Trenton Merricks
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199205233
- eISBN:
- 9780191709302
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199205233.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book explores how truth depends on the world or on things or on being, and examines philosophical debates concerning modality, time, and dispositions. For accounts of truth's dependence on being ...
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This book explores how truth depends on the world or on things or on being, and examines philosophical debates concerning modality, time, and dispositions. For accounts of truth's dependence on being have implications for these debates. Moreover, these debates have implications for how truth depends on being. Along the way, the book makes a number of new points about each of these debates, points that are of interest quite apart from the question of truth's dependence on being. The book concludes that some truths do not depend on being in any non-trivial way at all. One result of this conclusion is that it is a mistake to oppose a philosophical theory merely because it violates truth's alleged substantive dependence on being. Another result is that the correspondence theory of truth is false and, more fundamentally, that truth itself is not a relation of any sort between truth-bearers and that which makes them true.Less
This book explores how truth depends on the world or on things or on being, and examines philosophical debates concerning modality, time, and dispositions. For accounts of truth's dependence on being have implications for these debates. Moreover, these debates have implications for how truth depends on being. Along the way, the book makes a number of new points about each of these debates, points that are of interest quite apart from the question of truth's dependence on being. The book concludes that some truths do not depend on being in any non-trivial way at all. One result of this conclusion is that it is a mistake to oppose a philosophical theory merely because it violates truth's alleged substantive dependence on being. Another result is that the correspondence theory of truth is false and, more fundamentally, that truth itself is not a relation of any sort between truth-bearers and that which makes them true.
Jeffrey C. King
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199226061
- eISBN:
- 9780191710377
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199226061.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
Belief in propositions has had a long and distinguished history in analytic philosophy. Three of the founding fathers of analytic philosophy, Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, and G. E. Moore, ...
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Belief in propositions has had a long and distinguished history in analytic philosophy. Three of the founding fathers of analytic philosophy, Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, and G. E. Moore, believed in propositions. Many philosophers since then have shared this belief; and the belief is widely, though certainly not universally, accepted among philosophers today. Among contemporary philosophers who believe in propositions, many, and perhaps even most, take them to be structured entities with individuals, properties, and relations as constituents. For example, the proposition that ‘Glenn loves Tracy’ has Glenn, the loving relation, and Tracy as constituents. What is it, then, that binds these constituents together and imposes structure on them? And if the proposition that ‘Glenn loves Tracy’ is distinct from the proposition that ‘Tracy loves Glenn’ yet both have the same constituents, what is it about the way these constituents are structured or bound together that makes them two different propositions? This book formulates an account of the metaphysical nature of propositions, and provides fresh answers to the above questions. In addition to explaining what it is that binds together the constituents of structured propositions and imposes structure on them, the book deals with some of the standard objections to accounts of propositions: it shows that there is no mystery about what propositions are; that given certain minimal assumptions, it follows that they exist; and that on this approach, we can see how and why propositions manage to have truth conditions and represent the world as being a certain way. The book also contains a detailed account of the nature of tense and modality, and provides a solution to the paradox of analysis.Less
Belief in propositions has had a long and distinguished history in analytic philosophy. Three of the founding fathers of analytic philosophy, Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, and G. E. Moore, believed in propositions. Many philosophers since then have shared this belief; and the belief is widely, though certainly not universally, accepted among philosophers today. Among contemporary philosophers who believe in propositions, many, and perhaps even most, take them to be structured entities with individuals, properties, and relations as constituents. For example, the proposition that ‘Glenn loves Tracy’ has Glenn, the loving relation, and Tracy as constituents. What is it, then, that binds these constituents together and imposes structure on them? And if the proposition that ‘Glenn loves Tracy’ is distinct from the proposition that ‘Tracy loves Glenn’ yet both have the same constituents, what is it about the way these constituents are structured or bound together that makes them two different propositions? This book formulates an account of the metaphysical nature of propositions, and provides fresh answers to the above questions. In addition to explaining what it is that binds together the constituents of structured propositions and imposes structure on them, the book deals with some of the standard objections to accounts of propositions: it shows that there is no mystery about what propositions are; that given certain minimal assumptions, it follows that they exist; and that on this approach, we can see how and why propositions manage to have truth conditions and represent the world as being a certain way. The book also contains a detailed account of the nature of tense and modality, and provides a solution to the paradox of analysis.
P. J. E. Kail
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199229505
- eISBN:
- 9780191710728
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199229505.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Hume talks of our ‘gilding and staining’ natural objects, and of the mind's propensity to ‘spread itself’ on the world. This has led commentators to use the metaphor of ‘projection’ in connection ...
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Hume talks of our ‘gilding and staining’ natural objects, and of the mind's propensity to ‘spread itself’ on the world. This has led commentators to use the metaphor of ‘projection’ in connection with his philosophy. This book spells out its meaning, the role it plays in Hume's work, and examines how, if at all, what sounds ‘projective’ in Hume can be reconciled with what sounds ‘realist’. In addition to offering some original readings of Hume's central ideas on God and the Self among other things, this book offers a detailed examination of the notion of projection and the problems it faces.Less
Hume talks of our ‘gilding and staining’ natural objects, and of the mind's propensity to ‘spread itself’ on the world. This has led commentators to use the metaphor of ‘projection’ in connection with his philosophy. This book spells out its meaning, the role it plays in Hume's work, and examines how, if at all, what sounds ‘projective’ in Hume can be reconciled with what sounds ‘realist’. In addition to offering some original readings of Hume's central ideas on God and the Self among other things, this book offers a detailed examination of the notion of projection and the problems it faces.
Amie L. Thomasson
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195319910
- eISBN:
- 9780199869602
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195319910.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Arguments that ordinary inanimate objects such as tables and chairs, sticks and stones, simply do not exist have become increasingly common. Some arguments for eliminativism are based on demands for ...
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Arguments that ordinary inanimate objects such as tables and chairs, sticks and stones, simply do not exist have become increasingly common. Some arguments for eliminativism are based on demands for parsimony or for a non-arbitrary answer to the special composition question; others arise from prohibitions against causal redundancy, ontological vagueness, or colocation; and others still come from worries that a common sense ontology would be a rival to a scientific one. This book makes the case that the mistakes behind all of these superficially diverse eliminativist arguments may be traced to a common source, and may be successfully resisted by adopting a small cluster of interrelated and independently plausible theses about reference, analyticity, and modality. By adopting these theses, we can make sense of our common sense world view without internal contradiction, violation of plausible metaphysical principles, or rivalry with a scientific ontology. In the end, however, the most important result of addressing these eliminativist arguments is not merely avoiding their conclusions. It also leads to important metaontological results, bringing into question widely held assumptions about which uses of metaphysical principles are appropriate, which metaphysical demands are answerable, and how we incur ontological commitments. As a result, the work of this book hopes to provide not only the route to a reflective understanding of our unreflective common sense world view, but also a better understanding of the proper methods and limits of metaphysics.Less
Arguments that ordinary inanimate objects such as tables and chairs, sticks and stones, simply do not exist have become increasingly common. Some arguments for eliminativism are based on demands for parsimony or for a non-arbitrary answer to the special composition question; others arise from prohibitions against causal redundancy, ontological vagueness, or colocation; and others still come from worries that a common sense ontology would be a rival to a scientific one. This book makes the case that the mistakes behind all of these superficially diverse eliminativist arguments may be traced to a common source, and may be successfully resisted by adopting a small cluster of interrelated and independently plausible theses about reference, analyticity, and modality. By adopting these theses, we can make sense of our common sense world view without internal contradiction, violation of plausible metaphysical principles, or rivalry with a scientific ontology. In the end, however, the most important result of addressing these eliminativist arguments is not merely avoiding their conclusions. It also leads to important metaontological results, bringing into question widely held assumptions about which uses of metaphysical principles are appropriate, which metaphysical demands are answerable, and how we incur ontological commitments. As a result, the work of this book hopes to provide not only the route to a reflective understanding of our unreflective common sense world view, but also a better understanding of the proper methods and limits of metaphysics.
Robert Carl
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195325287
- eISBN:
- 9780199869428
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195325287.001.0001
- Subject:
- Music, Popular, History, American
This book examines Terry Riley's In C as a new paradigm of “classical” composition. In C is only one page long, consists of fifty-three compact modules, is of open instrumentation and length, and ...
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This book examines Terry Riley's In C as a new paradigm of “classical” composition. In C is only one page long, consists of fifty-three compact modules, is of open instrumentation and length, and generates itself through a set of simple and direct rules. At a time when contemporary concert music was pushing the limits of complexity and information density, In C is an essay in economy; it explores how much can be gotten out of what seems to be so little. Riley's 1964 work is also important in the way it sets the standard for American minimalist repetitive practice, for the use of modality and slow harmonic progression for the acceptance of world music and non-“classical” models, and for the use of structured improvisation to create a new idea of form and development. The book explores the history of In C, in terms of Riley's development as a composer in California in the early 1960s; of the story of the 1964 San Francisco premiere; of the history of the “second premiere” in New York in 1968, when the piece was recorded for Columbia records; and of its influence and legacy as described by subsequent experts and a close examination of later recordings. Throughout there are extensive original interviews with Riley and most of the participants in the 1964 concert and 1968 recording.Less
This book examines Terry Riley's In C as a new paradigm of “classical” composition. In C is only one page long, consists of fifty-three compact modules, is of open instrumentation and length, and generates itself through a set of simple and direct rules. At a time when contemporary concert music was pushing the limits of complexity and information density, In C is an essay in economy; it explores how much can be gotten out of what seems to be so little. Riley's 1964 work is also important in the way it sets the standard for American minimalist repetitive practice, for the use of modality and slow harmonic progression for the acceptance of world music and non-“classical” models, and for the use of structured improvisation to create a new idea of form and development. The book explores the history of In C, in terms of Riley's development as a composer in California in the early 1960s; of the story of the 1964 San Francisco premiere; of the history of the “second premiere” in New York in 1968, when the piece was recorded for Columbia records; and of its influence and legacy as described by subsequent experts and a close examination of later recordings. Throughout there are extensive original interviews with Riley and most of the participants in the 1964 concert and 1968 recording.
Marc Lange
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195328134
- eISBN:
- 9780199870042
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195328134.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
Laws of nature have long puzzled philosophers. What distinguishes laws from facts about the world that do not rise to the level of laws? How can laws be contingent and nevertheless necessary? In what ...
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Laws of nature have long puzzled philosophers. What distinguishes laws from facts about the world that do not rise to the level of laws? How can laws be contingent and nevertheless necessary? In what sense are the laws necessary like the broadly logical truths, yet not as necessary as those truths? What are the “lawmakers”: the facts in virtue of which the laws are laws? This book offers provocative and original answers to these questions. It argues that laws are distinguished by their necessity, which is grounded in primitive subjunctive facts (expressed by counterfactual conditionals). This view avoids the notorious circularity afflicting the view that the laws are the truths that would still have held had things been different in any fashion that is logically consistent with … the laws! While recognizing that natural necessity is distinct from logical, metaphysical, and mathematical necessity, the book explains how natural necessity constitutes a species of the same genus as those other varieties of necessity. The book discusses the relation between laws and objective chances, the completeness of the laws of physics, and the laws' immutability, as well as meta-laws such as the symmetry principles so prominent in contemporary physics. It is argued that David Lewis's Humean approach to law fails to do justice the laws' necessity, and that scientific essentialist approaches fail to accommodate the way certain laws transcend the details of others.Less
Laws of nature have long puzzled philosophers. What distinguishes laws from facts about the world that do not rise to the level of laws? How can laws be contingent and nevertheless necessary? In what sense are the laws necessary like the broadly logical truths, yet not as necessary as those truths? What are the “lawmakers”: the facts in virtue of which the laws are laws? This book offers provocative and original answers to these questions. It argues that laws are distinguished by their necessity, which is grounded in primitive subjunctive facts (expressed by counterfactual conditionals). This view avoids the notorious circularity afflicting the view that the laws are the truths that would still have held had things been different in any fashion that is logically consistent with … the laws! While recognizing that natural necessity is distinct from logical, metaphysical, and mathematical necessity, the book explains how natural necessity constitutes a species of the same genus as those other varieties of necessity. The book discusses the relation between laws and objective chances, the completeness of the laws of physics, and the laws' immutability, as well as meta-laws such as the symmetry principles so prominent in contemporary physics. It is argued that David Lewis's Humean approach to law fails to do justice the laws' necessity, and that scientific essentialist approaches fail to accommodate the way certain laws transcend the details of others.
Ori Simchen
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199608515
- eISBN:
- 9780191738241
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199608515.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Language
Are words and thoughts necessarily about what they are about or are they only contingently so? This book defends the former alternative against the latter by articulating a requisite modal background ...
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Are words and thoughts necessarily about what they are about or are they only contingently so? This book defends the former alternative against the latter by articulating a requisite modal background and then bringing this background to bear on cognitive matters—notably the intentionality of cognitive episodes and states. The modal picture that emerges from the first two chapters is a strongly particularist approach whereby all possibilities reduce to possibilities for particular things, where the latter are determined by the natures of the particular things involved. The ensuing three chapters are devoted to the aboutness of referring terms in language and thought. The approach espoused is, once again, strongly particularist in allotting explanatory priority to cognitive episodes and states regarding particular things. The emerging view is that a given use of a name to refer to a particular thing, or a given thought about the thing, could not be what it is without being about the thing it is actually about.Less
Are words and thoughts necessarily about what they are about or are they only contingently so? This book defends the former alternative against the latter by articulating a requisite modal background and then bringing this background to bear on cognitive matters—notably the intentionality of cognitive episodes and states. The modal picture that emerges from the first two chapters is a strongly particularist approach whereby all possibilities reduce to possibilities for particular things, where the latter are determined by the natures of the particular things involved. The ensuing three chapters are devoted to the aboutness of referring terms in language and thought. The approach espoused is, once again, strongly particularist in allotting explanatory priority to cognitive episodes and states regarding particular things. The emerging view is that a given use of a name to refer to a particular thing, or a given thought about the thing, could not be what it is without being about the thing it is actually about.
Charles S. Chihara
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199246557
- eISBN:
- 9780191697609
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199246557.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book gives a critical exposition of modal realism, the philosophical doctrine that there exist many possible worlds of which the actual world — the universe in which we live — is just one. The ...
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This book gives a critical exposition of modal realism, the philosophical doctrine that there exist many possible worlds of which the actual world — the universe in which we live — is just one. The striking success of possible-worlds semantics in modal logic has made this ontological doctrine attractive. Modal realists maintain that philosophers must accept the existence of possible worlds if they wish to have the benefit of using possible-worlds semantics to assess modal arguments and explain modal principles. The book challenges this claim, and argues instead for modality without worlds; it offers a new account of the role of interpretations or structures of the formal languages of logic.Less
This book gives a critical exposition of modal realism, the philosophical doctrine that there exist many possible worlds of which the actual world — the universe in which we live — is just one. The striking success of possible-worlds semantics in modal logic has made this ontological doctrine attractive. Modal realists maintain that philosophers must accept the existence of possible worlds if they wish to have the benefit of using possible-worlds semantics to assess modal arguments and explain modal principles. The book challenges this claim, and argues instead for modality without worlds; it offers a new account of the role of interpretations or structures of the formal languages of logic.
Sarah Waterlow
- Published in print:
- 1982
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198246565
- eISBN:
- 9780191681011
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198246565.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book attempts to expound on Aristotle's views on time and modality. The term ‘attempt’ is used because on either subject Aristotle's thoughts are amongst his least accessible. In the relevant ...
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This book attempts to expound on Aristotle's views on time and modality. The term ‘attempt’ is used because on either subject Aristotle's thoughts are amongst his least accessible. In the relevant passages we face obscurities of language and occasional dubieties of text. But the main difficulties lie not with these. Often enough the words are clear, yet their import continues to evade systematic philosophical comprehension. To some extent this is true even when Aristotle is considering time and modality as separate topics. But perhaps the most frustrating puzzles arise over various connections he draws between temporal and modal concepts. For if one thing is certain, it is that he sees necessity and possibility as related to time in ways that find no echo in the standard modern treatment of these modalities. The book focuses on the following texts — De Gaela 1.12 and De Interpretatione 9 — and draws on Professor J. Hintikka's series of studies on the relation of modality to time in Aristotle.Less
This book attempts to expound on Aristotle's views on time and modality. The term ‘attempt’ is used because on either subject Aristotle's thoughts are amongst his least accessible. In the relevant passages we face obscurities of language and occasional dubieties of text. But the main difficulties lie not with these. Often enough the words are clear, yet their import continues to evade systematic philosophical comprehension. To some extent this is true even when Aristotle is considering time and modality as separate topics. But perhaps the most frustrating puzzles arise over various connections he draws between temporal and modal concepts. For if one thing is certain, it is that he sees necessity and possibility as related to time in ways that find no echo in the standard modern treatment of these modalities. The book focuses on the following texts — De Gaela 1.12 and De Interpretatione 9 — and draws on Professor J. Hintikka's series of studies on the relation of modality to time in Aristotle.
Sandra Visser and Thomas Williams
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195309386
- eISBN:
- 9780199852123
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195309386.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
This book offers a brief introduction to the life and thought of Saint Anselm (c. 1033–1109). Anselm, Archbishop of Canterbury for the last sixteen years of his life, is one of the foremost ...
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This book offers a brief introduction to the life and thought of Saint Anselm (c. 1033–1109). Anselm, Archbishop of Canterbury for the last sixteen years of his life, is one of the foremost philosopher-theologians of the Middle Ages. His keen and rigorous thinking earned him the title “The Father of Scholasticism”, and his influence is discernible in figures as various as Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus, the voluntarists of the late-13th and 14th centuries, and the Protestant reformers. Part I of this book lays out the framework of Anselm's thought: his approach to what he calls “the reason of faith”, his account of thought and language, and his theory of truth. Part II focuses on Anselm's account of God and the divine attributes, and it shows how Anselm applies his theory of language and thought to develop a theological semantics that at once respects divine transcendence and allows for the possibility of divine rational knowledge. In Part III, the book turns from the heavenly to the animal. It elucidates Anselm's theory of modality and his understanding of free choice, an idea that was, for Anselm, embedded in his conception of justice. The book concludes with a discussion of Incarnation, Atonement, and original sin, as the chapters examine Anselm's argument that the death of a God-man is the only possible remedy for human injustice.Less
This book offers a brief introduction to the life and thought of Saint Anselm (c. 1033–1109). Anselm, Archbishop of Canterbury for the last sixteen years of his life, is one of the foremost philosopher-theologians of the Middle Ages. His keen and rigorous thinking earned him the title “The Father of Scholasticism”, and his influence is discernible in figures as various as Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus, the voluntarists of the late-13th and 14th centuries, and the Protestant reformers. Part I of this book lays out the framework of Anselm's thought: his approach to what he calls “the reason of faith”, his account of thought and language, and his theory of truth. Part II focuses on Anselm's account of God and the divine attributes, and it shows how Anselm applies his theory of language and thought to develop a theological semantics that at once respects divine transcendence and allows for the possibility of divine rational knowledge. In Part III, the book turns from the heavenly to the animal. It elucidates Anselm's theory of modality and his understanding of free choice, an idea that was, for Anselm, embedded in his conception of justice. The book concludes with a discussion of Incarnation, Atonement, and original sin, as the chapters examine Anselm's argument that the death of a God-man is the only possible remedy for human injustice.
Nathan Salmon
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199284719
- eISBN:
- 9780191603235
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199284717.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
It is argued, against Randolph Carter, that if there are merely possible worlds, then indeed there are also impossible worlds. Worlds are things, but impossible worlds are not impossible things. A ...
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It is argued, against Randolph Carter, that if there are merely possible worlds, then indeed there are also impossible worlds. Worlds are things, but impossible worlds are not impossible things. A world, in the sense in which the actual world is only one among many, is a maximal scenario, a total way for things to be-all things. The actual world is the way things are. Merely possible worlds are ways things might have been but are not. Impossible worlds are ways things could not have been.Less
It is argued, against Randolph Carter, that if there are merely possible worlds, then indeed there are also impossible worlds. Worlds are things, but impossible worlds are not impossible things. A world, in the sense in which the actual world is only one among many, is a maximal scenario, a total way for things to be-all things. The actual world is the way things are. Merely possible worlds are ways things might have been but are not. Impossible worlds are ways things could not have been.
Stewart Shapiro
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195139303
- eISBN:
- 9780199833658
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195139305.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
The philosophy of mathematics articulated and defended in this book goes by the name of “structuralism”, and its slogan is that mathematics is the science of structure. The subject matter of ...
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The philosophy of mathematics articulated and defended in this book goes by the name of “structuralism”, and its slogan is that mathematics is the science of structure. The subject matter of arithmetic, for example, is the natural number structure, the pattern common to any countably infinite system of objects with a distinguished initial object and a successor relation that satisfies the induction principle. The essence of each natural number is its relation to the other natural numbers. One way to understand structuralism is to reify structures as ante rem universals. This would be a platonism concerning mathematical objects, which are the places within such structures. Alternatively, one can take an eliminative, in re approach, and understand talk of structures as shorthand for talk of systems of objects or, invoking modality, talk of possible systems of objects. Shapiro argues that although the realist, ante rem approach is the most perspicuous, in a sense, the various accounts are equivalent. Along the way, the ontological and epistemological aspects of the structuralist philosophies are assessed. One key aspect is to show how each philosophy deals with reference to mathematical objects. The view is tentatively extended to objects generally: to science and ordinary discourse.Less
The philosophy of mathematics articulated and defended in this book goes by the name of “structuralism”, and its slogan is that mathematics is the science of structure. The subject matter of arithmetic, for example, is the natural number structure, the pattern common to any countably infinite system of objects with a distinguished initial object and a successor relation that satisfies the induction principle. The essence of each natural number is its relation to the other natural numbers. One way to understand structuralism is to reify structures as ante rem universals. This would be a platonism concerning mathematical objects, which are the places within such structures. Alternatively, one can take an eliminative, in re approach, and understand talk of structures as shorthand for talk of systems of objects or, invoking modality, talk of possible systems of objects. Shapiro argues that although the realist, ante rem approach is the most perspicuous, in a sense, the various accounts are equivalent. Along the way, the ontological and epistemological aspects of the structuralist philosophies are assessed. One key aspect is to show how each philosophy deals with reference to mathematical objects. The view is tentatively extended to objects generally: to science and ordinary discourse.
Alvin Plantinga
Matthew Davidson (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195103762
- eISBN:
- 9780199833573
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195103769.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book is a collection of my essays, dating from 1969, concerning the metaphysics of modality. The first two chapters are a defense of the idea of modality de re against criticisms from William ...
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This book is a collection of my essays, dating from 1969, concerning the metaphysics of modality. The first two chapters are a defense of the idea of modality de re against criticisms from William Kneale and W. V. Quine, and an elaboration on the notions of possible worlds and essences. In the third chapter, I conclude that the Theory of Worldbound Individuals is false, even when fortified with Counterpart Theory. Chapter 4 contains an argument for the conclusion that there neither are, nor could have been, possible but nonexistent objects. In the next chapter, I develop this theme in greater detail and argue for the compatibility of actualism – i.e., the view that there neither are, nor could have been, any nonexistent objects – and possible worlds. Both Chs. 6 and 7 contain an account of the relationship between proper names and essences, my view being that proper names express essences and that sometimes different proper names for the same object express different essences of that object. The end of Ch. 7 and all of Ch. 8 are an examination of existentialism (the theory that propositions and states of affairs ontologically depend on their subjects) and arguments against it. In Ch. 9, I defend my theory of modality against objections raised by John Pollock. In Ch. 10, I sketch out what the commitments of modal realism are, and argue that David Lewis's modal theory is not a modal realist theory. Finally, in the concluding chapter I argue that propositions cannot be concrete objects.Less
This book is a collection of my essays, dating from 1969, concerning the metaphysics of modality. The first two chapters are a defense of the idea of modality de re against criticisms from William Kneale and W. V. Quine, and an elaboration on the notions of possible worlds and essences. In the third chapter, I conclude that the Theory of Worldbound Individuals is false, even when fortified with Counterpart Theory. Chapter 4 contains an argument for the conclusion that there neither are, nor could have been, possible but nonexistent objects. In the next chapter, I develop this theme in greater detail and argue for the compatibility of actualism – i.e., the view that there neither are, nor could have been, any nonexistent objects – and possible worlds. Both Chs. 6 and 7 contain an account of the relationship between proper names and essences, my view being that proper names express essences and that sometimes different proper names for the same object express different essences of that object. The end of Ch. 7 and all of Ch. 8 are an examination of existentialism (the theory that propositions and states of affairs ontologically depend on their subjects) and arguments against it. In Ch. 9, I defend my theory of modality against objections raised by John Pollock. In Ch. 10, I sketch out what the commitments of modal realism are, and argue that David Lewis's modal theory is not a modal realist theory. Finally, in the concluding chapter I argue that propositions cannot be concrete objects.
Alvin Plantinga
- Published in print:
- 1978
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198244141
- eISBN:
- 9780191598241
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198244142.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book is a study of the concept of necessity. In the first three chapters, I clarify and defend the distinction between modality de re and modality de dicto. Also, I show how to explain de re ...
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This book is a study of the concept of necessity. In the first three chapters, I clarify and defend the distinction between modality de re and modality de dicto. Also, I show how to explain de re modality in terms of de dicto modality. In Ch. 4, I explicate the concept of a possible world and define what it is for an object x to have a property P essentially. I then use the concept of an essential property to give an account of essences and their relationship to proper names. In Ch. 6, I argue that the Theory of Worldbound Individuals—even when fortified with Counterpart Theory—is false. Chapters 7 and 8 address the subject of possible but non‐existent objects; I argue here for the conclusion that there is no good reason to think that there are any such objects. In Ch. 9, I apply my theory of modality to the Problem of Evil in an effort to show that the Free Will Defense defeats this particular objection to theism. In Ch. 10, I present a sound modal version of the ontological argument for the existence of God. Finally, in the appendix, I address Quinean objections to quantified modal logic.Less
This book is a study of the concept of necessity. In the first three chapters, I clarify and defend the distinction between modality de re and modality de dicto. Also, I show how to explain de re modality in terms of de dicto modality. In Ch. 4, I explicate the concept of a possible world and define what it is for an object x to have a property P essentially. I then use the concept of an essential property to give an account of essences and their relationship to proper names. In Ch. 6, I argue that the Theory of Worldbound Individuals—even when fortified with Counterpart Theory—is false. Chapters 7 and 8 address the subject of possible but non‐existent objects; I argue here for the conclusion that there is no good reason to think that there are any such objects. In Ch. 9, I apply my theory of modality to the Problem of Evil in an effort to show that the Free Will Defense defeats this particular objection to theism. In Ch. 10, I present a sound modal version of the ontological argument for the existence of God. Finally, in the appendix, I address Quinean objections to quantified modal logic.
Kit Fine
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199278701
- eISBN:
- 9780191603105
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199278709.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This book is collection of the the author’s previously published papers on the philosophy of modality and tense and it also includes three unpublished papers. The author provides an exposition and ...
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This book is collection of the the author’s previously published papers on the philosophy of modality and tense and it also includes three unpublished papers. The author provides an exposition and defence of certain positions for which he is well-known: the intelligibility of modality de re; the primitiveness of the modal; and the primacy of the actual over the possible. He also argues for some less familiar positions: the existence of distinctive forms of natural and normative necessity, not reducible to any form of metaphysical necessity; the need to make a distinction between the worldly and unworldly, analogous to the distinction between the tensed and the tenseless; and the viability of a nonstandard form of realism about tense, which recognizes the tensed character of reality without conceding there is any privileged standpoint from which it is to be viewed.Less
This book is collection of the the author’s previously published papers on the philosophy of modality and tense and it also includes three unpublished papers. The author provides an exposition and defence of certain positions for which he is well-known: the intelligibility of modality de re; the primitiveness of the modal; and the primacy of the actual over the possible. He also argues for some less familiar positions: the existence of distinctive forms of natural and normative necessity, not reducible to any form of metaphysical necessity; the need to make a distinction between the worldly and unworldly, analogous to the distinction between the tensed and the tenseless; and the viability of a nonstandard form of realism about tense, which recognizes the tensed character of reality without conceding there is any privileged standpoint from which it is to be viewed.
PETER SIMONS
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199241460
- eISBN:
- 9780191696930
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199241460.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
This book provides a connected account of the various kinds of mereology, or formal theory of part, whole, and related concepts, which exist in the literature. It also exposes the philosophical ...
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This book provides a connected account of the various kinds of mereology, or formal theory of part, whole, and related concepts, which exist in the literature. It also exposes the philosophical defects of most of this tradition, and suggests why, where, and how it should be put right. The standardly accepted formal theory of part-whole is classical extensional mereology, which is known in two logical guises, the Calculus of Individuals of Henry Leonard and Nelson Goodman, and the Mereology of Stanislaw Leśniewski. Despite the discrepancies between the underlying logics of these two approaches, there is a precise sense in which both say the same things about parts and wholes. The book also considers the mereology of continuants and brings modality and mereology together as they are found in the work of Edmund Husserl at the beginning of the century and later in that of Roderick Chisholm.Less
This book provides a connected account of the various kinds of mereology, or formal theory of part, whole, and related concepts, which exist in the literature. It also exposes the philosophical defects of most of this tradition, and suggests why, where, and how it should be put right. The standardly accepted formal theory of part-whole is classical extensional mereology, which is known in two logical guises, the Calculus of Individuals of Henry Leonard and Nelson Goodman, and the Mereology of Stanislaw Leśniewski. Despite the discrepancies between the underlying logics of these two approaches, there is a precise sense in which both say the same things about parts and wholes. The book also considers the mereology of continuants and brings modality and mereology together as they are found in the work of Edmund Husserl at the beginning of the century and later in that of Roderick Chisholm.
PETER SIMONS
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199241460
- eISBN:
- 9780191696930
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199241460.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
This book has shown that mereology was dominated by a single theory: classical extensional mereology (CEM), present in two logical guises — the Calculus of Individuals and Mereology — each in a ...
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This book has shown that mereology was dominated by a single theory: classical extensional mereology (CEM), present in two logical guises — the Calculus of Individuals and Mereology — each in a number of variants. CEM is algebraically neat: only a complete Boolean algebra is neater. It is also strong. CEM is tenseless, non-modal, upholds extensionality of parts, and upholds the conditioned existence of general sums. The first two characteristics are privative, while the last two are positive. Among approaches at variance with CEM, most retain the first three characteristics and drop the last in favour of some weaker conditional existence principle. In the face of apparent temporal and modal variation, two major strategies have been followed. The first ignores modality and attempts to retain the third characteristic by recourse to an ontology of four-dimensional objects. The second strategy, that of Roderick Chisholm, takes both time and modality seriously, but preserves the third characteristic by putting forward an ontology, opposed to common sense, of modally and temporally invariable objects.Less
This book has shown that mereology was dominated by a single theory: classical extensional mereology (CEM), present in two logical guises — the Calculus of Individuals and Mereology — each in a number of variants. CEM is algebraically neat: only a complete Boolean algebra is neater. It is also strong. CEM is tenseless, non-modal, upholds extensionality of parts, and upholds the conditioned existence of general sums. The first two characteristics are privative, while the last two are positive. Among approaches at variance with CEM, most retain the first three characteristics and drop the last in favour of some weaker conditional existence principle. In the face of apparent temporal and modal variation, two major strategies have been followed. The first ignores modality and attempts to retain the third characteristic by recourse to an ontology of four-dimensional objects. The second strategy, that of Roderick Chisholm, takes both time and modality seriously, but preserves the third characteristic by putting forward an ontology, opposed to common sense, of modally and temporally invariable objects.
Thomas Sattig
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199279524
- eISBN:
- 9780191604041
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199279527.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
This chapter presents a new account of temporal predication — the representational account — combined with four-dimensionalism to yield the temporal-parts account of temporal supervenience. This ...
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This chapter presents a new account of temporal predication — the representational account — combined with four-dimensionalism to yield the temporal-parts account of temporal supervenience. This elegant account asserts and explains the theses that the facts of persistence logically supervene on facts about the spatiotemporal location of temporal parts of objects, and that the facts of temporal instantiation logically supervene on facts about the atemporal instantiation of properties by temporal parts of objects. It is further shown that the questions of temporal supervenience as well as the four-dimensionalist answers to these questions have interesting spatial and modal analogues. Despite its success in explaining the supervenience of facts of persistence and change, the temporal-parts account has objectionable consequences. Three problems are raised, the most serious of which is the problem of predicational overkill. Each of these problems concerns the account’s failure to capture certain ordinary temporal facts.Less
This chapter presents a new account of temporal predication — the representational account — combined with four-dimensionalism to yield the temporal-parts account of temporal supervenience. This elegant account asserts and explains the theses that the facts of persistence logically supervene on facts about the spatiotemporal location of temporal parts of objects, and that the facts of temporal instantiation logically supervene on facts about the atemporal instantiation of properties by temporal parts of objects. It is further shown that the questions of temporal supervenience as well as the four-dimensionalist answers to these questions have interesting spatial and modal analogues. Despite its success in explaining the supervenience of facts of persistence and change, the temporal-parts account has objectionable consequences. Three problems are raised, the most serious of which is the problem of predicational overkill. Each of these problems concerns the account’s failure to capture certain ordinary temporal facts.
Karen Bennett and Dean W. Zimmerman (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199659081
- eISBN:
- 9780191745201
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199659081.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Oxford Studies in Metaphysics is dedicated to the timely publication of new work in metaphysics, broadly construed. These volumes provide a forum for the best new work in this flourishing field. They ...
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Oxford Studies in Metaphysics is dedicated to the timely publication of new work in metaphysics, broadly construed. These volumes provide a forum for the best new work in this flourishing field. They offer a broad view of the subject, featuring not only the traditionally central topics such as existence, identity, modality, time, and causation, but also the rich clusters of metaphysical questions in neighbouring fields, such as philosophy of mind and philosophy of science. This book is the seventh volume in the series. Topics covered include counterpart theory, the idea of absolute generality, humean supervenience, coincident objects, open future, presentism, laws, and identity.Less
Oxford Studies in Metaphysics is dedicated to the timely publication of new work in metaphysics, broadly construed. These volumes provide a forum for the best new work in this flourishing field. They offer a broad view of the subject, featuring not only the traditionally central topics such as existence, identity, modality, time, and causation, but also the rich clusters of metaphysical questions in neighbouring fields, such as philosophy of mind and philosophy of science. This book is the seventh volume in the series. Topics covered include counterpart theory, the idea of absolute generality, humean supervenience, coincident objects, open future, presentism, laws, and identity.
C. W. A. Whitaker
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199254194
- eISBN:
- 9780191598654
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199254192.003.0013
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
Aristotle now turns his attention to assertions involving the ideas of necessity and possibility, and examines how they should be arranged into their correct contradictory pairs. Here, he argues, the ...
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Aristotle now turns his attention to assertions involving the ideas of necessity and possibility, and examines how they should be arranged into their correct contradictory pairs. Here, he argues, the contradictory is formed not (as in other cases) by negating the copula ’is’, which unites subject and predicate, but by negating the modal word instead. Being becomes a kind of 'subject’, and the modal words are ’additions’ or copulas, thus establishing an interesting parity between the modal and non‐modal classes of assertion.Less
Aristotle now turns his attention to assertions involving the ideas of necessity and possibility, and examines how they should be arranged into their correct contradictory pairs. Here, he argues, the contradictory is formed not (as in other cases) by negating the copula ’is’, which unites subject and predicate, but by negating the modal word instead. Being becomes a kind of 'subject’, and the modal words are ’additions’ or copulas, thus establishing an interesting parity between the modal and non‐modal classes of assertion.