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Parliamentary Democracy and Delegatio n

Kaare Strøm

in Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies

Published in print:
2003
Published Online:
January 2005
ISBN:
9780198297840
eISBN:
9780191602016
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/019829784X.003.0003
Subject:
Political Science, Comparative Politics

Identifies three motivations for political delegation (capacity, competence, collective action problems) and discusses agency problems and mechanisms of accountability. An ideal-typical form of ... More


 Bounding Equilibrium Perfect Public Equilibrium Payoffs

George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson

in Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
January 2007
ISBN:
9780195300796
eISBN:
9780199783700
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300796.003.0008
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics

This chapter uses the tools developed in Chapter 7 to bound the set of equilibrium payoffs for a repeated game, based on decomposing payoffs on half spaces. These bounds imply a lack of efficiency ... More


Delegation and its Peril s

Arthur Lupia

in Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies

Published in print:
2003
Published Online:
January 2005
ISBN:
9780198297840
eISBN:
9780191602016
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/019829784X.003.0002
Subject:
Political Science, Comparative Politics

Presents a formal theoretical framework that clarifies when principals can, and cannot, use delegation to accomplish desired ends. It shows the conditions (having to do with preferences and ... More


The Economic Theory of Agrarian Institutions

Pranab Bardhan (ed.)

Published in print:
1991
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780198287629
eISBN:
9780191595912
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0198287623.001.0001
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Development, Growth, and Environmental

In this book, the authors theorize about the rationale and consequences of some economic institutions and contractual arrangements that are particularly predominant in poor agrarian economies. The ... More


Parliamentary Democracy: Promise and Problems

Kaare Strøm, Wolfgang C. Müller, and Torbjörn Bergman

in Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies

Published in print:
2003
Published Online:
January 2005
ISBN:
9780198297840
eISBN:
9780191602016
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/019829784X.003.0001
Subject:
Political Science, Comparative Politics

Parliamentary government is the most common way to organize delegation and accountability in contemporary democracies. Parliamentary government is a system of government in which the prime minister ... More


Obstacles to Trade, Enhanced Models of Selection, and the Impact of Policy Variation

Robert M. Townsend

in Financial Systems in Developing Economies: Growth, Inequality and Policy Evaluation in Thailand

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
January 2011
ISBN:
9780199533237
eISBN:
9780191594892
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199533237.003.0010
Subject:
Economics and Finance, South and East Asia, Development, Growth, and Environmental

This chapter establishes that moral hazard, limited commitment, transaction costs, and other obstacles to trade are salient features of the Thai financial landscape. Structural choice models and data ... More


The Gods of Risk

Witham Larry

in Marketplace of the Gods: How Economics Explains Religion

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
May 2010
ISBN:
9780195394757
eISBN:
9780199777372
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195394757.003.0004
Subject:
Religion, Religion and Society

Religion is a form of risk management in human lives and in religious groups. Pascal’s Wager famously illustrates the calculation of loss and benefit in religious belief. But there are other economic ... More


Open Issues

Michael Chui and Prasanna Gai

in Private Sector Involvement and International Financial Crises: An Analytical Perspective

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
July 2005
ISBN:
9780199267750
eISBN:
9780191602504
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199267758.003.0010
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Financial Economics

Explores the circumstances under which the imposition of statutory debt restructuring mechanisms and/or debt standstills can trigger a ‘rush for the exits’ by creditors. Given the possibility of such ... More


The Mirage of Private Unemployment Insurance

Nicholas Barr

in The Welfare State as Piggy Bank: Information, Risk, Uncertainty, and the Role of the State

Published in print:
2001
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780199246595
eISBN:
9780191595936
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199246599.003.0003
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Public and Welfare

Chapter 3 discusses unemployment insurance. Actuarial insurance faces a series of problems including adverse selection and – particularly – moral hazard. It is, therefore, not surprising that private ... More


Moral Hazard in Health Insurance

Amy Finkelstein

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
November 2015
ISBN:
9780231163804
eISBN:
9780231538688
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Columbia University Press
DOI:
10.7312/columbia/9780231163804.001.0001
Subject:
Business and Management, Business Ethics and Corporate Social Responsibility

Moral hazard—the tendency to change behavior when the cost of that behavior will be borne by others—is a particularly tricky question when considering health care. Kenneth J. Arrow's seminal 1963 ... More


Fragmented Credit Markets

Pranab Bardhan and Christopher Udry

in Development Microeconomics

Published in print:
1999
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780198773719
eISBN:
9780191595929
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0198773714.003.0007
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Development, Growth, and Environmental

One aspect of financial markets that is of great relevance to economic development is the study of credit mechanism design by lenders facing private information. This chapter first develops a model ... More


Laying the Theoretical Foundations for the Study of Development Aid

Clark C. Gibson

in The Samaritan's Dilemma: The Political Economy of Development Aid

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
October 2005
ISBN:
9780199278855
eISBN:
9780191602863
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199278857.003.0002
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Development, Growth, and Environmental

This chapter focuses on the problem of collective action as it relates to development at the operational level. It first explores how individuals’ motivation may hamper their incentive to work ... More


Uncertainty and health insurance

Jan Abel Olsen

in Principles in Health Economics and Policy

Published in print:
2009
Published Online:
May 2010
ISBN:
9780199237814
eISBN:
9780191717215
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199237814.003.0007
Subject:
Public Health and Epidemiology, Public Health, Epidemiology

This chapter shows that there is a welfare gain from health insurance because people are risk averse with respect to the financial implications of the prospect of ill health. There are effectively ... More


The Theory of Moral Hazard and Unobservable Behaviour: Part I

James A. Mirrlees

in Welfare, Incentives, and Taxation

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
October 2011
ISBN:
9780198295211
eISBN:
9780191685095
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198295211.003.0020
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Public and Welfare, Development, Growth, and Environmental

This chapter discusses the different formal models of moral hazard, which include that of Zeckhauser and Mirrlees. It includes an argument that relies on first-order conditions which can help in ... More


 Taking Charge

Ken Binmore

in Playing for Real: Game Theory

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
May 2007
ISBN:
9780195300574
eISBN:
9780199783748
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300574.003.0020
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Microeconomics

This chapter introduces mechanism design, which is the subject wherein games are designed so that rational play results in socially desirable outcomes. The judgment of Solomon from the Bible is used ... More


Conclusion

Oisín Tansey

in Regime-Building: Democratization and International Administration

Published in print:
2009
Published Online:
May 2009
ISBN:
9780199561032
eISBN:
9780191721496
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199561032.003.0007
Subject:
Political Science, Comparative Politics, Democratization

This concluding chapter restates and further examines the findings of the book in detail. The first section explores the impact of democratic regime-building operations across the three cases, paying ... More


Moral Hazard in Health Insurance: Developments Since Arrow (1963)

Amy Finkelstein

in Moral Hazard in Health Insurance

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
November 2015
ISBN:
9780231163804
eISBN:
9780231538688
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Columbia University Press
DOI:
10.7312/columbia/9780231163804.003.0002
Subject:
Business and Management, Business Ethics and Corporate Social Responsibility

This chapter examines economics professor Amy Finkelstein's lecture of the economics of moral hazard in health insurance, with respect to economist Kenneth J. Arrow's “Uncertainty and the Welfare ... More


Institutional Analysis of Credit Co‐Operatives

Avishay Braverman and J. Luis Guasch

in The Economic Theory of Agrarian Institutions

Published in print:
1991
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780198287629
eISBN:
9780191595912
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0198287623.003.0017
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Development, Growth, and Environmental

In this chapter, the authors present an analysis of the motivation, formation, and design of credit cooperatives and show how their degree of success is likely to depend crucially on the particular ... More


The Rural Land Market

Pranab Bardhan and Christopher Udry

in Development Microeconomics

Published in print:
1999
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780198773719
eISBN:
9780191595929
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0198773714.003.0006
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Development, Growth, and Environmental

Commences with some comments on the evolution of property rights in land and on reasons for rural land markets being relatively ‘thin’; the rest of the chapter then analyzes the more active ... More


Family Ties, Incentives and Development †: A Model of Coerced Altruism

Ingela Alger and JÖrgen W. Weibull

in Arguments for a Better World: Essays in Honor of Amartya Sen, Volume 2: Society, Institutions, and Development

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
May 2009
ISBN:
9780199239979
eISBN:
9780191716874
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239979.003.0011
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Development, Growth, and Environmental

This chapter analyses the effects of family ties on the incentives for production of effort, where family ties are defined as a mixture of true and coerced altruism between family members. It models ... More


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