David Copp
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199653492
- eISBN:
- 9780191741661
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199653492.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Moral and political philosophers commonly appeal to moral “intuitions” at crucial points in their reasoning. This chapter considers recent challenges to this practice—here referred to as “the ...
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Moral and political philosophers commonly appeal to moral “intuitions” at crucial points in their reasoning. This chapter considers recent challenges to this practice—here referred to as “the Method”—based in empirical studies of moral intuitions. It contends that such studies do not justify radical or revisionary conclusions about the Method. A method is aimed at achieving certain goals. The key issue is the nature of the goals in relation to which the Method is to be evaluated. This chapter argues that the relevant goal is not the “realist goal” of discovering the truth about moral and political matters. The central point is that, the chapter argues, the systematic philosophical study of moral and political questions would be worthwhile even if it turned out that moral realism cannot be vindicated or that the Method cannot be vindicated in relation to the realist goal. If this is correct, then the goal relative to which it is crucial to vindicate the Method is not the realist goal. A Rawlsian view is more plausible, according to which the relevant goal is to “characterize our moral sensibility” as it would be in “reflective equilibrium.” It turns out, however, that this Rawlsian view has some, perhaps unwelcome, deflationary implications.Less
Moral and political philosophers commonly appeal to moral “intuitions” at crucial points in their reasoning. This chapter considers recent challenges to this practice—here referred to as “the Method”—based in empirical studies of moral intuitions. It contends that such studies do not justify radical or revisionary conclusions about the Method. A method is aimed at achieving certain goals. The key issue is the nature of the goals in relation to which the Method is to be evaluated. This chapter argues that the relevant goal is not the “realist goal” of discovering the truth about moral and political matters. The central point is that, the chapter argues, the systematic philosophical study of moral and political questions would be worthwhile even if it turned out that moral realism cannot be vindicated or that the Method cannot be vindicated in relation to the realist goal. If this is correct, then the goal relative to which it is crucial to vindicate the Method is not the realist goal. A Rawlsian view is more plausible, according to which the relevant goal is to “characterize our moral sensibility” as it would be in “reflective equilibrium.” It turns out, however, that this Rawlsian view has some, perhaps unwelcome, deflationary implications.
Walter Sinnott‐Armstrong, Liane Young, and Fiery Cushman
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199582143
- eISBN:
- 9780191594496
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199582143.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Moral intuitions are strong, stable, immediate moral beliefs. Moral philosophers ask when they are justified. This question cannot be answered separately from a psychological question: How do moral ...
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Moral intuitions are strong, stable, immediate moral beliefs. Moral philosophers ask when they are justified. This question cannot be answered separately from a psychological question: How do moral intuitions arise? Their reliability depends upon their source. This chapter develops and argues for a new theory of how moral intuitions arise—that they arise through heuristic processes best understood as unconscious attribute substitutions. That is, when asked whether something has the attribute of moral wrongness, people unconsciously substitute a different question about a separate but related heuristic attribute (such as emotional impact). Evidence for this view is drawn from psychology and neuroscience, and competing views of moral heuristics are contrasted. It is argued that moral intuitions are not direct perceptions and, in many cases, are unreliable sources of evidence for moral claims.Less
Moral intuitions are strong, stable, immediate moral beliefs. Moral philosophers ask when they are justified. This question cannot be answered separately from a psychological question: How do moral intuitions arise? Their reliability depends upon their source. This chapter develops and argues for a new theory of how moral intuitions arise—that they arise through heuristic processes best understood as unconscious attribute substitutions. That is, when asked whether something has the attribute of moral wrongness, people unconsciously substitute a different question about a separate but related heuristic attribute (such as emotional impact). Evidence for this view is drawn from psychology and neuroscience, and competing views of moral heuristics are contrasted. It is argued that moral intuitions are not direct perceptions and, in many cases, are unreliable sources of evidence for moral claims.
Michael R. DePaul
David Copp (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195147797
- eISBN:
- 9780199785841
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195147790.003.0022
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter begins with a weak understanding of intuitions as beliefs that do not result from more familiar sources, but that the person currently holds simply because the proposition believed seems ...
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This chapter begins with a weak understanding of intuitions as beliefs that do not result from more familiar sources, but that the person currently holds simply because the proposition believed seems true to the person upon due consideration. Nearly all moral inquiry makes significant use of moral intuitions. Reflective equilibrium is perhaps the most sophisticated intuitionistic approach to moral inquiry. It modifies the usual understanding of reflective equilibrium by arguing that inquirers must not merely mold their moral intuitions into a coherent system via a process of mutual adjustment, but must also strive to enhance their competence at making moral judgments. It then considers and rejects an argument for the reliability of moral intuitions that takes them to provide evidence regarding our own moral concepts. Finally, it defends reflective equilibrium by arguing that there is no sensible alternative to accepting the intuitions we have after full reflection, which is, in essence, what reflective equilibrium does.Less
This chapter begins with a weak understanding of intuitions as beliefs that do not result from more familiar sources, but that the person currently holds simply because the proposition believed seems true to the person upon due consideration. Nearly all moral inquiry makes significant use of moral intuitions. Reflective equilibrium is perhaps the most sophisticated intuitionistic approach to moral inquiry. It modifies the usual understanding of reflective equilibrium by arguing that inquirers must not merely mold their moral intuitions into a coherent system via a process of mutual adjustment, but must also strive to enhance their competence at making moral judgments. It then considers and rejects an argument for the reliability of moral intuitions that takes them to provide evidence regarding our own moral concepts. Finally, it defends reflective equilibrium by arguing that there is no sensible alternative to accepting the intuitions we have after full reflection, which is, in essence, what reflective equilibrium does.
Allan Gibbard
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195370423
- eISBN:
- 9780199851980
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195370423.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter discusses moral reasoning. It presents a situation wherein morality lies outside the scope of empirical science. It notes that science itself rests on intuitions about the justification ...
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This chapter discusses moral reasoning. It presents a situation wherein morality lies outside the scope of empirical science. It notes that science itself rests on intuitions about the justification of empirical conclusions. It explains that human's social emotions are especially refined and elaborate. Many of human feelings are intensely social, as with guilt and resentment, with shame and disdain. It adds that humans are beings with language, and make judgments that are expressed with language. It discusses that moral questions are planning questions of a particular kind, questions of how to feel about things, where the feelings in questions are the moral sentiments. It emphasizes that not only do humans think about how things are, but they also act and feel. It also explains how moral intuition works and how plans require intuition.Less
This chapter discusses moral reasoning. It presents a situation wherein morality lies outside the scope of empirical science. It notes that science itself rests on intuitions about the justification of empirical conclusions. It explains that human's social emotions are especially refined and elaborate. Many of human feelings are intensely social, as with guilt and resentment, with shame and disdain. It adds that humans are beings with language, and make judgments that are expressed with language. It discusses that moral questions are planning questions of a particular kind, questions of how to feel about things, where the feelings in questions are the moral sentiments. It emphasizes that not only do humans think about how things are, but they also act and feel. It also explains how moral intuition works and how plans require intuition.
Peter Unger
- Published in print:
- 1996
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195108590
- eISBN:
- 9780199868261
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195108590.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
That our unexamined moral intuitions often lead us to commend conduct that is seriously wrong and to condemn conduct that is not wrong indicates the extent to which these intuitions clash with our ...
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That our unexamined moral intuitions often lead us to commend conduct that is seriously wrong and to condemn conduct that is not wrong indicates the extent to which these intuitions clash with our Basic Moral Values. The view known as Liberationism, which holds that moral intuitions are often unreflective of basic values, contrasts with the more common view known as Preservationism, which maintains that our moral intuitions accord with our basic moral values. This book explores the inconsistencies in the Preservationist position by highlighting disparities in the responses that our intuitions generate for relevantly similar moral cases. These misleading responses are generated by psychological tendencies, such as projective separating and protophysical thinking, that distort the features of moral problems. In distorting our responses, the Preservationist position allows us to think erroneously that it is not difficult for well‐off people to lead a morally good life in a world in which serious suffering may easily be reduced. In fact, a moral life is extremely costly for well‐off people given how much we efficiently may do to alleviate the distant serious suffering of others.Less
That our unexamined moral intuitions often lead us to commend conduct that is seriously wrong and to condemn conduct that is not wrong indicates the extent to which these intuitions clash with our Basic Moral Values. The view known as Liberationism, which holds that moral intuitions are often unreflective of basic values, contrasts with the more common view known as Preservationism, which maintains that our moral intuitions accord with our basic moral values. This book explores the inconsistencies in the Preservationist position by highlighting disparities in the responses that our intuitions generate for relevantly similar moral cases. These misleading responses are generated by psychological tendencies, such as projective separating and protophysical thinking, that distort the features of moral problems. In distorting our responses, the Preservationist position allows us to think erroneously that it is not difficult for well‐off people to lead a morally good life in a world in which serious suffering may easily be reduced. In fact, a moral life is extremely costly for well‐off people given how much we efficiently may do to alleviate the distant serious suffering of others.
Robert Audi
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691156484
- eISBN:
- 9781400846320
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691156484.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter studies disagreements involving moral intuitions and other kinds of moral cognitions. In understanding disagreements of any kind, it is essential to ascertain whether the disputants ...
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This chapter studies disagreements involving moral intuitions and other kinds of moral cognitions. In understanding disagreements of any kind, it is essential to ascertain whether the disputants differ regarding the same proposition. Sometimes a person rejects what another says without seeing just what that is, perhaps because the language used seems threatening, as where one can tell that one is being accused of something but does not see exactly what it is. The chapter calls this kind of disagreement illocutionary, since the disagreement is focused on the other's speech act and not its content. Ultimately, moral knowledge rests on perception, on intuition regarding ethical questions about actual or envisaged action, or on intuitions concerning hypothetical cases that helps one decide what is right or wrong.Less
This chapter studies disagreements involving moral intuitions and other kinds of moral cognitions. In understanding disagreements of any kind, it is essential to ascertain whether the disputants differ regarding the same proposition. Sometimes a person rejects what another says without seeing just what that is, perhaps because the language used seems threatening, as where one can tell that one is being accused of something but does not see exactly what it is. The chapter calls this kind of disagreement illocutionary, since the disagreement is focused on the other's speech act and not its content. Ultimately, moral knowledge rests on perception, on intuition regarding ethical questions about actual or envisaged action, or on intuitions concerning hypothetical cases that helps one decide what is right or wrong.
Robert Audi
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691156484
- eISBN:
- 9781400846320
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691156484.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter examines how moral perception is possible for virtually any normal person with an elementary mastery of moral concepts. But moral perception is by no means the only route to moral ...
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This chapter examines how moral perception is possible for virtually any normal person with an elementary mastery of moral concepts. But moral perception is by no means the only route to moral intuition or moral knowledge; reflection is another way. Moral intuitions may also arise in a quite different way: from emotion. The importance of emotional evidence in ethical matters is best appreciated when its relation to moral perception and moral intuition is taken into account. The chapter argues that people sometimes know things that they would not otherwise know, which is possible through the evidence of emotion, often where the emotion is connected with intuition.Less
This chapter examines how moral perception is possible for virtually any normal person with an elementary mastery of moral concepts. But moral perception is by no means the only route to moral intuition or moral knowledge; reflection is another way. Moral intuitions may also arise in a quite different way: from emotion. The importance of emotional evidence in ethical matters is best appreciated when its relation to moral perception and moral intuition is taken into account. The chapter argues that people sometimes know things that they would not otherwise know, which is possible through the evidence of emotion, often where the emotion is connected with intuition.
Shelly Kagan
- Published in print:
- 1991
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198239161
- eISBN:
- 9780191597848
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198239165.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This book is a sustained attack on two of the most fundamental features of ‘ordinary morality’, the common‐sense moral view that most of us accept. According to this view, morality involves two ...
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This book is a sustained attack on two of the most fundamental features of ‘ordinary morality’, the common‐sense moral view that most of us accept. According to this view, morality involves two different kinds of limits. First, morality imposes certain limits on our actions, ruling out various kinds of acts – for example, harming the innocent – even if more good might be brought about by performing an act of this kind. Second, there are limits imposed on morality, limits to what morality can demand of us; in particular, we are not required to make our greatest possible contribution to the overall good. I argue that despite their intuitive appeal, neither sort of limit can be adequately defended.Less
This book is a sustained attack on two of the most fundamental features of ‘ordinary morality’, the common‐sense moral view that most of us accept. According to this view, morality involves two different kinds of limits. First, morality imposes certain limits on our actions, ruling out various kinds of acts – for example, harming the innocent – even if more good might be brought about by performing an act of this kind. Second, there are limits imposed on morality, limits to what morality can demand of us; in particular, we are not required to make our greatest possible contribution to the overall good. I argue that despite their intuitive appeal, neither sort of limit can be adequately defended.
Nils Holtug
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199580170
- eISBN:
- 9780191722707
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199580170.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Political Philosophy
This chapter introduces some key concepts, including prudence and justice and the relations between them, and gives an overview of the book. It also provides an account of the methodology employed. ...
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This chapter introduces some key concepts, including prudence and justice and the relations between them, and gives an overview of the book. It also provides an account of the methodology employed. More precisely, it is shown that the types of arguments used are compatible with a wide variety of more particular epistemic and ontological views about ethics. Furthermore, the role of thought experiments, contrast arguments and arguments that rely on the notion that ‘betterness’ is a transitive relation are clarified.Less
This chapter introduces some key concepts, including prudence and justice and the relations between them, and gives an overview of the book. It also provides an account of the methodology employed. More precisely, it is shown that the types of arguments used are compatible with a wide variety of more particular epistemic and ontological views about ethics. Furthermore, the role of thought experiments, contrast arguments and arguments that rely on the notion that ‘betterness’ is a transitive relation are clarified.
Thomas L. Carson
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199577415
- eISBN:
- 9780191722813
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577415.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General
If lying and not lying will have exactly the same consequences, then, according to act-utilitarianism, it doesn't matter whether or not one lies. Ross claims that lying is prima facie wrong, or wrong ...
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If lying and not lying will have exactly the same consequences, then, according to act-utilitarianism, it doesn't matter whether or not one lies. Ross claims that lying is prima facie wrong, or wrong other things being equal. He holds that this is “self-evident.” Ross also thinks that it is obvious that it is wrong to lie when lying produces only slightly better consequences than not lying. In contrast with Ross, Moore claims that it is self-evident that we should always do whatever has the best consequences. Ross's criticisms of act-utilitarianism are inconclusive because they appeal to disputed moral intuitions and because he doesn't do enough to justify his own moral intuitions. Brad Hooker's argument in favor of his well-known version of rule-consequentialism is inconclusive for similar reasons — it rests on an appeal to disputed considered moral judgments that he doesn't adequately justify.Less
If lying and not lying will have exactly the same consequences, then, according to act-utilitarianism, it doesn't matter whether or not one lies. Ross claims that lying is prima facie wrong, or wrong other things being equal. He holds that this is “self-evident.” Ross also thinks that it is obvious that it is wrong to lie when lying produces only slightly better consequences than not lying. In contrast with Ross, Moore claims that it is self-evident that we should always do whatever has the best consequences. Ross's criticisms of act-utilitarianism are inconclusive because they appeal to disputed moral intuitions and because he doesn't do enough to justify his own moral intuitions. Brad Hooker's argument in favor of his well-known version of rule-consequentialism is inconclusive for similar reasons — it rests on an appeal to disputed considered moral judgments that he doesn't adequately justify.
Leland F. Saunders
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199230167
- eISBN:
- 9780191696442
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230167.003.0015
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
This chapter explores how morality can be rational if moral intuitions are resistant to rational reflection. There are two parts to this question. The normative problem is whether there is a model of ...
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This chapter explores how morality can be rational if moral intuitions are resistant to rational reflection. There are two parts to this question. The normative problem is whether there is a model of moral justification which can show that morality is a rational enterprise given the facts of moral dumbfounding. Appealing to the model of reflective equilibrium for the rational justification of moral intuitions solves this problem. Reflective equilibrium views the rational justification of morality as a back-and-forth balancing between moral theory and moral intuition, and therefore does not require that individual moral intuitions be directly responsive to rational reflection. The psychological problem is whether human psychology actually implements the processes required for reflective equilibrium. The psychological problem is far more difficult, and requires appealing to a dual-process view of moral judgement that regards moral intuitions and moral theories as belonging to different mental systems.Less
This chapter explores how morality can be rational if moral intuitions are resistant to rational reflection. There are two parts to this question. The normative problem is whether there is a model of moral justification which can show that morality is a rational enterprise given the facts of moral dumbfounding. Appealing to the model of reflective equilibrium for the rational justification of moral intuitions solves this problem. Reflective equilibrium views the rational justification of morality as a back-and-forth balancing between moral theory and moral intuition, and therefore does not require that individual moral intuitions be directly responsive to rational reflection. The psychological problem is whether human psychology actually implements the processes required for reflective equilibrium. The psychological problem is far more difficult, and requires appealing to a dual-process view of moral judgement that regards moral intuitions and moral theories as belonging to different mental systems.
Shelly Kagan
- Published in print:
- 1991
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198239161
- eISBN:
- 9780191597848
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198239165.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter lays out the basic elements of ordinary morality, according to which there is only a limited requirement to promote the overall good. In particular, ‘constraints’ impose restrictions on ...
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This chapter lays out the basic elements of ordinary morality, according to which there is only a limited requirement to promote the overall good. In particular, ‘constraints’ impose restrictions on permissible means of promoting the good, and ‘options’ free us of the obligation to promote the good – even within the limits set by those constraints. We are free to make large sacrifices for others, but typically are not required to do so. This is an intuitively attractive position, but there is more involved in defending a moral view than showing its intuitive appeal. The most natural defence of options appeals to the cost to the agent of promoting the good, but this appeal leads to unacceptable results unless we can first defend constraints as well, and many straightforward attempts to defend constraints are inadequate.Less
This chapter lays out the basic elements of ordinary morality, according to which there is only a limited requirement to promote the overall good. In particular, ‘constraints’ impose restrictions on permissible means of promoting the good, and ‘options’ free us of the obligation to promote the good – even within the limits set by those constraints. We are free to make large sacrifices for others, but typically are not required to do so. This is an intuitively attractive position, but there is more involved in defending a moral view than showing its intuitive appeal. The most natural defence of options appeals to the cost to the agent of promoting the good, but this appeal leads to unacceptable results unless we can first defend constraints as well, and many straightforward attempts to defend constraints are inadequate.
Walter Glannon
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- May 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199734092
- eISBN:
- 9780199894475
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199734092.003.0013
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter examines claims by some cognitive psychologists conducting functional neuroimaging experiments about the neural basis of moral intuitions. It questions the idea that there are distinct ...
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This chapter examines claims by some cognitive psychologists conducting functional neuroimaging experiments about the neural basis of moral intuitions. It questions the idea that there are distinct cognitive and emotional subsystems in the brain driving utilitarian and deontological judgments. The chapter appeals to neuroscientific research showing that cognition and emotion are interacting processes mediated by overlapping neural systems distributed throughout the brain, Still, the reasons we adduce to justify actions depend not only on overlapping brain systems but also on social and cultural factors external to the brain.Less
This chapter examines claims by some cognitive psychologists conducting functional neuroimaging experiments about the neural basis of moral intuitions. It questions the idea that there are distinct cognitive and emotional subsystems in the brain driving utilitarian and deontological judgments. The chapter appeals to neuroscientific research showing that cognition and emotion are interacting processes mediated by overlapping neural systems distributed throughout the brain, Still, the reasons we adduce to justify actions depend not only on overlapping brain systems but also on social and cultural factors external to the brain.
Dennis L. Krebs
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199778232
- eISBN:
- 9780199897261
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199778232.003.0029
- Subject:
- Psychology, Evolutionary Psychology, Social Psychology
This chapter contains a classification of the moral senses and a speculative account of how they originated. It is suggested that a sense of duty originated in the emotional and motivational states ...
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This chapter contains a classification of the moral senses and a speculative account of how they originated. It is suggested that a sense of duty originated in the emotional and motivational states that induce people to behave in prosocial ways. A sense of rights originated in a consciousness of implicit social norms defining how people are permitted to advance their interests in the context of their groups. Conscience originated in emotional reactions to social sanctions administered by others. Such moral sentiments as gratitude and indignation originated in emotional reactions to prosocial and antisocial behaviors emitted by others. A sense of justice originated as a means of counteracting cheating in cooperative exchanges. Abstract ideas about morality emerged when early humans acquired the ability to reflect on their moral intuitions. Jonathan Haidt’s model of moral decision-making contrasts rational sources of moral judgment with moral intuitions.Less
This chapter contains a classification of the moral senses and a speculative account of how they originated. It is suggested that a sense of duty originated in the emotional and motivational states that induce people to behave in prosocial ways. A sense of rights originated in a consciousness of implicit social norms defining how people are permitted to advance their interests in the context of their groups. Conscience originated in emotional reactions to social sanctions administered by others. Such moral sentiments as gratitude and indignation originated in emotional reactions to prosocial and antisocial behaviors emitted by others. A sense of justice originated as a means of counteracting cheating in cooperative exchanges. Abstract ideas about morality emerged when early humans acquired the ability to reflect on their moral intuitions. Jonathan Haidt’s model of moral decision-making contrasts rational sources of moral judgment with moral intuitions.
Morris B. Hoffman
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- May 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199599844
- eISBN:
- 9780191725227
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199599844.003.0026
- Subject:
- Law, Medical Law
This chapter begins by surveying the naturalistic fallacy's philosophical landscape and some of the scientific literature on the evolution of morality. It then proposes a set of principles that legal ...
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This chapter begins by surveying the naturalistic fallacy's philosophical landscape and some of the scientific literature on the evolution of morality. It then proposes a set of principles that legal decision-makers might use to determine what to do, if anything, when our moral intuitions conflict with existing legal doctrine. It concludes by applying those principles to the felony murder rule, arguing that the broadest Anglo-American forms of that rule are dissonant with our intuitions of moral blameworthiness and should be abolished.Less
This chapter begins by surveying the naturalistic fallacy's philosophical landscape and some of the scientific literature on the evolution of morality. It then proposes a set of principles that legal decision-makers might use to determine what to do, if anything, when our moral intuitions conflict with existing legal doctrine. It concludes by applying those principles to the felony murder rule, arguing that the broadest Anglo-American forms of that rule are dissonant with our intuitions of moral blameworthiness and should be abolished.
Allan Gibbard
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195370423
- eISBN:
- 9780199851980
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195370423.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter discusses that moral inquiry in philosophy often comes in two broad styles. One is humanistic and pragmatic, wherein one would think what is in morality for him, and what version of ...
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This chapter discusses that moral inquiry in philosophy often comes in two broad styles. One is humanistic and pragmatic, wherein one would think what is in morality for him, and what version of morality would best serve him. The other broad style is the intuitionist, wherein man would consult his moral intuitions, revise them as needed to achieve consistency, and embrace what emerges. It notes that the hope in consulting and systematizing intuitions is that doing so will uncover a deep, implicit rationale for man's intuitive responses, and that this rationale will turn out to be a worthy one. Utilitarianism sometimes ignores the “separateness of persons.” It explains Harsanyi's two welfare theorems. It explains a way to work out the contractarian ideal, the ideal of living with others on a basis that no one could reasonably reject and evaluate if there is such a thing as a person's good.Less
This chapter discusses that moral inquiry in philosophy often comes in two broad styles. One is humanistic and pragmatic, wherein one would think what is in morality for him, and what version of morality would best serve him. The other broad style is the intuitionist, wherein man would consult his moral intuitions, revise them as needed to achieve consistency, and embrace what emerges. It notes that the hope in consulting and systematizing intuitions is that doing so will uncover a deep, implicit rationale for man's intuitive responses, and that this rationale will turn out to be a worthy one. Utilitarianism sometimes ignores the “separateness of persons.” It explains Harsanyi's two welfare theorems. It explains a way to work out the contractarian ideal, the ideal of living with others on a basis that no one could reasonably reject and evaluate if there is such a thing as a person's good.
David Baggett and Jerry L. Walls
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- May 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199751808
- eISBN:
- 9780199894840
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199751808.003.0008
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
This chapter answers arbitrariness and vacuity objections to divine command theory without shying away from the hard biblical passages like the binding of Isaac and the conquest narratives, nor ...
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This chapter answers arbitrariness and vacuity objections to divine command theory without shying away from the hard biblical passages like the binding of Isaac and the conquest narratives, nor opting for a nonliteral interpretation. The chapter rather attempts to show that, though these are undoubtedly difficult passages to understand, they are ultimately reconcilable with our most nonnegotiable moral intuitions. There are indeed recognizably abhorrent commands that God by his nature could never perform, but these Old Testament passages, though hard to make sense of morally, aren't impossible. What is needed is a principled line between the merely hard passages and actually impossible moral scenarios.Less
This chapter answers arbitrariness and vacuity objections to divine command theory without shying away from the hard biblical passages like the binding of Isaac and the conquest narratives, nor opting for a nonliteral interpretation. The chapter rather attempts to show that, though these are undoubtedly difficult passages to understand, they are ultimately reconcilable with our most nonnegotiable moral intuitions. There are indeed recognizably abhorrent commands that God by his nature could never perform, but these Old Testament passages, though hard to make sense of morally, aren't impossible. What is needed is a principled line between the merely hard passages and actually impossible moral scenarios.
C. Stephen Evans
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- May 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199696680
- eISBN:
- 9780191744266
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199696680.003.0006
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion, Theology
This book has argued that moral obligations are best explained as God's commands. However, if God does not exist, someone might regard this argument as a reductio of moral realism, giving reasons to ...
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This book has argued that moral obligations are best explained as God's commands. However, if God does not exist, someone might regard this argument as a reductio of moral realism, giving reasons to embrace an error theory. Hence to complete the argument reasons to accept moral realism and reject error theory must be provided. One argument for moral realism is linked to moral experience and the principle of credulity, which holds that experience generally provides prima facie evidence for the reality of what is experienced. Further arguments are provided by Thomas Reid, who tries to show that the first principles of morality are among the deliverances of “common sense.” David Enoch's work updates this type of argument by showing how a commitment to normative realism is presupposed by practical deliberation. Ultimately, moral realism without moral knowledge would be useless and even paradoxical, so the chapter ends with a defense of conscience and the claim that moral intuitions are a source of moral knowledge. A moderate intuitionism is argued to be compatible with evolutionary theory as an account of how moral knowledge is possible.Less
This book has argued that moral obligations are best explained as God's commands. However, if God does not exist, someone might regard this argument as a reductio of moral realism, giving reasons to embrace an error theory. Hence to complete the argument reasons to accept moral realism and reject error theory must be provided. One argument for moral realism is linked to moral experience and the principle of credulity, which holds that experience generally provides prima facie evidence for the reality of what is experienced. Further arguments are provided by Thomas Reid, who tries to show that the first principles of morality are among the deliverances of “common sense.” David Enoch's work updates this type of argument by showing how a commitment to normative realism is presupposed by practical deliberation. Ultimately, moral realism without moral knowledge would be useless and even paradoxical, so the chapter ends with a defense of conscience and the claim that moral intuitions are a source of moral knowledge. A moderate intuitionism is argued to be compatible with evolutionary theory as an account of how moral knowledge is possible.
Daniel Jacobson
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199662951
- eISBN:
- 9780191745195
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199662951.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Several prominent moral psychologists and philosophers make much of a phenomenon they term moral dumbfounding, which is characterized by dogmatic insistence on a moral judgment for which no good ...
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Several prominent moral psychologists and philosophers make much of a phenomenon they term moral dumbfounding, which is characterized by dogmatic insistence on a moral judgment for which no good reasons can be given. They hold that the phenomenon shows something important about ordinary moral judgment: that commonplace reasons offered for moral judgment are mere post hoc rationalizations of decisions made on other grounds. The chapter argues that the prominent and influential dumbfounding study does not work on its own terms, because its examples ignore crucial distinctions concerning harm and wrongness, and between dumbfounding and inarticulate reason-responsiveness. In fact there are good reasons for moral condemnation of every case they consider, but the problem is not just a matter of poorly chosen examples. By ignoring the symbolic and expressive aspects of action, the dumbfounders adopt an artificially narrow conception of reasons. Moreover, the fact that humans are sometimes dumbfounded and sometimes confabulate does not support their strong claims about the speciousness of reasons and reasoning in ordinary moral judgment.Less
Several prominent moral psychologists and philosophers make much of a phenomenon they term moral dumbfounding, which is characterized by dogmatic insistence on a moral judgment for which no good reasons can be given. They hold that the phenomenon shows something important about ordinary moral judgment: that commonplace reasons offered for moral judgment are mere post hoc rationalizations of decisions made on other grounds. The chapter argues that the prominent and influential dumbfounding study does not work on its own terms, because its examples ignore crucial distinctions concerning harm and wrongness, and between dumbfounding and inarticulate reason-responsiveness. In fact there are good reasons for moral condemnation of every case they consider, but the problem is not just a matter of poorly chosen examples. By ignoring the symbolic and expressive aspects of action, the dumbfounders adopt an artificially narrow conception of reasons. Moreover, the fact that humans are sometimes dumbfounded and sometimes confabulate does not support their strong claims about the speciousness of reasons and reasoning in ordinary moral judgment.
Martha Klein
- Published in print:
- 1990
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198248347
- eISBN:
- 9780191681134
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198248347.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter argues that some of our reflective moral intuitions are ‘U-condition generating beliefs’, that is beliefs which commit those who hold them (whether they realize it or not) to the belief ...
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This chapter argues that some of our reflective moral intuitions are ‘U-condition generating beliefs’, that is beliefs which commit those who hold them (whether they realize it or not) to the belief in a U-condition. These intuitions are all beliefs to the effect that agents are not morally responsible if their actions are caused by certain specific factors; what these factors have in common is that they are states or events for which the agents are not responsible.Less
This chapter argues that some of our reflective moral intuitions are ‘U-condition generating beliefs’, that is beliefs which commit those who hold them (whether they realize it or not) to the belief in a U-condition. These intuitions are all beliefs to the effect that agents are not morally responsible if their actions are caused by certain specific factors; what these factors have in common is that they are states or events for which the agents are not responsible.