Search Results

Attitude, Affect, and Authority

Mark Eli Kalderon

in Moral Fictionalism

This chapter argues that renewed moral inquiry might have a number of outcomes. At one end of the spectrum, a revision of moral practice is both theoretically and practically required. At the other ... More

This chapter argues that renewed moral inquiry might have a number of outcomes. At one end of the spectrum, a revision of moral practice is both theoretically and practically required. At the other end of the spectrum, no such revision is required. But there are interim possibilities. Perhaps moral practice would remain fictionalist even after a renewed moral inquiry but the character of the fiction would change. Perhaps, while benign moral fictionalism is a legitimate possibility, the moral fiction that competent speakers actually accept is not itself benign. Or perhaps the actual moral fiction is in many ways benign but renewed moral inquiry suggests ways in which that fiction could be improved. There is no telling, in advance, what such an inquiry would reveal.Less

Intuitions in Moral Inquiry

Michael R. DePaul

David Copp (ed.)

in The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory

This chapter begins with a weak understanding of intuitions as beliefs that do not result from more familiar sources, but that the person currently holds simply because the proposition believed seems ... More

This chapter begins with a weak understanding of intuitions as beliefs that do not result from more familiar sources, but that the person currently holds simply because the proposition believed seems true to the person upon due consideration. Nearly all moral inquiry makes significant use of moral intuitions. Reflective equilibrium is perhaps the most sophisticated intuitionistic approach to moral inquiry. It modifies the usual understanding of reflective equilibrium by arguing that inquirers must not merely mold their moral intuitions into a coherent system via a process of mutual adjustment, but must also strive to enhance their competence at making moral judgments. It then considers and rejects an argument for the reliability of moral intuitions that takes them to provide evidence regarding our own moral concepts. Finally, it defends reflective equilibrium by arguing that there is no sensible alternative to accepting the intuitions we have after full reflection, which is, in essence, what reflective equilibrium does.Less

Summary and Prospect

Margaret Gilbert

in A Theory of Political Obligation: Membership, Commitment, and the Bonds of Society

The book’s argument is summarized and its conclusions are brought to hear on two classic situations of crisis: Socrates awaiting the death penalty in prison, and Antigone in her conflict with the ... More

The book’s argument is summarized and its conclusions are brought to hear on two classic situations of crisis: Socrates awaiting the death penalty in prison, and Antigone in her conflict with the ruler of her political society, Creon. Emphasis is given to the point that though obligations of joint commitment are absolute in the sense discussed, and supersede one’s personal inclinations and self-interest as such, it is possible for other considerations to ‘trump’ them. Antigone believed there were such considerations in her case; Socrates seems not to have thought so. A number of avenues for further empirical investigation and moral inquiry are noted.Less

Living Together: Economic and Moral Argument

Allan Gibbard

in Reconciling Our Aims: In Search of Bases for Ethics

This chapter discusses that moral inquiry in philosophy often comes in two broad styles. One is humanistic and pragmatic, wherein one would think what is in morality for him, and what version of ... More

This chapter discusses that moral inquiry in philosophy often comes in two broad styles. One is humanistic and pragmatic, wherein one would think what is in morality for him, and what version of morality would best serve him. The other broad style is the intuitionist, wherein man would consult his moral intuitions, revise them as needed to achieve consistency, and embrace what emerges. It notes that the hope in consulting and systematizing intuitions is that doing so will uncover a deep, implicit rationale for man's intuitive responses, and that this rationale will turn out to be a worthy one. Utilitarianism sometimes ignores the “separateness of persons.” It explains Harsanyi's two welfare theorems. It explains a way to work out the contractarian ideal, the ideal of living with others on a basis that no one could reasonably reject and evaluate if there is such a thing as a person's good.Less

Introduction

Mike W. Martin

in Meaningful Work: Rethinking Professional Ethics

The expression “professional ethics” can mean three things: de facto morality, justified morality, and moral inquiry. Professional ethics consists entirely of the moral requirements attached to a ... More

The expression “professional ethics” can mean three things: de facto morality, justified morality, and moral inquiry. Professional ethics consists entirely of the moral requirements attached to a profession and imposed on all its members, together with the ethical dilemmas created when the requirements conflict or are too vague to provide guidance. This dominant perspective is called the consensus paradigm, which the present book argues is implausible and constricting. The consensus paradigm neglects how personal moral commitments and ideals motivate, sustain, and guide professionals in their work. In exploring personal commitments, this book introduces narrative case studies and also includes portrayals of professionals in works of fiction. Case studies are ubiquitous in studying professional ethics, but almost invariably they consist of episodic (time-slice) dilemmas about how to act when confronted with conflicting obligations. A diachronic perspective reveals the importance of caring relationships, meaningful work, voluntary service, burnout, self-betrayal, balancing family with other commitments, and other topics examined in this book.Less

The Puzzle of Pure Moral Motivation

Adam Lerner

in Oxford Studies in Metaethics 13

People engage in pure moral inquiry whenever they inquire into the moral features of some act, agent, or state of affairs without inquiring into the non-moral features of that act, agent, or state of ... More

People engage in pure moral inquiry whenever they inquire into the moral features of some act, agent, or state of affairs without inquiring into the non-moral features of that act, agent, or state of affairs. The first section of this chapter argues that ordinary people act rationally when they engage in pure moral inquiry, and so any adequate view in metaethics ought to be able to explain this fact. The Puzzle of Pure Moral Motivation is to provide such an explanation. The remaining sections of the chapter argue that each of the standard views in metaethics has trouble providing such an explanation. A metaethical view can provide such an explanation only if it meets two constraints: it allows ordinary moral inquirers to know the essences of moral properties, and the essence of each moral property makes it rational to care for its own sake whether that property is instantiated.Less

ONE: An Account of Oneself

Judith Butler

in Giving an Account of Oneself

This chapter begins with a discussion of what is important about Adorno's conception of ethical violence. It points out the importance of his formulation for contemporary debates about moral nihilism ... More

This chapter begins with a discussion of what is important about Adorno's conception of ethical violence. It points out the importance of his formulation for contemporary debates about moral nihilism and shows how changes in his theoretical framework are necessitated by the shifting historical character of moral inquiry itself. It then examines Foucault's later theory of subject formation and considers the limitations one encounters when one tries to use it to think the other. This is followed by a post-Hegelian account of recognition that seeks to establish the social basis for giving an account of oneself. In this context, the chapter considers the critique of a Hegelian model of recognition offered by Adriana Cavarero, a feminist philosopher who draws on the work of Levinas and Arendt.Less

Something Rich and Strange: Joyce’s Perspectivism

Philip Kitcher

in Joyce's Ulysses: Philosophical Perspectives

Ulysses presents its central figures from many perspectives. Joyce’s proliferation of stylistic devices enables readers to view Leopold Bloom, Stephen Dedalus, and Molly Bloom from different angles. ... More

Ulysses presents its central figures from many perspectives. Joyce’s proliferation of stylistic devices enables readers to view Leopold Bloom, Stephen Dedalus, and Molly Bloom from different angles. Although confused and irritated readers might take the profusion of styles as a showy display of erudition, or, at best, as creating opportunities for humor, this chapter argues that the multiplication of narrative techniques serves important novelistic purposes. They enable Joyce to provoke revisions of our conventional values and to recognize the extraordinary in the commonplace. The chapter suggests broadening David Hayman’s seminal concept of “the Arranger” to consider arrangements, ways of reordering and restructuring the world that transcend the perspective of any potential human observer. Joyce’s multiple perspectives are akin to the worlds of experience favored by pragmatists like William James and John Dewey. They enable us to recognize the heroism in Bloom and to reflect on moral attitudes we take for granted.Less