John F. Horty
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199744077
- eISBN:
- 9780199932566
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199744077.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
Although the study of reasons plays an important role in both epistemology and moral philosophy, little attention has been devoted to the question of how, exactly, reason interact to support the ...
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Although the study of reasons plays an important role in both epistemology and moral philosophy, little attention has been devoted to the question of how, exactly, reason interact to support the actions or conclusions they do. The goal of this book is to answer this question by providing a precise, concrete account of reasons and their interaction, based on the logic of default reasoning. The book begins with an intuitive, accessible introduction to default logic itself, and then argues that this logic can be adapted to serve as a foundation for a concrete theory of reasons. It then shows that the resulting theory helps to explain how the interplay among reasons can determine what we ought to do by developing two different deontic logics, capturing two different intuitions about moral conflicts. The central part of the book elaborates the basic theory to account for reasoning about the strength of our own reasons, and also about the related concepts of undercutting defeaters and exclusionary reasons. The theory is illustrated with an application to particularist arguments concerning the role of principles in moral theory. The book concludes by introducing a pair of issues new to the philosophical literature: the problem of determining the epistemic status of conclusions supported by separate but conflicting reasons, and the problem of drawing conclusions from sets of reasons that can vary aribtrarily in strength, or importance.Less
Although the study of reasons plays an important role in both epistemology and moral philosophy, little attention has been devoted to the question of how, exactly, reason interact to support the actions or conclusions they do. The goal of this book is to answer this question by providing a precise, concrete account of reasons and their interaction, based on the logic of default reasoning. The book begins with an intuitive, accessible introduction to default logic itself, and then argues that this logic can be adapted to serve as a foundation for a concrete theory of reasons. It then shows that the resulting theory helps to explain how the interplay among reasons can determine what we ought to do by developing two different deontic logics, capturing two different intuitions about moral conflicts. The central part of the book elaborates the basic theory to account for reasoning about the strength of our own reasons, and also about the related concepts of undercutting defeaters and exclusionary reasons. The theory is illustrated with an application to particularist arguments concerning the role of principles in moral theory. The book concludes by introducing a pair of issues new to the philosophical literature: the problem of determining the epistemic status of conclusions supported by separate but conflicting reasons, and the problem of drawing conclusions from sets of reasons that can vary aribtrarily in strength, or importance.
R. M. Hare
- Published in print:
- 1965
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198810926
- eISBN:
- 9780191597589
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019881092X.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Concerns the apparent antinomy between freedom and reason. Rationality appears to be a restraint on freedom, whereas freedom seems to be incompatible with rationality. Rejecting rationality to ...
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Concerns the apparent antinomy between freedom and reason. Rationality appears to be a restraint on freedom, whereas freedom seems to be incompatible with rationality. Rejecting rationality to preserve freedom is the mark of subjectivist/emotivist theories of ethics. Rejecting freedom to emphasize rationality belongs to the naturalist/descriptivist theories. This book aims to reconcile these positions and do away with the alleged antinomy. The argument makes three main assumptions: (1) moral judgements are prescriptive; (2) they are universalizable; (3) there are genuine logical relations between prescriptive judgements. Insofar as moral judgements are universalizable, rationality gets a foothold, and their prescriptivity is intimately related to freedom to form one's own moral judgements. The first part of the book elaborates the thesis of universalizability and the connection between this feature and the fact that moral judgements have a descriptive element in addition to being prescriptive. The second and third parts expound the beginnings of a theory of moral reasoning grounded in the logic of prescriptivity and universalizability.It is argued that moral judgements are universalizable and prescriptive, and have an element of descriptive meaning. Moral judgements seriously intended must be taken as committing the speaker to some universal judgement applying to anyone in relevantly similar situations (universalizability). The thesis maintained here (universal prescriptivism) retains what is sound in descriptivism (natural and non‐natural), improving upon it by revealing the additional, prescriptive element of moral judgement. It is argued that the connection between universalizability and descriptive meaning is logically tight: it is impossible to maintain with consistency that moral judgements are descriptive yet not universalizable (descriptivism entails universalizability). However, descriptivism is not a complete account of evaluative language, and prescriptivism is additionally required to reach the mark. The ethical theory presented in this book is prescriptivist: it is argued that it is an essential characteristic of moral terms that judgements containing them are, as typically used, intended as guides for conduct. The view shares with naturalism the emphasis on the possession of non‐moral properties by the object of moral judgement, which qualifies it for evaluation of its kind. However, it differs from the naturalist view of moral discourse in rejecting its understanding of moral argument. The prescriptivist thrust of the argument is brought to bear upon the question of the freedom of will.The book defends Hume's doctrine that one cannot deduce moral judgements from non‐moral statements of fact, and the application of this theory, which says that one cannot deduce morally substantial conclusions from non‐moral statements about the use of the moral terms. The explorations of various chapters produce theses about moral reasoning that are logical, not substantial: the robustly moral is derived from the particular predicament of the moral arguers. This comes out clearly in the discussion of universalizability and utilitarianism. The Humean thesis does not as supposed lead to the conclusion that the only kind of cogent moral argument is one which is premised on moral assumptions shared between the parties to the argument; on the contrary, it is maintained that once the logical character of the moral concepts is understood, there can be useful and compelling moral arguments between people who do not share a substantive moral outlook. The discussion brings together issues of moral conflict, interests, and ideals and the ability of the theory to handle conflict in practical scenarios.Less
Concerns the apparent antinomy between freedom and reason. Rationality appears to be a restraint on freedom, whereas freedom seems to be incompatible with rationality. Rejecting rationality to preserve freedom is the mark of subjectivist/emotivist theories of ethics. Rejecting freedom to emphasize rationality belongs to the naturalist/descriptivist theories. This book aims to reconcile these positions and do away with the alleged antinomy. The argument makes three main assumptions: (1) moral judgements are prescriptive; (2) they are universalizable; (3) there are genuine logical relations between prescriptive judgements. Insofar as moral judgements are universalizable, rationality gets a foothold, and their prescriptivity is intimately related to freedom to form one's own moral judgements. The first part of the book elaborates the thesis of universalizability and the connection between this feature and the fact that moral judgements have a descriptive element in addition to being prescriptive. The second and third parts expound the beginnings of a theory of moral reasoning grounded in the logic of prescriptivity and universalizability.
It is argued that moral judgements are universalizable and prescriptive, and have an element of descriptive meaning. Moral judgements seriously intended must be taken as committing the speaker to some universal judgement applying to anyone in relevantly similar situations (universalizability). The thesis maintained here (universal prescriptivism) retains what is sound in descriptivism (natural and non‐natural), improving upon it by revealing the additional, prescriptive element of moral judgement. It is argued that the connection between universalizability and descriptive meaning is logically tight: it is impossible to maintain with consistency that moral judgements are descriptive yet not universalizable (descriptivism entails universalizability). However, descriptivism is not a complete account of evaluative language, and prescriptivism is additionally required to reach the mark. The ethical theory presented in this book is prescriptivist: it is argued that it is an essential characteristic of moral terms that judgements containing them are, as typically used, intended as guides for conduct. The view shares with naturalism the emphasis on the possession of non‐moral properties by the object of moral judgement, which qualifies it for evaluation of its kind. However, it differs from the naturalist view of moral discourse in rejecting its understanding of moral argument. The prescriptivist thrust of the argument is brought to bear upon the question of the freedom of will.
The book defends Hume's doctrine that one cannot deduce moral judgements from non‐moral statements of fact, and the application of this theory, which says that one cannot deduce morally substantial conclusions from non‐moral statements about the use of the moral terms. The explorations of various chapters produce theses about moral reasoning that are logical, not substantial: the robustly moral is derived from the particular predicament of the moral arguers. This comes out clearly in the discussion of universalizability and utilitarianism. The Humean thesis does not as supposed lead to the conclusion that the only kind of cogent moral argument is one which is premised on moral assumptions shared between the parties to the argument; on the contrary, it is maintained that once the logical character of the moral concepts is understood, there can be useful and compelling moral arguments between people who do not share a substantive moral outlook. The discussion brings together issues of moral conflict, interests, and ideals and the ability of the theory to handle conflict in practical scenarios.
John F. Horty
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199744077
- eISBN:
- 9780199932566
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199744077.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
This chapter appraises the possibility of all things considered moral conflicts. The chapter considers three kinds of objections to the possibility, based on considerations from deontic logic, on ...
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This chapter appraises the possibility of all things considered moral conflicts. The chapter considers three kinds of objections to the possibility, based on considerations from deontic logic, on conceptual considerations concerning the nature of all things considered oughts, and on an analogy between moral and physical forces.Less
This chapter appraises the possibility of all things considered moral conflicts. The chapter considers three kinds of objections to the possibility, based on considerations from deontic logic, on conceptual considerations concerning the nature of all things considered oughts, and on an analogy between moral and physical forces.
Maria Dimova‐Cookson (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199271665
- eISBN:
- 9780191709364
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199271665.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Political Philosophy
This chapter links the problems posed by value pluralism with those posed by moral conflict and aims to apply the solutions T. H. Green offers to the latter in the case of the former. The argument is ...
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This chapter links the problems posed by value pluralism with those posed by moral conflict and aims to apply the solutions T. H. Green offers to the latter in the case of the former. The argument is that Green's analysis of moral action yields useful strategies for resolving moral conflicts and these strategies can in turn be applied in tackling the tensions arising when living in a value pluralist social environment. The British idealist distinguishes between an ‘epistemological’ aspect (knowledge of the right thing to do) and a ‘volitional’ aspect (commitment to do the right thing) of moral action, where the ‘volitional’ aspect plays a crucial role in resolving moral conflicts. It is this aspect of moral action that contemporary liberals like Rawls and Nagel fail to theorise and as a result lose crucial resources for easing the strains of living in a pluralist society.Less
This chapter links the problems posed by value pluralism with those posed by moral conflict and aims to apply the solutions T. H. Green offers to the latter in the case of the former. The argument is that Green's analysis of moral action yields useful strategies for resolving moral conflicts and these strategies can in turn be applied in tackling the tensions arising when living in a value pluralist social environment. The British idealist distinguishes between an ‘epistemological’ aspect (knowledge of the right thing to do) and a ‘volitional’ aspect (commitment to do the right thing) of moral action, where the ‘volitional’ aspect plays a crucial role in resolving moral conflicts. It is this aspect of moral action that contemporary liberals like Rawls and Nagel fail to theorise and as a result lose crucial resources for easing the strains of living in a pluralist society.
Andrew F. March
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195330960
- eISBN:
- 9780199868278
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195330960.003.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Islam
This chapter states the aims of the book: its core question of the compatibility between formal Islamic doctrine and liberal citizenship It emphasizes how this book differs from historical, ...
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This chapter states the aims of the book: its core question of the compatibility between formal Islamic doctrine and liberal citizenship It emphasizes how this book differs from historical, anthropological, sociological, or genealogical approaches to Islam and how the book seeks to avoid the pitfalls of studies which inquire into the “compatibility” of Islam with democracy or human rights. It introduces the idea of an overlapping consensus within political liberalism as an answer to the theologico-political problem and the place of a normatively committed comparative ethics, or what John Rawls referred to as “conjecture.”Less
This chapter states the aims of the book: its core question of the compatibility between formal Islamic doctrine and liberal citizenship It emphasizes how this book differs from historical, anthropological, sociological, or genealogical approaches to Islam and how the book seeks to avoid the pitfalls of studies which inquire into the “compatibility” of Islam with democracy or human rights. It introduces the idea of an overlapping consensus within political liberalism as an answer to the theologico-political problem and the place of a normatively committed comparative ethics, or what John Rawls referred to as “conjecture.”
Robert B. Louden
- Published in print:
- 1992
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195072921
- eISBN:
- 9780199852925
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195072921.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter discusses some of Aristotle and Kant's remarks about the nature of their own work in ethics in an attempt to show that their conceptions of moral theory differ strongly from the idea of ...
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This chapter discusses some of Aristotle and Kant's remarks about the nature of their own work in ethics in an attempt to show that their conceptions of moral theory differ strongly from the idea of moral theory that is assumed by contemporary antitheorists. Although the chapter concedes that both philosophers produced moral theories, they are not in the same sense as the antitheorists and they do not commit the sins attributed by antitheorists to moral theorists. For example, neither Kant nor Aristotle ever asserted that human beings can simply deduce correct moral judgments from universal principles. Both of them recognize the obvious necessity of informed empirical knowledge in human practical reasoning. Finally, the chapter sets out to make a framework for what it believes how an alternative moral theory should be.Less
This chapter discusses some of Aristotle and Kant's remarks about the nature of their own work in ethics in an attempt to show that their conceptions of moral theory differ strongly from the idea of moral theory that is assumed by contemporary antitheorists. Although the chapter concedes that both philosophers produced moral theories, they are not in the same sense as the antitheorists and they do not commit the sins attributed by antitheorists to moral theorists. For example, neither Kant nor Aristotle ever asserted that human beings can simply deduce correct moral judgments from universal principles. Both of them recognize the obvious necessity of informed empirical knowledge in human practical reasoning. Finally, the chapter sets out to make a framework for what it believes how an alternative moral theory should be.
Michael Stocker
- Published in print:
- 1992
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198240556
- eISBN:
- 9780191598463
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198240554.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Philosophers commonly argue that conflicts of values are deeply problematic for ethical theories in so far as they force the theories into impracticality, incompleteness, or irrealism. To be ...
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Philosophers commonly argue that conflicts of values are deeply problematic for ethical theories in so far as they force the theories into impracticality, incompleteness, or irrealism. To be complete, a theory must tell us in every case what must be done. To be practical, it must never tell us to do what is impossible. As conflict seems to involve just these features, some philosophers argue from the fact that avoiding conflict (and correlatively regret) is impossible to the conclusion that ethical theories must either be silent in some cases or that it requires us to do both of the jointly impossible acts. Others seek to explain the conflict away as merely apparent. Against these views, it is argued that mere incompossibility does not make for a conflict. All choice involves incompossibility, but not all choice involves conflict. Conflict must be understood in terms of what is conflicting. Understanding this requires seeing that many act evaluations are not action‐guiding.Less
Philosophers commonly argue that conflicts of values are deeply problematic for ethical theories in so far as they force the theories into impracticality, incompleteness, or irrealism. To be complete, a theory must tell us in every case what must be done. To be practical, it must never tell us to do what is impossible. As conflict seems to involve just these features, some philosophers argue from the fact that avoiding conflict (and correlatively regret) is impossible to the conclusion that ethical theories must either be silent in some cases or that it requires us to do both of the jointly impossible acts. Others seek to explain the conflict away as merely apparent. Against these views, it is argued that mere incompossibility does not make for a conflict. All choice involves incompossibility, but not all choice involves conflict. Conflict must be understood in terms of what is conflicting. Understanding this requires seeing that many act evaluations are not action‐guiding.
Philippa Foot
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199252848
- eISBN:
- 9780191597411
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019925284X.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Argues against two articles of Bernard Williams in which he attacks moral realism. In the first (Ethical Consistency), Williams finds a disanalogy between judgements of matters of fact and moral ...
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Argues against two articles of Bernard Williams in which he attacks moral realism. In the first (Ethical Consistency), Williams finds a disanalogy between judgements of matters of fact and moral judgements in that when two beliefs are irreconcilable one must simply cede: whereas an obligation that overrides another obligation does so only with ‘remainder.’ Foot argues that although the notion of obligation when understood in one way does indeed allow coexisting irreconcilable obligations, this no more supports anti‐realism here than the possibility of clashing social engagements supports an anti‐realistic account of judgements about them. In the second article (Consistency and Realism) Williams argues from the special case of irresolvable moral conflict, where there are as good reasons for doing a as for doing not a, suggesting that there cannot similarly be as good reasons for believing and disbelieving a proposition. Foot denies that this implies anti‐realism for propositions about reasons, suggesting an analogy in the case of propositions that are equally assertable or deniable relative to different grounds.Less
Argues against two articles of Bernard Williams in which he attacks moral realism. In the first (Ethical Consistency), Williams finds a disanalogy between judgements of matters of fact and moral judgements in that when two beliefs are irreconcilable one must simply cede: whereas an obligation that overrides another obligation does so only with ‘remainder.’ Foot argues that although the notion of obligation when understood in one way does indeed allow coexisting irreconcilable obligations, this no more supports anti‐realism here than the possibility of clashing social engagements supports an anti‐realistic account of judgements about them. In the second article (Consistency and Realism) Williams argues from the special case of irresolvable moral conflict, where there are as good reasons for doing a as for doing not a, suggesting that there cannot similarly be as good reasons for believing and disbelieving a proposition. Foot denies that this implies anti‐realism for propositions about reasons, suggesting an analogy in the case of propositions that are equally assertable or deniable relative to different grounds.
Stephen C. Angle
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195385144
- eISBN:
- 9780199869756
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195385144.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This chapter is organized around challenges from Martha Nussbaum, Karen Stohr, and Diana Myers. Does a commitment to harmony entail an unhealthy desire for consistency and unity in one's life and ...
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This chapter is organized around challenges from Martha Nussbaum, Karen Stohr, and Diana Myers. Does a commitment to harmony entail an unhealthy desire for consistency and unity in one's life and relationships? Along similar lines, can a commitment to harmony be squared with the existence of moral conflicts? Finally, does such a commitment push one toward a state of “emotional vanilla” in which one cannot mount dramatic challenges to the status quo? The chapter argues that a contemporary Neo-Confucian understanding of harmony has the resources to rebut all these concerns. In particular, the role of imagination in overcoming moral conflicts is stressed; this is illustrated through consideration of famous passages concerning potential conflicts from the Mencius. Particular attention is paid to the role of anger. The chapter argues, though, that both classical and Neo-Confucians too often leave grief out of account, even though it can fit well into their picture.Less
This chapter is organized around challenges from Martha Nussbaum, Karen Stohr, and Diana Myers. Does a commitment to harmony entail an unhealthy desire for consistency and unity in one's life and relationships? Along similar lines, can a commitment to harmony be squared with the existence of moral conflicts? Finally, does such a commitment push one toward a state of “emotional vanilla” in which one cannot mount dramatic challenges to the status quo? The chapter argues that a contemporary Neo-Confucian understanding of harmony has the resources to rebut all these concerns. In particular, the role of imagination in overcoming moral conflicts is stressed; this is illustrated through consideration of famous passages concerning potential conflicts from the Mencius. Particular attention is paid to the role of anger. The chapter argues, though, that both classical and Neo-Confucians too often leave grief out of account, even though it can fit well into their picture.
R. M. Hare
- Published in print:
- 1981
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198246602
- eISBN:
- 9780191597596
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198246609.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Hare introduces a distinction between two levels of moral thinking; the first being the intuitive and the second being the critical. These levels of moral thinking are concerned with moral questions ...
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Hare introduces a distinction between two levels of moral thinking; the first being the intuitive and the second being the critical. These levels of moral thinking are concerned with moral questions of substance, but they handled them differently, each appropriate to the different circumstances in which, and purposes for which, the thinking is done. The intuitive level of thinking is concerned with the ordinary, day‐to‐day evaluation of the moral status of different acts. The critical level of thinking consists of making a choice under the constraints imposed by the logical properties of the moral concept under question. The explanation of these two moral levels is done by discussing the problem of moral conflicts. It is argued that moral conflicts are possible at the intuitive level, but not at the critical level.Less
Hare introduces a distinction between two levels of moral thinking; the first being the intuitive and the second being the critical. These levels of moral thinking are concerned with moral questions of substance, but they handled them differently, each appropriate to the different circumstances in which, and purposes for which, the thinking is done. The intuitive level of thinking is concerned with the ordinary, day‐to‐day evaluation of the moral status of different acts. The critical level of thinking consists of making a choice under the constraints imposed by the logical properties of the moral concept under question. The explanation of these two moral levels is done by discussing the problem of moral conflicts. It is argued that moral conflicts are possible at the intuitive level, but not at the critical level.
Michael Stocker
- Published in print:
- 1992
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198240556
- eISBN:
- 9780191598463
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198240554.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
A dirty hands case is (1) justified, (2) obligatory or permissible, and (3) morally wrong. It is argued that dirty hands are conceptually unproblematic and that they are instances of ordinary ...
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A dirty hands case is (1) justified, (2) obligatory or permissible, and (3) morally wrong. It is argued that dirty hands are conceptually unproblematic and that they are instances of ordinary evaluative phenomena. Some ordinary cases of moral conflict are like dirty hands in that they are entirely justified, yet regrettable. The analysis shows that such cases involve double counting––the disvalue is counted once and overridden in the act‐guiding evaluation, and counted again later as the object of the moral emotions (guilt, shame, regret) and as being a disvalue. In addition, dirty hands are cases in which what is morally required is also immoral, and therefore regrettable. Shows that ethical theories can and should account for the existence of moral choices involving acts that are justified, even obligatory, yet nevertheless wrong, shameful, and regrettable.Less
A dirty hands case is (1) justified, (2) obligatory or permissible, and (3) morally wrong. It is argued that dirty hands are conceptually unproblematic and that they are instances of ordinary evaluative phenomena. Some ordinary cases of moral conflict are like dirty hands in that they are entirely justified, yet regrettable. The analysis shows that such cases involve double counting––the disvalue is counted once and overridden in the act‐guiding evaluation, and counted again later as the object of the moral emotions (guilt, shame, regret) and as being a disvalue. In addition, dirty hands are cases in which what is morally required is also immoral, and therefore regrettable. Shows that ethical theories can and should account for the existence of moral choices involving acts that are justified, even obligatory, yet nevertheless wrong, shameful, and regrettable.
Michael Stocker
- Published in print:
- 1992
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198240556
- eISBN:
- 9780191598463
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198240554.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
The central concern of this book is whether plural and incommensurable values necessarily result in unsolvable conflict and whether this conflict poses special problems for ethical theories. The view ...
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The central concern of this book is whether plural and incommensurable values necessarily result in unsolvable conflict and whether this conflict poses special problems for ethical theories. The view defended here is that plurality is no impediment to sound choice, and that a practicable ethics accounts for the fact that plurality and choice are ordinary and pervasive phenomena of moral life. Ethical theories, broadly divided into monistic and pluralistic, are pitted against each other in an attempt to show that the traditional understanding of the connection between value and conflict is flawed––a rationally grounded ethics does not require an evaluative monism purged of conflict, nor an algorithm to compare and choose between plural values. The book combines criticism of contemporary ethical theories with specific chapters on Aristotle's ethics. The first part focuses on the nature of moral conflict. Drawing on Aristotle's moral psychology, the author looks at dirty hands, moral immorality, and the nature of moral conflict in general. The second part focuses on whether plural values preclude sound moral judgement. The third part discusses whether conflict requires plural values, looking first at irrational conflict (akrasia or weakness of will) and next at rational conflict. The last part discusses maximization and plurality, and argues that maximization is mistaken, irrelevant, and parasitic. A central theme of the book is that ethics extends far beyond the guiding of action––‘our moral concern with acts goes beyond, primarily, what is to be done, and secondarily, what is better or best’.Less
The central concern of this book is whether plural and incommensurable values necessarily result in unsolvable conflict and whether this conflict poses special problems for ethical theories. The view defended here is that plurality is no impediment to sound choice, and that a practicable ethics accounts for the fact that plurality and choice are ordinary and pervasive phenomena of moral life. Ethical theories, broadly divided into monistic and pluralistic, are pitted against each other in an attempt to show that the traditional understanding of the connection between value and conflict is flawed––a rationally grounded ethics does not require an evaluative monism purged of conflict, nor an algorithm to compare and choose between plural values. The book combines criticism of contemporary ethical theories with specific chapters on Aristotle's ethics. The first part focuses on the nature of moral conflict. Drawing on Aristotle's moral psychology, the author looks at dirty hands, moral immorality, and the nature of moral conflict in general. The second part focuses on whether plural values preclude sound moral judgement. The third part discusses whether conflict requires plural values, looking first at irrational conflict (akrasia or weakness of will) and next at rational conflict. The last part discusses maximization and plurality, and argues that maximization is mistaken, irrelevant, and parasitic. A central theme of the book is that ethics extends far beyond the guiding of action––‘our moral concern with acts goes beyond, primarily, what is to be done, and secondarily, what is better or best’.
Matthew H. Kramer
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- June 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780198714200
- eISBN:
- 9780191782664
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198714200.003.0001
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law, Human Rights and Immigration
After briefly adumbrating the structure of the book as a whole, this chapter addresses some important matters in the more abstract reaches of moral philosophy. It disambiguates several key concepts ...
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After briefly adumbrating the structure of the book as a whole, this chapter addresses some important matters in the more abstract reaches of moral philosophy. It disambiguates several key concepts in order to clarify the import of moral conflicts, and it elucidates the distinction between deontological obligations and consequentialist obligations. It repels a number of arguments propounded by philosophers who have maintained that moral conflicts are not genuinely possible. It proceeds to delineate the general structure of morality, with reference to the deontology/consequentialism distinction and the other distinctions that have been highlighted earlier in the chapter. The author's absolutist position is pitted against Michael Moore's threshold deontology, which deems the perpetration of interrogational torture to be permissible in circumstances of desperation.Less
After briefly adumbrating the structure of the book as a whole, this chapter addresses some important matters in the more abstract reaches of moral philosophy. It disambiguates several key concepts in order to clarify the import of moral conflicts, and it elucidates the distinction between deontological obligations and consequentialist obligations. It repels a number of arguments propounded by philosophers who have maintained that moral conflicts are not genuinely possible. It proceeds to delineate the general structure of morality, with reference to the deontology/consequentialism distinction and the other distinctions that have been highlighted earlier in the chapter. The author's absolutist position is pitted against Michael Moore's threshold deontology, which deems the perpetration of interrogational torture to be permissible in circumstances of desperation.
R. S. Downie and K. C. Calman
- Published in print:
- 1994
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780192624086
- eISBN:
- 9780191723728
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780192624086.003.0008
- Subject:
- Public Health and Epidemiology, Public Health, Epidemiology
Conflict can occur within the team dealing with patient care, and between professional and patient opinion on treatment. This chapter suggests ways of dealing with both kinds of conflict. ...
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Conflict can occur within the team dealing with patient care, and between professional and patient opinion on treatment. This chapter suggests ways of dealing with both kinds of conflict. Deficiencies can arise in patient care, either through incompetence or rudeness or the pursuit of vested interests. The difficulties of dealing with deficiencies are acknowledged and tactful ways of dealing with them are outlined.Less
Conflict can occur within the team dealing with patient care, and between professional and patient opinion on treatment. This chapter suggests ways of dealing with both kinds of conflict. Deficiencies can arise in patient care, either through incompetence or rudeness or the pursuit of vested interests. The difficulties of dealing with deficiencies are acknowledged and tactful ways of dealing with them are outlined.
Robert R. Williams
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199656059
- eISBN:
- 9780191744846
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199656059.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
This chapter examines Hegel’s concept of tragedy from his Early Theological Writings, through the Phenomenology of Spirit to his Lectures on Aesthetics. Through the action of the tragic hero the main ...
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This chapter examines Hegel’s concept of tragedy from his Early Theological Writings, through the Phenomenology of Spirit to his Lectures on Aesthetics. Through the action of the tragic hero the main institutions of ethical life, the family and the state, come into conflict. In Hegel’s view the essence of tragedy is conflict, not a moral conflict between right and wrong, but a conflict between legitimate rights and institutions. Such conflict moves the unmovable, i.e., the norms and institutions of ethical life, threatening them with destruction. Such conflict arises out of the false consciousness of the tragic hero, who, convinced of his own rectitude, embodies a stubborn fixity of will that issues in one-sided action that both violates another legitimate right and plunges the hero into self-contradiction. S/he refuses to recognize what, if s/he were true to her/himself, s/he should honor. Like Aristotle Hegel believes in tragic resolution. In Hegel’s view the tragic resolution demands that the hero yield, give a little, recognize what s/he refuses, enlarge her perspective. If s/he yields, the drama does not have to end tragically; but if s/he refuses to yield, then the hero is destroyed by the very powers s/he refuses to recognize. The tragic resolution is constituted by a fundamental contrast: on the one hand, we are shattered by the destruction of one who is noble and excellent, but on the other we are fundamentally reconciled to this destruction because a conflict and loss of essential institutions that hold everything together would be even more unbearable. Hegel agrees with Nietzsche that the destruction of the hero, whose one-sided action threatens to destroy ethical life, is necessary, and is a healing, not as a fusion with primal being but rather the upholding of the essential rights and institutions of ethical life, the one as counterbalanced by the other.Less
This chapter examines Hegel’s concept of tragedy from his Early Theological Writings, through the Phenomenology of Spirit to his Lectures on Aesthetics. Through the action of the tragic hero the main institutions of ethical life, the family and the state, come into conflict. In Hegel’s view the essence of tragedy is conflict, not a moral conflict between right and wrong, but a conflict between legitimate rights and institutions. Such conflict moves the unmovable, i.e., the norms and institutions of ethical life, threatening them with destruction. Such conflict arises out of the false consciousness of the tragic hero, who, convinced of his own rectitude, embodies a stubborn fixity of will that issues in one-sided action that both violates another legitimate right and plunges the hero into self-contradiction. S/he refuses to recognize what, if s/he were true to her/himself, s/he should honor. Like Aristotle Hegel believes in tragic resolution. In Hegel’s view the tragic resolution demands that the hero yield, give a little, recognize what s/he refuses, enlarge her perspective. If s/he yields, the drama does not have to end tragically; but if s/he refuses to yield, then the hero is destroyed by the very powers s/he refuses to recognize. The tragic resolution is constituted by a fundamental contrast: on the one hand, we are shattered by the destruction of one who is noble and excellent, but on the other we are fundamentally reconciled to this destruction because a conflict and loss of essential institutions that hold everything together would be even more unbearable. Hegel agrees with Nietzsche that the destruction of the hero, whose one-sided action threatens to destroy ethical life, is necessary, and is a healing, not as a fusion with primal being but rather the upholding of the essential rights and institutions of ethical life, the one as counterbalanced by the other.
Lisa Tessman
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- November 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199396146
- eISBN:
- 9780199396160
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199396146.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Chapter 1 introduces the concepts of impossible moral requirements and unavoidable moral failure by reviewing and rethinking the philosophical debates about whether or not any moral conflicts are ...
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Chapter 1 introduces the concepts of impossible moral requirements and unavoidable moral failure by reviewing and rethinking the philosophical debates about whether or not any moral conflicts are genuine moral dilemmas. When a moral conflict occurs and one chooses to fulfill one of the conflicting requirements, the other requirement thereby becomes impossible to fulfill. What happens to a moral requirement that becomes impossible in this way? The chapter claims that some moral requirements, those one can call negotiable, can be negotiated away in the course of resolving a conflict, while other moral requirements, which are non-negotiable, remain binding no matter how the conflict is resolved for the purpose of deciding which action to perform. After discussing moral value pluralism, the chapter argues that non-negotiable moral requirements—which concern significant values for which there can be neither substitutions nor compensations—remain binding even if they become impossible to fulfill.Less
Chapter 1 introduces the concepts of impossible moral requirements and unavoidable moral failure by reviewing and rethinking the philosophical debates about whether or not any moral conflicts are genuine moral dilemmas. When a moral conflict occurs and one chooses to fulfill one of the conflicting requirements, the other requirement thereby becomes impossible to fulfill. What happens to a moral requirement that becomes impossible in this way? The chapter claims that some moral requirements, those one can call negotiable, can be negotiated away in the course of resolving a conflict, while other moral requirements, which are non-negotiable, remain binding no matter how the conflict is resolved for the purpose of deciding which action to perform. After discussing moral value pluralism, the chapter argues that non-negotiable moral requirements—which concern significant values for which there can be neither substitutions nor compensations—remain binding even if they become impossible to fulfill.
John W. Lango
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- September 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780748645756
- eISBN:
- 9780748697182
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Edinburgh University Press
- DOI:
- 10.3366/edinburgh/9780748645756.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
In this chapter, the question of why just war principles should be accepted is explored. Central to the chapter is a discussion of how just war principles can be elucidated by means of general moral ...
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In this chapter, the question of why just war principles should be accepted is explored. Central to the chapter is a discussion of how just war principles can be elucidated by means of general moral principles – in particular, prima facie principles of nonmaleficence and beneficence. Some other topics of moral theory discussed in the chapter are coherentism, moral universalism, the moral relevance of particular cases, the pertinence of human rights theory, moral deliberation, and the problem of moral conflict. As specific moral principles about a limited domain of particular cases, just war principles are intermediate between moral judgements about particular cases in that domain and general moral principles that hold comprehensively of all particular cases. On the one hand, we can make moral judgements about particular cases of armed conflict, in order to rethink or revise just war principles. On the other hand, in order to rethink or revise just war principles, we can also make use of such prima facie moral principles as nonmaleficence and beneficence. For concreteness, the chapter features the idea of noncombatant immunity.Less
In this chapter, the question of why just war principles should be accepted is explored. Central to the chapter is a discussion of how just war principles can be elucidated by means of general moral principles – in particular, prima facie principles of nonmaleficence and beneficence. Some other topics of moral theory discussed in the chapter are coherentism, moral universalism, the moral relevance of particular cases, the pertinence of human rights theory, moral deliberation, and the problem of moral conflict. As specific moral principles about a limited domain of particular cases, just war principles are intermediate between moral judgements about particular cases in that domain and general moral principles that hold comprehensively of all particular cases. On the one hand, we can make moral judgements about particular cases of armed conflict, in order to rethink or revise just war principles. On the other hand, in order to rethink or revise just war principles, we can also make use of such prima facie moral principles as nonmaleficence and beneficence. For concreteness, the chapter features the idea of noncombatant immunity.
R. M. Hare
- Published in print:
- 1965
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198810926
- eISBN:
- 9780191597589
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019881092X.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Examines the nature of moral argument and how arguments might be brought to a conclusion. It is argued that moral reasoning is a kind of exploration akin to Karl Popper's concept of deduction; the ...
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Examines the nature of moral argument and how arguments might be brought to a conclusion. It is argued that moral reasoning is a kind of exploration akin to Karl Popper's concept of deduction; the only inferences that take place are deductive. This approach allows for the defence of the neutrality of ethics, which appears to be ruled out by its practical relevance. It lays the ground for the possibility of moral reasoning in terms of moral rules, corresponding to prescriptivity and universalizability. These are taken to task in the context of a concrete example of a moral conflict.Less
Examines the nature of moral argument and how arguments might be brought to a conclusion. It is argued that moral reasoning is a kind of exploration akin to Karl Popper's concept of deduction; the only inferences that take place are deductive. This approach allows for the defence of the neutrality of ethics, which appears to be ruled out by its practical relevance. It lays the ground for the possibility of moral reasoning in terms of moral rules, corresponding to prescriptivity and universalizability. These are taken to task in the context of a concrete example of a moral conflict.
Michael B. Gill
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- June 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780198714033
- eISBN:
- 9780191782480
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198714033.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
David Hume argues for a pluralist view of morality. According to his pluralist view, there are different ultimate moral ends, those different moral ends can come into conflict with each other, and ...
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David Hume argues for a pluralist view of morality. According to his pluralist view, there are different ultimate moral ends, those different moral ends can come into conflict with each other, and there is no invariable ordering principle that tells us what to do when those ends conflict. Hume maintains, for instance, that the artificial virtue of justice can sometimes conflict with the natural virtues of benevolence. In some cases, justice will override benevolence, but in other cases, benevolence will override justice, and there are no rules we can rely on to determine which sort of case we are in. Hume’s sentimentalist account of the origins of moral judgment explains these features of morality, and Hume’s sentimentalist explanation of the pluralist character of morality is at least as powerful as the non-naturalist, intuitionist explanation developed by W. D. Ross.Less
David Hume argues for a pluralist view of morality. According to his pluralist view, there are different ultimate moral ends, those different moral ends can come into conflict with each other, and there is no invariable ordering principle that tells us what to do when those ends conflict. Hume maintains, for instance, that the artificial virtue of justice can sometimes conflict with the natural virtues of benevolence. In some cases, justice will override benevolence, but in other cases, benevolence will override justice, and there are no rules we can rely on to determine which sort of case we are in. Hume’s sentimentalist account of the origins of moral judgment explains these features of morality, and Hume’s sentimentalist explanation of the pluralist character of morality is at least as powerful as the non-naturalist, intuitionist explanation developed by W. D. Ross.
Matthew H. Kramer
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- June 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780198714200
- eISBN:
- 9780191782664
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198714200.001.0001
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law, Human Rights and Immigration
Torture and Moral Integrity is about the wrongness of torture and about the nature of morality. It lengthily discusses multiple types of torture with great philosophical acuity, and it seeks to ...
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Torture and Moral Integrity is about the wrongness of torture and about the nature of morality. It lengthily discusses multiple types of torture with great philosophical acuity, and it seeks to explain why interrogational torture and other types of torture are always and everywhere morally wrong. At the same time, it rigorously plumbs the general structure of morality and the intricacies of moral conflicts, and it probes some of the chief grounds for the moral illegitimacy of various modes of conduct. It sophisticatedly defends a deontological conception of morality against some subtle critiques that have been mounted during the past few decades by proponents of consequentialism. The book tackles a concrete moral problem–a problem heatedly debated during recent years in the governmental and military institutions of many countries as well as in academic circles–and it likewise tackles some very abstract issues in moral and political philosophy. Moreover, as becomes apparent at numerous junctures, the abstract ruminations and the concrete prescriptions are closely connected. For example, the author's recommendations concerning the legal consequences of the perpetration of torture by public officials or private individuals are based squarely on his more abstract accounts of the nature of torture and the nature of morality. His philosophical reflections on the structure of morality are the vital background for his approach to torture, and his approach to torture is a natural outgrowth of those philosophical reflections.Less
Torture and Moral Integrity is about the wrongness of torture and about the nature of morality. It lengthily discusses multiple types of torture with great philosophical acuity, and it seeks to explain why interrogational torture and other types of torture are always and everywhere morally wrong. At the same time, it rigorously plumbs the general structure of morality and the intricacies of moral conflicts, and it probes some of the chief grounds for the moral illegitimacy of various modes of conduct. It sophisticatedly defends a deontological conception of morality against some subtle critiques that have been mounted during the past few decades by proponents of consequentialism. The book tackles a concrete moral problem–a problem heatedly debated during recent years in the governmental and military institutions of many countries as well as in academic circles–and it likewise tackles some very abstract issues in moral and political philosophy. Moreover, as becomes apparent at numerous junctures, the abstract ruminations and the concrete prescriptions are closely connected. For example, the author's recommendations concerning the legal consequences of the perpetration of torture by public officials or private individuals are based squarely on his more abstract accounts of the nature of torture and the nature of morality. His philosophical reflections on the structure of morality are the vital background for his approach to torture, and his approach to torture is a natural outgrowth of those philosophical reflections.