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Reviews the experiences of several existing mixed‐member electoral systems in an effort to assess the likely prospects for the continued spread of this mode of electoral reform. There are three sections. The first, ‘Inherent and Contingent Factors in Electoral Reform’, looks at extreme electoral systems and systemic failure, act‐contingent explanations of pressures for reform, and outcome‐contingent explanations of political compromise leading to reform. The second section, ‘The Best of Both Worlds’, looks at the interparty and intraparty dimensions of mixed‐member electoral systems, and offers an assessment of these systems. The third section briefly assesses the prospects for continued spread of the mixed‐member idea.

Mexico has experimented with mixed‐member electoral systems for many years, is probably the second oldest mixed‐member system after Germany, and has modified its mixed system more than any other country. The purpose behind the electoral reforms has always been the same: to open up the system enough to satisfy political demands, but not so much that the hegemonic party loses control. Although the latter could to a large extent be controlled by electoral fraud, the former objective still had to be addressed, and over the last 35 years Mexico has seen a gradual but consistent expansion of proportional representation, so that by 1997, the electoral laws, together with electoral preferences and the general democratization of the country, had led to the end of majority control by the official party in the Chamber of Deputies, and Mexico now has a strong two‐ or three‐party system. However, there have been seven fundamentally different electoral systems in Mexico this century, with a different electoral system for each of the last five elections, which makes it impossible to distinguish the effects of electoral rules from those of voter preference; furthermore, most of the reforms are highly endogenous with the party system. Discusses reforms from 1964 onwards, and is arranged as follows: it first describes the party (minority) deputy system that operated under single‐seat district plurality rules in the period 1964–1976, and then the minority representation system of 1979–1985 (mixed‐member majoritarian (MMM) rules were introduced for the 1979 election); next it gives accounts of the 1988, 1991, 1994 and 1997 mixed‐member electoral laws, and details of the senate formulas for the period 1994–2000; it then discusses the consequences of the four mixed‐member electoral laws (effects on party competition and Duvergerian effects), the effects of the change to an MMM system on legislative behavior, and the prospects for future electoral reform.

Mexico has a long experience with highly majoritarian variants of mixed‐member systems, but has recently been made more proportional in a process of democratization. Electoral reform has developed along two major axes: the degree of proportionality, and the composition of the electoral authority, with the parties often trading openness on one axis for closure on the other. Sometimes trade‐offs in reform negotiations followed a third dimension—the registration requirements for new parties. This chapter first describes the evolution of the Mexican electoral formulae from 1963 to today, explaining the rationale of each phase of reform either as a majority party decision or as a trade‐off between government and opposition; the phases described are the plurality party deputy system (1963–1976), the mixed‐member majoritarian (MMM) minority representation system (1979–1985), the governability clause of the 1988 law, the governability clause with ‘moving escalator’ of the 1991 law, and the abandonment of the governability clause in the 1994 law. The last part of the chapter focuses on the last round of electoral reforms (the 1997 law), in which the mixed‐member majoritarian (MMM) system reintroduced in 1994 (after the earlier brief interludes of systems that combined MMM with mixed‐member proportional (MMP) arrangements under the 1988 and 1991 laws), was further reformed to result in a more proportional allocation of seats, with the dominant principle depending on the vote distribution.

This develops an argument applicable primarily to reform in established democracies, but potentially offering insight into choices in new democracies as well: that there are certain electoral systems that may be seen as extreme on one (or both) of two dimensions—interparty and intraparty. The interparty dimension refers to the degree to which, on the one hand, a single party forms a majority government on well under a majority of votes, or, on the other hand, coalitions are formed among several parties; the intraparty dimension refers to a continuum of electoral systems from those in which legislators depend exclusively on their own personal votes to those in which votes are given exclusively to parties such that legislators have no direct ties to voters. Suggests that electoral systems that are extreme on one or both of these dimensions are inherently prone to reformist pressures, and also shows that much of the appeal of mixed‐member systems derives from how they appear to balance the extremes on each of these dimensions: the trade‐off on the interparty dimension, which is between majoritarian and proportional forms of representation; and the trade‐off on the intraparty dimension, which is between ‘strong candidates’ and ‘strong parties’. Brief studies are presented of five cases of reform from extreme electoral systems to mixed‐member systems: New Zealand (formerly a pluralitarian system); Italy and Israel (formerly hyper‐representative systems); Japan (formerly a hyper‐personalistic system); and Venezuela (formerly a hyper‐centralized system). The ideas presented in the chapter form the basis for the set of key questions presented to the authors of the country chapters in Part II of the book.

The introduction of a mixed‐member majoritarian (MMM) electoral system in Russia came in the midst of a violent struggle between President Boris Yeltsin and a communist and nationalist opposition, after which Yeltsin was left to construct a new electoral system and a new constitutional order unopposed. Explains the development and maintenance of the MMM system in Russia as a compromise between competing intraparty and interparty goals, first within the small circle drafting the executive decree in 1993, and then between competing institutions in the struggle over the electoral law in 1995. The designers of the presidential decree that implemented the system saw a mixed‐member system as being able to promote the formation of national parties while maintaining regional representation, and despite the preponderance of power that Yeltsin held throughout this process, the system was not crafted exclusively for the interests of a particular party or ideological camp. It is argued that the system that eventually emerged was a product of competing goals, uncertainty over future electoral outcomes, and compromise between competing institutions. The chapter proceeds as follows: the first section briefly examines the historical background of elections in Russia and provides an overview of the MMM system adopted in 1993; the second describes the process surrounding Yeltsin's executive decree establishing the electoral system for the 1993 election; the third looks at the adoption of the electoral law in 1995; the final section draws some conclusions.

Mixed‐member electoral systems are described as a mixture of two principles of electoral system design: majoritarian systems, which usually have single‐seat districts with plurality rule and tend to give greater representation to the two parties that receive the most votes; and proportional systems, which have multi‐seat districts, usually with party lists, and typically produce parliamentary representation that largely mirrors the vote shares of multiple parties. In the prototype mixed‐member system, half the seats in a legislative chamber (the nominal tier) are elected in single‐seat districts and the other half (the list tier) are elected from party lists allocated by proportional representation; such systems come in a wide variety of options, with the most important choices involved being those of how seats and/or votes are linked between the two tiers. Defines mixed‐member electoral systems as a subset of the broader category of multiple‐tier electoral systems. The typology of systems outlined is arranged in three main sections: Mixed‐Member Systems as Variants of Multiple‐Tier Electoral Systems; Majoritarian or Proportional: Linkage Between Nominal and Tier Lists—mixed‐member majoritarian (MMM) and mixed‐member proportional (MMP) systems; and How MMM and MMP Systems Work: Simple Systems and Additional Variables—this section includes a table of mixed‐member systems in use around the world in 1999.

The Russian mixed‐member majoritarian (MMM) system introduced by executive decree in 1993 and passed into law in 1995 did not produce the outcomes expected by its designers, nor have electoral system effects in Russia followed expectations in the electoral systems literature. Russia has been rather exceptional in the degree of fractionalization allowed under its MMM system, and there has been a great disparity in electoral support for parties in the list and nominal tiers of the system, and a proliferation of independent candidates with no partisan affiliation in the single‐seat districts (SSD). These unexpected outcomes might lead one to consider the MMM system to be a failure, but this chapter argues that the intraparty effects of the system, namely, the incentives promoting the formation of national parties with strong grassroots organization, make the current MMM system ideal for Russia. The purpose of the chapter is to lay out the effects of Russia's MMM system and offer some explanations for its unexpected outcomes. There are five sections: the first provides a brief description of the system; the second looks at the interparty dimension; the third expands on the interparty dimension by describing the emerging party system in Russia, examining the effects of the MMM system on the number of electoral parties, and looking at the impact the MMM system has had on the success of particular parties; the fourth section examines the intraparty dimension, and shows how the proportional representation party‐list tier has promoted the formation of parties as the central mechanism for nomination and election to public office while SSD elections in the nominal tier have encouraged party‐building at the local level; the final section offers some conclusions and implications of the Russian case for the study of electoral systems.

Explores several of the factors that significantly affected the transition of New Zealand's political system from a pluralitarian (extreme majoritarian) system famous for its tranquil efficacy to an MMP (mixed‐member proportional) system renowned for its vengeful reformism. These factors include: (1) dealignment; (2) minor party under‐representation; (3) the under‐representation of minority groups in an era of increasing multiculturalism; (4) radical, unpopular economic reform by successive Labour and National party governments; and (5) the parliamentary ‘other side’ of the calculus—the provision of both a Royal Commission, which highlighted representational failings of the Westminster system while legitimating MMP specifically as an alternative electoral system, and indicative and binding referendums, which gave New Zealand's voters the final say in determining the fate of the country's electoral system. The extent to which these issues were important in vote choices of electors in the 1993 referendum is also considered. A last section considers the overall explanations for New Zealand's turn to MMP, and the chapter includes a table that shows a timeline of electoral change in New Zealand since 1985 (the period immediately preceding the reform of 1993) and an appendix giving a sketch of the MMP system in New Zealand.

Recent electoral reform in Venezuela, including the adoption of a mixed‐member proportional (MMP) system, has occurred in the context of crisis. Recounts the history leading from the situation of an extreme electoral system with a very dominant party leadership (a hyper‐centralized system) to the adoption of the MMP system in 1993—in which it was hoped that legislators would be more accountable to voters in the newly created single‐seat geographic constituencies; the system adopted is described as the result of compromise. The first section describes the electoral system and how it has evolved, emphasizing issues of ‘electoral efficiency’. The next section analyzes the reform process and the role/motivations of various actors in the move to an MMP system. With these historical data in hand, the chapter concludes by putting the system for electing congress in the context of wider systemic, institutional issues.

When the new mixed‐member majoritarian (MMM) electoral system was introduced in the summer of 1993, Italian politics was characterized by a destructuring of the old party system with a dramatic weakening of the old dominant parties and the rise of new ones. In such a context, the introduction of a predominantly plurality system did not reduce party fragmentation, but it did provide powerful institutional incentives for parties to enter into pre‐election coalitions, which have permitted clearer choices for voters, although parties within the coalitions have ‘proportionalized’ the single‐seat districts by dividing up the nominations among themselves. The coalitions have restructured the pattern of competition and created the condition for a system of alternating governments, in spite of the high number of parties. In this respect, the new electoral system has worked, producing a more efficient system of interparty competition, yet it remains a difficult case to classify, precisely because the new electoral rules have produced two types of actor: coalitions (which are few) and parties (which are many), with each playing a role, and each contributing to the overall dynamics of the system. However, the main argument is that with the present electoral rules the coalitions will remain the prevailing feature of the system, whether they evolve into new parties, federations of parties or something else.

This analyzes the consequences of the Israeli version of a mixed electoral system, in which a majoritarian method of electing the head of the executive branch was grafted onto an extremely proportional system of electing the legislature. Focuses on the first two elections in which this mixed system was implemented, 1996 and 1999, and in doing so, concentrates on two aspects of the elections: the election results, i.e., the decimation of the two main parties and the rise of sectarian parties (fragmentation of the parliamentary system); and the electoral dynamics, i.e., the convergence toward the center in both the executive and the legislative elections. The most significant ramifications of the implementation of the direct popular election of the prime minister have been a significant shift in the electoral strength of the parties and a dramatic change in the competitive electoral orientation of the Israeli party system. Neither result was expected by those who initiated and propelled the electoral reform, while many of the actual expectations of the reform were not met. Arranged in the following sections: The Israeli Version of a Mixed Electoral System and Resulting Hybrid Political System; and The Consequences of the Mixed Electoral System for (1) Electoral Competition, (2) Political Representation, and (3) Electoral Efficiency.

Explores the replacement in Italy of an extremely proportional (hyper‐representative) system by a relatively majoritarian variant of a mixed‐member electoral system. On April 18, 1993, the Italian electorate overwhelmingly approved a referendum that altered the electoral system for the national Senate. Unlike the 1993 referendum altering the electoral system in New Zealand (discussed in the previous chapter), which came at the end of a lengthy process including an extensive study and report by a Royal Commission, and which gave final popular approval to put the new electoral regime into effect, the Italian referendum was the catalyst that finally initiated change after long, but apparently futile, debate. Rather than ratifying the selection of one system that had been deliberately chosen over others, the Italian referendum imposed, at least for the moment, the only reform possible, given that Italian referendums can only abrogate existing laws, but cannot impose new ones. The different sections of the chapter are: Background to the Referendum of 1993; Immediate Impact of the Referendum; Ends and Means—to electoral reform; Drafting the New Electoral System in the Chamber; Drafting the New Electoral System in the Senate; The New Electoral System; and Expectations and Predictions.

In 1994, Bolivia undertook a major constitutional and electoral reform, in which a closed‐list proportional representation (PR) system for the Lower House of the Congress was replaced by a mixed‐member proportional (MMP) system. Article 60 of the reformed constitution establishes that 68 deputies out of a constitutionally fixed number of 130 will be chosen by plurality rule in single‐seat districts, while the remaining 62 will be chosen by party‐list voting according to proportional representation in nine regional multi‐seat districts. This new electoral system establishes seats linkage between the two tiers such that the overall allocation of seats is determined proportionally according to list votes at the level of each multi‐seat district. In analyzing the underlying causes of the electoral reform in 1994, Mayorga first deals with the widely perceived fundamental problems and flaws of the traditional PR system and, second, addresses the main causes leading to the adoption of an MMP system, focusing on the context in which the politics of electoral reform was carried out.

The inaugural mixed‐member proportional (MMP) elections were held in Venezuela in 1993. According to the MMP electoral rules in Venezuela, approximately half of the Chamber of Deputies is elected from single‐seat districts in the nominal tier of the system, and half is elected from closed party lists in the list tier. Analyzes how electoral incentives associated with the two tiers affect campaigns, elections, legislative entrepreneurship, and representation, and considers political behaviour and attitudes to be responses both to the institutional incentives associated with electoral rules and party structures, and to the actions of politically active citizens and interest organizations. The chapter has three sections: the first discusses the effects of MMP on the interparty dimension, examining proportionality and the effective number of parties, and analyzing party strategies for joining pre‐election coalitions in the nominal and list tier elections; the second and third sections look at the intraparty dimension, analyzing distinctions between the incentives and behaviour of members elected in each tier. The second section analyzes legislative entrepreneurship in the Chamber of Deputies before and after the adoption of the MMP system; the third section (Legislators, Parties and Representation) shows that legislators elected in the nominal and list tiers view campaigns and legislative representation differently, but that the adoption of MMP rules has not altered the strong relationships between established interest organizations and representatives in the Congress.

Outlines the aim of the book, and briefly describes the contents of each chapter. The book seeks to evaluate (1) why so many countries with such diverse political histories have chosen to adopt mixed‐member electoral systems, and (2) what the consequences have been of implementing such a system. Part I sets the stage for the 10 country chapters presented in Part II, which presents 10 stories of why the countries concerned adopted a mixed‐member system. Part II then covers the same countries but investigates the consequences of adopting a mixed‐member system, and Part IV looks at the prospects for further reform in two further countries (Britain and Canada), and provides a conclusion, which summarizes what has been learned from the country chapters.

The purpose is to provide an initial assessment of the impact of the introduction of the mixed‐member proportional (MMP) electoral system on the New Zealand political system, especially with regard to the normative criteria established by the New Zealand Royal Commission on the Electoral System. However, since the normative nature of these criteria may limit the breadth of any analysis (they are not necessarily comprehensive and unambiguous, nor do they provide a watertight framework for evaluation), this particular discussion of the impact of MMP on the New Zealand political system is left until the last section. The bulk of the chapter instead employs the findings of political scientists on the relationships between electoral systems, political behavior, and political institutions. These are presented in 10 sections: Anticipating the New Electoral System; The Election and Government Formation; The Political Parties and the Party System; Political Recruitment and Careers; Voting Behavior; Parliament; Government Transition and Durability; Government and the Policy Process; The Future of the New Electoral System; and Winners and Losers. The authors make the point that (as in Germany) personalized geographic representation has continued even as the overall system has been made more proportional.

Describes how the German mixed‐member electoral system arose, and shows how it developed both from interest‐based bargaining and from more widely shared concerns about political stability. Some of the features that are most characteristic of the current German arrangements—including giving citizens two ballots and the legal threshold set at 5% of the national vote—were absent in West Germany's first electoral law. These points were incorporated into the German law as the result of partisan struggles, contests whose outcomes were shaped by the shifting contours of West Germany's evolving party system. In other words, although the circumstances of total regime collapse and temporary occupation created rare opportunities to develop a political consensus for principled experimentation with new institutional designs, the German ‘model’ was as much an ad hoc creation as it was the product of theoretically inspired engineering. The different sections of the chapter are: Electoral Systems in the Federal Republic of Germany; The Origins of Germany's Mixed‐Member System; The 1949 Law—and the 1953 and 1956 laws; The German Electoral System Since 1956; and Conclusion: Accidentally Inventing a Model?

An analysis of the factors and the processes that led to the adoption of a mixed‐member electoral system in Israel. The first section analyzes the characteristics of the Israeli pre‐reform extreme electoral (hyper‐representative) system according to the two dimensions (intraparty and interparty) suggested by Shugart in Ch. 2; it also presents a brief discussion of reform initiatives, intended to provide solutions to some of the electoral system pathologies, and explains their failure. The second section discusses the developments in the intraparty dimension—the parties’ tendencies from the 1970s on to adopt more and more inclusive selectorates for candidate selection (this was reform outside the constitutional and legislative framework). The final section discusses the developments in the interparty dimension—patching a majoritarian feature onto a proportional system; this is an analysis of the politics of reform—the factors and the processes that led to the adoption of direct election of the prime minister, and includes five elements: long‐term developments that served as background factors; events that served as catalysts during the struggle for and against reform; a description of the political actors who took part in this struggle; the characteristics of the mixed system that make it more fit for promotion and its use by the reformers to overcome the primary advantage of the institutional status quo; and, lastly, the four stages of the reform process. An appendix lists major events and dates.

Bolivia's mixed‐member proportional (MMP) electoral system was only established in 1994 and was applied for the first time in the elections of June 1997, so it is not yet possible to make a definitive assessment of its impact on the country's political system. The chapter therefore discusses the specific immediate effects that implementation of the system has had. The first section focuses on the effects on the representation of parties and the structure of the party system (interparty and intraparty dimensions) and on the relations between single‐seat district (SSD) deputies and constituents, and the second section focuses on governance. The overall finding is that the MMP system has had no far‐reaching consequences on the government system, but has had some noteworthy consequences for the party system. Some political leaders in both governing and opposition parties are not, however, satisfied with either the degree of personalization of Bolivian politics or the role of SSD deputies, and have highlighted the need for further electoral reforms; this issue is discussed in the third section.