A. E. Denham
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198240105
- eISBN:
- 9780191680076
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198240105.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Moral Philosophy
This book examines the parallels between moral and metaphorical discourse, and the ways in which our engagement with literary art, and metaphorical discourse in particular, informs our moral beliefs. ...
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This book examines the parallels between moral and metaphorical discourse, and the ways in which our engagement with literary art, and metaphorical discourse in particular, informs our moral beliefs. It suggests that there are three ways in which one's beliefs can be improved: if more of them are true, if more of them are warranted or justified, or if the warrant or justification for some of them is strengthened. So the book considers whether and how such improvements can be made to moral beliefs, and what role metaphor can play. It is an integral aim of the work to discern to what extent moral and metaphorical discourses deserve to be regarded as cognitive at all. This involves investigating to what extent such discourses are capable of truth or falsehood, warrant or justification, and how it is that we understand moral judgements and metaphorical expressions. This investigation is founded on an account of the nature of value and of our experience of value.Less
This book examines the parallels between moral and metaphorical discourse, and the ways in which our engagement with literary art, and metaphorical discourse in particular, informs our moral beliefs. It suggests that there are three ways in which one's beliefs can be improved: if more of them are true, if more of them are warranted or justified, or if the warrant or justification for some of them is strengthened. So the book considers whether and how such improvements can be made to moral beliefs, and what role metaphor can play. It is an integral aim of the work to discern to what extent moral and metaphorical discourses deserve to be regarded as cognitive at all. This involves investigating to what extent such discourses are capable of truth or falsehood, warrant or justification, and how it is that we understand moral judgements and metaphorical expressions. This investigation is founded on an account of the nature of value and of our experience of value.
Mark Eli Kalderon
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199275977
- eISBN:
- 9780191706066
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199275977.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
Moral realists maintain that morality has a distinctive subject matter. Specifically, realists maintain that moral discourse is representational, that moral sentences express moral propositions — ...
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Moral realists maintain that morality has a distinctive subject matter. Specifically, realists maintain that moral discourse is representational, that moral sentences express moral propositions — propositions that attribute moral properties to things. Noncognitivists, in contrast, maintain that the realist imagery associated with morality is a fiction, a reification of our noncognitive attitudes. The thought that there is a distinctively moral subject matter is regarded as something to be debunked by philosophical reflection on the way moral discourse mediates and makes public our noncognitive attitudes. The realist fiction might be understood as a philosophical misconception of a discourse that is not fundamentally representational but whose intent is rather practical. There is, however, another way to understand the realist fiction. Perhaps the subject matter of morality is a fiction that stands in no need of debunking, but is rather the means by which our attitudes are conveyed. Perhaps moral sentences express moral propositions, just as the realist maintains, but in accepting a moral sentence competent speakers do not believe the moral proposition expressed but rather adopt the relevant non-cognitive attitudes. Noncognitivism, in its primary sense, is a claim about moral acceptance: the acceptance of a moral sentence is not moral belief but is some other attitude. Standardly, non-cognitivism has been linked to non-factualism — the claim that the content of a moral sentence does not consist in its expressing a moral proposition. Indeed, the terms ‘noncognitivism’ and ‘nonfactualism’ have been used interchangeably. But this misses an important possibility, since moral content may be representational but the acceptance of moral sentences might not be belief in the moral proposition expressed. This possibility constitutes a novel form of noncognitivism: moral fictionalism. Whereas nonfactualists seek to debunk the realist fiction of a moral subject matter, the moral fictionalist claims that that fiction stands in no need of debunking but is the means by which the noncognitive attitudes involved in moral acceptance are conveyed by moral utterance. Moral fictionalism is noncognitivism without a non-representational semantics.Less
Moral realists maintain that morality has a distinctive subject matter. Specifically, realists maintain that moral discourse is representational, that moral sentences express moral propositions — propositions that attribute moral properties to things. Noncognitivists, in contrast, maintain that the realist imagery associated with morality is a fiction, a reification of our noncognitive attitudes. The thought that there is a distinctively moral subject matter is regarded as something to be debunked by philosophical reflection on the way moral discourse mediates and makes public our noncognitive attitudes. The realist fiction might be understood as a philosophical misconception of a discourse that is not fundamentally representational but whose intent is rather practical. There is, however, another way to understand the realist fiction. Perhaps the subject matter of morality is a fiction that stands in no need of debunking, but is rather the means by which our attitudes are conveyed. Perhaps moral sentences express moral propositions, just as the realist maintains, but in accepting a moral sentence competent speakers do not believe the moral proposition expressed but rather adopt the relevant non-cognitive attitudes. Noncognitivism, in its primary sense, is a claim about moral acceptance: the acceptance of a moral sentence is not moral belief but is some other attitude. Standardly, non-cognitivism has been linked to non-factualism — the claim that the content of a moral sentence does not consist in its expressing a moral proposition. Indeed, the terms ‘noncognitivism’ and ‘nonfactualism’ have been used interchangeably. But this misses an important possibility, since moral content may be representational but the acceptance of moral sentences might not be belief in the moral proposition expressed. This possibility constitutes a novel form of noncognitivism: moral fictionalism. Whereas nonfactualists seek to debunk the realist fiction of a moral subject matter, the moral fictionalist claims that that fiction stands in no need of debunking but is the means by which the noncognitive attitudes involved in moral acceptance are conveyed by moral utterance. Moral fictionalism is noncognitivism without a non-representational semantics.
Terence Cuneo
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199218837
- eISBN:
- 9780191711749
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199218837.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter specifies the character of moral realism of a paradigmatic sort, which is the position for which the book argues. It argues that realism of this sort is comprised of three theses: first, ...
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This chapter specifies the character of moral realism of a paradigmatic sort, which is the position for which the book argues. It argues that realism of this sort is comprised of three theses: first, a claim regarding the character of moral discourse; second, a claim regarding the nature of moral truth; and, third, a claim about the nature of moral facts. According to the type of realism in question, moral facts ‘irreducibly exist’. That is the heart of the realist position.Less
This chapter specifies the character of moral realism of a paradigmatic sort, which is the position for which the book argues. It argues that realism of this sort is comprised of three theses: first, a claim regarding the character of moral discourse; second, a claim regarding the nature of moral truth; and, third, a claim about the nature of moral facts. According to the type of realism in question, moral facts ‘irreducibly exist’. That is the heart of the realist position.
Robin Shoaps
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195331646
- eISBN:
- 9780199867974
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195331646.003.0005
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Sociolinguistics / Anthropological Linguistics
This chapter presents an ethnographically sensitive analysis of irony in Sakapultek Maya. It is argued that Sakapultek irony is an indirect stancetaking resource that plays a key role in moral ...
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This chapter presents an ethnographically sensitive analysis of irony in Sakapultek Maya. It is argued that Sakapultek irony is an indirect stancetaking resource that plays a key role in moral discourse. Examples from naturally occurring talk are analyzed to illustrate how irony reflects, contests, and reproduces Sakapultek notions of personhood. Thus, due to their primary interactional function, the Sakapultek constructions are dubbed “moral irony.” The morpho-syntactic composition and semiotic processes involved in moral irony are described, the latter making use of Goffman's distinction between author, animator, and principal as dimensions of the speaker role. The semiotic function of Sakapultek moral irony is unattested in analyses of irony in the linguistics literature. It is contrasted with published examples of irony from Anglo-American discourse in order to offer a general means by which ironic expressions can be subcategorized based on the target of the irony and the nature of evaluative work that they do.Less
This chapter presents an ethnographically sensitive analysis of irony in Sakapultek Maya. It is argued that Sakapultek irony is an indirect stancetaking resource that plays a key role in moral discourse. Examples from naturally occurring talk are analyzed to illustrate how irony reflects, contests, and reproduces Sakapultek notions of personhood. Thus, due to their primary interactional function, the Sakapultek constructions are dubbed “moral irony.” The morpho-syntactic composition and semiotic processes involved in moral irony are described, the latter making use of Goffman's distinction between author, animator, and principal as dimensions of the speaker role. The semiotic function of Sakapultek moral irony is unattested in analyses of irony in the linguistics literature. It is contrasted with published examples of irony from Anglo-American discourse in order to offer a general means by which ironic expressions can be subcategorized based on the target of the irony and the nature of evaluative work that they do.
A. E. Denham
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198240105
- eISBN:
- 9780191680076
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198240105.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Moral Philosophy
This chapter reconsiders the intuitive conception of truth which any account of ‘qualified judgements’ and ‘suitable subjects’ will have to subserve. There are many alternative conceptions of truth; ...
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This chapter reconsiders the intuitive conception of truth which any account of ‘qualified judgements’ and ‘suitable subjects’ will have to subserve. There are many alternative conceptions of truth; philosophers have characterised it variously in terms of correspondence, coherence, conventional warrant, and idealised assertibility. A minimalist conception of truth is not committed to any constitutive account of the truth-predicate as it applies to any and every discourse, but is rather satisfied to assign minimal content to the idea of ‘truth-in-general’. At least two approaches to this minimalist conception may be distinguished. The first denies that truth is, strictly speaking, a property at all, while the second — known as a ‘minimalist’ approach — allows that any predicate which coincides in normative force with warranted assertibility while yet being potentially divergent from it in extension deserves the title of a truth-predicate.Less
This chapter reconsiders the intuitive conception of truth which any account of ‘qualified judgements’ and ‘suitable subjects’ will have to subserve. There are many alternative conceptions of truth; philosophers have characterised it variously in terms of correspondence, coherence, conventional warrant, and idealised assertibility. A minimalist conception of truth is not committed to any constitutive account of the truth-predicate as it applies to any and every discourse, but is rather satisfied to assign minimal content to the idea of ‘truth-in-general’. At least two approaches to this minimalist conception may be distinguished. The first denies that truth is, strictly speaking, a property at all, while the second — known as a ‘minimalist’ approach — allows that any predicate which coincides in normative force with warranted assertibility while yet being potentially divergent from it in extension deserves the title of a truth-predicate.
A. E. Denham
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198240105
- eISBN:
- 9780191680076
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198240105.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Moral Philosophy
The epistemic status of moral discourse turns in part on the explanation of divergent moral beliefs. Whether differences of moral opinion there are best explained by a failure accurately to represent ...
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The epistemic status of moral discourse turns in part on the explanation of divergent moral beliefs. Whether differences of moral opinion there are best explained by a failure accurately to represent specifically moral features of actions and characters, or whether they are better explained by cognitively blameless differences of preference and desire, not only matters to the cognitive claims of moral discourse. The answer to this question should also shed light on the phenomenology of moral experience and the epistemology of moral judgement. Crispin Wright's arguments suggest that an inferential account of moral belief can only be avoided by positing some anomalous faculty of moral perception. This chapter argues that the genesis of moral experience is one in which cognition and affect are jointly implicated, but that their cooperation does nothing to undermine the thought that moral discourse is, for the most part, both conceptually autonomous and genuinely representational. The concepts of moral reasons, rational conflict, moral competence, imagination, and basic moral judgements are also discussed.Less
The epistemic status of moral discourse turns in part on the explanation of divergent moral beliefs. Whether differences of moral opinion there are best explained by a failure accurately to represent specifically moral features of actions and characters, or whether they are better explained by cognitively blameless differences of preference and desire, not only matters to the cognitive claims of moral discourse. The answer to this question should also shed light on the phenomenology of moral experience and the epistemology of moral judgement. Crispin Wright's arguments suggest that an inferential account of moral belief can only be avoided by positing some anomalous faculty of moral perception. This chapter argues that the genesis of moral experience is one in which cognition and affect are jointly implicated, but that their cooperation does nothing to undermine the thought that moral discourse is, for the most part, both conceptually autonomous and genuinely representational. The concepts of moral reasons, rational conflict, moral competence, imagination, and basic moral judgements are also discussed.
Stephen Schiffer
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199257768
- eISBN:
- 9780191602313
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199257760.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
The account of indeterminacy is brought to bear on normative, and especially moral, discourse. Cognitivism is easily secured by the theory of pleonastic propositions, but facts about moral discourse ...
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The account of indeterminacy is brought to bear on normative, and especially moral, discourse. Cognitivism is easily secured by the theory of pleonastic propositions, but facts about moral discourse conjoined with the theory of indeterminacy entail that moral realism is neither determinately true nor determinately false, that no substantive moral propositions have determinate truth values.Less
The account of indeterminacy is brought to bear on normative, and especially moral, discourse. Cognitivism is easily secured by the theory of pleonastic propositions, but facts about moral discourse conjoined with the theory of indeterminacy entail that moral realism is neither determinately true nor determinately false, that no substantive moral propositions have determinate truth values.
Dagmar Wujastyk
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199856268
- eISBN:
- 9780199950560
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199856268.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Hinduism
When is it right for a doctor to lie to a patient? What is more important: a patient's health, or his dignity? When should a patient refuse to follow the doctor's orders? What is acceptable medical ...
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When is it right for a doctor to lie to a patient? What is more important: a patient's health, or his dignity? When should a patient refuse to follow the doctor's orders? What is acceptable medical risk? Whose fault is it if a patient dies under a doctor's care? Who cares for the patient? And who pays the bill? About two thousand years ago, physicians in ancient India could find answers to these questions in the then new, and now classic ayurvedic textbooks. Held in great respect, and used for ayurvedic training even today, the early ayurvedic treatises offer many guidelines on good medical practice: They define what made a physician a good physician, or a patient a good patient. They describe the formal procedures of medical education and lay out the rules for subsequent practice. They determine the duties or obligations doctors and patients had to each other, providing a catalogue of rules of professional conduct that physicians were bound to, including guidelines on appropriate interactions both with patients as well as with colleagues. Translating and discussing the original Sanskrit texts of the core ayurvedic treatises, the book offers a survey and analysis of the ayurvedic moral discourses on professional conduct in a medical setting and explores in what relationship the ethical tenets found in the ayurvedic works stand to those from other broadly contemporaneous South Asian sources.Less
When is it right for a doctor to lie to a patient? What is more important: a patient's health, or his dignity? When should a patient refuse to follow the doctor's orders? What is acceptable medical risk? Whose fault is it if a patient dies under a doctor's care? Who cares for the patient? And who pays the bill? About two thousand years ago, physicians in ancient India could find answers to these questions in the then new, and now classic ayurvedic textbooks. Held in great respect, and used for ayurvedic training even today, the early ayurvedic treatises offer many guidelines on good medical practice: They define what made a physician a good physician, or a patient a good patient. They describe the formal procedures of medical education and lay out the rules for subsequent practice. They determine the duties or obligations doctors and patients had to each other, providing a catalogue of rules of professional conduct that physicians were bound to, including guidelines on appropriate interactions both with patients as well as with colleagues. Translating and discussing the original Sanskrit texts of the core ayurvedic treatises, the book offers a survey and analysis of the ayurvedic moral discourses on professional conduct in a medical setting and explores in what relationship the ethical tenets found in the ayurvedic works stand to those from other broadly contemporaneous South Asian sources.
Rosalind Brown‐Grant
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199554140
- eISBN:
- 9780191721069
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199554140.003.0003
- Subject:
- Literature, Early and Medieval Literature
This chapter discusses idyllic romances which feature the deeply-felt reciprocal love of an adolescent couple and their struggle to marry in the face of parental opposition. Comparing two late ...
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This chapter discusses idyllic romances which feature the deeply-felt reciprocal love of an adolescent couple and their struggle to marry in the face of parental opposition. Comparing two late medieval idyllic texts, Paris et Vienne and Pierre de Provence, with a number of earlier works in the sub-genre (Floire et Blancheflor, L'Escoufle, Galeran de Bretagne, Guillaume de Palerne, and Aucassin et Nicolette), it argues that a marked change appears in the later romances in the way in which the young couple are treated, this change being in line with the critical attitude adopted towards adolescents in the moral discourses of the period, as found in the works of, among others, Philippe de Novare, Giles of Rome, and Christine de Pizan.Less
This chapter discusses idyllic romances which feature the deeply-felt reciprocal love of an adolescent couple and their struggle to marry in the face of parental opposition. Comparing two late medieval idyllic texts, Paris et Vienne and Pierre de Provence, with a number of earlier works in the sub-genre (Floire et Blancheflor, L'Escoufle, Galeran de Bretagne, Guillaume de Palerne, and Aucassin et Nicolette), it argues that a marked change appears in the later romances in the way in which the young couple are treated, this change being in line with the critical attitude adopted towards adolescents in the moral discourses of the period, as found in the works of, among others, Philippe de Novare, Giles of Rome, and Christine de Pizan.
DIANA JEATER
- Published in print:
- 1993
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198203797
- eISBN:
- 9780191675980
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198203797.003.0010
- Subject:
- History, World Modern History
Inspired by a wish to emancipate African women from lineage control, in order to further the Administration's proletarianization policy, the Native Marriages Ordinance of 1901 was built around the ...
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Inspired by a wish to emancipate African women from lineage control, in order to further the Administration's proletarianization policy, the Native Marriages Ordinance of 1901 was built around the thought that African male sexuality was ‘perverse’ and should be subject to State monitoring. Although the material transformations brought about by white occupation and colonization were fundamental to the construction of moral discourse in Southern Rhodesia, they provided only the context, within which specific contestations took place. No dominant, single hegemonic moral discourse emerged in Southern Rhodesia; what did develop and take firm root was a concept of the ‘moral realm’ itself. Africans as well as whites began to conceptualize the issues of gender and sexuality in terms of individual acts — the acceptable and the ‘perverse’ — which were disassociated from the broader context of family membership.Less
Inspired by a wish to emancipate African women from lineage control, in order to further the Administration's proletarianization policy, the Native Marriages Ordinance of 1901 was built around the thought that African male sexuality was ‘perverse’ and should be subject to State monitoring. Although the material transformations brought about by white occupation and colonization were fundamental to the construction of moral discourse in Southern Rhodesia, they provided only the context, within which specific contestations took place. No dominant, single hegemonic moral discourse emerged in Southern Rhodesia; what did develop and take firm root was a concept of the ‘moral realm’ itself. Africans as well as whites began to conceptualize the issues of gender and sexuality in terms of individual acts — the acceptable and the ‘perverse’ — which were disassociated from the broader context of family membership.
Stephen Mulhall
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198238508
- eISBN:
- 9780191679643
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198238508.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Aesthetics
The central lineaments of Cavell's understanding of morality are laid out in the chapters that constitute part 3 of The Claim of Reason — chapters originally composed as part of his doctoral ...
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The central lineaments of Cavell's understanding of morality are laid out in the chapters that constitute part 3 of The Claim of Reason — chapters originally composed as part of his doctoral dissertation, and thus roughly contemporaneous with material collected in Must We Mean What We Say?. The guiding assumption is that rationality in moral debate may be a matter of agreement on patterns of support for conclusions rather than guaranteed agreement in conclusions, and he begins by suggesting that it is only the contrary assumption — predicated upon an excessive emphasis on logic and natural science as models of reasoning — which leads many philosophers to deny that moral argument can be seen as rational. In so doing, Cavell makes more explicit the point that those who identify the ability of logicians and scientists to reach agreement on conclusions as the criterion of the rationality of their practices may be completely misidentifying rather than completely describing our concept of rationality.Less
The central lineaments of Cavell's understanding of morality are laid out in the chapters that constitute part 3 of The Claim of Reason — chapters originally composed as part of his doctoral dissertation, and thus roughly contemporaneous with material collected in Must We Mean What We Say?. The guiding assumption is that rationality in moral debate may be a matter of agreement on patterns of support for conclusions rather than guaranteed agreement in conclusions, and he begins by suggesting that it is only the contrary assumption — predicated upon an excessive emphasis on logic and natural science as models of reasoning — which leads many philosophers to deny that moral argument can be seen as rational. In so doing, Cavell makes more explicit the point that those who identify the ability of logicians and scientists to reach agreement on conclusions as the criterion of the rationality of their practices may be completely misidentifying rather than completely describing our concept of rationality.
DIANA JEATER
- Published in print:
- 1993
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198203797
- eISBN:
- 9780191675980
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198203797.003.0009
- Subject:
- History, World Modern History
This chapter demonstrates construction of a moral discourse in Southern Rhodesia that was influenced by the concept of morality brought into the region by the white Occupation. The criminalization of ...
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This chapter demonstrates construction of a moral discourse in Southern Rhodesia that was influenced by the concept of morality brought into the region by the white Occupation. The criminalization of female adultery crystallized the idea that sexual acts could be wrong in themselves, a concept stressed by missionary groups to enforce Christian concepts of correct male and female gender roles. Sexual immorality provided another set of rules with which to control the behaviour of insubordinate women. The 1920s was a decade in which African women continued to assert their independence. The ideology of inherent ‘immorality’ of African women rose to prominence. By 1936, the long-awaited pass system for women was instituted in the shape of the Natives Registration Act, which put a check on the influx of young women who evade parental control and enter into an immoral life.Less
This chapter demonstrates construction of a moral discourse in Southern Rhodesia that was influenced by the concept of morality brought into the region by the white Occupation. The criminalization of female adultery crystallized the idea that sexual acts could be wrong in themselves, a concept stressed by missionary groups to enforce Christian concepts of correct male and female gender roles. Sexual immorality provided another set of rules with which to control the behaviour of insubordinate women. The 1920s was a decade in which African women continued to assert their independence. The ideology of inherent ‘immorality’ of African women rose to prominence. By 1936, the long-awaited pass system for women was instituted in the shape of the Natives Registration Act, which put a check on the influx of young women who evade parental control and enter into an immoral life.
Bruce Haddock and Peri Roberts
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780748641963
- eISBN:
- 9780748652860
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Edinburgh University Press
- DOI:
- 10.3366/edinburgh/9780748641963.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
What role should the idea of evil have in contemporary moral and social thought? The concept of ‘evil’ has long been a key idea in moral discourse. Now, the contributors to this book make a start on ...
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What role should the idea of evil have in contemporary moral and social thought? The concept of ‘evil’ has long been a key idea in moral discourse. Now, the contributors to this book make a start on the important task of systematically exploring evil in the context of political theory. Intuitively, we know what evil means. Yet once we begin to think about its meaning, we quickly uncover competing definitions. In recent years, political theorists have generally set the concept aside as outdated or inappropriate. Yet the idea that some things are wrong beyond toleration still has significant currency. If ‘evil’ can capture that significance, it merits a closer look. The book presents a broad-ranging exploration of the idea of evil in contemporary theory; offers a philosophical analysis of the role of evil in ethics; and analyses the idea of evil in classic arguments.Less
What role should the idea of evil have in contemporary moral and social thought? The concept of ‘evil’ has long been a key idea in moral discourse. Now, the contributors to this book make a start on the important task of systematically exploring evil in the context of political theory. Intuitively, we know what evil means. Yet once we begin to think about its meaning, we quickly uncover competing definitions. In recent years, political theorists have generally set the concept aside as outdated or inappropriate. Yet the idea that some things are wrong beyond toleration still has significant currency. If ‘evil’ can capture that significance, it merits a closer look. The book presents a broad-ranging exploration of the idea of evil in contemporary theory; offers a philosophical analysis of the role of evil in ethics; and analyses the idea of evil in classic arguments.
Lisa Fitzgerald and Gillian Abel
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9781847423344
- eISBN:
- 9781447303664
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Policy Press
- DOI:
- 10.1332/policypress/9781847423344.003.0012
- Subject:
- Social Work, Crime and Justice
This chapter examines the role of the media in the context of the implementation of the 2003 Prostitution Reform Act (PRA). It determines whether the media coverage of the PRA reinforced existing ...
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This chapter examines the role of the media in the context of the implementation of the 2003 Prostitution Reform Act (PRA). It determines whether the media coverage of the PRA reinforced existing moral discourses of sex work or developed original ones within the new policy context. To determine the role played by the media, a content analysis of the print-media reporting on the PRA is provided. The chapter also explores messages communicated in and by the print media in New Zealand from 2003 to 2006. It furthermore employs a qualitative analysis of in-depth interviews with 58 sex workers concerning their media-coverage experiences. The main emphasis of the chapter is on the moral discourses of sex work, which dominated print media in spite of the media's attempts to maintain a neutral stand on prostitution. Reporting that focused on the morality of prostitution was particularly acknowledged by the sex workers, and was believed to be a tool for the reinforcement of the existing stigmatisation of sex work. Apart from highlighting the type of media reporting that reinforced stigmatisation, the chapter also highlights the manner in which sex workers resisted dominant discourses in their everyday practices.Less
This chapter examines the role of the media in the context of the implementation of the 2003 Prostitution Reform Act (PRA). It determines whether the media coverage of the PRA reinforced existing moral discourses of sex work or developed original ones within the new policy context. To determine the role played by the media, a content analysis of the print-media reporting on the PRA is provided. The chapter also explores messages communicated in and by the print media in New Zealand from 2003 to 2006. It furthermore employs a qualitative analysis of in-depth interviews with 58 sex workers concerning their media-coverage experiences. The main emphasis of the chapter is on the moral discourses of sex work, which dominated print media in spite of the media's attempts to maintain a neutral stand on prostitution. Reporting that focused on the morality of prostitution was particularly acknowledged by the sex workers, and was believed to be a tool for the reinforcement of the existing stigmatisation of sex work. Apart from highlighting the type of media reporting that reinforced stigmatisation, the chapter also highlights the manner in which sex workers resisted dominant discourses in their everyday practices.
Anna L. Peterson
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780520226548
- eISBN:
- 9780520926059
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of California Press
- DOI:
- 10.1525/california/9780520226548.003.0003
- Subject:
- Anthropology, Anthropology, Theory and Practice
This volume explores the connections among ideas about nature, ideas about humanness, and environmental ethics. This book is divided into nine chapters that explore ideas about the definition, ...
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This volume explores the connections among ideas about nature, ideas about humanness, and environmental ethics. This book is divided into nine chapters that explore ideas about the definition, meaning, and value of humanness in a variety of traditions of thought. It also considers central issues regarding the shape of our communities, the destruction of our natural environment and the character of moral discourse.Less
This volume explores the connections among ideas about nature, ideas about humanness, and environmental ethics. This book is divided into nine chapters that explore ideas about the definition, meaning, and value of humanness in a variety of traditions of thought. It also considers central issues regarding the shape of our communities, the destruction of our natural environment and the character of moral discourse.
John Mumm
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- January 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780199367955
- eISBN:
- 9780199367979
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199367955.003.0014
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General
The figure of the amoralist has played a central role in the debate between moral judgment internalists and externalists. Unfortunately, the debate has led to an impasse based on conflicting ...
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The figure of the amoralist has played a central role in the debate between moral judgment internalists and externalists. Unfortunately, the debate has led to an impasse based on conflicting intuitions. This chapter argues that one can move forward by drawing a distinction between two functions of moral language. Moral language primarily functions to allow human beings to deliberate together. However, it also functions to keep track of the assumptions and standards of evaluation of the community in which it operates. Externalists are correct to countenance the possibility of a character who sincerely and competently makes moral judgments without corresponding motivation. But internalists are correct to doubt that these moral judgments are in an important sense genuine. This is because the amoralist engages in moral discourse only in its secondary and derivative (though still important) function of tracking the current state of moral thought.Less
The figure of the amoralist has played a central role in the debate between moral judgment internalists and externalists. Unfortunately, the debate has led to an impasse based on conflicting intuitions. This chapter argues that one can move forward by drawing a distinction between two functions of moral language. Moral language primarily functions to allow human beings to deliberate together. However, it also functions to keep track of the assumptions and standards of evaluation of the community in which it operates. Externalists are correct to countenance the possibility of a character who sincerely and competently makes moral judgments without corresponding motivation. But internalists are correct to doubt that these moral judgments are in an important sense genuine. This is because the amoralist engages in moral discourse only in its secondary and derivative (though still important) function of tracking the current state of moral thought.
Olivia Newman
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- September 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780262028790
- eISBN:
- 9780262327558
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262028790.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Domain-differentiation suggests that individuals are well equipped to hold different commitments and beliefs in different domains of their lives. Domain-differentiation is, this chapter argues, a ...
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Domain-differentiation suggests that individuals are well equipped to hold different commitments and beliefs in different domains of their lives. Domain-differentiation is, this chapter argues, a precondition of moral reasoning and communication across difference. This is contrary to the claims of MacIntyre, who suggests that genuine moral discourse across difference is futile. This chapter argues, conversely, that individuals can develop a habitual disposition toward public reason in the sphere of public, political discourse even when their personal convictions provide no doctrinal reasons for doing so. This chapter suggests that we can and should exploit this possibility of developing such a habitual disposition toward public reason amongst the citizenry, as doing so is the only way to ensure the inclusion of many true believers in the process of public justification.Less
Domain-differentiation suggests that individuals are well equipped to hold different commitments and beliefs in different domains of their lives. Domain-differentiation is, this chapter argues, a precondition of moral reasoning and communication across difference. This is contrary to the claims of MacIntyre, who suggests that genuine moral discourse across difference is futile. This chapter argues, conversely, that individuals can develop a habitual disposition toward public reason in the sphere of public, political discourse even when their personal convictions provide no doctrinal reasons for doing so. This chapter suggests that we can and should exploit this possibility of developing such a habitual disposition toward public reason amongst the citizenry, as doing so is the only way to ensure the inclusion of many true believers in the process of public justification.
Encarnación Juárez-Almendros
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- January 2019
- ISBN:
- 9781786940780
- eISBN:
- 9781786945013
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Liverpool University Press
- DOI:
- 10.5949/liverpool/9781786940780.003.0002
- Subject:
- Literature, Criticism/Theory
The first chapter explores sixteenth and seventeenth century Spanish medical, regulatory and moral discourses in order to show how they inherit, reproduce and propagate an amalgam of Western ...
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The first chapter explores sixteenth and seventeenth century Spanish medical, regulatory and moral discourses in order to show how they inherit, reproduce and propagate an amalgam of Western traditional concepts of the female embodiment. The exposition includes selected medical works from the fifteenth to the end of sixteenth century that deal with anatomic descriptions of bodily functions, the role of each sex in procreation, and the explanation of diseases, prophylactic measures and cures. In addition, chapter 1 examines discourses of the plague and syphilis in order to show how stigmatizing diseases particularly affected women. Besides medical treatises, the chapter examines influential moral works, such as Juan Luis Vives’s De Institutione Feminae Christianae (1524) and fray Luis de León’s La perfecta casada (1583), as well as discourses on poverty such as Vives’s De subventione pauperum (1525), and Cristóbal Pérez de Herrera’s Amparo de pobres (1598), to illuminate how the established conception of female mental and physical inferiority had detrimental consequences for her diminished social role.Less
The first chapter explores sixteenth and seventeenth century Spanish medical, regulatory and moral discourses in order to show how they inherit, reproduce and propagate an amalgam of Western traditional concepts of the female embodiment. The exposition includes selected medical works from the fifteenth to the end of sixteenth century that deal with anatomic descriptions of bodily functions, the role of each sex in procreation, and the explanation of diseases, prophylactic measures and cures. In addition, chapter 1 examines discourses of the plague and syphilis in order to show how stigmatizing diseases particularly affected women. Besides medical treatises, the chapter examines influential moral works, such as Juan Luis Vives’s De Institutione Feminae Christianae (1524) and fray Luis de León’s La perfecta casada (1583), as well as discourses on poverty such as Vives’s De subventione pauperum (1525), and Cristóbal Pérez de Herrera’s Amparo de pobres (1598), to illuminate how the established conception of female mental and physical inferiority had detrimental consequences for her diminished social role.
Cheryl Mattingly
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- January 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780520281196
- eISBN:
- 9780520959538
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of California Press
- DOI:
- 10.1525/california/9780520281196.003.0008
- Subject:
- Anthropology, Medical Anthropology
Chapter 8 considers how many competing moral spaces and discourses are brought to bear upon one another in the face of the murder of a child. Here, moral laboratories also become political ...
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Chapter 8 considers how many competing moral spaces and discourses are brought to bear upon one another in the face of the murder of a child. Here, moral laboratories also become political laboratories, attempts to radically transform social and political life. Authoritative moral discourses and practices are directly critiqued and challenged. The church figures in a particularly central way as confessional speech, a powerful normative religious discourse, is used to challenge the church’s authority.Less
Chapter 8 considers how many competing moral spaces and discourses are brought to bear upon one another in the face of the murder of a child. Here, moral laboratories also become political laboratories, attempts to radically transform social and political life. Authoritative moral discourses and practices are directly critiqued and challenged. The church figures in a particularly central way as confessional speech, a powerful normative religious discourse, is used to challenge the church’s authority.
Gunnar Björnsson
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- August 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780198738695
- eISBN:
- 9780191802515
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198738695.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Metaethical absolutism is the view that moral concepts have non-relative satisfaction conditions that are constant across judges and their particular beliefs, attitudes, and cultural embedding. Two ...
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Metaethical absolutism is the view that moral concepts have non-relative satisfaction conditions that are constant across judges and their particular beliefs, attitudes, and cultural embedding. Two related premises underpin the argument for absolutism: (1) that moral thinking and discourse display a number of features that are characteristically found in paradigmatically absolutist domains, and only partly in uncontroversially non-absolutist domains; and (2) that the best way of making sense of these features is to assume that absolutism is correct. This chapter defends the prospect of a non-absolutist explanation of these “absolutist” features, thus calling into question the second premise. The chapter proposes independently motivated general accounts of attributions of agreement, disagreement, correctness, and incorrectness that can explain both why absolutist domains display all “absolutist” features and why these non-absolutist domains display some, and thus provides preliminary reasons to think that these features of moral discourse can be given a non-absolutist explanation.Less
Metaethical absolutism is the view that moral concepts have non-relative satisfaction conditions that are constant across judges and their particular beliefs, attitudes, and cultural embedding. Two related premises underpin the argument for absolutism: (1) that moral thinking and discourse display a number of features that are characteristically found in paradigmatically absolutist domains, and only partly in uncontroversially non-absolutist domains; and (2) that the best way of making sense of these features is to assume that absolutism is correct. This chapter defends the prospect of a non-absolutist explanation of these “absolutist” features, thus calling into question the second premise. The chapter proposes independently motivated general accounts of attributions of agreement, disagreement, correctness, and incorrectness that can explain both why absolutist domains display all “absolutist” features and why these non-absolutist domains display some, and thus provides preliminary reasons to think that these features of moral discourse can be given a non-absolutist explanation.
