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Experiments, Intuitions, and Methodology in Moral and Political Theory 1

David Copp

in Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 7

Moral and political philosophers commonly appeal to moral “intuitions” at crucial points in their reasoning. This chapter considers recent challenges to this practice—here referred to as “the ... More

Moral and political philosophers commonly appeal to moral “intuitions” at crucial points in their reasoning. This chapter considers recent challenges to this practice—here referred to as “the Method”—based in empirical studies of moral intuitions. It contends that such studies do not justify radical or revisionary conclusions about the Method. A method is aimed at achieving certain goals. The key issue is the nature of the goals in relation to which the Method is to be evaluated. This chapter argues that the relevant goal is not the “realist goal” of discovering the truth about moral and political matters. The central point is that, the chapter argues, the systematic philosophical study of moral and political questions would be worthwhile even if it turned out that moral realism cannot be vindicated or that the Method cannot be vindicated in relation to the realist goal. If this is correct, then the goal relative to which it is crucial to vindicate the Method is not the realist goal. A Rawlsian view is more plausible, according to which the relevant goal is to “characterize our moral sensibility” as it would be in “reflective equilibrium.” It turns out, however, that this Rawlsian view has some, perhaps unwelcome, deflationary implications.Less

Moral Intuitions

Walter Sinnott‐Armstrong, Liane Young, and Fiery Cushman

in The Moral Psychology Handbook

Moral intuitions are strong, stable, immediate moral beliefs. Moral philosophers ask when they are justified. This question cannot be answered separately from a psychological question: How do moral ... More

Moral intuitions are strong, stable, immediate moral beliefs. Moral philosophers ask when they are justified. This question cannot be answered separately from a psychological question: How do moral intuitions arise? Their reliability depends upon their source. This chapter develops and argues for a new theory of how moral intuitions arise—that they arise through heuristic processes best understood as unconscious attribute substitutions. That is, when asked whether something has the attribute of moral wrongness, people unconsciously substitute a different question about a separate but related heuristic attribute (such as emotional impact). Evidence for this view is drawn from psychology and neuroscience, and competing views of moral heuristics are contrasted. It is argued that moral intuitions are not direct perceptions and, in many cases, are unreliable sources of evidence for moral claims.Less

Intuitions in Moral Inquiry

Michael R. DePaul

David Copp (ed.)

in The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory

This chapter begins with a weak understanding of intuitions as beliefs that do not result from more familiar sources, but that the person currently holds simply because the proposition believed seems ... More

This chapter begins with a weak understanding of intuitions as beliefs that do not result from more familiar sources, but that the person currently holds simply because the proposition believed seems true to the person upon due consideration. Nearly all moral inquiry makes significant use of moral intuitions. Reflective equilibrium is perhaps the most sophisticated intuitionistic approach to moral inquiry. It modifies the usual understanding of reflective equilibrium by arguing that inquirers must not merely mold their moral intuitions into a coherent system via a process of mutual adjustment, but must also strive to enhance their competence at making moral judgments. It then considers and rejects an argument for the reliability of moral intuitions that takes them to provide evidence regarding our own moral concepts. Finally, it defends reflective equilibrium by arguing that there is no sensible alternative to accepting the intuitions we have after full reflection, which is, in essence, what reflective equilibrium does.Less

Insight, Consistency, and Plans for Living

Allan Gibbard

in Reconciling Our Aims: In Search of Bases for Ethics

This chapter discusses moral reasoning. It presents a situation wherein morality lies outside the scope of empirical science. It notes that science itself rests on intuitions about the justification ... More

This chapter discusses moral reasoning. It presents a situation wherein morality lies outside the scope of empirical science. It notes that science itself rests on intuitions about the justification of empirical conclusions. It explains that human's social emotions are especially refined and elaborate. Many of human feelings are intensely social, as with guilt and resentment, with shame and disdain. It adds that humans are beings with language, and make judgments that are expressed with language. It discusses that moral questions are planning questions of a particular kind, questions of how to feel about things, where the feelings in questions are the moral sentiments. It emphasizes that not only do humans think about how things are, but they also act and feel. It also explains how moral intuition works and how plans require intuition.Less

Perceptual Grounds, Ethical Disagreement, and Moral Intuitions

Robert Audi

in Moral Perception

This chapter studies disagreements involving moral intuitions and other kinds of moral cognitions. In understanding disagreements of any kind, it is essential to ascertain whether the disputants ... More

This chapter studies disagreements involving moral intuitions and other kinds of moral cognitions. In understanding disagreements of any kind, it is essential to ascertain whether the disputants differ regarding the same proposition. Sometimes a person rejects what another says without seeing just what that is, perhaps because the language used seems threatening, as where one can tell that one is being accused of something but does not see exactly what it is. The chapter calls this kind of disagreement illocutionary, since the disagreement is focused on the other's speech act and not its content. Ultimately, moral knowledge rests on perception, on intuition regarding ethical questions about actual or envisaged action, or on intuitions concerning hypothetical cases that helps one decide what is right or wrong.Less

Emotion and Intuition as Sources of Moral Judgment

Robert Audi

in Moral Perception

This chapter examines how moral perception is possible for virtually any normal person with an elementary mastery of moral concepts. But moral perception is by no means the only route to moral ... More

This chapter examines how moral perception is possible for virtually any normal person with an elementary mastery of moral concepts. But moral perception is by no means the only route to moral intuition or moral knowledge; reflection is another way. Moral intuitions may also arise in a quite different way: from emotion. The importance of emotional evidence in ethical matters is best appreciated when its relation to moral perception and moral intuition is taken into account. The chapter argues that people sometimes know things that they would not otherwise know, which is possible through the evidence of emotion, often where the emotion is connected with intuition.Less

Introduction

Nils Holtug

in Persons, Interests, and Justice

This chapter introduces some key concepts, including prudence and justice and the relations between them, and gives an overview of the book. It also provides an account of the methodology employed. ... More

This chapter introduces some key concepts, including prudence and justice and the relations between them, and gives an overview of the book. It also provides an account of the methodology employed. More precisely, it is shown that the types of arguments used are compatible with a wide variety of more particular epistemic and ontological views about ethics. Furthermore, the role of thought experiments, contrast arguments and arguments that rely on the notion that ‘betterness’ is a transitive relation are clarified.Less

Ross and Rule‐Consequentialism

Thomas L. Carson

in Lying and Deception: Theory and Practice

If lying and not lying will have exactly the same consequences, then, according to act-utilitarianism, it doesn't matter whether or not one lies. Ross claims that lying is prima facie wrong, or wrong ... More

If lying and not lying will have exactly the same consequences, then, according to act-utilitarianism, it doesn't matter whether or not one lies. Ross claims that lying is prima facie wrong, or wrong other things being equal. He holds that this is “self-evident.” Ross also thinks that it is obvious that it is wrong to lie when lying produces only slightly better consequences than not lying. In contrast with Ross, Moore claims that it is self-evident that we should always do whatever has the best consequences. Ross's criticisms of act-utilitarianism are inconclusive because they appeal to disputed moral intuitions and because he doesn't do enough to justify his own moral intuitions. Brad Hooker's argument in favor of his well-known version of rule-consequentialism is inconclusive for similar reasons — it rests on an appeal to disputed considered moral judgments that he doesn't adequately justify.Less

Reason and intuition in the moral life: A dual-process account of moral justification

Leland F. Saunders

in In two minds: Dual processes and beyond

This chapter explores how morality can be rational if moral intuitions are resistant to rational reflection. There are two parts to this question. The normative problem is whether there is a model of ... More

This chapter explores how morality can be rational if moral intuitions are resistant to rational reflection. There are two parts to this question. The normative problem is whether there is a model of moral justification which can show that morality is a rational enterprise given the facts of moral dumbfounding. Appealing to the model of reflective equilibrium for the rational justification of moral intuitions solves this problem. Reflective equilibrium views the rational justification of morality as a back-and-forth balancing between moral theory and moral intuition, and therefore does not require that individual moral intuitions be directly responsive to rational reflection. The psychological problem is whether human psychology actually implements the processes required for reflective equilibrium. The psychological problem is far more difficult, and requires appealing to a dual-process view of moral judgement that regards moral intuitions and moral theories as belonging to different mental systems.Less

Neuroscience and Moral Reasoning

Walter Glannon

in Brain, Body, and Mind: Neuroethics with a Human Face

This chapter examines claims by some cognitive psychologists conducting functional neuroimaging experiments about the neural basis of moral intuitions. It questions the idea that there are distinct ... More

This chapter examines claims by some cognitive psychologists conducting functional neuroimaging experiments about the neural basis of moral intuitions. It questions the idea that there are distinct cognitive and emotional subsystems in the brain driving utilitarian and deontological judgments. The chapter appeals to neuroscientific research showing that cognition and emotion are interacting processes mediated by overlapping neural systems distributed throughout the brain, Still, the reasons we adduce to justify actions depend not only on overlapping brain systems but also on social and cultural factors external to the brain.Less

The Origin of the Moral Senses

Dennis L. Krebs

in The Origins of Morality: An Evolutionary Account

This chapter contains a classification of the moral senses and a speculative account of how they originated. It is suggested that a sense of duty originated in the emotional and motivational states ... More

This chapter contains a classification of the moral senses and a speculative account of how they originated. It is suggested that a sense of duty originated in the emotional and motivational states that induce people to behave in prosocial ways. A sense of rights originated in a consciousness of implicit social norms defining how people are permitted to advance their interests in the context of their groups. Conscience originated in emotional reactions to social sanctions administered by others. Such moral sentiments as gratitude and indignation originated in emotional reactions to prosocial and antisocial behaviors emitted by others. A sense of justice originated as a means of counteracting cheating in cooperative exchanges. Abstract ideas about morality emerged when early humans acquired the ability to reflect on their moral intuitions. Jonathan Haidt’s model of moral decision-making contrasts rational sources of moral judgment with moral intuitions.Less

Evolutionary Jurisprudence: The End of the Naturalistic Fallacy and the Beginning of Natural Reform?

Morris B. Hoffman

in Law and Neuroscience: Current Legal Issues Volume 13

This chapter begins by surveying the naturalistic fallacy's philosophical landscape and some of the scientific literature on the evolution of morality. It then proposes a set of principles that legal ... More

This chapter begins by surveying the naturalistic fallacy's philosophical landscape and some of the scientific literature on the evolution of morality. It then proposes a set of principles that legal decision-makers might use to determine what to do, if anything, when our moral intuitions conflict with existing legal doctrine. It concludes by applying those principles to the felony murder rule, arguing that the broadest Anglo-American forms of that rule are dissonant with our intuitions of moral blameworthiness and should be abolished.Less

Living Together: Economic and Moral Argument

Allan Gibbard

in Reconciling Our Aims: In Search of Bases for Ethics

This chapter discusses that moral inquiry in philosophy often comes in two broad styles. One is humanistic and pragmatic, wherein one would think what is in morality for him, and what version of ... More

This chapter discusses that moral inquiry in philosophy often comes in two broad styles. One is humanistic and pragmatic, wherein one would think what is in morality for him, and what version of morality would best serve him. The other broad style is the intuitionist, wherein man would consult his moral intuitions, revise them as needed to achieve consistency, and embrace what emerges. It notes that the hope in consulting and systematizing intuitions is that doing so will uncover a deep, implicit rationale for man's intuitive responses, and that this rationale will turn out to be a worthy one. Utilitarianism sometimes ignores the “separateness of persons.” It explains Harsanyi's two welfare theorems. It explains a way to work out the contractarian ideal, the ideal of living with others on a basis that no one could reasonably reject and evaluate if there is such a thing as a person's good.Less

Abhorrent Commands

David Baggett and Jerry L. Walls

in Good God: The Theistic Foundations of Morality

This chapter answers arbitrariness and vacuity objections to divine command theory without shying away from the hard biblical passages like the binding of Isaac and the conquest narratives, nor ... More

This chapter answers arbitrariness and vacuity objections to divine command theory without shying away from the hard biblical passages like the binding of Isaac and the conquest narratives, nor opting for a nonliteral interpretation. The chapter rather attempts to show that, though these are undoubtedly difficult passages to understand, they are ultimately reconcilable with our most nonnegotiable moral intuitions. There are indeed recognizably abhorrent commands that God by his nature could never perform, but these Old Testament passages, though hard to make sense of morally, aren't impossible. What is needed is a principled line between the merely hard passages and actually impossible moral scenarios.Less

Conclusions: The Inescapability of Moral Obligations

C. Stephen Evans

in God and Moral Obligation

This book has argued that moral obligations are best explained as God's commands. However, if God does not exist, someone might regard this argument as a reductio of moral realism, giving reasons to ... More

This book has argued that moral obligations are best explained as God's commands. However, if God does not exist, someone might regard this argument as a reductio of moral realism, giving reasons to embrace an error theory. Hence to complete the argument reasons to accept moral realism and reject error theory must be provided. One argument for moral realism is linked to moral experience and the principle of credulity, which holds that experience generally provides prima facie evidence for the reality of what is experienced. Further arguments are provided by Thomas Reid, who tries to show that the first principles of morality are among the deliverances of “common sense.” David Enoch's work updates this type of argument by showing how a commitment to normative realism is presupposed by practical deliberation. Ultimately, moral realism without moral knowledge would be useless and even paradoxical, so the chapter ends with a defense of conscience and the claim that moral intuitions are a source of moral knowledge. A moderate intuitionism is argued to be compatible with evolutionary theory as an account of how moral knowledge is possible.Less

Moral Dumbfounding and Moral Stupefaction

Daniel Jacobson

in Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics: Volume 2

Several prominent moral psychologists and philosophers make much of a phenomenon they term moral dumbfounding, which is characterized by dogmatic insistence on a moral judgment for which no good ... More

Several prominent moral psychologists and philosophers make much of a phenomenon they term moral dumbfounding, which is characterized by dogmatic insistence on a moral judgment for which no good reasons can be given. They hold that the phenomenon shows something important about ordinary moral judgment: that commonplace reasons offered for moral judgment are mere post hoc rationalizations of decisions made on other grounds. The chapter argues that the prominent and influential dumbfounding study does not work on its own terms, because its examples ignore crucial distinctions concerning harm and wrongness, and between dumbfounding and inarticulate reason-responsiveness. In fact there are good reasons for moral condemnation of every case they consider, but the problem is not just a matter of poorly chosen examples. By ignoring the symbolic and expressive aspects of action, the dumbfounders adopt an artificially narrow conception of reasons. Moreover, the fact that humans are sometimes dumbfounded and sometimes confabulate does not support their strong claims about the speciousness of reasons and reasoning in ordinary moral judgment.Less