Quentin Smith
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199264933
- eISBN:
- 9780191718472
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199264933.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This introductory chapter presents an overview of the different topics discussed in the subsequent chapters. These include process reliabilism, evidentialism, viral epistemology, anti-luminosity ...
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This introductory chapter presents an overview of the different topics discussed in the subsequent chapters. These include process reliabilism, evidentialism, viral epistemology, anti-luminosity argument, and modal epistemology.Less
This introductory chapter presents an overview of the different topics discussed in the subsequent chapters. These include process reliabilism, evidentialism, viral epistemology, anti-luminosity argument, and modal epistemology.
Quentin Smith (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199264933
- eISBN:
- 9780191718472
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199264933.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book offers a view of the current state of play in epistemology in the form of twelve chapters by some of the philosophers who have most influenced the course of debates in recent years. Topics ...
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This book offers a view of the current state of play in epistemology in the form of twelve chapters by some of the philosophers who have most influenced the course of debates in recent years. Topics include epistemic justification, solipsism, scepticism, and modal, moral, naturalistic, and probabilistic epistemology. Such approaches as reliabilism, evidentialism, infinitism, and virtue epistemology are here developed further by the philosophers who pioneered them.Less
This book offers a view of the current state of play in epistemology in the form of twelve chapters by some of the philosophers who have most influenced the course of debates in recent years. Topics include epistemic justification, solipsism, scepticism, and modal, moral, naturalistic, and probabilistic epistemology. Such approaches as reliabilism, evidentialism, infinitism, and virtue epistemology are here developed further by the philosophers who pioneered them.
Amie L. Thomasson
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- July 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780190098193
- eISBN:
- 9780190098223
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190098193.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter argues that accepting modal normativism brings significant epistemological advantages. Those who aim to account for modal knowledge face the integration challenge of reconciling an ...
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This chapter argues that accepting modal normativism brings significant epistemological advantages. Those who aim to account for modal knowledge face the integration challenge of reconciling an account of what is involved in knowing modal truths with a plausible story about how we can come to know them, and the reliability challenge of explaining how we could have evolved to have a reliable faculty for coming to know modal truths. Recent empiricist accounts of modal knowledge cannot solve these problems regarding specifically metaphysical modal truths—leaving us with the threat of skepticism about large portions of metaphysics. However, by giving a different functional story, the modal normativist can develop a plausible response to the remaining versions of both of these classic problems for modal epistemology. Modal normativists can also respond to further worries parallel to those raised by Sharon Street’s evolutionary debunking arguments in meta-ethics.Less
This chapter argues that accepting modal normativism brings significant epistemological advantages. Those who aim to account for modal knowledge face the integration challenge of reconciling an account of what is involved in knowing modal truths with a plausible story about how we can come to know them, and the reliability challenge of explaining how we could have evolved to have a reliable faculty for coming to know modal truths. Recent empiricist accounts of modal knowledge cannot solve these problems regarding specifically metaphysical modal truths—leaving us with the threat of skepticism about large portions of metaphysics. However, by giving a different functional story, the modal normativist can develop a plausible response to the remaining versions of both of these classic problems for modal epistemology. Modal normativists can also respond to further worries parallel to those raised by Sharon Street’s evolutionary debunking arguments in meta-ethics.
Dominic Gregory
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199565818
- eISBN:
- 9780191722004
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199565818.003.0015
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
Why do we tend to ascribe possibility to what we can imagine? One strategy for answering that question involves the thought that, just as sensory episodes often involve its seeming to us as though ...
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Why do we tend to ascribe possibility to what we can imagine? One strategy for answering that question involves the thought that, just as sensory episodes often involve its seeming to us as though the world is certain ways, so imaginings involve its seeming to us that what we have imagined is possible. This chapter argues that while some imaginings do feature appearances of possibility, very many others do not; and it explores the broader relevance of its conclusions for modal epistemology.Less
Why do we tend to ascribe possibility to what we can imagine? One strategy for answering that question involves the thought that, just as sensory episodes often involve its seeming to us as though the world is certain ways, so imaginings involve its seeming to us that what we have imagined is possible. This chapter argues that while some imaginings do feature appearances of possibility, very many others do not; and it explores the broader relevance of its conclusions for modal epistemology.
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa and Benjamin W. Jarvis
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- September 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199661800
- eISBN:
- 9780191748325
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199661800.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter develops a moderate modal rationalism. According to this moderate modal rationalism, knowledge of metaphysical possibility and necessity is available through sensitivity to the rational ...
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This chapter develops a moderate modal rationalism. According to this moderate modal rationalism, knowledge of metaphysical possibility and necessity is available through sensitivity to the rational entailment relations between propositions. The imagination can be used to explore these rational entailment relations so as to discover whether a proposition is “conceivable” in the sense that it does not rationally entail a rational absurdity. Some metaphysically impossible propositions are conceivable in this way, but their metaphysical impossibility can be discovered nonetheless by noticing that they rationally entail some proposition about the actual world that is, in fact, false.Less
This chapter develops a moderate modal rationalism. According to this moderate modal rationalism, knowledge of metaphysical possibility and necessity is available through sensitivity to the rational entailment relations between propositions. The imagination can be used to explore these rational entailment relations so as to discover whether a proposition is “conceivable” in the sense that it does not rationally entail a rational absurdity. Some metaphysically impossible propositions are conceivable in this way, but their metaphysical impossibility can be discovered nonetheless by noticing that they rationally entail some proposition about the actual world that is, in fact, false.
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- March 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780198716808
- eISBN:
- 9780191785375
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198716808.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter distinguishes two projects in modal epistemology—one about how we come to know modal truths, and one about why we have the ability so to come to know. It is suggested that the latter is ...
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This chapter distinguishes two projects in modal epistemology—one about how we come to know modal truths, and one about why we have the ability so to come to know. It is suggested that the latter is amenable to an evolutionary treatment in terms of general capacities developed to evaluate quotidian modal claims. This approach is compared to a recent suggestion in a similar spirit by Christopher Hill and Timothy Williamson, emphasizing counterfactual conditionals instead of quotidian modals; it is argued that while there are some reasons to prefer the quotidian modals approach, there are none favoring the Hill/Williamson counterfactual approach. The chapter concludes with a suggestion that the remaining questions both approaches leave unanswered ought not to be too troubling.Less
This chapter distinguishes two projects in modal epistemology—one about how we come to know modal truths, and one about why we have the ability so to come to know. It is suggested that the latter is amenable to an evolutionary treatment in terms of general capacities developed to evaluate quotidian modal claims. This approach is compared to a recent suggestion in a similar spirit by Christopher Hill and Timothy Williamson, emphasizing counterfactual conditionals instead of quotidian modals; it is argued that while there are some reasons to prefer the quotidian modals approach, there are none favoring the Hill/Williamson counterfactual approach. The chapter concludes with a suggestion that the remaining questions both approaches leave unanswered ought not to be too troubling.
Amy Kind and Peter Kung (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- March 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780198716808
- eISBN:
- 9780191785375
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198716808.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind
From daydreaming to decision-making, from pretending to planning, imagination plays a central role in many of the activities of everyday life. But as even these brief examples suggest, we call upon ...
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From daydreaming to decision-making, from pretending to planning, imagination plays a central role in many of the activities of everyday life. But as even these brief examples suggest, we call upon imagination for two distinct and seemingly incompatible kinds of projects. Though imagination is sometimes used to enable us to escape or look beyond the world as it is, as when we daydream or fantasize or pretend, it is also sometimes used to enable us to learn about the world as it is, as when we plan or make decisions or make predictions about the future. This raises something of a puzzle, since we might naturally wonder how the same mental activity that allows us to fly completely free of reality can also teach us something about it. The ten contributions in this book, stemming from a 2012 conference, shed light on this puzzle by examining whether and how imagination can provide us with knowledge about the world. Many of the contributors address the issue by examining architectural and evolutionary considerations about the imagination. Some take a global stance, while others look at specific imaginative domains: Can imagination help us to perceive other people? Can it enable us to understand the perspectives of others? Can it substantiate ethical theorizing through its role in thought experimentation? In exploring these and other questions, the contributors’ positions on the epistemic function of imagination range along a continuum from guardedly optimistic to deeply pessimistic.Less
From daydreaming to decision-making, from pretending to planning, imagination plays a central role in many of the activities of everyday life. But as even these brief examples suggest, we call upon imagination for two distinct and seemingly incompatible kinds of projects. Though imagination is sometimes used to enable us to escape or look beyond the world as it is, as when we daydream or fantasize or pretend, it is also sometimes used to enable us to learn about the world as it is, as when we plan or make decisions or make predictions about the future. This raises something of a puzzle, since we might naturally wonder how the same mental activity that allows us to fly completely free of reality can also teach us something about it. The ten contributions in this book, stemming from a 2012 conference, shed light on this puzzle by examining whether and how imagination can provide us with knowledge about the world. Many of the contributors address the issue by examining architectural and evolutionary considerations about the imagination. Some take a global stance, while others look at specific imaginative domains: Can imagination help us to perceive other people? Can it enable us to understand the perspectives of others? Can it substantiate ethical theorizing through its role in thought experimentation? In exploring these and other questions, the contributors’ positions on the epistemic function of imagination range along a continuum from guardedly optimistic to deeply pessimistic.
Amie L. Thomasson
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- July 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780190098193
- eISBN:
- 9780190098223
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190098193.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book develops a new approach to understanding our claims about what is metaphysically necessary or possible: modal normativism. While claims about what is metaphysically necessary or possible ...
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This book develops a new approach to understanding our claims about what is metaphysically necessary or possible: modal normativism. While claims about what is metaphysically necessary or possible have long played a central role in metaphysics and other areas of philosophy, such claims are traditionally thought of as aiming to describe a special kind of modal fact or property, or perhaps facts about other possible worlds. But that assumption leads to difficult ontological, epistemological, and methodological puzzles. Should we accept that there are modal facts or properties, or other possible worlds? If so, what could these things be? How could we come to know what the modal facts or properties are? How can we resolve philosophical debates about what is necessary or possible? The normativist rejects the assumption that modal claims aim to describe modal features or possible worlds, arguing instead that they serve as useful ways of conveying, reasoning with, and renegotiating semantic rules and their consequences. By dropping the descriptivist assumption, the normativist is able to unravel the notorious ontological problems of modality, and provide a clear and plausible story about how we can come to know what is metaphysically necessary or possible. Most importantly, this approach helps demystify philosophical methodology. For we are able to see that resolving metaphysical modal questions does not require a special form of philosophical insight or intuition. Instead, it requires nothing more mysterious than empirical knowledge, conceptual mastery, and an ability to explicitly convey and renegotiate semantic rules.Less
This book develops a new approach to understanding our claims about what is metaphysically necessary or possible: modal normativism. While claims about what is metaphysically necessary or possible have long played a central role in metaphysics and other areas of philosophy, such claims are traditionally thought of as aiming to describe a special kind of modal fact or property, or perhaps facts about other possible worlds. But that assumption leads to difficult ontological, epistemological, and methodological puzzles. Should we accept that there are modal facts or properties, or other possible worlds? If so, what could these things be? How could we come to know what the modal facts or properties are? How can we resolve philosophical debates about what is necessary or possible? The normativist rejects the assumption that modal claims aim to describe modal features or possible worlds, arguing instead that they serve as useful ways of conveying, reasoning with, and renegotiating semantic rules and their consequences. By dropping the descriptivist assumption, the normativist is able to unravel the notorious ontological problems of modality, and provide a clear and plausible story about how we can come to know what is metaphysically necessary or possible. Most importantly, this approach helps demystify philosophical methodology. For we are able to see that resolving metaphysical modal questions does not require a special form of philosophical insight or intuition. Instead, it requires nothing more mysterious than empirical knowledge, conceptual mastery, and an ability to explicitly convey and renegotiate semantic rules.
Ivette Fred-Rivera and Jessica Leech
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- October 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780198792161
- eISBN:
- 9780191866876
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198792161.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
The themes of ontology and modality are introduced. The introduction sketches two major strands of metaphysics from the last fifty years or so in which ontology and modality have been combined in ...
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The themes of ontology and modality are introduced. The introduction sketches two major strands of metaphysics from the last fifty years or so in which ontology and modality have been combined in particularly important ways, namely, in the worlds approach to modality, and the revival of essentialism. Also introduced are questions of modal ontology—whether and what things exist necessarily or contingently—and questions concerning the interaction of modal ontology and modal epistemology—what consequences do one’s views on modality and ontology have for a modal epistemology? Within this framework, the rest of the chapters of the book are introduced.Less
The themes of ontology and modality are introduced. The introduction sketches two major strands of metaphysics from the last fifty years or so in which ontology and modality have been combined in particularly important ways, namely, in the worlds approach to modality, and the revival of essentialism. Also introduced are questions of modal ontology—whether and what things exist necessarily or contingently—and questions concerning the interaction of modal ontology and modal epistemology—what consequences do one’s views on modality and ontology have for a modal epistemology? Within this framework, the rest of the chapters of the book are introduced.
Tuomas E. Tahko
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- November 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780198796299
- eISBN:
- 9780191866807
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198796299.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The epistemology of essence is a topic that has received relatively little attention, although there are signs that this is changing. The lack of literature engaging directly with the topic is ...
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The epistemology of essence is a topic that has received relatively little attention, although there are signs that this is changing. The lack of literature engaging directly with the topic is probably partly due to the mystery surrounding the notion of essence itself, and partly due to the sheer difficulty of developing a plausible epistemology. The need for such an account is clear especially for those, like E. J. Lowe, who are committed to a broadly Aristotelian conception of essence, whereby essence plays an important theoretical role. In this chapter, our epistemic access to essence is examined in terms of the a posteriori vs. a priori distinction. The two main accounts to be contrasted are those of David S. Oderberg and E. J. Lowe.Less
The epistemology of essence is a topic that has received relatively little attention, although there are signs that this is changing. The lack of literature engaging directly with the topic is probably partly due to the mystery surrounding the notion of essence itself, and partly due to the sheer difficulty of developing a plausible epistemology. The need for such an account is clear especially for those, like E. J. Lowe, who are committed to a broadly Aristotelian conception of essence, whereby essence plays an important theoretical role. In this chapter, our epistemic access to essence is examined in terms of the a posteriori vs. a priori distinction. The two main accounts to be contrasted are those of David S. Oderberg and E. J. Lowe.
Peter Kung
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- March 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780198716808
- eISBN:
- 9780191785375
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198716808.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind
Counterexample thought experiments (CTEs) play a prominent role in the ethics literature. A wide range of ethics CTEs have a distinctive feature: they feature forced choices with fixed outcomes. This ...
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Counterexample thought experiments (CTEs) play a prominent role in the ethics literature. A wide range of ethics CTEs have a distinctive feature: they feature forced choices with fixed outcomes. This feature matters because, according to a generally accepted understanding of CTEs’ role in philosophical methodology, CTEs work by presenting genuinely possible scenarios. This chapter argues that imagining CTEs gives us no reason to believe that forced choices with fixed outcomes are genuine possibilities. To provide data for theorizing, CTEs must thus describe more realistic scenarios: they cannot abstract away from the fact that choices have many possible outcomes. Good thought experiments will also promise no guarantees. This means that any ethical view that counts outcomes as ethically relevant will have to take seriously moral risk. This consideration must be built into the foundation of our ethical theorizing, not just added as an afterthought once we have crafted our ethical theories.Less
Counterexample thought experiments (CTEs) play a prominent role in the ethics literature. A wide range of ethics CTEs have a distinctive feature: they feature forced choices with fixed outcomes. This feature matters because, according to a generally accepted understanding of CTEs’ role in philosophical methodology, CTEs work by presenting genuinely possible scenarios. This chapter argues that imagining CTEs gives us no reason to believe that forced choices with fixed outcomes are genuine possibilities. To provide data for theorizing, CTEs must thus describe more realistic scenarios: they cannot abstract away from the fact that choices have many possible outcomes. Good thought experiments will also promise no guarantees. This means that any ethical view that counts outcomes as ethically relevant will have to take seriously moral risk. This consideration must be built into the foundation of our ethical theorizing, not just added as an afterthought once we have crafted our ethical theories.
Billy Dunaway
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- March 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780198798705
- eISBN:
- 9780191848469
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198798705.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
Theories of “divine illumination” were popular from St Augustine through the Middle Ages. Henry of Ghent is traditionally thought of as providing one of the last and most sophisticated theories of ...
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Theories of “divine illumination” were popular from St Augustine through the Middle Ages. Henry of Ghent is traditionally thought of as providing one of the last and most sophisticated theories of Divine Illumination. This chapter examines one of John Duns Scotus’s main arguments against Henry’s theory of Divine Illumination. The chapter reads Scotus as claiming that Henry’s theory aims, but fails, to avoid skepticism—the conclusion that we can’t have any knowledge on the basis of sensation. It shows how this argument can be understood formally on the basis of an analogy with modal logic, which Scotus explicitly calls attention to. The chapter argues that this way of understanding Scotus’s argument points toward some important refinements that contemporary anti-risk principles in epistemology will need to account for.Less
Theories of “divine illumination” were popular from St Augustine through the Middle Ages. Henry of Ghent is traditionally thought of as providing one of the last and most sophisticated theories of Divine Illumination. This chapter examines one of John Duns Scotus’s main arguments against Henry’s theory of Divine Illumination. The chapter reads Scotus as claiming that Henry’s theory aims, but fails, to avoid skepticism—the conclusion that we can’t have any knowledge on the basis of sensation. It shows how this argument can be understood formally on the basis of an analogy with modal logic, which Scotus explicitly calls attention to. The chapter argues that this way of understanding Scotus’s argument points toward some important refinements that contemporary anti-risk principles in epistemology will need to account for.
Ivette Fred-Rivera and Jessica Leech (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- October 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780198792161
- eISBN:
- 9780191866876
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198792161.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
What is the relationship between ontology and modality: between what there is, and what there could be, must be, or might have been? Throughout a distinguished career, Bob Hale’s work has addressed ...
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What is the relationship between ontology and modality: between what there is, and what there could be, must be, or might have been? Throughout a distinguished career, Bob Hale’s work has addressed this question on a number of fronts, through the development of a Fregean approach to ontology, an essentialist theory of modality, and in his work on neo-logicism in the philosophy of mathematics. This collection of new essays engages with these themes in Hale’s work in order to make further progress in our understanding of ontology, modality, and the relations between them. Some essays directly address questions in modal metaphysics, drawing on ontological concerns. Others raise questions in modal epistemology and its links to matters of ontology, such as the challenge to give an epistemology of essence. There are also several essays engaging with questions of what might be called ‘modal ontology’: the study of whether and what things exist necessarily or contingently. Such issues can be raised and addressed directly, but they also have an important bearing on the kinds of semantic commitments engendered in logic and mathematics, e.g., to the existence of sets, or numbers, or properties, and so on. It is thus explored in some chapters to what extent one’s ontology—and indeed, one’s ontology of necessary beings—interacts with other plausible assumptions and commitments.Less
What is the relationship between ontology and modality: between what there is, and what there could be, must be, or might have been? Throughout a distinguished career, Bob Hale’s work has addressed this question on a number of fronts, through the development of a Fregean approach to ontology, an essentialist theory of modality, and in his work on neo-logicism in the philosophy of mathematics. This collection of new essays engages with these themes in Hale’s work in order to make further progress in our understanding of ontology, modality, and the relations between them. Some essays directly address questions in modal metaphysics, drawing on ontological concerns. Others raise questions in modal epistemology and its links to matters of ontology, such as the challenge to give an epistemology of essence. There are also several essays engaging with questions of what might be called ‘modal ontology’: the study of whether and what things exist necessarily or contingently. Such issues can be raised and addressed directly, but they also have an important bearing on the kinds of semantic commitments engendered in logic and mathematics, e.g., to the existence of sets, or numbers, or properties, and so on. It is thus explored in some chapters to what extent one’s ontology—and indeed, one’s ontology of necessary beings—interacts with other plausible assumptions and commitments.
Peter Langland-Hassan
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- September 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780198815068
- eISBN:
- 9780191852886
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198815068.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Three types of conditional are distinguished: the material conditional, indicative conditional, and subjunctive/counterfactual conditional. The apparent difference in truth conditions of each is ...
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Three types of conditional are distinguished: the material conditional, indicative conditional, and subjunctive/counterfactual conditional. The apparent difference in truth conditions of each is suggestive of different psychological procedures used in the evaluation of each. The psychology of the material conditional is then examined. Despite procedures in formal logic that are suggestive of sui generis imaginative states (e.g., “assuming” a proposition for conditional proof, or for reductio), we need not countenance the use of such states within the psychological procedures used to carry out the inferences. Further, work in psychology has long suggested that humans do not, as a rule, reason in accordance with normative standards appropriate to the material conditional. A popular alternative proposal in psychology is that conditional reasoning involves the use of mental models (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002). The use of mental models is shown to be consistent with conditional reasoning involving only sequences of beliefs.Less
Three types of conditional are distinguished: the material conditional, indicative conditional, and subjunctive/counterfactual conditional. The apparent difference in truth conditions of each is suggestive of different psychological procedures used in the evaluation of each. The psychology of the material conditional is then examined. Despite procedures in formal logic that are suggestive of sui generis imaginative states (e.g., “assuming” a proposition for conditional proof, or for reductio), we need not countenance the use of such states within the psychological procedures used to carry out the inferences. Further, work in psychology has long suggested that humans do not, as a rule, reason in accordance with normative standards appropriate to the material conditional. A popular alternative proposal in psychology is that conditional reasoning involves the use of mental models (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002). The use of mental models is shown to be consistent with conditional reasoning involving only sequences of beliefs.
Amy Kind
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- March 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780198716808
- eISBN:
- 9780191785375
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198716808.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind
As Hume famously claimed, we are nowhere more free than in our imagination. While this feature of imagination suggests that imagination has a crucial role to play in modal epistemology, it also ...
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As Hume famously claimed, we are nowhere more free than in our imagination. While this feature of imagination suggests that imagination has a crucial role to play in modal epistemology, it also suggests that imagining cannot provide us with any non-modal knowledge about the world in which we live. This chapter rejects this latter suggestion. Instead it offers an account of “imagining under constraints,” providing a framework for showing when and how an imaginative project can play a justificatory role with respect to our beliefs about the world. That we can be free in our imaginings does not show that they must proceed unfettered; as is argued, our ability to constrain our imaginings in light of facts about the world enables us to learn from them. The important upshot is that imagination has considerably more epistemic significance than previously thought.Less
As Hume famously claimed, we are nowhere more free than in our imagination. While this feature of imagination suggests that imagination has a crucial role to play in modal epistemology, it also suggests that imagining cannot provide us with any non-modal knowledge about the world in which we live. This chapter rejects this latter suggestion. Instead it offers an account of “imagining under constraints,” providing a framework for showing when and how an imaginative project can play a justificatory role with respect to our beliefs about the world. That we can be free in our imaginings does not show that they must proceed unfettered; as is argued, our ability to constrain our imaginings in light of facts about the world enables us to learn from them. The important upshot is that imagination has considerably more epistemic significance than previously thought.