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The Normative Web: An Argument for Moral Realism

Terence Cuneo

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
January 2008
ISBN:
9780199218837
eISBN:
9780191711749
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199218837.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

Antirealist views about morality claim that moral facts do not exist. An interesting question to raise about these views is whether they imply that other types of normative facts, such as epistemic ... More


Moral Realism: A Defence

Russ Shafer-Landau

Published in print:
2003
Published Online:
January 2005
ISBN:
9780199259755
eISBN:
9780191601835
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199259755.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

This is a book in metaethics that defends a brand of moral realism known as non‐naturalism. The book has five Parts. Part I outlines the sort of moral realism that the author wishes to defend, and ... More


The Parity Premise

Terence Cuneo

in The Normative Web: An Argument for Moral Realism

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
January 2008
ISBN:
9780199218837
eISBN:
9780191711749
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199218837.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

This chapter contains the second stage of argument for the core argument's first premise. The strategy employed is to point out that that there is a class of standard objections ordinarily leveled ... More


Defending the Parallel

Terence Cuneo

in The Normative Web: An Argument for Moral Realism

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
January 2008
ISBN:
9780199218837
eISBN:
9780191711749
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199218837.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

The argument for the core argument's first premise comes in two stages. This chapter presents the first stage of the argument. Its aim is threefold: first, to identify the character of epistemic ... More


Introduction

Terence Cuneo

in The Normative Web: An Argument for Moral Realism

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
January 2008
ISBN:
9780199218837
eISBN:
9780191711749
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199218837.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

This chapter lays out the core argument of the book, which runs as follows: (1) if moral facts do not exist, then epistemic facts do not exist; (2) epistemic facts exist; (3) so, moral facts exist; ... More


Three Objections to the Core Argument

Terence Cuneo

in The Normative Web: An Argument for Moral Realism

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
January 2008
ISBN:
9780199218837
eISBN:
9780191711749
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199218837.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

This chapter addresses three objections that might be raised against what is argued in the preceding chapters. The first objection is directed toward the core argument's first premise. It maintains ... More


Claims and Counter-claims: A General Introduction to Moral Realism

Christian F. R. Illies

in The Grounds of Ethical Judgement: New Transcendental Arguments in Moral Philosophy

Published in print:
2003
Published Online:
October 2011
ISBN:
9780198238324
eISBN:
9780191679612
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198238324.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

This chapter examines the debate about moral realism which can be found in current analytic philosophy and outlines the position of moral realism and anti-realism and the main arguments raised by ... More


Knowing Reasons

Jonathan Dancy

in Ethics Without Principles

Published in print:
2004
Published Online:
January 2005
ISBN:
9780199270026
eISBN:
9780191601729
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199270023.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

A chapter on moral epistemology. Asks what, for the particularist, will count as a basic moral fact. Considers the modal status of such facts, arguing that they are contingent, but known a priori. ... More


Legal Content, Social Facts, and Interpretive Practice

JULES L. COLEMAN

in The Practice of Principle: In Defence of a Pragmatist Approach to Legal Theory

Published in print:
2003
Published Online:
January 2010
ISBN:
9780199264124
eISBN:
9780191707698
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199264124.003.0012
Subject:
Law, Philosophy of Law

This chapter outlines the chapter’s views on three fundamental substantive questions in jurisprudence regarding the relationship between law and political morality. These are: (1) What are the ... More


Three Antirealist Views

Terence Cuneo

in Speech and Morality: On the Metaethical Implications of Speaking

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
August 2014
ISBN:
9780198712725
eISBN:
9780191781063
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198712725.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Moral Philosophy

If the argument up to Chapter 5 succeeds, we should accept not only that normative features are ingredient in the count-generation of speech, but also that some of these features are moral. So far, ... More


Properties for Nothing, Facts for Free? Expressivism’s Deflationary Gambit

Terence Cuneo

in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 8

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
September 2013
ISBN:
9780199678044
eISBN:
9780191757457
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199678044.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Philosophers accept the deflationary package when they maintain that moral propositional content, properties, facts, and truth admit of a deflationary (or minimalist) treatment. Expressivists often ... More


Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence

Jonas Olson

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
April 2014
ISBN:
9780198701934
eISBN:
9780191771620
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198701934.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

This book examines moral error theory of the kind advocated by J. L. Mackie. Part I (History) gives a historical background to the debate. The moral error theories of David Hume and of some more or ... More


Criteria for Moral Realism

Colin Marshall

in Compassionate Moral Realism

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
June 2018
ISBN:
9780198809685
eISBN:
9780191846953
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198809685.003.0012
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

This chapter discusses the nature of moral realism, identifying desiderata that the view defended here (Compassionate Moral Realism) needs to meet. First, the general idea behind the moral ... More


Impediments to Usability: Error, Ignorance, and Uncertainty

Holly M. Smith

in Making Morality Work

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
May 2018
ISBN:
9780199560080
eISBN:
9780191853210
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780199560080.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

The Usability Demand requires all moral theories to be usable for decision-making, arguably by each agent and on every occasion for decision-making. Chapter 3 first examines the ways in which common ... More


Defending the Moral/Epistemic Parity

Terence Cuneo and Christos Kyriacou

in Metaepistemology

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
December 2018
ISBN:
9780198805366
eISBN:
9780191843433
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198805366.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Do irreducible moral and epistemic facts stand or fall together? In his critical engagement with Cuneo’s The Normative Web, Chris Heathwood maintains that they do not. Appealing to a version of the ... More


“Just No Damned Good”

Jeremy Waldron

in Legal, Moral, and Metaphysical Truths: The Philosophy of Michael S. Moore

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
June 2016
ISBN:
9780198703242
eISBN:
9780191773068
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198703242.003.0019
Subject:
Law, Philosophy of Law, Criminal Law and Criminology

Moral realism is sometimes defended by arguing that “moral facts” provide the best explanation for events or situations in the world. Sometimes the events and situations that are allegedly explained ... More


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