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Truth and Ontology

Trenton Merricks

This book explores how truth depends on the world or on things or on being, and examines philosophical debates concerning modality, time, and dispositions. For accounts of truth's dependence on being ... More

This book explores how truth depends on the world or on things or on being, and examines philosophical debates concerning modality, time, and dispositions. For accounts of truth's dependence on being have implications for these debates. Moreover, these debates have implications for how truth depends on being. Along the way, the book makes a number of new points about each of these debates, points that are of interest quite apart from the question of truth's dependence on being. The book concludes that some truths do not depend on being in any non-trivial way at all. One result of this conclusion is that it is a mistake to oppose a philosophical theory merely because it violates truth's alleged substantive dependence on being. Another result is that the correspondence theory of truth is false and, more fundamentally, that truth itself is not a relation of any sort between truth-bearers and that which makes them true.Less

The Nature and Structure of Content

Jeffrey C. King

Belief in propositions has had a long and distinguished history in analytic philosophy. Three of the founding fathers of analytic philosophy, Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, and G. E. Moore, ... More

Belief in propositions has had a long and distinguished history in analytic philosophy. Three of the founding fathers of analytic philosophy, Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, and G. E. Moore, believed in propositions. Many philosophers since then have shared this belief; and the belief is widely, though certainly not universally, accepted among philosophers today. Among contemporary philosophers who believe in propositions, many, and perhaps even most, take them to be structured entities with individuals, properties, and relations as constituents. For example, the proposition that ‘Glenn loves Tracy’ has Glenn, the loving relation, and Tracy as constituents. What is it, then, that binds these constituents together and imposes structure on them? And if the proposition that ‘Glenn loves Tracy’ is distinct from the proposition that ‘Tracy loves Glenn’ yet both have the same constituents, what is it about the way these constituents are structured or bound together that makes them two different propositions? This book formulates an account of the metaphysical nature of propositions, and provides fresh answers to the above questions. In addition to explaining what it is that binds together the constituents of structured propositions and imposes structure on them, the book deals with some of the standard objections to accounts of propositions: it shows that there is no mystery about what propositions are; that given certain minimal assumptions, it follows that they exist; and that on this approach, we can see how and why propositions manage to have truth conditions and represent the world as being a certain way. The book also contains a detailed account of the nature of tense and modality, and provides a solution to the paradox of analysis.Less

Projection and Realism in Hume's Philosophy

P. J. E. Kail

Hume talks of our ‘gilding and staining’ natural objects, and of the mind's propensity to ‘spread itself’ on the world. This has led commentators to use the metaphor of ‘projection’ in connection ... More

Hume talks of our ‘gilding and staining’ natural objects, and of the mind's propensity to ‘spread itself’ on the world. This has led commentators to use the metaphor of ‘projection’ in connection with his philosophy. This book spells out its meaning, the role it plays in Hume's work, and examines how, if at all, what sounds ‘projective’ in Hume can be reconciled with what sounds ‘realist’. In addition to offering some original readings of Hume's central ideas on God and the Self among other things, this book offers a detailed examination of the notion of projection and the problems it faces.Less

Ordinary Objects

Amie L. Thomasson

Arguments that ordinary inanimate objects such as tables and chairs, sticks and stones, simply do not exist have become increasingly common. Some arguments for eliminativism are based on demands for ... More

Arguments that ordinary inanimate objects such as tables and chairs, sticks and stones, simply do not exist have become increasingly common. Some arguments for eliminativism are based on demands for parsimony or for a non-arbitrary answer to the special composition question; others arise from prohibitions against causal redundancy, ontological vagueness, or colocation; and others still come from worries that a common sense ontology would be a rival to a scientific one. This book makes the case that the mistakes behind all of these superficially diverse eliminativist arguments may be traced to a common source, and may be successfully resisted by adopting a small cluster of interrelated and independently plausible theses about reference, analyticity, and modality. By adopting these theses, we can make sense of our common sense world view without internal contradiction, violation of plausible metaphysical principles, or rivalry with a scientific ontology. In the end, however, the most important result of addressing these eliminativist arguments is not merely avoiding their conclusions. It also leads to important metaontological results, bringing into question widely held assumptions about which uses of metaphysical principles are appropriate, which metaphysical demands are answerable, and how we incur ontological commitments. As a result, the work of this book hopes to provide not only the route to a reflective understanding of our unreflective common sense world view, but also a better understanding of the proper methods and limits of metaphysics.Less

Terry Riley's in C

Robert Carl

This book examines Terry Riley's In C as a new paradigm of “classical” composition. In C is only one page long, consists of fifty-three compact modules, is of open instrumentation and length, and ... More

This book examines Terry Riley's In C as a new paradigm of “classical” composition. In C is only one page long, consists of fifty-three compact modules, is of open instrumentation and length, and generates itself through a set of simple and direct rules. At a time when contemporary concert music was pushing the limits of complexity and information density, In C is an essay in economy; it explores how much can be gotten out of what seems to be so little. Riley's 1964 work is also important in the way it sets the standard for American minimalist repetitive practice, for the use of modality and slow harmonic progression for the acceptance of world music and non-“classical” models, and for the use of structured improvisation to create a new idea of form and development. The book explores the history of In C, in terms of Riley's development as a composer in California in the early 1960s; of the story of the 1964 San Francisco premiere; of the history of the “second premiere” in New York in 1968, when the piece was recorded for Columbia records; and of its influence and legacy as described by subsequent experts and a close examination of later recordings. Throughout there are extensive original interviews with Riley and most of the participants in the 1964 concert and 1968 recording.Less

Laws and Lawmakers Science, Metaphysics, and the Laws of Nature

Marc Lange

Laws of nature have long puzzled philosophers. What distinguishes laws from facts about the world that do not rise to the level of laws? How can laws be contingent and nevertheless necessary? In what ... More

Laws of nature have long puzzled philosophers. What distinguishes laws from facts about the world that do not rise to the level of laws? How can laws be contingent and nevertheless necessary? In what sense are the laws necessary like the broadly logical truths, yet not as necessary as those truths? What are the “lawmakers”: the facts in virtue of which the laws are laws? This book offers provocative and original answers to these questions. It argues that laws are distinguished by their necessity, which is grounded in primitive subjunctive facts (expressed by counterfactual conditionals). This view avoids the notorious circularity afflicting the view that the laws are the truths that would still have held had things been different in any fashion that is logically consistent with … the laws! While recognizing that natural necessity is distinct from logical, metaphysical, and mathematical necessity, the book explains how natural necessity constitutes a species of the same genus as those other varieties of necessity. The book discusses the relation between laws and objective chances, the completeness of the laws of physics, and the laws' immutability, as well as meta-laws such as the symmetry principles so prominent in contemporary physics. It is argued that David Lewis's Humean approach to law fails to do justice the laws' necessity, and that scientific essentialist approaches fail to accommodate the way certain laws transcend the details of others.Less

Necessary Intentionality: A Study in the Metaphysics of Aboutness

Ori Simchen

Are words and thoughts necessarily about what they are about or are they only contingently so? This book defends the former alternative against the latter by articulating a requisite modal background ... More

Are words and thoughts necessarily about what they are about or are they only contingently so? This book defends the former alternative against the latter by articulating a requisite modal background and then bringing this background to bear on cognitive matters—notably the intentionality of cognitive episodes and states. The modal picture that emerges from the first two chapters is a strongly particularist approach whereby all possibilities reduce to possibilities for particular things, where the latter are determined by the natures of the particular things involved. The ensuing three chapters are devoted to the aboutness of referring terms in language and thought. The approach espoused is, once again, strongly particularist in allotting explanatory priority to cognitive episodes and states regarding particular things. The emerging view is that a given use of a name to refer to a particular thing, or a given thought about the thing, could not be what it is without being about the thing it is actually about.Less

The Worlds of Possibility: Modal Realism and the Semantics of Modal Logic

Charles S. Chihara

This book gives a critical exposition of modal realism, the philosophical doctrine that there exist many possible worlds of which the actual world — the universe in which we live — is just one. The ... More

This book gives a critical exposition of modal realism, the philosophical doctrine that there exist many possible worlds of which the actual world — the universe in which we live — is just one. The striking success of possible-worlds semantics in modal logic has made this ontological doctrine attractive. Modal realists maintain that philosophers must accept the existence of possible worlds if they wish to have the benefit of using possible-worlds semantics to assess modal arguments and explain modal principles. The book challenges this claim, and argues instead for modality without worlds; it offers a new account of the role of interpretations or structures of the formal languages of logic.Less

Anselm

Sandra Visser and Thomas Williams

This book offers a brief introduction to the life and thought of Saint Anselm (c. 1033–1109). Anselm, Archbishop of Canterbury for the last sixteen years of his life, is one of the foremost ... More

This book offers a brief introduction to the life and thought of Saint Anselm (c. 1033–1109). Anselm, Archbishop of Canterbury for the last sixteen years of his life, is one of the foremost philosopher-theologians of the Middle Ages. His keen and rigorous thinking earned him the title “The Father of Scholasticism”, and his influence is discernible in figures as various as Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus, the voluntarists of the late-13th and 14th centuries, and the Protestant reformers. Part I of this book lays out the framework of Anselm's thought: his approach to what he calls “the reason of faith”, his account of thought and language, and his theory of truth. Part II focuses on Anselm's account of God and the divine attributes, and it shows how Anselm applies his theory of language and thought to develop a theological semantics that at once respects divine transcendence and allows for the possibility of divine rational knowledge. In Part III, the book turns from the heavenly to the animal. It elucidates Anselm's theory of modality and his understanding of free choice, an idea that was, for Anselm, embedded in his conception of justice. The book concludes with a discussion of Incarnation, Atonement, and original sin, as the chapters examine Anselm's argument that the death of a God-man is the only possible remedy for human injustice.Less

Modality and Tense: Philosophical Papers

Kit Fine

This book is collection of the the author’s previously published papers on the philosophy of modality and tense and it also includes three unpublished papers. The author provides an exposition and ... More

This book is collection of the the author’s previously published papers on the philosophy of modality and tense and it also includes three unpublished papers. The author provides an exposition and defence of certain positions for which he is well-known: the intelligibility of modality de re; the primitiveness of the modal; and the primacy of the actual over the possible. He also argues for some less familiar positions: the existence of distinctive forms of natural and normative necessity, not reducible to any form of metaphysical necessity; the need to make a distinction between the worldly and unworldly, analogous to the distinction between the tensed and the tenseless; and the viability of a nonstandard form of realism about tense, which recognizes the tensed character of reality without conceding there is any privileged standpoint from which it is to be viewed.Less

Essays in the Metaphysics of Modality

Alvin Plantinga

Matthew Davidson (ed.)

This book is a collection of my essays, dating from 1969, concerning the metaphysics of modality. The first two chapters are a defense of the idea of modality de re against criticisms from William ... More

This book is a collection of my essays, dating from 1969, concerning the metaphysics of modality. The first two chapters are a defense of the idea of modality de re against criticisms from William Kneale and W. V. Quine, and an elaboration on the notions of possible worlds and essences. In the third chapter, I conclude that the Theory of Worldbound Individuals is false, even when fortified with Counterpart Theory. Chapter 4 contains an argument for the conclusion that there neither are, nor could have been, possible but nonexistent objects. In the next chapter, I develop this theme in greater detail and argue for the compatibility of actualism – i.e., the view that there neither are, nor could have been, any nonexistent objects – and possible worlds. Both Chs. 6 and 7 contain an account of the relationship between proper names and essences, my view being that proper names express essences and that sometimes different proper names for the same object express different essences of that object. The end of Ch. 7 and all of Ch. 8 are an examination of existentialism (the theory that propositions and states of affairs ontologically depend on their subjects) and arguments against it. In Ch. 9, I defend my theory of modality against objections raised by John Pollock. In Ch. 10, I sketch out what the commitments of modal realism are, and argue that David Lewis's modal theory is not a modal realist theory. Finally, in the concluding chapter I argue that propositions cannot be concrete objects.Less

Oxford Studies in Metaphysics volume 7

Karen Bennett and Dean W. Zimmerman (eds)

Oxford Studies in Metaphysics is dedicated to the timely publication of new work in metaphysics, broadly construed. These volumes provide a forum for the best new work in this flourishing field. They ... More

Oxford Studies in Metaphysics is dedicated to the timely publication of new work in metaphysics, broadly construed. These volumes provide a forum for the best new work in this flourishing field. They offer a broad view of the subject, featuring not only the traditionally central topics such as existence, identity, modality, time, and causation, but also the rich clusters of metaphysical questions in neighbouring fields, such as philosophy of mind and philosophy of science. This book is the seventh volume in the series. Topics covered include counterpart theory, the idea of absolute generality, humean supervenience, coincident objects, open future, presentism, laws, and identity.Less