Search Results

This chapter lays out the main arguments supporting massive modularity and explicates the notion of ‘module’ that those arguments support (which is significantly weaker than on Fodor’s influential account). It argues that modularity is a property of biological systems quite generally, and of animal minds in particular. It also defends the viability of evolutionary psychology as a scientific research program. The chapter criticizes Fodor’s argument that encapsulated forms of modularity are a requirement of computational tractability, arguing that the latter can be assured through the use of various kinds of cognitive heuristic.

Modularists claim that folk psychology is mediated by an innate modularized database, the structures of which support inferences concerning representational relations like belief, desire, and pretense. It is doubtful, however, that mindreading really qualifies as modular, specifically, that it satisfies Fodor’s chief criteria of modularity: domain specificity and informational encapsulation. Alan Leslie postulates a core module called the “theory of mind mechanism”, but most of the work in assigning mental states is done by the “selection processor”, which is a non-modular mechanism. Finally, no real evidence is provided that propositional attitudes are ascribed via theoretical inference rather than simulation.

Chapter introduces the problem of vertical disintegration, outlining the basic competitive dynamics that give rise to it. A five fold typology of supplier-customer relations is presented: arms length, captured, modular, relational contracts and sustained contingent collaboration. Sustained contingent collaboration is the modal relation in the current historical environment. The range of supplier strategies and public policies that are emerging to cope with sustained contingent collaboration are extensively discussed.

Our understanding of the interaction between technological structure and organizational structure has made many advances. This chapter argues that a more dynamic conception of the relationship is necessary in order to capture important elements that otherwise go unnoticed. Illustrations of a dynamic conception are offered, based on empirical research in the disk-drive industry. Organizational traps may emerge, in that companies are not properly aligned with their technologies, but adaptation is difficult. Path-dependent behaviours can result, which intensify these traps.

This chapter takes the automobile industry as an empirical setting for clarification of the concept of modularity in product architecture. Three arenas of modularity: Modularity in Design, Modularity in Production, and Modularity in Use are discussed as presenting alternative criteria for making boundary choices in complex products. The chapter moves on to understanding strategic drivers for pushing the product architecture towards modularity. It then considers the implications of these different paths for industry dynamics (in particular the power balance between customer and supplier companies) and supply chain management.

This chapter analyses modularization in the world automotive industry. Modularization has involved architectural changes in product, production, and supplier systems in the industry. As an attempt to understand such multi-faceted, complex processes, this chapter proposes a conceptual framework that sees development/production activities as multiple hierarchies of products, processes, and inter-firm boundaries that are interlinked. Using this framework and drawing on case studies and questionnaire survey data, the chapter examines the ongoing processes of modularization in the industry and argues that tensions exist among the three hierarchies. Such tensions may lead to further changes in product, production, and supplier-system architectures.

This chapter is an introduction to Section 4 (Neuroscience). In the first chapter, the target article, resource-sharing framework for the comparative study of language and music is presented. Resource sharing is based on two principles: language and music involve domain-specific representations, and when similar cognitive processes are conducted on these representations, the brain shares neural resources between the two domains. This is followed by commentaries. The second target article focuses on modularity in language and music. That chapter suggests that an updated view of modularity can provide a useful framework within which to study cognitive systems (including language and music) and expands the modularity position to singing and speaking (hence, modularity in action), This is followed by commentaries.

This chapter presents a response to the commentaries in Chapters 28–31. It addresses the four points raised by Besson and Schön on their comments questioning the usefulness of the modularity frame. Skoe and Kraus provide a useful reminder and compelling case for considering that cortical modules do not function in isolation from subcortical neural systems. They remind us of the importance of top-down processing or corticofugal influences on the early tuning of brainstem responses to auditory input. Goswami draws attention to the role of prosody and rhythm in both music and speech from development and animal cognition. This chapter thanks Goswami for bringing to attention a study in which auditory chimera were created by interchanging sentences for melodies in using the envelope of one sentence or melody and the fine time structure of another.

This chapter introduces systems integration as the main topic book and then sets the scene for the discussion of the main themes presented in the book such as modularity, technology, the theory of the firm, and competitive advantage.

This chapter identifies two analytical categories of systems integration in multi-technology multi-component products, namely synchronic and diachronic. Synchronic systems integration refers to the technological capabilities required to set the product concept design, decompose it, coordinate the network of suppliers, and then recompose the product within a given family. Diachronic systems integration refers to the technological capabilities to envisage and move progressively towards different and alternative paths of product architectures (i.e., new product families) to meet evolving customer requirements.

This introductory chapter reviews some of the debates in philosophy, psychology, anthropology, evolutionary theory, and other cognitive sciences that provide a background for the topics with which this volume is concerned. Topics covered include the history of nativism, the poverty of the stimulus argument, the uniform and structure pattern followed by human cognitive development, evolution biology, and cognitive modularity. An overview of the subsequent chapters is presented.

This chapter addresses the flexibility problem for massive modularity. It argues that massively modular architectures exhibit flexibility largely as a result of context-sensitive competition between modules for the allocation of cognitive resources. Thus, it is the cognitive system as a whole that exhibits flexibility, rather than any particular subsystem within it.

This chapter addresses the main challenge facing massively modular theories of the architecture of the human mind. This is to account for the distinctively flexible, non-domain-specific character of much human thinking. It shows how the appearance of a modular language faculty within an evolving modular architecture might have led to these distinctive features of human thinking with only minor further additions and non-domain-specific adaptations.

This chapter examines the scope and limits of the tractability argument. It argues for two claims. First, that when explored with appropriate care and attention, it becomes clear that the argument provides no good reason to prefer massive modularity to the more traditional rationalist alternative. Second, while it is denied that tractability considerations support massive modularity per se, this does not mean that they show nothing whatsoever. Careful analysis of tractability considerations suggests a range of characteristics that any plausible version of psychological rationalism is likely to possess. The chapter proceeds as follows: Section 1 outlines and clarifies the general form of the tractability argument. Section 2 explains how massive modularity is supposed to resolve intractability worries. Sections 3 to 7 highlight the deficiencies of the main extant arguments for claiming that nonmodular mechanisms are intractable. Section 8 concludes by sketching some of the general characteristics that a plausible rationalist alternative to massive modularity — one capable of subserving tractable cognitive processes — is likely to possess.

Our understanding of the interaction between technological structure and organisational structure has made many advances. Argues that a more dynamic conception of the relationship is necessary in order to capture important elements that otherwise go unnoticed. Illustrations of a dynamic conception are offered, based on empirical research in the disk‐drive industry. Organisational traps may emerge, in that companies are not properly aligned with their technologies, but adaptation is difficult. Path dependent behaviours can result, which intensify these traps.