Dieter Helm
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199270743
- eISBN:
- 9780191718540
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199270743.001.0001
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Economic History
This book is a major study of the new market approach to energy policy in Britain since 1979. It describes the miners' strike, the privatizations of the gas, electricity, nuclear generation, and coal ...
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This book is a major study of the new market approach to energy policy in Britain since 1979. It describes the miners' strike, the privatizations of the gas, electricity, nuclear generation, and coal industries, and looks at events such as the dash for gas, regulatory failures in setting monopoly prices, and the takeovers and consolidations of the late 1990s. The author sets out the achievements of the new market philosophy, but also analyses why it has ultimately failed to turn energy industries into normal commodity businesses. The revised paperback edition includes a new chapter on the White Paper on a low-carbon economy and updated discussions on nuclear power, to incorporate the 2003 Nuclear White Paper, price reviews, and emissions trading.Less
This book is a major study of the new market approach to energy policy in Britain since 1979. It describes the miners' strike, the privatizations of the gas, electricity, nuclear generation, and coal industries, and looks at events such as the dash for gas, regulatory failures in setting monopoly prices, and the takeovers and consolidations of the late 1990s. The author sets out the achievements of the new market philosophy, but also analyses why it has ultimately failed to turn energy industries into normal commodity businesses. The revised paperback edition includes a new chapter on the White Paper on a low-carbon economy and updated discussions on nuclear power, to incorporate the 2003 Nuclear White Paper, price reviews, and emissions trading.
Spiegler Ran
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195398717
- eISBN:
- 9780199896790
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195398717.003.0009
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics
This chapter analyzes monopoly and duopoly pricing when consumers display loss aversion. It assumes that consumers’ reference point is determined by their expectations. First, the model is applied to ...
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This chapter analyzes monopoly and duopoly pricing when consumers display loss aversion. It assumes that consumers’ reference point is determined by their expectations. First, the model is applied to capture the idea that consumers are antagonized by unexpected price increases, and the implications of this idea for price rigidity and uniformity. Second, the model is applied to capture an “attachment effect” (a variant on the endowment effect) and the implications of this idea for the use of sales.Less
This chapter analyzes monopoly and duopoly pricing when consumers display loss aversion. It assumes that consumers’ reference point is determined by their expectations. First, the model is applied to capture the idea that consumers are antagonized by unexpected price increases, and the implications of this idea for price rigidity and uniformity. Second, the model is applied to capture an “attachment effect” (a variant on the endowment effect) and the implications of this idea for the use of sales.
Richard S. Higgins and Mark Perelman
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- September 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199989287
- eISBN:
- 9780199346325
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199989287.003.0011
- Subject:
- Law, Competition Law
This chapter looks at tying and the deadweight losses associated with monopoly pricing. It addresses both the welfare effects and the profitability of full-requirements tying contracts designed to ...
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This chapter looks at tying and the deadweight losses associated with monopoly pricing. It addresses both the welfare effects and the profitability of full-requirements tying contracts designed to extract surplus in the tying-good market. It shows that whether such tying should be prohibited through antitrust law enforcement depends on the applicable competitive benchmark. The chapter also considers the possibility of tying to monopolize the tied-good market, finding that this type of monopolization is equivalent to predatory pricing. It concludes that tying to monopolize is less profitable than tying solely to extract more fully the area of the demand curve in the tying-good market.Less
This chapter looks at tying and the deadweight losses associated with monopoly pricing. It addresses both the welfare effects and the profitability of full-requirements tying contracts designed to extract surplus in the tying-good market. It shows that whether such tying should be prohibited through antitrust law enforcement depends on the applicable competitive benchmark. The chapter also considers the possibility of tying to monopolize the tied-good market, finding that this type of monopolization is equivalent to predatory pricing. It concludes that tying to monopolize is less profitable than tying solely to extract more fully the area of the demand curve in the tying-good market.
Elena Osokina
- Published in print:
- 2021
- Published Online:
- January 2022
- ISBN:
- 9781501758515
- eISBN:
- 9781501758539
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Cornell University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7591/cornell/9781501758515.003.0020
- Subject:
- History, Russian and Former Soviet Union History
This chapter assesses how Torgsin became a sorcerer's stone of Soviet industrialization. Torgsin did not sell anything abroad but nonetheless was considered an export organization because it turned ...
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This chapter assesses how Torgsin became a sorcerer's stone of Soviet industrialization. Torgsin did not sell anything abroad but nonetheless was considered an export organization because it turned the country's resources into gold and foreign currency. The terms and conditions under which Torgsin worked contributed to its hard-currency success. It saved on expenses related to export, but most important, Torgsin's sale prices were not affected by the world economic crisis and international competition because Torgsin sold at home, where shortages and famine raged and the state had a price monopoly. Torgsin's methods were predatory, but if the government, instead of opening Torgsin to Soviet people, had tried to gain more hard currency by further increasing food exports under the unfavorable world market conditions, the scope of the famine would have been even greater.Less
This chapter assesses how Torgsin became a sorcerer's stone of Soviet industrialization. Torgsin did not sell anything abroad but nonetheless was considered an export organization because it turned the country's resources into gold and foreign currency. The terms and conditions under which Torgsin worked contributed to its hard-currency success. It saved on expenses related to export, but most important, Torgsin's sale prices were not affected by the world economic crisis and international competition because Torgsin sold at home, where shortages and famine raged and the state had a price monopoly. Torgsin's methods were predatory, but if the government, instead of opening Torgsin to Soviet people, had tried to gain more hard currency by further increasing food exports under the unfavorable world market conditions, the scope of the famine would have been even greater.
Maurice E. Stucke
- Published in print:
- 2022
- Published Online:
- April 2022
- ISBN:
- 9780197617601
- eISBN:
- 9780197617649
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780197617601.003.0004
- Subject:
- Law, Intellectual Property, IT, and Media Law
The policy proposals in the last chapter assume that more competition can restore privacy and well-being, by curbing the data-opoly's surveillance and extraction of data. This chapter examines why ...
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The policy proposals in the last chapter assume that more competition can restore privacy and well-being, by curbing the data-opoly's surveillance and extraction of data. This chapter examines why increasing competition will not always improve privacy in many digital markets that depend on behavioral advertising for their revenues. While the competition would still be toxic without the data-opolies, the chapter discusses how Google and Facebook, as the Gamemakers, design the competitive process to maintain their dominance and profits.Less
The policy proposals in the last chapter assume that more competition can restore privacy and well-being, by curbing the data-opoly's surveillance and extraction of data. This chapter examines why increasing competition will not always improve privacy in many digital markets that depend on behavioral advertising for their revenues. While the competition would still be toxic without the data-opolies, the chapter discusses how Google and Facebook, as the Gamemakers, design the competitive process to maintain their dominance and profits.
