Thomas von Ungern-Sternberg
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- April 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780199268818
- eISBN:
- 9780191600890
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199268819.001.0001
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Public and Welfare
Compares the market for property insurance in five European countries, Britain, Spain, France, Switzerland, and Germany. The comparisons are of particular interest, as the regulatory frameworks vary ...
More
Compares the market for property insurance in five European countries, Britain, Spain, France, Switzerland, and Germany. The comparisons are of particular interest, as the regulatory frameworks vary widely from country to country and so do the market outcomes, both in terms of premium level and in terms of available insurance cover. In particular, the state insurance monopolies in Spain and parts of Switzerland permit property owners to obtain global cover against a wide range of natural damages (including floods) at a very low premium rate. The premiums of private insurance companies are much higher because they typically spend more than one third of premium income on commissions and administrative costs. State monopolies are considerably more efficient in this respect.In several countries, insurance against occurrences such as floods is not available in competitive insurance systems, or it is offered only to the better risks. This is probably due to problems of adverse selection. For compulsory state monopolies, adverse selection is not an issue.Less
Compares the market for property insurance in five European countries, Britain, Spain, France, Switzerland, and Germany. The comparisons are of particular interest, as the regulatory frameworks vary widely from country to country and so do the market outcomes, both in terms of premium level and in terms of available insurance cover. In particular, the state insurance monopolies in Spain and parts of Switzerland permit property owners to obtain global cover against a wide range of natural damages (including floods) at a very low premium rate. The premiums of private insurance companies are much higher because they typically spend more than one third of premium income on commissions and administrative costs. State monopolies are considerably more efficient in this respect.
In several countries, insurance against occurrences such as floods is not available in competitive insurance systems, or it is offered only to the better risks. This is probably due to problems of adverse selection. For compulsory state monopolies, adverse selection is not an issue.
Mark Thatcher
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199245680
- eISBN:
- 9780191715273
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199245680.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Economy
This chapter analyses how three sets of international factors revolutionised markets for securities trading from the mid-1960s onwards. Firstly, transnational technological and economic developments, ...
More
This chapter analyses how three sets of international factors revolutionised markets for securities trading from the mid-1960s onwards. Firstly, transnational technological and economic developments, such as computerisation, expansion of securities markets, higher cross-border flows, and growth of large corporate investors and suppliers that transformed financial markets are examined. The other two factors relate to reforms in the US between the late 1960s and early 1980s that influenced the world securities market and offered an example of new institutions; European Union (EU) sectoral regulation that grew from the late 1980s and established a legal framework that outlawed monopolies and aided competition. These three forms of internationalisation placed severe pressures on traditional European institutions for securities trading, notably the organisation of stock exchanges as clubs of individual brokers, monopolies over trading, and regulation by governments and brokers themselves. Subsequent chapters compare the impacts of these three forms of internationalisation across countries.Less
This chapter analyses how three sets of international factors revolutionised markets for securities trading from the mid-1960s onwards. Firstly, transnational technological and economic developments, such as computerisation, expansion of securities markets, higher cross-border flows, and growth of large corporate investors and suppliers that transformed financial markets are examined. The other two factors relate to reforms in the US between the late 1960s and early 1980s that influenced the world securities market and offered an example of new institutions; European Union (EU) sectoral regulation that grew from the late 1980s and established a legal framework that outlawed monopolies and aided competition. These three forms of internationalisation placed severe pressures on traditional European institutions for securities trading, notably the organisation of stock exchanges as clubs of individual brokers, monopolies over trading, and regulation by governments and brokers themselves. Subsequent chapters compare the impacts of these three forms of internationalisation across countries.
Mark Thatcher
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199245680
- eISBN:
- 9780191715273
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199245680.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Economy
This chapter analyses how and why two forms of internationalisation — transnational technological and economic developments and reforms in the US — were met with institutional inertia, or at most ...
More
This chapter analyses how and why two forms of internationalisation — transnational technological and economic developments and reforms in the US — were met with institutional inertia, or at most limited divergent reforms in France, West Germany, and Italy between the mid-1960s and 1985. It shows that the two forms of internationalisation placed major pressures on traditional sectoral institutions that were very long-standing and protective of suppliers, such as public ownership of stock exchanges, legal monopolies, and the allocation of regulatory powers to governments and associations of brokers and exchanges. They led to debates in all three countries on modest reform proposals. Yet even limited alterations were largely blocked, due to the failure of governments to form a strong alliance with the leaders of stock exchanges that could overcome opposition to change. Instead, either poorly-functioning institutions were continued or non-institutional responses to internationalisation pressures were found.Less
This chapter analyses how and why two forms of internationalisation — transnational technological and economic developments and reforms in the US — were met with institutional inertia, or at most limited divergent reforms in France, West Germany, and Italy between the mid-1960s and 1985. It shows that the two forms of internationalisation placed major pressures on traditional sectoral institutions that were very long-standing and protective of suppliers, such as public ownership of stock exchanges, legal monopolies, and the allocation of regulatory powers to governments and associations of brokers and exchanges. They led to debates in all three countries on modest reform proposals. Yet even limited alterations were largely blocked, due to the failure of governments to form a strong alliance with the leaders of stock exchanges that could overcome opposition to change. Instead, either poorly-functioning institutions were continued or non-institutional responses to internationalisation pressures were found.
Mark Thatcher
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199245680
- eISBN:
- 9780191715273
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199245680.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Economy
Between 1986 and 2005, rapid and sweeping changes broke with long-standing sectoral institutions for securities trading in France, Germany, and Italy. Stock exchanges were privatised, legal ...
More
Between 1986 and 2005, rapid and sweeping changes broke with long-standing sectoral institutions for securities trading in France, Germany, and Italy. Stock exchanges were privatised, legal monopolies ended, and regulatory powers transferred to independent regulatory authorities. Policy forms of internationalisation were crucial in these changes. Policymakers feared regulatory competition due to new institutional arrangements in Britain, while also looking to Britain as a successful example of reform. But a second, more important factor was detailed sectoral EU regulation which increased fears of securities trading moving elsewhere and provided occasions and arguments for change. The two forms of internationalisation aided the formation of strong reform coalitions between governments and the managements of incumbent suppliers, and provided arguments to legitimate changes. By 2005, the three countries had adopted similar institutional outcomes to Britain, but following a different route, showing that policy forms of internationalisation can lead to similar outcomes through nationally-specific routes.Less
Between 1986 and 2005, rapid and sweeping changes broke with long-standing sectoral institutions for securities trading in France, Germany, and Italy. Stock exchanges were privatised, legal monopolies ended, and regulatory powers transferred to independent regulatory authorities. Policy forms of internationalisation were crucial in these changes. Policymakers feared regulatory competition due to new institutional arrangements in Britain, while also looking to Britain as a successful example of reform. But a second, more important factor was detailed sectoral EU regulation which increased fears of securities trading moving elsewhere and provided occasions and arguments for change. The two forms of internationalisation aided the formation of strong reform coalitions between governments and the managements of incumbent suppliers, and provided arguments to legitimate changes. By 2005, the three countries had adopted similar institutional outcomes to Britain, but following a different route, showing that policy forms of internationalisation can lead to similar outcomes through nationally-specific routes.
Mark Thatcher
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199245680
- eISBN:
- 9780191715273
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199245680.003.0008
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Economy
This chapter shows why transnational technological and economic developments and regulatory reforms in the US failed to result in major institutional changes in France, West Germany, and Italy ...
More
This chapter shows why transnational technological and economic developments and regulatory reforms in the US failed to result in major institutional changes in France, West Germany, and Italy between 1965 and 1987 (just before detailed EU regulation began). Traditional institutional arrangements were highly protective of national suppliers in the mid-1960s, notably publicly-owned suppliers enjoying wide monopolies. During the 1960s and 1970s, suppliers faced major problems, including lack of investment and inability to meet demand. Existing institutions were widely regarded as inefficient and unable to meet transnational technological and economic pressures. Yet even modest reforms were blocked by a determined coalition led by trade unions, employees, and political parties. Instead, policies that did not require major institutional changes were used and/or inefficiencies were tolerated. Insofar as limited reforms were made, they widened cross-national contrasts, so that the two forms of internationalisation did not lead to institutional change or convergence.Less
This chapter shows why transnational technological and economic developments and regulatory reforms in the US failed to result in major institutional changes in France, West Germany, and Italy between 1965 and 1987 (just before detailed EU regulation began). Traditional institutional arrangements were highly protective of national suppliers in the mid-1960s, notably publicly-owned suppliers enjoying wide monopolies. During the 1960s and 1970s, suppliers faced major problems, including lack of investment and inability to meet demand. Existing institutions were widely regarded as inefficient and unable to meet transnational technological and economic pressures. Yet even modest reforms were blocked by a determined coalition led by trade unions, employees, and political parties. Instead, policies that did not require major institutional changes were used and/or inefficiencies were tolerated. Insofar as limited reforms were made, they widened cross-national contrasts, so that the two forms of internationalisation did not lead to institutional change or convergence.
Mark Thatcher
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199245680
- eISBN:
- 9780191715273
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199245680.003.0009
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Economy
This chapter argues that Britain followed its own distinct route to reform in telecommunications, in similar fashion to securities trading. Despite large-scale failures of supply, arising in part ...
More
This chapter argues that Britain followed its own distinct route to reform in telecommunications, in similar fashion to securities trading. Despite large-scale failures of supply, arising in part because of transnational technological and economic developments, only limited changes were introduced in 1969 and thereafter inertia reigned. This position altered dramatically in the 1980s. A determined government pushed through privatisation of the incumbent operator, British Telecom, ended its monopoly and transferred important regulatory powers to a newly created independent sectoral regulatory agency. The policies were initiated for domestic reasons, but thereafter examples of institutions in the US were used selectively to legitimate new arrangements. Hence, as in securities, the US example was important in the policy process but EU regulation played very little role in British decisions.Less
This chapter argues that Britain followed its own distinct route to reform in telecommunications, in similar fashion to securities trading. Despite large-scale failures of supply, arising in part because of transnational technological and economic developments, only limited changes were introduced in 1969 and thereafter inertia reigned. This position altered dramatically in the 1980s. A determined government pushed through privatisation of the incumbent operator, British Telecom, ended its monopoly and transferred important regulatory powers to a newly created independent sectoral regulatory agency. The policies were initiated for domestic reasons, but thereafter examples of institutions in the US were used selectively to legitimate new arrangements. Hence, as in securities, the US example was important in the policy process but EU regulation played very little role in British decisions.
Luiz Carlos Bresser-Pereira
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- November 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780199261185
- eISBN:
- 9780191601507
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199261180.003.0018
- Subject:
- Political Science, Democratization
Executive and regulatory agencies are decentralized state organizations that implement policies. When the law clearly defines the policy, we have a state policy; when it leaves the precise definition ...
More
Executive and regulatory agencies are decentralized state organizations that implement policies. When the law clearly defines the policy, we have a state policy; when it leaves the precise definition to the incumbent administration, we have a government policy. Regulatory agencies are supposed to execute state policies and be more autonomous from the administration, whereas executive agencies will be less autonomous politically but equally independent in administrative terms. Policies introduced by executive agencies are supposed to change the moment that the opposition political party or political coalition wins an election and a new administration begins, whereas the policies introduced by regulatory policies do not change so easily. Government policies may be changed either by the parliament or by the executive, whereas state policies may be changed only by the parliament. Executive agencies are supposed to have administrative autonomy, regulatory agencies, decision autonomy, but policies are not or should not be their responsibility.Less
Executive and regulatory agencies are decentralized state organizations that implement policies. When the law clearly defines the policy, we have a state policy; when it leaves the precise definition to the incumbent administration, we have a government policy. Regulatory agencies are supposed to execute state policies and be more autonomous from the administration, whereas executive agencies will be less autonomous politically but equally independent in administrative terms. Policies introduced by executive agencies are supposed to change the moment that the opposition political party or political coalition wins an election and a new administration begins, whereas the policies introduced by regulatory policies do not change so easily. Government policies may be changed either by the parliament or by the executive, whereas state policies may be changed only by the parliament. Executive agencies are supposed to have administrative autonomy, regulatory agencies, decision autonomy, but policies are not or should not be their responsibility.
Milada Anna Vachudova
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199241194
- eISBN:
- 9780191602382
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199241198.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, European Union
The quality of political competition at the moment of regime change determined whether East European states embarked on a liberal or an illiberal pattern of political change after 1989. It was ...
More
The quality of political competition at the moment of regime change determined whether East European states embarked on a liberal or an illiberal pattern of political change after 1989. It was initially determined by the presence or absence of an opposition to communism strong enough to take power in 1989, and secondarily by the presence or absence of a reforming communist party. This chapter makes the theoretical case for why political competition is central to understanding variation in the domestic trajectories of post-communist states. It also presents a model of the causal mechanisms that translate different levels of political competition into liberal and illiberal political outcomes.Less
The quality of political competition at the moment of regime change determined whether East European states embarked on a liberal or an illiberal pattern of political change after 1989. It was initially determined by the presence or absence of an opposition to communism strong enough to take power in 1989, and secondarily by the presence or absence of a reforming communist party. This chapter makes the theoretical case for why political competition is central to understanding variation in the domestic trajectories of post-communist states. It also presents a model of the causal mechanisms that translate different levels of political competition into liberal and illiberal political outcomes.
Russell Hardin
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198290841
- eISBN:
- 9780191599415
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198290845.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Despite the singular term liberalism, there are two relatively distinct historical branches—political and economic liberalisms—and a collection of variously titled modern branches. Political ...
More
Despite the singular term liberalism, there are two relatively distinct historical branches—political and economic liberalisms—and a collection of variously titled modern branches. Political liberalism arose in the seventeenth century to counter universalistic religious views whose proponents were so ardent as to wish to impose those views by force, and in a sense therefore it was an invention to resolve a then current, awful problem. There have been many comparable social inventions, many of which have failed, as communism, egalitarianism, and perhaps socialism have all failed to date. In contrast, by the time Bernard Mandeville, Adam Smith, and others came to analyse economic liberalism, they were analysing characteristics of their own society, some of which had been developing over many centuries. Insofar as the early economic liberals had programmes, these were for reforms of political practice to end elements of state‐sponsored monopoly and protection and of political theory to give a moral (welfarist) justification for the supposedly immoral greed that drives markets to greater production; as he put it, public virtue comes from private vice.Less
Despite the singular term liberalism, there are two relatively distinct historical branches—political and economic liberalisms—and a collection of variously titled modern branches. Political liberalism arose in the seventeenth century to counter universalistic religious views whose proponents were so ardent as to wish to impose those views by force, and in a sense therefore it was an invention to resolve a then current, awful problem. There have been many comparable social inventions, many of which have failed, as communism, egalitarianism, and perhaps socialism have all failed to date. In contrast, by the time Bernard Mandeville, Adam Smith, and others came to analyse economic liberalism, they were analysing characteristics of their own society, some of which had been developing over many centuries. Insofar as the early economic liberals had programmes, these were for reforms of political practice to end elements of state‐sponsored monopoly and protection and of political theory to give a moral (welfarist) justification for the supposedly immoral greed that drives markets to greater production; as he put it, public virtue comes from private vice.
Jonathan Rosenberg
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780198294689
- eISBN:
- 9780191601538
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198294689.003.0008
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
Between 1945 and 1955, Churchill's attitude towards the use of force had undergone a dramatic transformation. In the period of the American nuclear monopoly, Churchill's views were largely consistent ...
More
Between 1945 and 1955, Churchill's attitude towards the use of force had undergone a dramatic transformation. In the period of the American nuclear monopoly, Churchill's views were largely consistent with those he held for many years: It was possible to maintain peace through strength, and, more specifically, the bomb could preserve European democracy against the threat of Soviet expansionism. Moreover, in keeping with his lifetime vigour as a soldier and a statesman, Churchill spoke privately about attacking the Soviet Union and forcing a showdown before the Soviets acquired the bomb. With the disappearance of that monopoly, Churchill came to realize that the new bomb could decrease the likelihood of war and perhaps some day eliminate great‐power conflict altogether. Accordingly, the idea of ’peaceful coexistence’ became an integral part of Churchill's approach to international politics.Less
Between 1945 and 1955, Churchill's attitude towards the use of force had undergone a dramatic transformation. In the period of the American nuclear monopoly, Churchill's views were largely consistent with those he held for many years: It was possible to maintain peace through strength, and, more specifically, the bomb could preserve European democracy against the threat of Soviet expansionism. Moreover, in keeping with his lifetime vigour as a soldier and a statesman, Churchill spoke privately about attacking the Soviet Union and forcing a showdown before the Soviets acquired the bomb. With the disappearance of that monopoly, Churchill came to realize that the new bomb could decrease the likelihood of war and perhaps some day eliminate great‐power conflict altogether. Accordingly, the idea of ’peaceful coexistence’ became an integral part of Churchill's approach to international politics.
Louis Galambos
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199251902
- eISBN:
- 9780191719059
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199251902.003.0006
- Subject:
- Business and Management, Business History
In the 1980s, the Reagan Administration drastically altered American antitrust policy, virtually eliminating Section 2 cases involving monopolies. This chapter provides a context for that decision by ...
More
In the 1980s, the Reagan Administration drastically altered American antitrust policy, virtually eliminating Section 2 cases involving monopolies. This chapter provides a context for that decision by tracing the efforts that the federal government made since 1890 to reconcile an opposition to highly concentrated economic power with the even stronger enthusiasm Americans have always had for the economic success they associated with the nation's largest enterprises. In this setting, judges and government lawyers struggled over the years to come up with a clear concept of monopoly. In the global economy of the late 20th century, the Reagan policy innovation solved that problem and proved to be timely and significant. The new policy allowed American firms to get up to global scale, either through strategic alliances or through mergers that would not have been allowed under previous administrations.Less
In the 1980s, the Reagan Administration drastically altered American antitrust policy, virtually eliminating Section 2 cases involving monopolies. This chapter provides a context for that decision by tracing the efforts that the federal government made since 1890 to reconcile an opposition to highly concentrated economic power with the even stronger enthusiasm Americans have always had for the economic success they associated with the nation's largest enterprises. In this setting, judges and government lawyers struggled over the years to come up with a clear concept of monopoly. In the global economy of the late 20th century, the Reagan policy innovation solved that problem and proved to be timely and significant. The new policy allowed American firms to get up to global scale, either through strategic alliances or through mergers that would not have been allowed under previous administrations.
Ran Spiegler
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195398717
- eISBN:
- 9780199896790
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195398717.001.0001
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics
This book synthesizes recent developments in the theory of Industrial Organization, incorporating aspects of consumer psychology that are absent from the standard model of rational choice. The book ...
More
This book synthesizes recent developments in the theory of Industrial Organization, incorporating aspects of consumer psychology that are absent from the standard model of rational choice. The book analyzes three classes of market models in which profit-maximizing firms interact with boundedly rational consumers, each capturing a different aspect of bounded consumer rationality: dynamically inconsistent preferences and biased beliefs regarding future preferences, limited ability to understand price complexity, and reference-dependent choice. These models address questions such as: Can we explain observed pricing, marketing and product differentiation strategies as equilibrium responses consumers' bounded rationality? Do market forces protect boundedly rational consumers from being exploited by firms? What is the role of market regulation and consumer protection policies in this regard? How do firms discriminate between consumers according to differences in their rationality? The book is meant to serve as a textbook for graduate courses in microeconomic theory, industrial organization or behavioral economics.Less
This book synthesizes recent developments in the theory of Industrial Organization, incorporating aspects of consumer psychology that are absent from the standard model of rational choice. The book analyzes three classes of market models in which profit-maximizing firms interact with boundedly rational consumers, each capturing a different aspect of bounded consumer rationality: dynamically inconsistent preferences and biased beliefs regarding future preferences, limited ability to understand price complexity, and reference-dependent choice. These models address questions such as: Can we explain observed pricing, marketing and product differentiation strategies as equilibrium responses consumers' bounded rationality? Do market forces protect boundedly rational consumers from being exploited by firms? What is the role of market regulation and consumer protection policies in this regard? How do firms discriminate between consumers according to differences in their rationality? The book is meant to serve as a textbook for graduate courses in microeconomic theory, industrial organization or behavioral economics.
Witham Larry
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195394757
- eISBN:
- 9780199777372
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195394757.003.0007
- Subject:
- Religion, Religion and Society
The “religious economies” of every society are a balance of monopoly and competition. Competition develops around religious market niches where suppliers meet consumer demand. No single religion (or ...
More
The “religious economies” of every society are a balance of monopoly and competition. Competition develops around religious market niches where suppliers meet consumer demand. No single religion (or business) can suit all consumer preferences, so pluralism and competition are the results. In the history of religion, competition is typified by the so-called church-sect dynamic, which describes the level of “tension” a religion has with its environments. Hence, religious niches range from strict (high-tension sectarian) to lenient (low tension church). In this marketplace, religions use every tool to find a stable and growing niche: innovation, specialization, product differentiation, and reducing start-up costs. Often, religious market vitality is determined by the degree of regulation and pluralism in the environment. This chapter looks at cases in colonial America, the Great Awakening, the rise of new religions, and the dynamics of politics and religion in Latin America and China.Less
The “religious economies” of every society are a balance of monopoly and competition. Competition develops around religious market niches where suppliers meet consumer demand. No single religion (or business) can suit all consumer preferences, so pluralism and competition are the results. In the history of religion, competition is typified by the so-called church-sect dynamic, which describes the level of “tension” a religion has with its environments. Hence, religious niches range from strict (high-tension sectarian) to lenient (low tension church). In this marketplace, religions use every tool to find a stable and growing niche: innovation, specialization, product differentiation, and reducing start-up costs. Often, religious market vitality is determined by the degree of regulation and pluralism in the environment. This chapter looks at cases in colonial America, the Great Awakening, the rise of new religions, and the dynamics of politics and religion in Latin America and China.
Louis T. Wells
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195310627
- eISBN:
- 9780199783847
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195310627.003.0006
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, International
Indosat did not collapse into the poorly run firm that has become the image of state-owned enterprises. On the contrary, it embarked on a bold new mission, invested in maintenance and new capacity, ...
More
Indosat did not collapse into the poorly run firm that has become the image of state-owned enterprises. On the contrary, it embarked on a bold new mission, invested in maintenance and new capacity, expanded rapidly, kept up with new technologies, and was profitable. Good management and the lack of harmful government intervention played a major role in Indosat's performance, but there was another important factor, and one that casts something of a shadow over the enterprise. An inherited tradition that Indosat chose not to modify in the post-ITT era was the use of monopoly power to charge its customers high prices.Less
Indosat did not collapse into the poorly run firm that has become the image of state-owned enterprises. On the contrary, it embarked on a bold new mission, invested in maintenance and new capacity, expanded rapidly, kept up with new technologies, and was profitable. Good management and the lack of harmful government intervention played a major role in Indosat's performance, but there was another important factor, and one that casts something of a shadow over the enterprise. An inherited tradition that Indosat chose not to modify in the post-ITT era was the use of monopoly power to charge its customers high prices.
Stephen D. Cohen
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195179354
- eISBN:
- 9780199783779
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195179354.003.0014
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, International
Only the most rabid proponents deny the potential for MNCs and FDI to inflict costs and harm on large numbers of people and countries. This chapter is the equivalent of a law brief, this time ...
More
Only the most rabid proponents deny the potential for MNCs and FDI to inflict costs and harm on large numbers of people and countries. This chapter is the equivalent of a law brief, this time one-sidedly expounding on the merits of the opposite side of the case and offering a totally different perspective on how to evaluate FDI and MNCs. Once again, no effort is made to replicate the emphasis in earlier chapters on the need for a balanced, objective approach to a subject dominated by heterogeneity, complexity, and subjectivity. The downsides of MNCs and FDI are discussed in terms of their demonstrable threat to a country's overall economic growth and prosperity as the result of the inherent conflict between their single-minded pursuit of profits and the interests of the host country's population. More specific costs such as intimidation of government officials anxious to promote and retain inward FDI, bribing regulators, tax avoidance, reduced competition in the marketplace including price collusion, diminished union and worker negotiating leverage, increased pollution, and increased capital outflows in the form of profit remittances, are also discussed.Less
Only the most rabid proponents deny the potential for MNCs and FDI to inflict costs and harm on large numbers of people and countries. This chapter is the equivalent of a law brief, this time one-sidedly expounding on the merits of the opposite side of the case and offering a totally different perspective on how to evaluate FDI and MNCs. Once again, no effort is made to replicate the emphasis in earlier chapters on the need for a balanced, objective approach to a subject dominated by heterogeneity, complexity, and subjectivity. The downsides of MNCs and FDI are discussed in terms of their demonstrable threat to a country's overall economic growth and prosperity as the result of the inherent conflict between their single-minded pursuit of profits and the interests of the host country's population. More specific costs such as intimidation of government officials anxious to promote and retain inward FDI, bribing regulators, tax avoidance, reduced competition in the marketplace including price collusion, diminished union and worker negotiating leverage, increased pollution, and increased capital outflows in the form of profit remittances, are also discussed.
Rosalyn Higgins
- Published in print:
- 1992
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198277712
- eISBN:
- 9780191598890
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198277717.003.0010
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
There are three reasons for linking Grotius to the UN. (1) The UN Charter deals with aspects of international law that are central to his writings. (2) In those areas, such as law of the sea, in ...
More
There are three reasons for linking Grotius to the UN. (1) The UN Charter deals with aspects of international law that are central to his writings. (2) In those areas, such as law of the sea, in which the UN has assisted in the codification of international law, it is worth seeing whether it has adhered to Grotian principles. (3) The UN has a spirit and ethos similar to that inculcated by Grotius, the viability of which merits exploration. These three themes are examined with special reference to the jus ad bellum, the jus in bello, and the state's presumed monopoly on the use of force. The UN Charter, many years after it was written, still captures a ‘Grotian moment’.Less
There are three reasons for linking Grotius to the UN. (1) The UN Charter deals with aspects of international law that are central to his writings. (2) In those areas, such as law of the sea, in which the UN has assisted in the codification of international law, it is worth seeing whether it has adhered to Grotian principles. (3) The UN has a spirit and ethos similar to that inculcated by Grotius, the viability of which merits exploration. These three themes are examined with special reference to the jus ad bellum, the jus in bello, and the state's presumed monopoly on the use of force. The UN Charter, many years after it was written, still captures a ‘Grotian moment’.
Ken Binmore
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195300574
- eISBN:
- 9780199783748
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300574.003.0009
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Microeconomics
This chapter reviews classical topics in economics. It is intended mostly for readers who have not studied economics before, but it is written in a style that will perhaps offer something new for ...
More
This chapter reviews classical topics in economics. It is intended mostly for readers who have not studied economics before, but it is written in a style that will perhaps offer something new for students of economics. The topics covered include demand and supply curves, the Edgeworth box, classical and discriminating monopolies, perfect competition, and Walrasian equilibrium.Less
This chapter reviews classical topics in economics. It is intended mostly for readers who have not studied economics before, but it is written in a style that will perhaps offer something new for students of economics. The topics covered include demand and supply curves, the Edgeworth box, classical and discriminating monopolies, perfect competition, and Walrasian equilibrium.
Philippa Dee and Christopher Findlay
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199235216
- eISBN:
- 9780191715624
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199235216.003.0008
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Development, Growth, and Environmental
This chapter discusses what many infrastructure industries have in common — economies of scale or scope — and how this poses some significant policy challenges for successful trade policy reform. ...
More
This chapter discusses what many infrastructure industries have in common — economies of scale or scope — and how this poses some significant policy challenges for successful trade policy reform. These conditions can lead to natural monopoly. The problem is that the single producer may abuse its monopoly power by restricting the quantity or quality of output and pricing above costs. Opening this market to trade creates opportunity for alternative suppliers but also creates challenges of arranging the transition to a new provider and regulating them appropriately. The chapter discusses how international trade negotiations can contribute to ensuring successful outcomes. The key messages are that while natural monopoly is a common feature of the infrastructure sector, care should be taken not to exaggerate its importance. There are circumstances in which no policy problem arises. Further, even if there is an apparent natural monopoly, it is important to separate that part of the chain of supply from other elements in which competition can develop. Even so, natural monopoly elements remain. The GATS is relevant to natural monopoly markets and contains some disciplines on policy in those markets. Trade-policy reform can contribute to performance in markets in which natural monopolies have some influence. However, market opening has to be complemented by the appropriate regulatory structures to capture these benefits, for example, related to the terms on which competitive firms have access to bottleneck facilities. Commitments made through international trade negotiations can facilitate the necessary regulatory reform.Less
This chapter discusses what many infrastructure industries have in common — economies of scale or scope — and how this poses some significant policy challenges for successful trade policy reform. These conditions can lead to natural monopoly. The problem is that the single producer may abuse its monopoly power by restricting the quantity or quality of output and pricing above costs. Opening this market to trade creates opportunity for alternative suppliers but also creates challenges of arranging the transition to a new provider and regulating them appropriately. The chapter discusses how international trade negotiations can contribute to ensuring successful outcomes. The key messages are that while natural monopoly is a common feature of the infrastructure sector, care should be taken not to exaggerate its importance. There are circumstances in which no policy problem arises. Further, even if there is an apparent natural monopoly, it is important to separate that part of the chain of supply from other elements in which competition can develop. Even so, natural monopoly elements remain. The GATS is relevant to natural monopoly markets and contains some disciplines on policy in those markets. Trade-policy reform can contribute to performance in markets in which natural monopolies have some influence. However, market opening has to be complemented by the appropriate regulatory structures to capture these benefits, for example, related to the terms on which competitive firms have access to bottleneck facilities. Commitments made through international trade negotiations can facilitate the necessary regulatory reform.
Raymond Plant
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199281756
- eISBN:
- 9780191713040
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199281756.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics, Political Theory
This chapter provides an analysis of neo‐liberal views about the idea of freedom. It is important for neo‐liberals that the absolutely central ideal of freedom should be compatible with a nomocratic ...
More
This chapter provides an analysis of neo‐liberal views about the idea of freedom. It is important for neo‐liberals that the absolutely central ideal of freedom should be compatible with a nomocratic order rather than embodying some controversial moral goods. This means that freedom has to be understood in a negative rather than a positive sense – that freedom is to be seen as the absence of coercion rather than being related to capacities and capabilities. This means that the idea of coercion also has to be subjected to close analysis since it is the absence of coercion which creates negative freedom. Again it is centrally important for the neo‐liberal that the idea of coercion should be free of positive moral content and has to be defined in a wholly empirical manner.Less
This chapter provides an analysis of neo‐liberal views about the idea of freedom. It is important for neo‐liberals that the absolutely central ideal of freedom should be compatible with a nomocratic order rather than embodying some controversial moral goods. This means that freedom has to be understood in a negative rather than a positive sense – that freedom is to be seen as the absence of coercion rather than being related to capacities and capabilities. This means that the idea of coercion also has to be subjected to close analysis since it is the absence of coercion which creates negative freedom. Again it is centrally important for the neo‐liberal that the idea of coercion should be free of positive moral content and has to be defined in a wholly empirical manner.
David B. Audretsch
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195183504
- eISBN:
- 9780199783885
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195183504.003.0009
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Development, Growth, and Environmental
In the 1990s, the United States had a virtual monopoly in terms of the entrepreneurial society, just as it had a virtual monopoly on plants and factories at the close of the Second World War. ...
More
In the 1990s, the United States had a virtual monopoly in terms of the entrepreneurial society, just as it had a virtual monopoly on plants and factories at the close of the Second World War. Monopoly breeds complacency and arrogance. It was exactly this complacency and arrogance that led to the US downfall in the 1970s and 1980s. As the rest of the world recovered, The United States lost its assumed monopoly on capital. In the 21st century the signs are rampant that the United States is rapidly losing, if not already has lost, its monopoly on the entrepreneurial society. Just as following the Second World War, in the 1990s growth, jobs, and prosperity seemed unending. Serious scholars and policy makers wondered if the business cycle had come to an end. The new economy had seemingly put an end to what, up until then, had been the inevitability of downturns. Things have not gone quite as smoothly in this century. While there are no doubt a number of contributing factors, such as the escalating prices of oil and other energy sources, the loss of innocence of the United States, in that it must now compete in a world where partners also enjoy an entrepreneurial society, has also contributed to a more problematic decade than the previous one. This book started by contrasting how different the entrepreneurial society is from the managed economy. It closes by emphasizing a similarity. The 1950s and 1990s stand out as two golden eras of recent US history. Both were eras of prosperity, growth, and confidence. Both successes have bred complacency and arrogance. In the case of the managed economy, such arrogance and complacency ultimately contributed to the demise of US leadership and economic supremacy. The book concludes by posing two essential questions: will the era of the entrepreneurial society prove to be the same? Will the United States be fooled again?Less
In the 1990s, the United States had a virtual monopoly in terms of the entrepreneurial society, just as it had a virtual monopoly on plants and factories at the close of the Second World War. Monopoly breeds complacency and arrogance. It was exactly this complacency and arrogance that led to the US downfall in the 1970s and 1980s. As the rest of the world recovered, The United States lost its assumed monopoly on capital. In the 21st century the signs are rampant that the United States is rapidly losing, if not already has lost, its monopoly on the entrepreneurial society. Just as following the Second World War, in the 1990s growth, jobs, and prosperity seemed unending. Serious scholars and policy makers wondered if the business cycle had come to an end. The new economy had seemingly put an end to what, up until then, had been the inevitability of downturns. Things have not gone quite as smoothly in this century. While there are no doubt a number of contributing factors, such as the escalating prices of oil and other energy sources, the loss of innocence of the United States, in that it must now compete in a world where partners also enjoy an entrepreneurial society, has also contributed to a more problematic decade than the previous one. This book started by contrasting how different the entrepreneurial society is from the managed economy. It closes by emphasizing a similarity. The 1950s and 1990s stand out as two golden eras of recent US history. Both were eras of prosperity, growth, and confidence. Both successes have bred complacency and arrogance. In the case of the managed economy, such arrogance and complacency ultimately contributed to the demise of US leadership and economic supremacy. The book concludes by posing two essential questions: will the era of the entrepreneurial society prove to be the same? Will the United States be fooled again?
