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Moral Sentiments

John Bricke

in Mind and Morality: An Examination of Hume's Moral Psychology

Published in print:
2000
Published Online:
October 2011
ISBN:
9780198250111
eISBN:
9780191681240
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198250111.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

David Hume's direct and indirect arguments constitute a sustained, sophisticated, and compelling attack on standard moral cognitivism and its many variants. With moral conativism as his foundation, ... More


Against Moral Cognitivism

John Bricke

in Mind and Morality: An Examination of Hume's Moral Psychology

Published in print:
2000
Published Online:
October 2011
ISBN:
9780198250111
eISBN:
9780191681240
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198250111.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

The typical moral cognitivist holds that specifically moral beliefs — beliefs with explicitly evaluative moral content — can, and often in fact do, play an essential explanatory role. While admitting ... More


Introduction

John Bricke

in Mind and Morality: An Examination of Hume's Moral Psychology

Published in print:
2000
Published Online:
October 2011
ISBN:
9780198250111
eISBN:
9780191681240
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198250111.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

Absence of agreement on the most fundamental questions concerning the interpretation of David Hume's views on mind and morality complements an utter absence of agreement as to the soundness of his ... More


From Moral Desire to Convention

John Bricke

in Mind and Morality: An Examination of Hume's Moral Psychology

Published in print:
2000
Published Online:
October 2011
ISBN:
9780198250111
eISBN:
9780191681240
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198250111.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

Specifically moral desires, just as the partial desires of which they are impartial variants, are person-implicating: their contents make essential reference to the actions and qualities of human ... More


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