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The disparities—both perceived and real—between US and EU responses to climate change play a central role in defining the political parameters of on-going negotiations over a post-Kyoto agreement. While the EU and the US are only two actors at a sprawling negotiating table increasingly dominated by the rapidly developing economies, they are two of the players whose early expressions of interest and commitment helped shape the framework of the debate as well as the willingness of other key players to come to the table. And, while the EU and the US are often portrayed as sitting at opposite ends of the negotiating table, this depiction is neither accurate nor helpful. This chapter attempts to more thoroughly analyze convergences and divergences in US and EU climate strategies and to begin examining some of the key factors that influence the two regimes' legal and political approaches to climate change.

Ongoing economic policy debates at specific times have affected economic reconstruction in countries coming out of war, from the period following the two World Wars to the post-Cold War experiences. These debates have naturally influenced the way sovereign governments and the international community plan for reconstruction and have been a major determinant of the international assistance and the conditionality imposed by donors. The general policy debate and the particular constraints to policymaking in post-conflict contexts should affect policymaking in the macro- and microeconomic areas; the required institutional arrangements; the policy mix; and in particular, the role of the state and the markets in economic reconstruction. This chapter analyzes the debate, the policy choices, and the policy constraints, and focuses on the need for a minimalist macroeconomic framework. The choice between flexible and fixed exchange rates; monetary and fiscal policies; fiscal federalism; and the real and external sectors are also addressed.

This chapter discusses the international scope and increasing prominence of social mix policies that enact processes of gentrification worldwide. It argues that the literatures on social mix and on gentrification, have, until now, existed as parallel discourses, and that there is an urgent need to read them together. The introduction begins by discussing the history of social mix policy and rhetoric, and by assessing, given the recent focus on social capital, if/how the meaning of social mixing has changed over recent decades and if we now have different expectations of what might constitute a socially mixed community. It moves on to look at the proliferation of gentrification and social mix in different national contexts. The countries that the chapter discusses represent the spectrum of policy contexts in which social mix is an explicit policy intervention, one viewed as welfare enhancing (Canada), through to different levels of policy intervention that seek to steer market processes towards mix (European cases), through to more marketized interventions (the USA and Australia). Then turning to the gentrification literature, the chapter discusses the evidence about whether social mix is but a transitory phenomenon on the way to complete gentrification (social homogeneity). It considers whether gentrifiers are more predisposed towards social mixing than other members of the middle class. And finally turning to the social mix literature, the chapter considers what the adequate threshold of social interaction might be to justify an area being regarded as socially mixed. And importantly, it questions whether the aspirations of social mix policy sit well with the lived realities of daily conduct by different social groups.

This chapter presents a detailed comparative account of the role played by industrial policies — including innovation and technology policies, education and skill formation policies, trade policies, targeted industrial support measures, sectoral competitiveness policies, and competition-regulation policies — in spurring development and growth in developing countries in the last fifty years. It illustrates their different effectiveness, highlighting the importance of the varying combinations of policy measures and of the details of their implementation.

This chapter extends several of the concepts for two-player games to games with N-players. It begins by considering general games with N players P₁, P₂, . . ., P(subscript N), which are allowed to select policies within action spaces Γ‎₁, Γ‎₂, . . ., Γ‎(subscript N). Each player wants to minimize their own outcome, and does not care about the outcome of the other players. The chapter proceeds by discussing the security level, security policy, and Nash equilibrium for N-player games, pure N-player games in normal form, mixed policy for N-player games in normal form, and computation of the completely mixed Nash equilibrium for N-player games. A mixed Nash equilibrium is computed for a different game in which some (or all) players want to maximize instead of minimize the outcome.

The growing collection of literature on the rise of capital flows in several countries across Eastern Europe, Latin America, Asia, and even in the former Soviet Union during the 1990s mainly takes on issues on whether domestic factors like structural reforms and plans on stabilizing inflation or external factors like international interest rates have a significant role in bringing about increased financial flows in developing market economies. While the macroeconomic ‘countercyclical’ policies implemented to address the rising inflows are often analyzed, few studies have attempted to examine the link between the two matters and discuss how the form of capital flows are shaped by the financial sector and the domestic capital market. As such, this chapter aims to study the changing dynamics involved in cross-border capital movements while specifically evaluating the role of policy response through direct intervention and a monetary-foreign exchange ‘policy mix’.

HOPE VI stands for Home ownership and Opportunity for People Everywhere, and this chapter looks at the HOPE VI mixed-income projects in US cities, especially Nashville, Tennessee. It calls for modesty in its claims.

This chapter examines the link between gentrification and so-called social mix policies in Paris, France. Based on an analysis of social and urban transformations in progress in Goutte d'Or, a working-class and immigrant Paris neighbourhood, the chapter contends that public policies focusing on social mix actually serve the ends of gentrification. In the case in point, such policies tend to result in ‘controlled’ gentrification. The chapter demonstrates that the gentrification process launched in Goutte d'Or partly stems from such policies that thrive in a tight housing market and converge with the residential and territorial investment strategies of middle- and upper-middle-class households. Urban projects sponsored by public authorities help to create pressure on housing and drum up expectations of social change among these households.

This chapter explores the concept of mixed policies and how the notions for pure policies can be adapted to this more general type of policies. A pure policy consists of choices of particular actions (perhaps based on some observation), whereas a mixed policy involves choosing a probability distribution to select actions (perhaps as a function of observations). The idea behind mixed policies is that the players select their actions randomly according to a previously selected probability distribution. The chapter first considers the rock-paper-scissors game as an example of mixed policy before discussing mixed action spaces, mixed security policy and saddle-point equilibrium, mixed saddle-point equilibrium vs. average security levels, and general zero-sum games. It concludes with practice exercises with corresponding solutions and an additional exercise.

This chapter focuses on the computation of mixed saddle-point equilibrium policies. In view of the Minimax Theorem, the mixed saddle-point equilibria can be determined by computing the mixed security policies for both players. For 2 x 2 games, the mixed security policy can be computed in closed form using the “graphical method.” After providing an overview of the graphical method, the chapter considers a systematic numerical procedure to find the linear program solution for mixed saddle-point equilibria and the use of MATLAB's Optimization Toolbox to numerically solve linear programs. It then describes a strictly dominating policy and a “weakly” dominating policy before concluding with practice exercises and their corresponding solutions, along with an additional exercise.

This chapter discusses two types of stochastic policy for extensive form game representation as well as the existence and computation of saddle-point equilibrium. For games in extensive form, a mixed policy corresponds to selecting a pure policy in random based on a previously selected probability distribution before the game starts, and then playing that policy throughout the game. It is assumed that the random selections by both players are done statistically independently and the players will try to optimize the expected outcome of the game. After providing an overview of mixed policies and saddle-point equilibria, the chapter considers the behavioral policy for games in extensive form. It also explores behavioral saddle-point equilibrium, behavioral vs. mixed policy, recursive computation of equilibria for feedback games, mixed vs. behavioral order interchangeability, and non-feedback games. It concludes with practice exercises and their corresponding solutions, along with additional exercises.

This chapter argues the need for a much better debate around social sustainability and what it might offer London. Focusing on mixed communities policy and how it has been used to gentrify large council estates in inner London, the chapter shows that the deconcentration of poverty plays itself out as working-class/low-income population displacement and community destruction. By highlighting the case of Heygate Estate in Elephant & Castle, it exposes the negative effect to the community life in London at the national and local level. The result is social exclusion and new forms of social segregation, rather than social inclusion.

The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the different types of instruments of innovation policy, to examine how governments and public agencies in different countries and different times have used these instruments differently, to explore the political nature of instrument choice and design (and associated issues), and to elaborate a set of criteria for the selection and design of the instruments in relation to the formulation of holistic innovation policy. The chapter argues that innovation policy instruments must be designed and combined into mixes that address the problems of the innovation system. These mixes are often called ‘policy mixes’, though we prefer the term ‘instrument mix’. The wide combination of instruments into such mixes is what makes innovation policy ‘holistic’.

This chapter defines a number of key concepts for non-zero-sum games involving two players. It begins by considering a two-player game G in which two players P₁ and P₂ are allowed to select policies within action spaces Γ‎₁ and Γ‎₂, respectively. Each player wants to minimize their own outcome, and does not care about the outcome of the other player. The chapter proceeds by discussing the security policy and Nash equilibrium for two-player non-zero-sum games, bimatrix games, admissible Nash equilibrium, and mixed policy. It also explores the order interchangeability property for Nash equilibria in best-response equivalent games before concluding with practice exercises and their corresponding solutions, along with additional exercises.

This chapter deals with the Minimax Theorem and its proof, which is based on elementary results from convex analysis. The theorem states that for every matrix A, the average security levels of both players coincide. In a mixed policy, the min and max always commute. For every constant c, at least one of the players can guarantee a security level of c. The chapter first considers the statement of the Minimax Theorem before discussing the convex hull and the Separating Hyperplane Theorem, one of the key results in convex analysis. It then demonstrates how to prove the Minimax Theorem and presents the proof. It also shows the consequences of the Minimax Theorem and concludes with a practice exercise related to symmetric games and the corresponding solution.

This chapter examines public resource allocation among LTC users in Australia, England, Germany, Japan, Italy, Sweden and the U.S. In public Ltc expenditure for older people Sweden is in a league of its own as its spending on both community care and institutions is more than double the others. Outside of Sweden, Japan and then Australia and England are the highest spenders. The low spenders are Italy and the U.S. After looking at the overall public expenditure, the chapter examines expenditure and coverage both in community care and in institutions. It then moves on exploiting the evidence gathered in order to discuss the most controversial issues concerning cost control in LTC policy, such as controlling eligibility and adjusting the policy mix between cash and care.

The culmination of the European Central Bank’s (ECB) policy evolution was the ‘combined arms strategy’ that started taking shape in 2014–2015. In this chapter, we review how four unconventional measures—negative interest rates, asset purchases, targeted lending operations, and forward guidance—were progressively combined into a unified policy package. We recount the sequence of ‘recalibrations’ of these tools that took place between December 2015 and June 2018 and the internal debates that informed them. We then conduct an impact analysis where we seek to isolate and examine the contribution of the policy package to financial conditions and macroeconomic outcomes. The novelty of our analysis lies both in its methodological approach and in its diagnostics, which allows us to disentangle the respective contribution of each instrument and assess counterfactual scenarios in which they were not combined. We end by considering some of the side effects of our unconventional policies with a focus on the banking sector.