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This chapter introduces a new Confucian perfectionist approach to individual autonomy and civil liberties. Confucianism has often been criticized for failing to recognize individual autonomy. But Confucian ethics does promote individual moral autonomy, in the sense that the moral agent must voluntarily accept the demands of morality and reflectively engage in the moral life. To a considerable extent, this notion supports toleration and freedom, since a highly restrictive or oppressive moral environment is harmful to the development of a genuine moral life. To cope with the demands of a fast-changing, pluralistic society, Confucian ethics must incorporate a moderate notion of personal autonomy in the wider sense that people should have the freedom to form life goals and chart a personal path of life.

This chapter continues the discussion began in Chapter 1 on the ways moral values are embedded in conceptions of mental disorders and positive health, focusing on when mental health is defined positively, as psychological well-being. Positive conceptions of health invariably embody or presuppose moral values. Marie Jahoda identified six (overlapping) criteria for positive health, which today, is the starting point for many contemporary discussions. These are: (1) self-esteem, (2) psychological integration, (3) personal autonomy, (4) self-actualization, (5) social coping, and (6) realistic cognition. It is argued that these criteria are closely linked, respectively, to self-respect, integrity, moral autonomy, authenticity, responsibility, and truthfulness. They are not synonymous with these virtues, however, and each feature can be unfolded in subjective or objective directions, thereby reflecting ambiguities in the therapeutic trend.

This chapter compares John Rawls's and Jürgen Habermas's concepts of ‘public reason’ in their starting points and methods as the framework for the role accorded to religious convictions within democratic opinion- and will-formation. Differences identified as crucial for the place of comprehensive doctrines are: the understanding of the tasks imposed by pluralism; the status and scope accorded to morality; autonomy as the normative basis of democracy; the public/private distinction; the relationship between reason and consensus; and the hermeneutical or critical function of philosophy. Habermas's new move to accept religious contributions to public reason is based on his understanding of democracy as a learning project and on his appreciation of their motivating and critical potential over against the pathologies of liberal societies. His demand for mutual ‘translation’ between secular and religious fellow-citizens is evaluated theologically. It needs to be developed to encompass the relations between reason, revelation, and inculturation, as well as practical reason and its hope for the highest good, to allow for the creativity of new cultural syntheses.

This chapter concludes, not only this book, but writings of pervious books, on ‘Law, State, and Practical Reason’. The philosophical scope of this writing has covered a general theory of law as ‘institutional normative order’, a discussion of sovereignty, statehood, and nationalism, an inquiry into legal reasoning as a discipline involving both logic and rhetoric, and finally in this book a study of practical reasoning in law and morality. The chapter ties up some remaining loose ends that connect the present work with its predecessors. These concern: universal and particular in moral judgement; the place of autonomy in moral reasoning; issues about ‘ natural law’; the virtues of the law-abiding person; the question of how to live; and the problem of life and death.

Immanuel Kant, John Hick, and Richard Swinburne, among others, have presented versions of the claim that God must be hidden from us if we are to make morally significant choices. The proposal that an intimate and enduring personal relationship with God would reduce our moral autonomy is especially plausible. Less plausible is the claim that somewhat more evidence than we currently have for the existence of God would be morally harmful. While God's hiddenness cannot be explained adequately in terms of preserving our moral autonomy, there may be a good of mystery in this area that is capable of contributing to an adequate explanation. Especially promising is the idea that it is very valuable that we should be able to choose whether or not to harm others.

A natural approach to justifying the coercive administration of morally enhancing neurointerventions is to appeal to a principle of moral paternalism. This chapter outlines the factors that need to be taken into account in order for a principle of moral paternalism to morally justify coercively administering neurointerventions. First, the author argues that the moral paternalist must take special care to ensure that the interventions will improve moral character. Second, she outlines the potential costs that the moral paternalist needs to address before a moral paternalistic interference is justified. The author argues that whilst the moral paternalistic administration of a neurointervention may have more kinds of cost to consider than other forms of moral paternalistic interference, this does not mean that such interventions cannot be justified under the principle.

The world’s first clinical trial using advisory brain implant operated by artificial intelligence (AI) has been completed with significant success. The tested devices predict a specific neuronal event (epileptic seizure), allowing people implanted with the device to be forewarned and to take steps to reduce or avoid the impact of the event. In principle, these kinds of artificially intelligent devices could be used to predict other neuronal events and allow those implanted with the device to take precautionary steps or to automate drug delivery so as to avoid unwanted outcomes. This chapter examines moral issues arising from the hypothetical situation where such devices controlled by AI are used to ensure that convicted criminal offenders are safe for release into society. We distinguish two types of predictive technologies controlled by AI: advisory systems and automated therapeutic response systems. The purpose of this chapter is to determine which of these two technologies would generate fewer ethical concerns. While there are moral similarities between the two technologies, the latter raises more concerns. In particular, it raises the possibility that individual moral decision-making and moral autonomy can be threatened by the use of automated implants.

Uniquely, Natural Law Constructivism can resolve the key challenge to rational justification posed by the Pyrrhonian Dilemma of the Criterion. Hume’s and Kant’s constructivist method is both sound and significant because it is based upon a core principle of rational justification as such within non-formal domains. Explicating this principle of Natural Law Constructivism illuminates and justifies four key aspects of the autonomy of rational judgment, including our positive moral freedom. Explicating these aspects of autonomous rational judgment shows how, inter alia, Kant’s constructivism is fundamentally social because it is fundamentally inter-subjective. It also shows how Kant’s constructivism accommodates historical factors bearing upon the appropriateness and legitimacy of social and political institutions. These advantages respond to common objections to Kant’s moral philosophy; none requires Kant’s Transcendental Idealism.

This introductory chapter begins with a brief background of the book, which is part of a project on legal ethics being carried out within the Faculty of Law at Griffith University, funded partly by the Australian Research Council and partly by the Queensland Law Society's Grants Committee. The project as a whole involves an examination of legal ethics in Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. It then discusses the meaning of legal ethics, the moral autonomy and accountability of lawyers, and the key themes addressed by the book. An overview of the subsequent chapters is also presented.

This chapter explains how severe cognitive impairment raises distinct normative and conceptual issues. It cites the importance of recognizing whether a person with an intellectual disability possesses or lacks autonomy. Context helps determine which of the notions of autonomy is most relevant to a problem, and can specify limits before a person's actions are judged to be autonomous. When we distinguish correctly the various complex conceptions of autonomy, we will realize these people have varieties of moral autonomies. For example, using calculators or seeking information does not lessen their autonomy; on the other hand, they seem to be learning to become more independent human beings. The chapter notes that since many people with cognitive disabilities make use of such assistive technical devices, they are more autonomous in a certain sense than we want to assume.