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David Hume's direct and indirect arguments constitute a sustained, sophisticated, and compelling attack on standard moral cognitivism and its many variants. With moral conativism as his foundation, Hume must find ways to incorporate a consonant treatment of those moral ‘judgements’ and ‘opinions’ that moral conativism does not itself touch, moral ‘judgements’ and ‘opinions’ that, not being practical in the intended sense, are not to be identified with moral desires. Sympathy's correction introduces the universality and impartiality, and thus the intersubjectivity, of moral desires. Attention to the two elements in Hume's explanatory account — attention both to sympathy and to its correction — will help confirm that the analysis this chapter offers of moral desires is Hume's. This chapter also discusses Hume's views on moral affections and moral language.

The typical moral cognitivist holds that specifically moral beliefs — beliefs with explicitly evaluative moral content — can, and often in fact do, play an essential explanatory role. While admitting that specifically moral reasons have a place in the explanation of actions, the moral conativist refuses to allow seemingly cognitivist appearances to settle the question of their character: for the moral conativist, what may seem to be practical moral beliefs are in fact specifically moral desires, desires whose contents distinguish them from other desires. The moral cognitivist claims to catch moral reasons within the net of his cognitivist theory of reasons for action. For the moral conativist, specifically moral reasons can be understood only within the framework of a conativist theory of reasons for action. In his Treatise of Human Nature, Hume presents two arguments designed to support moral conativism and to subvert moral cognitivism in any of its forms.

Absence of agreement on the most fundamental questions concerning the interpretation of David Hume's views on mind and morality complements an utter absence of agreement as to the soundness of his views, and as to the cogency — and even the aptness — of the arguments he musters in their support. This book explores Hume's efforts to found a theory of morality on a theory of mind. Hume's finished theory of mind and morality — his expanded moral conativism — will emerge from reflection on the character of reasons for action; on the interrelations of the primitive notions of desire, volition, and affection; and on the inadequacies of moral cognitivism. Its key conception is that of specifically moral desires, desires whose careful characterization contributes to Hume's elaboration of a general theory of moral sentiments; of a complex account of the connections between morality, justice, and convention; and of a theory of specifically moral agents.

Specifically moral desires, just as the partial desires of which they are impartial variants, are person-implicating: their contents make essential reference to the actions and qualities of human persons. More narrowly, they are mind-implicating: their contents make essential reference to the mind-displaying actions and qualities — the conative characteristics, the traits, the intellectual talents and abilities — of such individuals. Some moral desires are desire-implicating desires. Within the framework of David Hume's expanded moral conativism, it follows that some propositional moral affections are likewise desire-implicating ones. In his Artificiality Argument, Hume contends that desire-implicating moral desires implicate natural — that is to say, non-moral — desires. He also distinguishes two types of desire-implicating moral desires. Moral desires of one of these types implicate natural non-moral desires, desires that do not require conventions. Moral desires of the other of these types implicate artificial non-moral desires, desires that require the presence of conventions.