Kent Puckett
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195332759
- eISBN:
- 9780199868131
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195332759.001.0001
- Subject:
- Literature, Criticism/Theory, 19th-century and Victorian Literature
While everyone knows that the nineteenth-century novel is obsessed with gaffes, lapses, and blunders, who could have predicted that these would have so important a structural role to play in the ...
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While everyone knows that the nineteenth-century novel is obsessed with gaffes, lapses, and blunders, who could have predicted that these would have so important a structural role to play in the novel and its rise? Who knew that the novel in fact relies on its characters’ mistakes for its structural coherence, for its authority, for its form? Drawing simultaneously on the terms of narrative theory, sociology, and psychoanalysis, this book examines the necessary relation between social and literary form in the nineteenth-century novel as it is expressed at the site of the represented social mistake (eating peas with your knife, wearing the wrong thing, talking out of turn, etc.). Through close and careful readings of novels by Flaubert, Eliot, James, and others, this book shows that the novel achieves its coherence at the level of character, plot, and narration not in spite but because of the social mistake.Less
While everyone knows that the nineteenth-century novel is obsessed with gaffes, lapses, and blunders, who could have predicted that these would have so important a structural role to play in the novel and its rise? Who knew that the novel in fact relies on its characters’ mistakes for its structural coherence, for its authority, for its form? Drawing simultaneously on the terms of narrative theory, sociology, and psychoanalysis, this book examines the necessary relation between social and literary form in the nineteenth-century novel as it is expressed at the site of the represented social mistake (eating peas with your knife, wearing the wrong thing, talking out of turn, etc.). Through close and careful readings of novels by Flaubert, Eliot, James, and others, this book shows that the novel achieves its coherence at the level of character, plot, and narration not in spite but because of the social mistake.
R. M. Sainsbury and Michael Tye
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199695317
- eISBN:
- 9780191738531
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695317.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Language
How can one think about the same thing twice without knowing that it's the same thing? How can one think about nothing at all (for example Pegasus, the mythical flying horse)? Is thinking about ...
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How can one think about the same thing twice without knowing that it's the same thing? How can one think about nothing at all (for example Pegasus, the mythical flying horse)? Is thinking about oneself special? One could mistake one's car for someone else's, but it seems one could not mistake one's own headache for someone else's. Why not? This book provides an entirely new theory which answers these puzzles and more. The framework is an account of the mind that sees it as part of nature, as opposed to something with supernatural powers. This means that human beings have more opportunities to make mistakes than many have liked to think.Less
How can one think about the same thing twice without knowing that it's the same thing? How can one think about nothing at all (for example Pegasus, the mythical flying horse)? Is thinking about oneself special? One could mistake one's car for someone else's, but it seems one could not mistake one's own headache for someone else's. Why not? This book provides an entirely new theory which answers these puzzles and more. The framework is an account of the mind that sees it as part of nature, as opposed to something with supernatural powers. This means that human beings have more opportunities to make mistakes than many have liked to think.
Jana Matthews and Jeff Dennis
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195168259
- eISBN:
- 9780199849734
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195168259.003.0007
- Subject:
- Business and Management, Innovation
For aspiring business owners, this book hopefully has inspired avoidance of “the edge”. For those who are already experiencing the edge, the book contains help for those people to evaluate the ...
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For aspiring business owners, this book hopefully has inspired avoidance of “the edge”. For those who are already experiencing the edge, the book contains help for those people to evaluate the situation and identify the possible courses of action to be taken. This final chapter encourages entrepreneurs to participate in peer group activities since this may promote growth through sharing experiences with other entrepreneurs, discussing certain issues, and other such activities. Also, the chapter advises that having a mentor outside the peer group is helpful since such people may provide impartial judgment and advice about the business. In sum, one must be able to learn, if not from one's own mistakes, but from the mistakes of others especially in terms of business and avoiding being on the edge.Less
For aspiring business owners, this book hopefully has inspired avoidance of “the edge”. For those who are already experiencing the edge, the book contains help for those people to evaluate the situation and identify the possible courses of action to be taken. This final chapter encourages entrepreneurs to participate in peer group activities since this may promote growth through sharing experiences with other entrepreneurs, discussing certain issues, and other such activities. Also, the chapter advises that having a mentor outside the peer group is helpful since such people may provide impartial judgment and advice about the business. In sum, one must be able to learn, if not from one's own mistakes, but from the mistakes of others especially in terms of business and avoiding being on the edge.
Mia de Kuijper
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195171631
- eISBN:
- 9780199871353
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195171631.003.0015
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Macro- and Monetary Economics
Chapter 14 introduces the The Four Rules for Maximizing Profits in Transparency Method and presents a series of step-by-step templates for evaluation and action plans that should be implemented by ...
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Chapter 14 introduces the The Four Rules for Maximizing Profits in Transparency Method and presents a series of step-by-step templates for evaluation and action plans that should be implemented by any business leader or investor who is seriously interested in extraordinary returns. Chapter 15 through 18 contain the operating instructions for implementation of the Four Rules and for using power nodes. These guidelines are illustrated with many specific examples that successful companies have used, as well as with lessons from avoidable mistakes.Less
Chapter 14 introduces the The Four Rules for Maximizing Profits in Transparency Method and presents a series of step-by-step templates for evaluation and action plans that should be implemented by any business leader or investor who is seriously interested in extraordinary returns. Chapter 15 through 18 contain the operating instructions for implementation of the Four Rules and for using power nodes. These guidelines are illustrated with many specific examples that successful companies have used, as well as with lessons from avoidable mistakes.
Mia de Kuijper
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195171631
- eISBN:
- 9780199871353
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195171631.003.0018
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Macro- and Monetary Economics
Chapter 17 contains the operating instructions for implementation of the third of the Four Rules
Chapter 17 contains the operating instructions for implementation of the third of the Four Rules
Mia de Kuijper
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195171631
- eISBN:
- 9780199871353
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195171631.003.0019
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Macro- and Monetary Economics
Chapter 18 contains the operating instructions for implementation of the fourth of the Four Rules
Chapter 18 contains the operating instructions for implementation of the fourth of the Four Rules
Daniel Stoljar
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195306583
- eISBN:
- 9780199786619
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195306589.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter takes up the conditional thesis that if the ignorance hypothesis is true, the logical problem is solved. The defense of this thesis begins from the idea that there are a number of ...
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This chapter takes up the conditional thesis that if the ignorance hypothesis is true, the logical problem is solved. The defense of this thesis begins from the idea that there are a number of distinctive ways that a modal argument can go wrong — a number of standard mistakes. The philosophical challenge presented by the modal arguments that are constitutive of the logical problem is that it is hard to see in these cases that we are making any of these standard mistakes. On the other hand, if the ignorance hypothesis is true, it becomes immediately plausible to suppose that we are making one of (or a combination of) these mistakes. This suggests in turn that E1 is true: if the ignorance hypothesis is true, the logical problem is solved.Less
This chapter takes up the conditional thesis that if the ignorance hypothesis is true, the logical problem is solved. The defense of this thesis begins from the idea that there are a number of distinctive ways that a modal argument can go wrong — a number of standard mistakes. The philosophical challenge presented by the modal arguments that are constitutive of the logical problem is that it is hard to see in these cases that we are making any of these standard mistakes. On the other hand, if the ignorance hypothesis is true, it becomes immediately plausible to suppose that we are making one of (or a combination of) these mistakes. This suggests in turn that E1 is true: if the ignorance hypothesis is true, the logical problem is solved.
Hugh Beale QC FBA
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199593880
- eISBN:
- 9780191745362
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199593880.001.0001
- Subject:
- Law, Law of Obligations
This book examines the case for reforming the law on mistake and non-disclosure of fact to bring English law closer to the law in much of continental Europe. There, and in common law countries like ...
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This book examines the case for reforming the law on mistake and non-disclosure of fact to bring English law closer to the law in much of continental Europe. There, and in common law countries like the US, a party may avoid a contract for mistake of fact on a more liberal basis, and a party who deliberately keeps silent knowing that the other party is making a mistake may be guilty of fraud. This is not necessarily the case in England and Wales. Developing a proposal for law reform, the book concedes that the English courts require a law that puts great emphasis on certainty and expects parties to look out for their own interests; but posits that this individualistic approach is not suitable for smaller businesses which are less sophisticated and which are likely to be making low value contracts, so that relative cost of taking advice will be high. The book argues that the solution may not be to reform English contract law generally, but to support the development of an optional instrument on contract law, along the lines of the Common European Sales Law recently proposed by the European Commission. This measure is aimed specifically at the needs of small and medium enterprises, and contains the protective rules found in the other jurisdictions. It is aimed primarily at cross-border sales, but Member States would be given the option of adopting it for domestic transactions too. This would give small businesses the choice of using the current ‘hard-nosed’ law or adopting the more protective optional instrument, recognizing that different parties require different things from the law governing their contract.Less
This book examines the case for reforming the law on mistake and non-disclosure of fact to bring English law closer to the law in much of continental Europe. There, and in common law countries like the US, a party may avoid a contract for mistake of fact on a more liberal basis, and a party who deliberately keeps silent knowing that the other party is making a mistake may be guilty of fraud. This is not necessarily the case in England and Wales. Developing a proposal for law reform, the book concedes that the English courts require a law that puts great emphasis on certainty and expects parties to look out for their own interests; but posits that this individualistic approach is not suitable for smaller businesses which are less sophisticated and which are likely to be making low value contracts, so that relative cost of taking advice will be high. The book argues that the solution may not be to reform English contract law generally, but to support the development of an optional instrument on contract law, along the lines of the Common European Sales Law recently proposed by the European Commission. This measure is aimed specifically at the needs of small and medium enterprises, and contains the protective rules found in the other jurisdictions. It is aimed primarily at cross-border sales, but Member States would be given the option of adopting it for domestic transactions too. This would give small businesses the choice of using the current ‘hard-nosed’ law or adopting the more protective optional instrument, recognizing that different parties require different things from the law governing their contract.
Paul Weirich
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- November 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780195171259
- eISBN:
- 9780199834976
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019517125X.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
People facing decision problems may have faulty probability and utility assignments or be burdened with other mistakes. Prior todeciding, they should make a reasonable effort to correct for ...
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People facing decision problems may have faulty probability and utility assignments or be burdened with other mistakes. Prior todeciding, they should make a reasonable effort to correct for unacceptable mistakes. A mistake may be acceptable because it is in the remote past, insignificant in the current decision problem, incorrigible, or excusable in light of cognitive limits. Although a decision may be conditionally rational, granting an agent’s decision situation and procedures, it may still fail to be comprehensively rational because the agent’s decision situation and procedures include unacceptable mistakes.Less
People facing decision problems may have faulty probability and utility assignments or be burdened with other mistakes. Prior todeciding, they should make a reasonable effort to correct for unacceptable mistakes. A mistake may be acceptable because it is in the remote past, insignificant in the current decision problem, incorrigible, or excusable in light of cognitive limits. Although a decision may be conditionally rational, granting an agent’s decision situation and procedures, it may still fail to be comprehensively rational because the agent’s decision situation and procedures include unacceptable mistakes.
Stephen Shute and Andrew Simester (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- January 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199243495
- eISBN:
- 9780191714177
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199243495.001.0001
- Subject:
- Law, Criminal Law and Criminology
Written by philosophers and lawyers from the United States and the United Kingdom, this collection of original essays offers new insights into the doctrines that make up the general part of the ...
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Written by philosophers and lawyers from the United States and the United Kingdom, this collection of original essays offers new insights into the doctrines that make up the general part of the criminal law. It sheds theoretical light on the diversity and unity of the general part and advances our understanding of such key issues as criminalisation, omissions, voluntary actions, knowledge, belief, reckelssness, duress, self-defence, entrapment and officially-induced mistake of law.Less
Written by philosophers and lawyers from the United States and the United Kingdom, this collection of original essays offers new insights into the doctrines that make up the general part of the criminal law. It sheds theoretical light on the diversity and unity of the general part and advances our understanding of such key issues as criminalisation, omissions, voluntary actions, knowledge, belief, reckelssness, duress, self-defence, entrapment and officially-induced mistake of law.
Kent Puckett
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195332759
- eISBN:
- 9780199868131
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195332759.003.0001
- Subject:
- Literature, Criticism/Theory, 19th-century and Victorian Literature
The Introduction outlines the author's intentions in writing this book. This book, the Introduction says, is about mistakes, but not every single mistake. It presents instead an argument about the ...
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The Introduction outlines the author's intentions in writing this book. This book, the Introduction says, is about mistakes, but not every single mistake. It presents instead an argument about the relationship between the social mistake, the narrative omniscience of certain 19th-century novels, and the middle class social order and it's authority over such novels of that era. The book focus is on a certain kind of mistake. The Introduction then outlines the novels which form part of the book's discussion and explains the reasons why these novels feature. The Introduction finally summarizes the chapters that follow. Less
The Introduction outlines the author's intentions in writing this book. This book, the Introduction says, is about mistakes, but not every single mistake. It presents instead an argument about the relationship between the social mistake, the narrative omniscience of certain 19th-century novels, and the middle class social order and it's authority over such novels of that era. The book focus is on a certain kind of mistake. The Introduction then outlines the novels which form part of the book's discussion and explains the reasons why these novels feature. The Introduction finally summarizes the chapters that follow.
Richard Sorabji
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199256600
- eISBN:
- 9780191712609
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199256600.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
Zeno of Citium, the Stoic founder, had tried out other definitions of emotion. One, defended by Chrysippus, was that emotion involves oscillating, like Medea, between accepting the right value ...
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Zeno of Citium, the Stoic founder, had tried out other definitions of emotion. One, defended by Chrysippus, was that emotion involves oscillating, like Medea, between accepting the right value judgement and disobeying it. But disobedience to reason is not the same as mistake. How can it be, and is it ever, combined with mistake? The Stoic Seneca (1st century CE) allows this by distinguishing three movements in anger. The first movement is the appearance that revenge is appropriate and the resulting shock to soul or body. The second is the mistaken assent to the appearance that revenge is appropriate. The third movement — the full emotion — moves from mistake to disobedience with the judgement that revenge is to be pursued, appropriate or not.Less
Zeno of Citium, the Stoic founder, had tried out other definitions of emotion. One, defended by Chrysippus, was that emotion involves oscillating, like Medea, between accepting the right value judgement and disobeying it. But disobedience to reason is not the same as mistake. How can it be, and is it ever, combined with mistake? The Stoic Seneca (1st century CE) allows this by distinguishing three movements in anger. The first movement is the appearance that revenge is appropriate and the resulting shock to soul or body. The second is the mistaken assent to the appearance that revenge is appropriate. The third movement — the full emotion — moves from mistake to disobedience with the judgement that revenge is to be pursued, appropriate or not.
Alan Brudner
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199207251
- eISBN:
- 9780191705502
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199207251.003.0003
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law, Criminal Law and Criminology
This chapter criticizes the character and choice theories of the culpable mind as incapable of justifying judicial punishment specifically as opposed to moral censure generally. It develops from ...
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This chapter criticizes the character and choice theories of the culpable mind as incapable of justifying judicial punishment specifically as opposed to moral censure generally. It develops from legal retributivism an account of the culpable mind requirement that reconciles judicial punishment with the inviolability of the person. The chapter argues that the wrongdoer's choice to interfere or to risk interfering with another agent's capacity to act on ends it chooses is the level of fault required to make punishment implicitly self-imposed by the recipient and thus distinguishable from the wrongdoer's violence. Such a choice is one to which a denial of rights of agency may be logically imputed, a denial by which the wrongdoer implicitly authorizes his own coercibility. Exculpatory conditions are those which block an inference from the agent's choice to a denial of rights. The chapter argues that this version of subjectivism is invulnerable against the criticisms levelled against other versions.Less
This chapter criticizes the character and choice theories of the culpable mind as incapable of justifying judicial punishment specifically as opposed to moral censure generally. It develops from legal retributivism an account of the culpable mind requirement that reconciles judicial punishment with the inviolability of the person. The chapter argues that the wrongdoer's choice to interfere or to risk interfering with another agent's capacity to act on ends it chooses is the level of fault required to make punishment implicitly self-imposed by the recipient and thus distinguishable from the wrongdoer's violence. Such a choice is one to which a denial of rights of agency may be logically imputed, a denial by which the wrongdoer implicitly authorizes his own coercibility. Exculpatory conditions are those which block an inference from the agent's choice to a denial of rights. The chapter argues that this version of subjectivism is invulnerable against the criticisms levelled against other versions.
Michael Lobban
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199258826
- eISBN:
- 9780191705168
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199258826.003.0011
- Subject:
- Law, Legal History
This chapter discusses notions of mistake in contract formation. Topics covered include mistake in equity, mistake at common law, and mistake of identity.
This chapter discusses notions of mistake in contract formation. Topics covered include mistake in equity, mistake at common law, and mistake of identity.
EYAL ZAMIR and BARAK MEDINA
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195372168
- eISBN:
- 9780199776078
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195372168.003.09
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law
This chapter discusses contract law. Ordinarily, market transactions do not involve infringements of deontological constraints. For this reason (and since they usually involve money or easily ...
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This chapter discusses contract law. Ordinarily, market transactions do not involve infringements of deontological constraints. For this reason (and since they usually involve money or easily monetized goods), standard cost-benefit analysis is particularly apt for analyzing contract law. Nevertheless, it is argued that certain deontological constraints apply to contracting behavior and that combining deontological constraints with economic analysis of contract law, may be fruitful. The chapter briefly surveys the deontological constraints pertinent to contract law and critically examines the standard economic response to them. It then demonstrates how deontological constraints may be integrated with economic analysis of the contracting stage, focusing on the doctrines of mistake and misrepresentation. Last, it highlights the differences between economic and deontological analyses of contract performance and breach, and discusses the difficulties facing integration of deontological constraints with the economic analysis of contract remedies, given the current state of the pertinent theories.Less
This chapter discusses contract law. Ordinarily, market transactions do not involve infringements of deontological constraints. For this reason (and since they usually involve money or easily monetized goods), standard cost-benefit analysis is particularly apt for analyzing contract law. Nevertheless, it is argued that certain deontological constraints apply to contracting behavior and that combining deontological constraints with economic analysis of contract law, may be fruitful. The chapter briefly surveys the deontological constraints pertinent to contract law and critically examines the standard economic response to them. It then demonstrates how deontological constraints may be integrated with economic analysis of the contracting stage, focusing on the doctrines of mistake and misrepresentation. Last, it highlights the differences between economic and deontological analyses of contract performance and breach, and discusses the difficulties facing integration of deontological constraints with the economic analysis of contract remedies, given the current state of the pertinent theories.
Douglas Husak
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199585038
- eISBN:
- 9780191723476
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199585038.003.0010
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law
Since a mistaken belief about consent should be a defence to rape when it is reasonable, it is important to identify the kind of evidence that is helpful in distinguishing reasonable from ...
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Since a mistaken belief about consent should be a defence to rape when it is reasonable, it is important to identify the kind of evidence that is helpful in distinguishing reasonable from unreasonable mistakes about consent to sex. This chapter argues that an adequate theory of whether a mistake about consent is reasonable depends on empirical evidence about how consent to sexual relations is expressed even when no mistake is made. It examines this evidence and contends (contrary to many rape law reformers) that the author's views about the conditions under which mistakes about consent to sex are reasonable are not unfair to women in general or to rape victims in particular.Less
Since a mistaken belief about consent should be a defence to rape when it is reasonable, it is important to identify the kind of evidence that is helpful in distinguishing reasonable from unreasonable mistakes about consent to sex. This chapter argues that an adequate theory of whether a mistake about consent is reasonable depends on empirical evidence about how consent to sexual relations is expressed even when no mistake is made. It examines this evidence and contends (contrary to many rape law reformers) that the author's views about the conditions under which mistakes about consent to sex are reasonable are not unfair to women in general or to rape victims in particular.
Mark Schroeder
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199534654
- eISBN:
- 9780191715938
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199534654.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter offers an alternative approach to assigning truth conditions to complex descriptive sentences. Truth conditions are first motivated as a kind of composite of the assertability conditions ...
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This chapter offers an alternative approach to assigning truth conditions to complex descriptive sentences. Truth conditions are first motivated as a kind of composite of the assertability conditions on sentences and mistake conditions on mental states. It is then suggested that given biforcated attitude semantics, plausible assumptions about what mistake conditions will involve can be used to assign the right truth conditions to complex descriptive sentences — a result which is proven in an appendix to the chapter. It is further suggested that given an appropriate semantics for ‘believes that’, the expressivist can go on to maintain that the states expressed by complex descriptive sentences really are beliefs, after all.Less
This chapter offers an alternative approach to assigning truth conditions to complex descriptive sentences. Truth conditions are first motivated as a kind of composite of the assertability conditions on sentences and mistake conditions on mental states. It is then suggested that given biforcated attitude semantics, plausible assumptions about what mistake conditions will involve can be used to assign the right truth conditions to complex descriptive sentences — a result which is proven in an appendix to the chapter. It is further suggested that given an appropriate semantics for ‘believes that’, the expressivist can go on to maintain that the states expressed by complex descriptive sentences really are beliefs, after all.
Stephen A. Smith
- Published in print:
- 1993
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780198765615
- eISBN:
- 9780191695308
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198765615.001.0001
- Subject:
- Law, Law of Obligations
This book is both an examination of, and a contribution to, our understanding of the theoretical foundations of the common law of contract. Focusing on contemporary debates in contract theory, the ...
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This book is both an examination of, and a contribution to, our understanding of the theoretical foundations of the common law of contract. Focusing on contemporary debates in contract theory, the book aims to help readers better understand the nature and justification of the general idea of contractual obligation, as well as the nature and justification of the particular rules that make up the law of contract. The book is in three parts. Part I introduces the idea of ‘contract theory’, and presents a framework for identifying, classifying, and evaluating contract theories. Part II describes and evaluates the most important general theories of contract; examples include promissory theories, reliance-based theories, and economic theories. In Part III, the theoretical issues raised by the various specific doctrines that make up the law of contract (e.g., offer and acceptance, consideration, mistake, remedies, etc.) are examined in separate chapters. The legal focus of the book is the common law of the United Kingdom, but the theoretical literature discussed is international in origin; the arguments discussed are thus relevant to understanding the law of other common law jurisdictions and, in many instances, to understanding the law of civil law jurisdictions as well.Less
This book is both an examination of, and a contribution to, our understanding of the theoretical foundations of the common law of contract. Focusing on contemporary debates in contract theory, the book aims to help readers better understand the nature and justification of the general idea of contractual obligation, as well as the nature and justification of the particular rules that make up the law of contract. The book is in three parts. Part I introduces the idea of ‘contract theory’, and presents a framework for identifying, classifying, and evaluating contract theories. Part II describes and evaluates the most important general theories of contract; examples include promissory theories, reliance-based theories, and economic theories. In Part III, the theoretical issues raised by the various specific doctrines that make up the law of contract (e.g., offer and acceptance, consideration, mistake, remedies, etc.) are examined in separate chapters. The legal focus of the book is the common law of the United Kingdom, but the theoretical literature discussed is international in origin; the arguments discussed are thus relevant to understanding the law of other common law jurisdictions and, in many instances, to understanding the law of civil law jurisdictions as well.
E. Allan Farnsworth
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199276110
- eISBN:
- 9780191699887
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199276110.001.0001
- Subject:
- Law, Law of Obligations
This book examines the legal issues that arise when we seek to avoid the untoward consequences of an action by claiming that our perception was flawed. We all make mistakes: we might overpay a debt, ...
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This book examines the legal issues that arise when we seek to avoid the untoward consequences of an action by claiming that our perception was flawed. We all make mistakes: we might overpay a debt, make an unfavourable contract, or be sued or accused of a crime as a result of our mistake. Claims to alleviation on the grounds of mistake are likely to arise wherever the law prescribes a state of mind (some kind of intent) as a prerequisite for the application of a legal rule. This book asks when the fact that a person made a mistake should entitle them to alleviation. This may involve the intention to enter into a contract or a payment, in which case a person could seek its reversal, or it might involve the intent to commit a tort or crime, in which case they could seek forgiveness for the offence. The book defines ‘alleviating’ mistakes as those which entitle a person to relief from untoward consequences of their mistake. There is no general ‘law of mistake’ and, despite their similarities, few discussions of mistake in one setting pause to consider mistakes in other contexts. The goals of fields as disparate as contracts and criminal law are very different: how do these differences affect the treatment of mistakes? The book sets out a new taxonomy of mistakes. Its analysis reveals that over the past century, there has been a remarkable increase in the receptivity of courts and scholars to claims for both reversal and forgiveness—a waxing of alleviating mistakes.Less
This book examines the legal issues that arise when we seek to avoid the untoward consequences of an action by claiming that our perception was flawed. We all make mistakes: we might overpay a debt, make an unfavourable contract, or be sued or accused of a crime as a result of our mistake. Claims to alleviation on the grounds of mistake are likely to arise wherever the law prescribes a state of mind (some kind of intent) as a prerequisite for the application of a legal rule. This book asks when the fact that a person made a mistake should entitle them to alleviation. This may involve the intention to enter into a contract or a payment, in which case a person could seek its reversal, or it might involve the intent to commit a tort or crime, in which case they could seek forgiveness for the offence. The book defines ‘alleviating’ mistakes as those which entitle a person to relief from untoward consequences of their mistake. There is no general ‘law of mistake’ and, despite their similarities, few discussions of mistake in one setting pause to consider mistakes in other contexts. The goals of fields as disparate as contracts and criminal law are very different: how do these differences affect the treatment of mistakes? The book sets out a new taxonomy of mistakes. Its analysis reveals that over the past century, there has been a remarkable increase in the receptivity of courts and scholars to claims for both reversal and forgiveness—a waxing of alleviating mistakes.
Edmund F. Kallina Jr.
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780813034850
- eISBN:
- 9780813038599
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- University Press of Florida
- DOI:
- 10.5744/florida/9780813034850.001.0001
- Subject:
- History, American History: 20th Century
This is a book for everyone who thinks they know what happened in the pivotal election year of 1960. For 50 years we've accepted Theodore White's premise (from The Making of the President, 1960) that ...
More
This is a book for everyone who thinks they know what happened in the pivotal election year of 1960. For 50 years we've accepted Theodore White's premise (from The Making of the President, 1960) that Kennedy ran a brilliant campaign while Nixon committed blunder after blunder. But White the journalist was a Kennedy partisan and helped establish the myth of Camelot. Now, five decades later, this book offers a fresh overview of the election's most critical and controversial events. Based upon research conducted at four presidential libraries—those of Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon—this book is able to make observations and share insights unavailable in the immediate aftermath of one of the closest races in American presidential history. It describes the strengths and mistakes of both camps, and examines the impact of civil rights, Cold War tensions, and the televised presidential debates on an election that still looms large in both the political history and the popular imagination of the United States.Less
This is a book for everyone who thinks they know what happened in the pivotal election year of 1960. For 50 years we've accepted Theodore White's premise (from The Making of the President, 1960) that Kennedy ran a brilliant campaign while Nixon committed blunder after blunder. But White the journalist was a Kennedy partisan and helped establish the myth of Camelot. Now, five decades later, this book offers a fresh overview of the election's most critical and controversial events. Based upon research conducted at four presidential libraries—those of Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon—this book is able to make observations and share insights unavailable in the immediate aftermath of one of the closest races in American presidential history. It describes the strengths and mistakes of both camps, and examines the impact of civil rights, Cold War tensions, and the televised presidential debates on an election that still looms large in both the political history and the popular imagination of the United States.
