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This chapter introduces Part II, examining the ticking bomb question as one of public, practical, morality in the real world, namely whether it is morally justifiable for democratic states facing terrorism to torture in order to save many innocent lives. It outlines the parameters for discussing the question. Part II is to first address the question of whether transferring the ‘torture in a ticking bomb situation’ (TBS) moral dilemma from the private to the public sphere in itself entails a different moral solution. Secondly, the question is to be addressed of whether — accepting arguendo that torture in this situation is morally justified — states can torture in TBSs while limiting both torture and its direct and indirect harm to a morally acceptable level, or else must slide down an inevitable, and intolerable ‘slippery slope’. ‘Slippery surface’ dangers unique to the public sphere are also discussed.

This chapter outlines the author's minimal absolutist view, a ‘bare-boned’ moral view that certain acts must be prohibited absolutely, i.e., must never be performed, whatever the consequences. Reviewing questionable candidate acts for such prohibition, including lying and killing, and explaining the ‘slippery surface‘ method of logically testing the scope of moral views, the chapter then argues that the opposing view — anti-absolutism — cannot logically allow the prohibition of any act, however horrendous. Thus, it must allow torturing babies to death for fun if this would save thousands of other babies. Two real-life examples of minimal absolutism are provided: the prohibition of cruel death penalty in the West and the universal rejection of experiments on humans without informed consent, even if, used to develop a vaccine for HIV/AIDS, it would save millions of lives. It is concluded that anti-absolutism must justify atrocities, including terrorism, and is morally corrupting and enslaving.

This chapter considers whether there is, in extreme situations, a ‘public morality’ that is distinct from ‘private morality’ and its implications on the ‘ticking bomb’ debate, including a discussion of the ‘dirty hands’ dilemma. Theorists have argued that there are differences between action in the private and public spheres relating to representation, numbers, impersonality and impartiality, violence and consequences. However, those justifying torture in a ticking bomb situation have relied on general consequentialist arguments rather than limiting them to the public sphere or to officials. The effects of torture by officials would nevertheless be much more extensive than if inflicted by a private individual, and officials have a positive duty to protect the population. Theorists have argued that in the real world citizens must limit the powers of leaders, including by absolute prohibitions based on general moral grounds.

This chapter provides arguments for a minimal absolutist prohibition on torture. Logically, once anti-absolutism is rejected, torture must be prohibited absolutely, as it contains the worst acts one person can possibly inflict on another. Some examples are used to illustrate the depth of inhumanity to which, it is argued, those who justify torture in a ticking bomb situation must be prepared to sink. To become a torturer, a person must suppress all compassion and self-regard, and become instead a calculating pain-inflicting machine. The torture-justifying morality is incapable of supplying reasons not to torture the terrorist's child to ensure his compliance. Nor would the terrorist's potential innocent civilians be safe from calculations by torture-justifiers that their death would prevent a more costly attack and thus must not be prevented. In contrast, a minimal absolutist view would oppose anyone becoming a victim of torture or of terrorism.

This chapter addresses the wider issue that a moral agent facing a ticking bomb situation (TBS) should consider: whether ultimately a decision to torture the terrorist or not should be determined by consequences or by absolute moral prohibitions. First, the consequences of not torturing in the scenario and the planned terrorist attack occurring are described, illustrated by the 9/11 terrorist attacks on New York and a terrorist attack in Jerusalem. Then the two prominent moral-philosophical views clashing over the morality of action, including in such extreme emergencies, are outlined: on the one hand consequentialism (or utilitarianism), advocated by the likes of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, and determining the morality of actions by their consequences; on the other deontology, whose main advocate was Immanuel Kant, which emphasizes duties to oneself and others, and stipulates that certain types of acts must be prohibited absolutely (‘no-go areas’).

This chapter details the consequentialist arguments for torturing the terrorist in a ticking bomb situation. Consequentialist/utilitarians argue that a moral cost-benefit analysis needs to be made, pitting the suffering of the one terrorist under torture against the suffering of so many innocent civilians if the terrorist bomb were to explode. Such analysis would necessarily lead to a lesser evil choice in favour of torturing the terrorist. Deontologists with a ‘disastrous consequences clause’, allowing for consequentialist considerations to prevail, albeit only in extreme emergencies, raise arguments for torture that are identical. Therefore it is concluded that their approach to the ticking bomb dilemma is indistinguishable, for the purposes of this discussion, from that of consistent consequentialists.

This chapter considers other theorists’ analyses of the doctrine of provocation, and the concepts of anger than underpin those analyses. It looks at the moral aspects of retaliation in anger upon provocation, and the degree of blame to be attached to departure from a mean, right, or proper degree of retaliation. These other aspects are the meaning of ‘grave’ provocation and the fate of the victim’s body.

Here, the depth imbued in Herodotus’ landscape is enhanced by the element of human intervention, which lends a moral aspect. Characters in the narrative, particularly the holders of despotic power engaging in monumental projects, are seen to manipulate the natural world in ways that can be viewed positively or negatively. This chapter explores this apparent contradiction in terms of context, contrast, and varied focalizations, which combine to encourage the reader to see similar actions in different lights. Close attention is paid to the ‘voice’ in which judgements are cast, resulting in a subtle interpretative framework. The division between water and land is explored as particularly fertile ground for exploring human interaction with the landscape in Herodotus’ narrative. The crossing of continental divisions introduces the relationship between individual projects and wider imperial aims, and the sequence of transgressive river crossings is explored as precursor to Persia’s campaigns against Greece.