Laura Valentini
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199593859
- eISBN:
- 9780191731457
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199593859.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This chapter discusses how to move from a general concern with the justification of coercion to particular substantive principles of justice. It argues that a social system is just only so long as it ...
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This chapter discusses how to move from a general concern with the justification of coercion to particular substantive principles of justice. It argues that a social system is just only so long as it respects the right to freedom of those subject to it, namely their right to the social conditions necessary to lead autonomous lives. For this to be the case, the distribution of freedom engendered by the system has to be justifiable in the eyes of all those who are subject to it. Focusing on domestic societies in particular, the chapter concludes that a multiplicity of principles of economic justice might instantiate mutually justifiable distributions of freedom, not all of which are egalitarian in form. In other words, contrary to most contemporary liberal theorists’ arguments on the view defended in this chapter, economic equality is not a fundamental, non-negotiable demand of justice.Less
This chapter discusses how to move from a general concern with the justification of coercion to particular substantive principles of justice. It argues that a social system is just only so long as it respects the right to freedom of those subject to it, namely their right to the social conditions necessary to lead autonomous lives. For this to be the case, the distribution of freedom engendered by the system has to be justifiable in the eyes of all those who are subject to it. Focusing on domestic societies in particular, the chapter concludes that a multiplicity of principles of economic justice might instantiate mutually justifiable distributions of freedom, not all of which are egalitarian in form. In other words, contrary to most contemporary liberal theorists’ arguments on the view defended in this chapter, economic equality is not a fundamental, non-negotiable demand of justice.
Andreas Müller
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- November 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780198754329
- eISBN:
- 9780191904189
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198754329.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Constructivism takes practical reasons to be mind-dependent: facts about our mental states and activities figure ineliminably in its account of why some consideration is a reason for an agent to do ...
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Constructivism takes practical reasons to be mind-dependent: facts about our mental states and activities figure ineliminably in its account of why some consideration is a reason for an agent to do something. This chapter defends constructivism against the objection that its commitment to mind-dependence renders it unable to accommodate the objectivity of practical reasons and our judgements about them. It distinguishes various versions of mind-dependence and argues that the constructivist’s alethic version is compatible with the three features that those who raise the objectivity objection are most often concerned about: the fallibility of our reason judgements, the universality of some reasons, and the modal robustness of some of those reasons.Less
Constructivism takes practical reasons to be mind-dependent: facts about our mental states and activities figure ineliminably in its account of why some consideration is a reason for an agent to do something. This chapter defends constructivism against the objection that its commitment to mind-dependence renders it unable to accommodate the objectivity of practical reasons and our judgements about them. It distinguishes various versions of mind-dependence and argues that the constructivist’s alethic version is compatible with the three features that those who raise the objectivity objection are most often concerned about: the fallibility of our reason judgements, the universality of some reasons, and the modal robustness of some of those reasons.
Martin Smith
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- March 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780198755333
- eISBN:
- 9780191816635
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198755333.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
In this chapter, the normic support condition on justification is approached via the widely accepted safety condition on knowledge. It is argued that the normic support condition can be portrayed as ...
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In this chapter, the normic support condition on justification is approached via the widely accepted safety condition on knowledge. It is argued that the normic support condition can be portrayed as a modification of the safety condition, with the notion of world normalcy substituted for the more familiar notion of world similarity. This idea is used to generate a contextualist theory of justified belief attributions that mirrors a safety-based contextualist theory of knowledge attributions. The relative modal robustness of world normalcy, as opposed to world similarity, is used to explore anew the long-standing debate between internalism and externalism about justification.Less
In this chapter, the normic support condition on justification is approached via the widely accepted safety condition on knowledge. It is argued that the normic support condition can be portrayed as a modification of the safety condition, with the notion of world normalcy substituted for the more familiar notion of world similarity. This idea is used to generate a contextualist theory of justified belief attributions that mirrors a safety-based contextualist theory of knowledge attributions. The relative modal robustness of world normalcy, as opposed to world similarity, is used to explore anew the long-standing debate between internalism and externalism about justification.
