George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195300796
- eISBN:
- 9780199783700
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300796.001.0001
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics
This book begins with a careful development of fundamental concepts, including the notions of a repeated game, strategy, and equilibrium. It synthesizes and unifies the vast body of work in repeated ...
More
This book begins with a careful development of fundamental concepts, including the notions of a repeated game, strategy, and equilibrium. It synthesizes and unifies the vast body of work in repeated games and reputations, bringing the reader to the research frontier. Detailed arguments and proofs are given throughout; they are interwoven with examples, discussions of how the theory is to be used in the study of relationships, and economic applications of the theory. The book will be useful to those doing basic research in the theory of repeated games as well as those using repeated games as tools in more applied research. The classic folk theorem and reputation results for games of perfect and imperfect public monitoring are presented, with the benefit of the modern analytical tools of decomposability and self-generation. More recent developments are also presented, including results beyond folk theorems and recent work in games of private monitoring and alternative approaches to reputations. The book provides an integration of game theory and economics, moving from the theory of repeated games to the study of economic relationships.Less
This book begins with a careful development of fundamental concepts, including the notions of a repeated game, strategy, and equilibrium. It synthesizes and unifies the vast body of work in repeated games and reputations, bringing the reader to the research frontier. Detailed arguments and proofs are given throughout; they are interwoven with examples, discussions of how the theory is to be used in the study of relationships, and economic applications of the theory. The book will be useful to those doing basic research in the theory of repeated games as well as those using repeated games as tools in more applied research. The classic folk theorem and reputation results for games of perfect and imperfect public monitoring are presented, with the benefit of the modern analytical tools of decomposability and self-generation. More recent developments are also presented, including results beyond folk theorems and recent work in games of private monitoring and alternative approaches to reputations. The book provides an integration of game theory and economics, moving from the theory of repeated games to the study of economic relationships.
Naomi E. Chayen, John R. Helliwell, and Edward H. Snell
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199213252
- eISBN:
- 9780191707575
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199213252.001.0001
- Subject:
- Physics, Crystallography: Physics
Structural crystallography provides key information to understand the mechanism involved for biological processes. The technique requires high‐quality crystals. The book Macromolecular ...
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Structural crystallography provides key information to understand the mechanism involved for biological processes. The technique requires high‐quality crystals. The book Macromolecular crystallization and crystal perfection covers the techniques to get these high quality crystals and then obtain the best structural data from them. We focus on two areas, the crystal and the diffraction experiment. We briefly address crystallization theory and then focus on practical crystallization strategies discussing screening and optimization. Where high quality crystals are not initially obtained, remediation strategies and alternative approaches are discussed. Diffraction is covered from both the X‐ray and neutron viewpoint. A physical analysis of long and short‐range order is used to explain features seen in the diffraction pattern and the causes of those features. Diffraction disorders are discussed. Factors that cause degradation to the diffraction and strategies to mitigate those factors are addressed. We then address beamline and detector optimization as a means to improve the data quality. Crystallization is still a largely empirical process and our final chapters focus on the use of powder methods, where crystals are small, complementary techniques where we have no crystals at all and what the future holds with the advent of fourth generation X‐ray sources. Overall the book is aimed at both more experienced researchers and graduate students. We aim for it to become a reference work for all researchers in these interdisciplinary subjects on these topics.Less
Structural crystallography provides key information to understand the mechanism involved for biological processes. The technique requires high‐quality crystals. The book Macromolecular crystallization and crystal perfection covers the techniques to get these high quality crystals and then obtain the best structural data from them. We focus on two areas, the crystal and the diffraction experiment. We briefly address crystallization theory and then focus on practical crystallization strategies discussing screening and optimization. Where high quality crystals are not initially obtained, remediation strategies and alternative approaches are discussed. Diffraction is covered from both the X‐ray and neutron viewpoint. A physical analysis of long and short‐range order is used to explain features seen in the diffraction pattern and the causes of those features. Diffraction disorders are discussed. Factors that cause degradation to the diffraction and strategies to mitigate those factors are addressed. We then address beamline and detector optimization as a means to improve the data quality. Crystallization is still a largely empirical process and our final chapters focus on the use of powder methods, where crystals are small, complementary techniques where we have no crystals at all and what the future holds with the advent of fourth generation X‐ray sources. Overall the book is aimed at both more experienced researchers and graduate students. We aim for it to become a reference work for all researchers in these interdisciplinary subjects on these topics.
George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195300796
- eISBN:
- 9780199783700
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300796.003.0012
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics
This chapter introduces and illustrates the basic issues that arise in games with private monitoring. It discusses and presents the two basic approaches to equilibrium analysis in games with private ...
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This chapter introduces and illustrates the basic issues that arise in games with private monitoring. It discusses and presents the two basic approaches to equilibrium analysis in games with private monitoring, including games with almost-perfect monitoring and almost-public monitoring, as well as belief-free equilibria.Less
This chapter introduces and illustrates the basic issues that arise in games with private monitoring. It discusses and presents the two basic approaches to equilibrium analysis in games with private monitoring, including games with almost-perfect monitoring and almost-public monitoring, as well as belief-free equilibria.
Naomi E. Chayen, John R. Helliwell, and Edward H. Snell
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199213252
- eISBN:
- 9780191707575
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199213252.003.0020
- Subject:
- Physics, Crystallography: Physics
This chapter summarizes the state‐of‐the‐art in the field and discusses upcoming techniques to solve and to improve the current problems.
This chapter summarizes the state‐of‐the‐art in the field and discusses upcoming techniques to solve and to improve the current problems.
Luis Correia Da Silva, Marc Goergen, and Luc Renneboog
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- April 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780199259304
- eISBN:
- 9780191600852
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199259305.003.0004
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Financial Economics
Discusses the research questions that will be addressed in the next chapters. The research questions relate to the link between dividend levels and corporate control, and dividend flexibility and ...
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Discusses the research questions that will be addressed in the next chapters. The research questions relate to the link between dividend levels and corporate control, and dividend flexibility and corporate control.Less
Discusses the research questions that will be addressed in the next chapters. The research questions relate to the link between dividend levels and corporate control, and dividend flexibility and corporate control.
George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195300796
- eISBN:
- 9780199783700
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300796.003.0007
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics
This chapter provides the basic technical tools for working with games of imperfect public monitoring, with games of perfect monitoring as a special case. It introduces the central notions of a ...
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This chapter provides the basic technical tools for working with games of imperfect public monitoring, with games of perfect monitoring as a special case. It introduces the central notions of a public strategy and perfect public equilibrium (PPE), and shows that PPE has a recursive structure. Readers particularly interested in imperfect public monitoring can move straight from Chapter 2 to this chapter. This chapter develops and illustrates the ideas of decomposability, enforceability, and self-generation, the basic tools for working with games of incomplete information, as well as presenting the bang-bang theorem.Less
This chapter provides the basic technical tools for working with games of imperfect public monitoring, with games of perfect monitoring as a special case. It introduces the central notions of a public strategy and perfect public equilibrium (PPE), and shows that PPE has a recursive structure. Readers particularly interested in imperfect public monitoring can move straight from Chapter 2 to this chapter. This chapter develops and illustrates the ideas of decomposability, enforceability, and self-generation, the basic tools for working with games of incomplete information, as well as presenting the bang-bang theorem.
George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195300796
- eISBN:
- 9780199783700
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300796.003.0013
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics
This chapter provides a detailed treatment of work on games with almost-public monitoring. The chapter introduces the key distinction between strategies with bounded and unbounded recall, showing ...
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This chapter provides a detailed treatment of work on games with almost-public monitoring. The chapter introduces the key distinction between strategies with bounded and unbounded recall, showing that perfect public equilibria with bounded recall in public monitoring games induce equilibrium behavior in nearby private monitoring games, while equilibria with unbounded recall typically imply coordination failure in nearby private monitoring games. The chapter concludes with a folk theorem for games of almost-public monitoring.Less
This chapter provides a detailed treatment of work on games with almost-public monitoring. The chapter introduces the key distinction between strategies with bounded and unbounded recall, showing that perfect public equilibria with bounded recall in public monitoring games induce equilibrium behavior in nearby private monitoring games, while equilibria with unbounded recall typically imply coordination failure in nearby private monitoring games. The chapter concludes with a folk theorem for games of almost-public monitoring.
George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195300796
- eISBN:
- 9780199783700
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300796.003.0002
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics
This chapter introduces the basic concepts of a stage game, repeated game with perfect monitoring, subgame-perfect equilibrium, and the one-shot deviation principle; introduces the use of automata to ...
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This chapter introduces the basic concepts of a stage game, repeated game with perfect monitoring, subgame-perfect equilibrium, and the one-shot deviation principle; introduces the use of automata to represent strategy profiles; and introduces the concepts of decomposability, enforceability, and self-generation. Readers can either proceed to the next chapter, or if particularly interested in games with public monitoring, proceed directly to Chapter 7.Less
This chapter introduces the basic concepts of a stage game, repeated game with perfect monitoring, subgame-perfect equilibrium, and the one-shot deviation principle; introduces the use of automata to represent strategy profiles; and introduces the concepts of decomposability, enforceability, and self-generation. Readers can either proceed to the next chapter, or if particularly interested in games with public monitoring, proceed directly to Chapter 7.
George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195300796
- eISBN:
- 9780199783700
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300796.003.0003
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics
This chapter presents and proves the folk theorem for games of perfect monitoring. The chapter first proves the folk theorem for two players with public correlation and pure-action individual ...
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This chapter presents and proves the folk theorem for games of perfect monitoring. The chapter first proves the folk theorem for two players with public correlation and pure-action individual rationality. This is then generalized to arbitrary numbers of players, via both a dimensionality assumption on feasible payoffs and the idea of non-equivalent utilities, then to games without public correlation and finally to mixed-action individually rational payoffs.Less
This chapter presents and proves the folk theorem for games of perfect monitoring. The chapter first proves the folk theorem for two players with public correlation and pure-action individual rationality. This is then generalized to arbitrary numbers of players, via both a dimensionality assumption on feasible payoffs and the idea of non-equivalent utilities, then to games without public correlation and finally to mixed-action individually rational payoffs.
George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195300796
- eISBN:
- 9780199783700
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300796.003.0009
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics
This chapter shows that in many situations with patient players, the payoffs bounds from Chapter 8 are tight. It then proves various folk theorems for games of public monitoring, including games with ...
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This chapter shows that in many situations with patient players, the payoffs bounds from Chapter 8 are tight. It then proves various folk theorems for games of public monitoring, including games with a product structure and extensive form games. The chapter discusses the enforceability, identifiability, and rank conditions on the monitoring technology required for the folk theorem, and finally considers games of symmetric incomplete information.Less
This chapter shows that in many situations with patient players, the payoffs bounds from Chapter 8 are tight. It then proves various folk theorems for games of public monitoring, including games with a product structure and extensive form games. The chapter discusses the enforceability, identifiability, and rank conditions on the monitoring technology required for the folk theorem, and finally considers games of symmetric incomplete information.
George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195300796
- eISBN:
- 9780199783700
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300796.003.0010
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics
This chapter provides examples in which private strategies, where a player’s behavior can depend nontrivially on his or her own privately observed past action, open up new payoff possibilities that ...
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This chapter provides examples in which private strategies, where a player’s behavior can depend nontrivially on his or her own privately observed past action, open up new payoff possibilities that cannot be achieved with public strategies, even though the monitoring is public. Equilibria in private strategies need not have a recursive structure. The chapter shows that belief-free equilibria are nonetheless relatively tractable.Less
This chapter provides examples in which private strategies, where a player’s behavior can depend nontrivially on his or her own privately observed past action, open up new payoff possibilities that cannot be achieved with public strategies, even though the monitoring is public. Equilibria in private strategies need not have a recursive structure. The chapter shows that belief-free equilibria are nonetheless relatively tractable.
George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195300796
- eISBN:
- 9780199783700
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300796.003.0011
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics
This chapter illustrates how the theory of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring can be used in economic applications. It examines collusion in oligopoly with imperfectly monitored demand, ...
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This chapter illustrates how the theory of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring can be used in economic applications. It examines collusion in oligopoly with imperfectly monitored demand, oligopoly games with privately observed costs and hence adverse selection, risk sharing and insurance, and repeated principal-agent problems. The latter example also illustrates review strategies.Less
This chapter illustrates how the theory of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring can be used in economic applications. It examines collusion in oligopoly with imperfectly monitored demand, oligopoly games with privately observed costs and hence adverse selection, risk sharing and insurance, and repeated principal-agent problems. The latter example also illustrates review strategies.
George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195300796
- eISBN:
- 9780199783700
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300796.003.0014
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics
This chapter presents belief-free equilibria in private monitoring games. The chapter provides examples based on the prisoners’ dilemma and develops the notion of self-generation for private ...
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This chapter presents belief-free equilibria in private monitoring games. The chapter provides examples based on the prisoners’ dilemma and develops the notion of self-generation for private monitoring games.Less
This chapter presents belief-free equilibria in private monitoring games. The chapter provides examples based on the prisoners’ dilemma and develops the notion of self-generation for private monitoring games.
E. J. Milner-Gulland and Marcus Rowcliffe
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780198530367
- eISBN:
- 9780191713095
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198530367.003.0007
- Subject:
- Biology, Biodiversity / Conservation Biology
This chapter looks at how to implement management plans, monitor their conservation effectiveness and value for money, and ensure that they are resilient for the long term. Effective decision-making ...
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This chapter looks at how to implement management plans, monitor their conservation effectiveness and value for money, and ensure that they are resilient for the long term. Effective decision-making requires information on the state of the system, and cost effective ways of monitoring are discussed, including participatory monitoring. However, even with good information, some uncertainty about the system will always remain, and decisions must be made in the face of this. Methods of dealing with uncertainty through decision analysis are discussed, and placed in the context of adaptive management, in which the outcomes of management actions are used to learn about the system. Finally, external threats are discussed, considering ways to buffer against changes in the ecological, economic, and institutional context that are beyond control.Less
This chapter looks at how to implement management plans, monitor their conservation effectiveness and value for money, and ensure that they are resilient for the long term. Effective decision-making requires information on the state of the system, and cost effective ways of monitoring are discussed, including participatory monitoring. However, even with good information, some uncertainty about the system will always remain, and decisions must be made in the face of this. Methods of dealing with uncertainty through decision analysis are discussed, and placed in the context of adaptive management, in which the outcomes of management actions are used to learn about the system. Finally, external threats are discussed, considering ways to buffer against changes in the ecological, economic, and institutional context that are beyond control.
James Salzman and J. B. Ruhl
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195189650
- eISBN:
- 9780199783694
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195189650.003.0012
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Development, Growth, and Environmental
This essay evaluates wetlands mitigation banking (WMB) as a tool for accomplishing the policy of no net loss of the nation's wetlands. The first part describes the legal and historical background to ...
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This essay evaluates wetlands mitigation banking (WMB) as a tool for accomplishing the policy of no net loss of the nation's wetlands. The first part describes the legal and historical background to wetlands mitigation banking, identifying the expected advantages and highlighting the practical difficulties. The discussion then focuses on the three main limitations of WMB design: ensuring meaningful compliance monitoring, currency adequacy, and exchange adequacy. These theoretical concerns are tested by looking at experiences to date in the field. Finally, key lessons for market-based approaches to watershed protection are drawn out.Less
This essay evaluates wetlands mitigation banking (WMB) as a tool for accomplishing the policy of no net loss of the nation's wetlands. The first part describes the legal and historical background to wetlands mitigation banking, identifying the expected advantages and highlighting the practical difficulties. The discussion then focuses on the three main limitations of WMB design: ensuring meaningful compliance monitoring, currency adequacy, and exchange adequacy. These theoretical concerns are tested by looking at experiences to date in the field. Finally, key lessons for market-based approaches to watershed protection are drawn out.
Christopher Hood, Colin Scott, Oliver James, George Jones, and Tony Travers
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198280996
- eISBN:
- 9780191599491
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198280998.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, UK Politics
Examines regulation of prison standards by arms‐length oversight bodies, which generally had much stronger capacities for monitoring than enforcement. Prisons in England and Wales are subject to one ...
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Examines regulation of prison standards by arms‐length oversight bodies, which generally had much stronger capacities for monitoring than enforcement. Prisons in England and Wales are subject to one of the densest patterns of oversight of any public sector activity. There has been a tendency to add new layers of regulation at various times without taking anything away, creating considerable overlap and duplication. Regulators who lacked formal powers were nevertheless observed to develop less formal mechanisms for seeking modification of behaviour.Less
Examines regulation of prison standards by arms‐length oversight bodies, which generally had much stronger capacities for monitoring than enforcement. Prisons in England and Wales are subject to one of the densest patterns of oversight of any public sector activity. There has been a tendency to add new layers of regulation at various times without taking anything away, creating considerable overlap and duplication. Regulators who lacked formal powers were nevertheless observed to develop less formal mechanisms for seeking modification of behaviour.
Christopher Hood, Colin Scott, Oliver James, George Jones, and Tony Travers
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198280996
- eISBN:
- 9780191599491
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198280998.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, UK Politics
Explores the complex institutional jungle of regulators involved in regulating state schools in England. In this sector, in contrast with the prisons sector, regulators were able to link their ...
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Explores the complex institutional jungle of regulators involved in regulating state schools in England. In this sector, in contrast with the prisons sector, regulators were able to link their monitoring to sanctions as drastic as closing schools down. The study found no clear evidence of the benefits of the enhanced regulatory regime in terms of examination performance (the main performance indicator set by government for schools).Less
Explores the complex institutional jungle of regulators involved in regulating state schools in England. In this sector, in contrast with the prisons sector, regulators were able to link their monitoring to sanctions as drastic as closing schools down. The study found no clear evidence of the benefits of the enhanced regulatory regime in terms of examination performance (the main performance indicator set by government for schools).
Alvin I. Goldman
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195138924
- eISBN:
- 9780199786480
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195138929.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Most cognitive scientists and many philosophers of mind resist the traditional notion that the mind has a special method of monitoring or accessing its own current mental states. We review the ...
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Most cognitive scientists and many philosophers of mind resist the traditional notion that the mind has a special method of monitoring or accessing its own current mental states. We review the critiques of both philosophers (Wittgenstein, Burge, Shoemaker) and cognitive scientists (Gazzaniga, Nisbett and Wilson, Gopnik), based on confabulation or self/other parallelism, and find all to be wanting. We then examine the more congenial monitoring account of Nichols and Stich, but find it incapable of handling the problem of attitude-type identification. A nuanced special-method approach is presented that combines introspection (inner recognition) for self-attributing state-types and redeployment for self-attributing attitude contents. The question of what the input-properties are for introspection is addressed at length.Less
Most cognitive scientists and many philosophers of mind resist the traditional notion that the mind has a special method of monitoring or accessing its own current mental states. We review the critiques of both philosophers (Wittgenstein, Burge, Shoemaker) and cognitive scientists (Gazzaniga, Nisbett and Wilson, Gopnik), based on confabulation or self/other parallelism, and find all to be wanting. We then examine the more congenial monitoring account of Nichols and Stich, but find it incapable of handling the problem of attitude-type identification. A nuanced special-method approach is presented that combines introspection (inner recognition) for self-attributing state-types and redeployment for self-attributing attitude contents. The question of what the input-properties are for introspection is addressed at length.
Devi Sridhar
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199549962
- eISBN:
- 9780191720499
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199549962.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics, Political Economy
This chapter presents findings on the impact of the Bank framework of women as ‘agents of change’ on the Bank's projects and the communities at which they are aimed, using TINP. It is a critical ...
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This chapter presents findings on the impact of the Bank framework of women as ‘agents of change’ on the Bank's projects and the communities at which they are aimed, using TINP. It is a critical analysis of local understandings of TINP, specifically the tools of growth monitoring of preschool children, supplementary feeding, and health education for mothers. In addition, knowledge and practice of child care in Tamil Nadu and women's groups are discussed along with reflections on the main obstacles to addressing undernutrition in Tamil Nadu. The chapter examines the relative importance of choice and circumstance in explaining child hunger.Less
This chapter presents findings on the impact of the Bank framework of women as ‘agents of change’ on the Bank's projects and the communities at which they are aimed, using TINP. It is a critical analysis of local understandings of TINP, specifically the tools of growth monitoring of preschool children, supplementary feeding, and health education for mothers. In addition, knowledge and practice of child care in Tamil Nadu and women's groups are discussed along with reflections on the main obstacles to addressing undernutrition in Tamil Nadu. The chapter examines the relative importance of choice and circumstance in explaining child hunger.
Douglas H. Johnson
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- May 2021
- ISBN:
- 9780197266953
- eISBN:
- 9780191938191
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- British Academy
- DOI:
- 10.5871/bacad/9780197266953.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, Conflict Politics and Policy
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement succeeded in resolving Sudan’s oldest political question regarding the future of South Sudan, but its most obvious failure was the immediate resumption of war inside ...
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The Comprehensive Peace Agreement succeeded in resolving Sudan’s oldest political question regarding the future of South Sudan, but its most obvious failure was the immediate resumption of war inside Sudan’s ‘New South’ along its border with South Sudan before the latter’s formal independence in July 2011. By focusing on resolving ‘the Southern Problem’ only, the international mediators failed to recognize the common political, economic, and cultural issues of marginalisation that linked large parts of the border region to the wider war. Conflict in Abyei preceded the outbreak of the second civil war in 1983, but the Abyei Protocol was largely an afterthought that inadequately addressed the main issues confronting the peoples of the area. The CPA as a whole failed to include robust monitoring instruments to enforce compliance, enabling Khartoum to refuse to accept any resolution to the Abyei conflict on anything but its own terms.Less
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement succeeded in resolving Sudan’s oldest political question regarding the future of South Sudan, but its most obvious failure was the immediate resumption of war inside Sudan’s ‘New South’ along its border with South Sudan before the latter’s formal independence in July 2011. By focusing on resolving ‘the Southern Problem’ only, the international mediators failed to recognize the common political, economic, and cultural issues of marginalisation that linked large parts of the border region to the wider war. Conflict in Abyei preceded the outbreak of the second civil war in 1983, but the Abyei Protocol was largely an afterthought that inadequately addressed the main issues confronting the peoples of the area. The CPA as a whole failed to include robust monitoring instruments to enforce compliance, enabling Khartoum to refuse to accept any resolution to the Abyei conflict on anything but its own terms.
