist way. Thus the desiderata for an adequate theistic explanation of morality are met: facts about God enter immediately into the explanation of every moral fact. The chapter concludes by considering objections that moral concurrentism cannot handle the phenomenon of moral obligation and that it cannot handle what Quinn calls ‘the immoralities of the patriarchs,’ cases in which God reverses the moral status of certain actions by an act of divine will.
G. A. Cohen
Jonathan Wolff (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691149004
- eISBN:
- 9781400848713
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691149004.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter comments on Christine Korsgaard's views on reason, humanity, and moral law in the context of her ethics. In particular, it examines Korsgaard's response to the question inspired by ...
More
This chapter comments on Christine Korsgaard's views on reason, humanity, and moral law in the context of her ethics. In particular, it examines Korsgaard's response to the question inspired by Thomas Hobbes' second argument, the one about the sovereign: how can the subject be responsible to a law that it makes and can therefore unmake? Korsgaard's ethics descends from Immanuel Kant, but it contrasts in important ways with Kant's ethics. Korsgaard's subject is unequivocally the author of the law that binds it, for its law is the law of its practical identity, and the subject itself “constructs” that identity. In the case of the Kantian subject, we can say that it both is and is not the author of the law that binds it. The chapter considers Korsgaard's claim that morality is grounded in human nature, along with her position on the problem of normativity and on obligation.Less
This chapter comments on Christine Korsgaard's views on reason, humanity, and moral law in the context of her ethics. In particular, it examines Korsgaard's response to the question inspired by Thomas Hobbes' second argument, the one about the sovereign: how can the subject be responsible to a law that it makes and can therefore unmake? Korsgaard's ethics descends from Immanuel Kant, but it contrasts in important ways with Kant's ethics. Korsgaard's subject is unequivocally the author of the law that binds it, for its law is the law of its practical identity, and the subject itself “constructs” that identity. In the case of the Kantian subject, we can say that it both is and is not the author of the law that binds it. The chapter considers Korsgaard's claim that morality is grounded in human nature, along with her position on the problem of normativity and on obligation.
Henry E. Allison
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199647033
- eISBN:
- 9780191741166
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199647033.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
After providing a brief account of what Kant understands by a practical justification and the various types of it found in his writings, the essay examines the ways in which Kant attempts to provide ...
More
After providing a brief account of what Kant understands by a practical justification and the various types of it found in his writings, the essay examines the ways in which Kant attempts to provide a practical justification of freedom in various texts, chiefly the Groundwork and the Critique of Practical Reason. Its main focus is on the tension between Kant's attempt in the former work to ground the necessity of presupposing freedom in our conception of ourselves as rational agents, independently of any specifically moral considerations, and his view in the latter that, “[H]ad not the moral law already been distinctly thought in our reason, we should never consider ourselves justified in assuming such a thing as freedom” (KpV 5: 4n). The tension is resolved by linking the former with freedom as spontaneity and the latter with freedom as autonomy.Less
After providing a brief account of what Kant understands by a practical justification and the various types of it found in his writings, the essay examines the ways in which Kant attempts to provide a practical justification of freedom in various texts, chiefly the Groundwork and the Critique of Practical Reason. Its main focus is on the tension between Kant's attempt in the former work to ground the necessity of presupposing freedom in our conception of ourselves as rational agents, independently of any specifically moral considerations, and his view in the latter that, “[H]ad not the moral law already been distinctly thought in our reason, we should never consider ourselves justified in assuming such a thing as freedom” (KpV 5: 4n). The tension is resolved by linking the former with freedom as spontaneity and the latter with freedom as autonomy.
Susanne M. Sklar
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199603145
- eISBN:
- 9780191731594
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199603145.003.0009
- Subject:
- Religion, Religion and Literature
Blake's Jews coinhere with British Druids — who spread war throughout the world. Los's Spectre and Emanation appear as refugees, fleeing from Albion to tell their version of his fall (1). Los ...
More
Blake's Jews coinhere with British Druids — who spread war throughout the world. Los's Spectre and Emanation appear as refugees, fleeing from Albion to tell their version of his fall (1). Los journeys into Albion's interior, encountering creative ruin and shadowy Vala enthroned (2). Attempting to control lusts, Los sensually constricts Reuben (Albion's son) — while Jesus imaginatively creates states through which humanity can find forgiveness (3). Angelmorphic Eternals (cathedral cities) want to rescue Albion, but they are blighted by spectrous Selfhood (4) and though Los empowers them, Albion rejects their help (5). Vala tramples Jerusalem (6), but wise Erin protectively separates the poem's heroine from Albion's body, which is infected with bellicose Moral Law (7).Less
Blake's Jews coinhere with British Druids — who spread war throughout the world. Los's Spectre and Emanation appear as refugees, fleeing from Albion to tell their version of his fall (1). Los journeys into Albion's interior, encountering creative ruin and shadowy Vala enthroned (2). Attempting to control lusts, Los sensually constricts Reuben (Albion's son) — while Jesus imaginatively creates states through which humanity can find forgiveness (3). Angelmorphic Eternals (cathedral cities) want to rescue Albion, but they are blighted by spectrous Selfhood (4) and though Los empowers them, Albion rejects their help (5). Vala tramples Jerusalem (6), but wise Erin protectively separates the poem's heroine from Albion's body, which is infected with bellicose Moral Law (7).
Galen Strawson
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199247493
- eISBN:
- 9780191594830
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199247493.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter considers Kant's theory of freedom. Kant thinks that our experience of being subject to the Moral Law has the consequence that we cannot help experiencing ourselves as truly, radically ...
More
This chapter considers Kant's theory of freedom. Kant thinks that our experience of being subject to the Moral Law has the consequence that we cannot help experiencing ourselves as truly, radically free to choose. Various questions arise. For example: (1) Does Kant think that there is a sense in which we really are radically free ‘from a practical point of view’, i.e., as regards action, precisely because we cannot help experiencing ourselves as free? (2) Could a being that had no conception of morality none the less experience itself as radically free? (3) Is is really true that we — human beings — are bound to experience ourselves as radically free? (4) Is believing one is free perhaps a necessary condition of freedom, even if it is not sufficient?Less
This chapter considers Kant's theory of freedom. Kant thinks that our experience of being subject to the Moral Law has the consequence that we cannot help experiencing ourselves as truly, radically free to choose. Various questions arise. For example: (1) Does Kant think that there is a sense in which we really are radically free ‘from a practical point of view’, i.e., as regards action, precisely because we cannot help experiencing ourselves as free? (2) Could a being that had no conception of morality none the less experience itself as radically free? (3) Is is really true that we — human beings — are bound to experience ourselves as radically free? (4) Is believing one is free perhaps a necessary condition of freedom, even if it is not sufficient?
A. J. Joyce
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199216161
- eISBN:
- 9780191739248
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199216161.003.0006
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
This chapter provides a detailed analysis of Hooker's ‘law of reason’ and the account that he gives of how human beings come to the knowledge of what is good. This leads to a discussion of the ...
More
This chapter provides a detailed analysis of Hooker's ‘law of reason’ and the account that he gives of how human beings come to the knowledge of what is good. This leads to a discussion of the relationship between morality and soteriology in his thought and the extent to which the moral law might be subject to change. The chapter considers the extent to which Hooker draws upon the Thomist tradition of natural law, but also identifies respects in which he departs from Aquinas, particularly in the more negative view that he takes of will and emotion in relation to human conduct. The relationship between justification and sanctification is also considered, and elements of classic eudaimonism identified within his text. It is also observed that, at times, he appears to shape his argument in order to make a polemical point.Less
This chapter provides a detailed analysis of Hooker's ‘law of reason’ and the account that he gives of how human beings come to the knowledge of what is good. This leads to a discussion of the relationship between morality and soteriology in his thought and the extent to which the moral law might be subject to change. The chapter considers the extent to which Hooker draws upon the Thomist tradition of natural law, but also identifies respects in which he departs from Aquinas, particularly in the more negative view that he takes of will and emotion in relation to human conduct. The relationship between justification and sanctification is also considered, and elements of classic eudaimonism identified within his text. It is also observed that, at times, he appears to shape his argument in order to make a polemical point.
Karl Ameriks
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198238973
- eISBN:
- 9780191597022
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198238975.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter concerns human freedom, a topic that Kant remarkably struck from the list of main topics in rational psychology, although right before the Critique, he had given it pride of place. ...
More
This chapter concerns human freedom, a topic that Kant remarkably struck from the list of main topics in rational psychology, although right before the Critique, he had given it pride of place. Hence, it is crucial to see why the Critique neither presents nor directly criticizes the rationalist arguments for our freedom with which Kant was extremely familiar. Kant's views here must be understood in terms of clues from his lectures, and especially in the light of the different kinds of arguments to freedom, which he presents in his Groundwork (a ‘deduction’) and second Critique (a ‘fact of reason’). I connect the changes in his presentation there with the clearer expression, in the second ed. of the first Critique, of his anti‐rationalist doctrine of self‐knowledge (as dependent on knowing spatial things). In this way, I show how—to appreciate the full interconnection and development of Kant's theoretical and practical views on freedom—we need to go beyond readings by Beck, Paton, Henrich, and others.Less
This chapter concerns human freedom, a topic that Kant remarkably struck from the list of main topics in rational psychology, although right before the Critique, he had given it pride of place. Hence, it is crucial to see why the Critique neither presents nor directly criticizes the rationalist arguments for our freedom with which Kant was extremely familiar. Kant's views here must be understood in terms of clues from his lectures, and especially in the light of the different kinds of arguments to freedom, which he presents in his Groundwork (a ‘deduction’) and second Critique (a ‘fact of reason’). I connect the changes in his presentation there with the clearer expression, in the second ed. of the first Critique, of his anti‐rationalist doctrine of self‐knowledge (as dependent on knowing spatial things). In this way, I show how—to appreciate the full interconnection and development of Kant's theoretical and practical views on freedom—we need to go beyond readings by Beck, Paton, Henrich, and others.
Hans Kelsen
- Published in print:
- 1991
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780198252177
- eISBN:
- 9780191681363
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198252177.003.0040
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law
The failure to distinguish between a norm and a statement about the validity of a norm, and so between morality and ethics, also leads to the wholly indefensible claim that the norms of morality are ...
More
The failure to distinguish between a norm and a statement about the validity of a norm, and so between morality and ethics, also leads to the wholly indefensible claim that the norms of morality are not commands. Such is the thesis which Manfred Moritz tried to prove in his paper ‘Gebot und Pflicht’ (1941). He calls the norms of morality ‘moral sentences’ or ‘moral laws’. He speaks constantly of ‘moral commands’; but he says ‘The moral command does not have the properties one thought could be ascribed to it’, namely that of being a command.Less
The failure to distinguish between a norm and a statement about the validity of a norm, and so between morality and ethics, also leads to the wholly indefensible claim that the norms of morality are not commands. Such is the thesis which Manfred Moritz tried to prove in his paper ‘Gebot und Pflicht’ (1941). He calls the norms of morality ‘moral sentences’ or ‘moral laws’. He speaks constantly of ‘moral commands’; but he says ‘The moral command does not have the properties one thought could be ascribed to it’, namely that of being a command.
Nicholas White
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198250593
- eISBN:
- 9780191598661
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198250592.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
A common theme in the historiography of Greek ethics says that modern ethics is characterized by imperative notions such as ‘duty’—and with a Judeo‐Christian notion of imperatives or commands issued ...
More
A common theme in the historiography of Greek ethics says that modern ethics is characterized by imperative notions such as ‘duty’—and with a Judeo‐Christian notion of imperatives or commands issued by god—whereas ancient ethics supposedly deals mainly with ‘attractive notions such as ‘good’ and ‘virtue’. This thought is often juxtaposed with the idea that imperative notions betoken a conflict between one's duty and one's good, because an imperative seems to be required only to command people to do what they do not wish to do, which is felt to be inappropriate to the supposed eudaimonism of Greek ethics. In fact Greek ethics makes substantial use of imperative notions, and does not attempt to show that attractive notions are more basic or preferable in ethics.Less
A common theme in the historiography of Greek ethics says that modern ethics is characterized by imperative notions such as ‘duty’—and with a Judeo‐Christian notion of imperatives or commands issued by god—whereas ancient ethics supposedly deals mainly with ‘attractive notions such as ‘good’ and ‘virtue’. This thought is often juxtaposed with the idea that imperative notions betoken a conflict between one's duty and one's good, because an imperative seems to be required only to command people to do what they do not wish to do, which is felt to be inappropriate to the supposed eudaimonism of Greek ethics. In fact Greek ethics makes substantial use of imperative notions, and does not attempt to show that attractive notions are more basic or preferable in ethics.
