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Individual Moral Responsibility in Wrongful Social Practice

Tracy Isaacs

in Moral Responsibility in Collective Contexts

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
September 2011
ISBN:
9780199782963
eISBN:
9780199897117
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199782963.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

Chapter 6 investigates conditions under which wrongful social practice is the status quo and there is ignorance at both the collective and individual levels of the wrongness or harmfulness of these ... More


Unwitting Wrongdoers and the Role of Moral Disagreement in Blame 1

Matthew Talbert

in Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility Volume 1

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
September 2013
ISBN:
9780199694853
eISBN:
9780191757792
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199694853.003.0010
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter argues against the claim that morally ignorant wrongdoers are open to blame only if they are culpable for their ignorance, and argues against a version of skepticism about moral ... More


Excuse without Exculpation: The Case of Moral Ignorance

Paulina Sliwa

in Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 15

Published in print:
2020
Published Online:
August 2020
ISBN:
9780198859512
eISBN:
9780191891861
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198859512.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Moral Philosophy

Can moral ignorance excuse? This chapter argues that philosophical debate of this question has been based on a mistaken assumption: namely that excuses are all-or-nothing affairs; to have an excuse ... More


Blame and Moral Ignorance

Brian Weatherson

in Normative Externalism

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
May 2019
ISBN:
9780199696536
eISBN:
9780191876028
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780199696536.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter argues against the popular view that acting in accordance with one’s principles excuses moral wrongdoing. That is, if one is ignorant of the moral truth, and that ignorance explains ... More


Responsibility and Reproach

Cheshire Calhoun

in Moral Aims: Essays on the Importance of Getting It Right and Practicing Morality with Others

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
November 2015
ISBN:
9780199328796
eISBN:
9780190272104
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199328796.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General

The wrongdoing highlighted by feminist critique often occurs at the level of social practice where social acceptance of oppressive practices and the absence of widespread moral critique impede the ... More


When Ignorance is No Excuse

Maria Alvarez and Clayton Littlejohn (eds)

in Responsibility: The Epistemic Condition

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
July 2017
ISBN:
9780198779667
eISBN:
9780191824715
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198779667.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Moral Philosophy

The chapter argues that the best non-skeptical accounts of moral responsibility acknowledge that factual ignorance and mistake will diminish moral responsibility in a way that moral ignorance and ... More


Unwitting Wrongdoing, Reasonable Expectations, and Blameworthiness

William J. FitzPatrick (ed.)

in Responsibility: The Epistemic Condition

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
July 2017
ISBN:
9780198779667
eISBN:
9780191824715
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198779667.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Moral Philosophy

This chapter defends the view (1) that when an agent is blameworthy for an action performed in ignorance of its wrongness, the blameworthiness for the action derives from blameworthiness for the ... More


Two Ways of Socializing Moral Responsibility: Circumstantialism versus Scaffolded-Responsiveness

Jules Holroyd

in Social Dimensions of Moral Responsibility

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
April 2018
ISBN:
9780190609610
eISBN:
9780190609634
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780190609610.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General

This chapter evaluates two competing views of morally responsible agency. The first view at issue is Vargas’s circumstantialism—on which responsible agency is a function of the agent and her ... More


Moral Testimony Goes Only So Far

Elizabeth Harman

in Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility Volume 6

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
November 2019
ISBN:
9780198845539
eISBN:
9780191880711
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198845539.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This paper argues for answers to two questions, and then identifies a tension between the two answers. First, regarding the implications of moral ignorance for moral responsibility: “Do false moral ... More


Huckleberry Finn Revisited: Inverse Akrasia and Moral Ignorance

Nomy Arpaly

in The Nature of Moral Responsibility: New Essays

Published in print:
2015
Published Online:
June 2015
ISBN:
9780199998074
eISBN:
9780190238933
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199998074.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

This chapter argues that Huck Finn cases, or cases of inverse akrasia, give us reasons to believe that moral ignorance does not excuse from blame and that, therefore (1) theorists of moral ... More


Huck vs. JoJo: Moral Ignorance and the (A)symmetry of Praise and Blame

David Faraci and David Shoemaker

in Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy: Volume 1

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
January 2015
ISBN:
9780198718765
eISBN:
9780191803123
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198718765.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

When Huckleberry Finn fails to turn in Jim, he believes he is going to hell for doing what he has been raised to believe is wrong. When Susan Wolf’s JoJo—raised by his dictator father to embrace his ... More


Exemptions

Elinor Mason

in Ways to be Blameworthy: Rightness, Wrongness, and Responsibility

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
April 2019
ISBN:
9780198833604
eISBN:
9780191872037
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198833604.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

This chapter explores the complexities of who is in and who is out of our moral community. First, it considers agents who are not impaired in any obvious way, but who are in the grip of a false moral ... More


Blame and Moral Ignorance

George Sher

in Me, You, Us: Essays

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
August 2017
ISBN:
9780190660413
eISBN:
9780190660444
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780190660413.003.0010
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

People can be mistaken either about the truth of the moral principles they accept or about the rightness of their actions. Can they legitimately be blamed for acting wrongly when they know what they ... More


Blame and Moral Ignorance

George Sher (ed.)

in Responsibility: The Epistemic Condition

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
July 2017
ISBN:
9780198779667
eISBN:
9780191824715
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198779667.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Moral Philosophy

Can a person legitimately be blamed for acting wrongly when he knows what he is doing, but does not know that it is wrong? Like a good many others who have written on this topic, the author believes ... More


When is Failure to Realize Something Exculpatory?

Elizabeth Harman (ed.)

in Responsibility: The Epistemic Condition

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
July 2017
ISBN:
9780198779667
eISBN:
9780191824715
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198779667.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Moral Philosophy

Sometimes one has sufficient evidence for p, but one simply does not realize that p is true. In some of these cases, the failure to realize is exculpatory. In other cases, it is not. In general, ... More


Socializing Responsibility

Neil Levy

in Social Dimensions of Moral Responsibility

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
April 2018
ISBN:
9780190609610
eISBN:
9780190609634
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780190609610.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General

There is a near universal consensus that the bearers of moral responsibility are the individuals people identify with proper names. In this chapter, it is suggested that if people take the exercise ... More


The Story of a Village Elder, Part 2

Eve Monique Zucker

in Forest of Struggle: Moralities of Remembrance in Upland Cambodia

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
November 2016
ISBN:
9780824836115
eISBN:
9780824871079
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
University of Hawai'i Press
DOI:
10.21313/hawaii/9780824836115.003.0006
Subject:
Anthropology, Asian Cultural Anthropology

In this chapter, the author continues with the story of Ta Kam, whose moral ignorance was allegedly the reason for his betrayal of his neighbors and extended kin during the Khmer Rouge era. Ta Kam's ... More


Blaming Perpetrators

Matthew Talbert and Jessica Wolfendale

in War Crimes: Causes, Excuses, and Blame

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
October 2018
ISBN:
9780190675875
eISBN:
9780190675905
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780190675875.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

Chapter 5 explains why the arguments in the preceding chapter fail. On our view, an agent is blameworthy if her behavior manifests an inappropriate degree of moral regard for others. Typically, this ... More


Respecting Each Other and Taking Responsibility for Our Biases

Elinor Mason

in Social Dimensions of Moral Responsibility

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
April 2018
ISBN:
9780190609610
eISBN:
9780190609634
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780190609610.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General

This chapter considers cases of morally problematic action where an agent acts in a biased way and the explanation is socialization and nonculpable false belief, rather than bad will on the part of ... More


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