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Cam models are independent contractors, but they are not free agents in an open capitalist market. Instead, cam models work in a global network of pornographic industries, which sex entrepreneurs own and control, and moral entrepreneurs regulate. This chapter examines the relationship between sex entrepreneurs such as cam-site and studio owners, moral entrepreneurs such as politicians, legislators, and other rescue-industry agents, and cam models in structuring the camming industry. Moral entrepreneurs dictate the policies that regulate the camming industry. Sex entrepreneurs exploit cam models—all cam sites take a substantial portion of cam model’s sales and pay relatively low commissions. Various overlapping systems of oppression shape the camming industry and affect the wage outcomes and experiences of cam models. Cam models must work hard—but cam models who are thin, White, cisgender, in their 20s, from the United States, and do not work for studios are privileged by various systems of inequality that they have no control over. Far from a feminist, queer, or socialist utopia, the camming industry, while it sometimes provides decent wages to workers, operates via and reproduces the same inequities that exist in any capitalist workplace.

The trope of ‘lost childhood’ is a recurring one within UK newspapers. Every few years, a news article, editorial or letter leads with this idea, causing some media interest and connected articles, but then fades away until the next time. This chapter brings together concepts from moral panics and childhood studies to help analyse this trope. As Garland writes, sociologists using the concepts of moral panics start with scepticism that ‘permits the initial observation’ to give ‘way to a different attitude – one that is more analytic, more explanatory, or perhaps better, more diagnostic’.

A sociology of punishment for international criminal justice enables attention to the norms, morals, and values at play in the motivational dynamics of penal reforms. At the same time, these cultural forces must be analysed against the background of social organization and structure, indeed, as to what enables people to think and feel in certain ways and to promote policies in accordance with their sensibilities. As such, this chapter explores international criminal justice as a field replete with cosmopolitan sensibilities, but also of lifestyles, qualifications, and restraints. Finding that international criminal justice is perceived as a cosmopolitan expression of social justice, the first part conceptualizes human rights NGOs working in international criminal justice as global moral entrepreneurs and shows how they use humanist discourses to promote global justice-making through law, turning them into advocates of international criminal justice. Balancing claims to authority in the field, the NGOs have to navigate between being ‘insiders’ as experts and ‘outsiders’ that can claim moral authority. The analysis draws on scholarship inspired by Bourdieu and is put to work on transnational fields, enabling attention to what is often downplayed in studies of international law, namely class. As such, the chapter inquires into whose imaginations of global justice become part of its materiality, finding that advocates of humanity predominantly belong to a class of transnational western professionals.

The aim of this chapter is to explore why the informal/private sphere of intergenerational relations has become the focus of incessant moral crusades. It discusses the cultural narrative of child protection and the rhetoric of claims-making about a new species of threats facing children. The nature of moral crusades is considered with reference to medieval witch hunts and, in post-Savile Britain, to victim advocacy with its use of moralised language and the rhetoric of big numbers. It is argued that the duty to believe has become a master-narrative through which claims of victimisation are interpreted, and which has turned allegations of sexual abuse into a constant focus of public anxiety. Operation Yewtree, in response to the Savile Scandal, is used as an exemplar of these broader cultural trends.

This is the first of three chapters on protecting girls and women at risk and bringing about the end of honor killing. These short-term, emergency measures are understood as occurring while other efforts are made to achieve the long-term abolition of honor killing. Also examined are possibilities for leveraging change; that is, changing behaviors through pressures from outside honor–shame communities and through pressures that are coercive. Emergency interventions discussed include those tested elsewhere as well as new initiatives. Insofar as possible, trusted members of local communities should administer emergency interventions. Interventions include hotlines, smartphone apps, information networks, mobile crisis teams, observer-informants, shelters, halfway houses, family centers, granting asylum, and others. The objective of leveraged change, primarily initiated by outside change agents, is to make continuing honor killings too costly. Recommended leveraging strategies include legal reforms, moral entrepreneurship, initiative by media and national elites, and decreasing learned and socialized aggression.