Stephen Ansolabehere and Eitan Hersh
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691151106
- eISBN:
- 9781400840304
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691151106.003.0012
- Subject:
- Political Science, Democratization
This chapter considers how voters are different from nonvoters with respect to their demographic and ideological attributes, and if election outcomes would change if everyone voted. It first explains ...
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This chapter considers how voters are different from nonvoters with respect to their demographic and ideological attributes, and if election outcomes would change if everyone voted. It first explains why vote misreporting presents a problem for studies of participatory bias. Then, the chapter introduces the vote validation study conducted as part of the 2006 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES). It then compares voters to nonvoters along key demographic and attitudinal variables, using both CCES and ANES data. Here, the chapter shows how misreporting exaggerates the differences between voters and nonvoters, and it also addresses the problem with bias ratio measures. Finally, this chapter simulates higher voter turnout and shows that if more people voted, election results would hardly be affected at all.Less
This chapter considers how voters are different from nonvoters with respect to their demographic and ideological attributes, and if election outcomes would change if everyone voted. It first explains why vote misreporting presents a problem for studies of participatory bias. Then, the chapter introduces the vote validation study conducted as part of the 2006 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES). It then compares voters to nonvoters along key demographic and attitudinal variables, using both CCES and ANES data. Here, the chapter shows how misreporting exaggerates the differences between voters and nonvoters, and it also addresses the problem with bias ratio measures. Finally, this chapter simulates higher voter turnout and shows that if more people voted, election results would hardly be affected at all.
Douglas Cumming, Na Dai, and Sofia A. Johan
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- May 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199862566
- eISBN:
- 9780199332762
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199862566.001.0001
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Financial Economics
A recurrent concern shared by market participants and regulators around the world is that the increasing size of the hedge fund industry coupled with potential agency problems, activist investment ...
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A recurrent concern shared by market participants and regulators around the world is that the increasing size of the hedge fund industry coupled with potential agency problems, activist investment practices and herding behavior may exacerbate financial instability. Having said that, although it is frequently suggested that hedge funds are unregulated, hedge funds are in fact regulated at least to some degree in every country around the world. It is therefore worthwhile to consider such differences in legal and institutional settings across countries as they directly affect the structure, governance and performance of hedge funds. In this book, we consider international data including data from the US, Asia and Europe, to gain a significant amount of insight into how hedge funds operate on a global basis. While hedge funds are hardly regulated in the US, other jurisdictions implement different and sometimes more onerous sets of regulatory requirements. As explained in the book, international differences in hedge fund regulation include, but are not limited to, minimum capitalization requirements, restrictions on the location of key service providers and different permissible distribution channels via private placements, banks, other regulated or non-regulated financial intermediaries, wrappers, investment managers and fund distribution companies. Essentially, hedge fund regulatory structures differ across jurisdictions, so maybe we should not tar and feather all hedge funds with the same brush.Less
A recurrent concern shared by market participants and regulators around the world is that the increasing size of the hedge fund industry coupled with potential agency problems, activist investment practices and herding behavior may exacerbate financial instability. Having said that, although it is frequently suggested that hedge funds are unregulated, hedge funds are in fact regulated at least to some degree in every country around the world. It is therefore worthwhile to consider such differences in legal and institutional settings across countries as they directly affect the structure, governance and performance of hedge funds. In this book, we consider international data including data from the US, Asia and Europe, to gain a significant amount of insight into how hedge funds operate on a global basis. While hedge funds are hardly regulated in the US, other jurisdictions implement different and sometimes more onerous sets of regulatory requirements. As explained in the book, international differences in hedge fund regulation include, but are not limited to, minimum capitalization requirements, restrictions on the location of key service providers and different permissible distribution channels via private placements, banks, other regulated or non-regulated financial intermediaries, wrappers, investment managers and fund distribution companies. Essentially, hedge fund regulatory structures differ across jurisdictions, so maybe we should not tar and feather all hedge funds with the same brush.
Douglas Cumming, Na Dai, and Sofia A. Johan
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- May 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199862566
- eISBN:
- 9780199332762
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199862566.003.0008
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Financial Economics
Chapter 8 addresses the issue of whether hedge fund regulation mitigates or exacerbates the tendency of fund managers to misreport returns. By examining cross-country evidence on misreported returns, ...
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Chapter 8 addresses the issue of whether hedge fund regulation mitigates or exacerbates the tendency of fund managers to misreport returns. By examining cross-country evidence on misreported returns, it is possible to infer by holding other factors constant the impact of international differences on hedge fund regulation on the propensity to misreport returns. Further, the chapter examines and calculates explicitly whether it pays to misreport.Less
Chapter 8 addresses the issue of whether hedge fund regulation mitigates or exacerbates the tendency of fund managers to misreport returns. By examining cross-country evidence on misreported returns, it is possible to infer by holding other factors constant the impact of international differences on hedge fund regulation on the propensity to misreport returns. Further, the chapter examines and calculates explicitly whether it pays to misreport.
Douglas Cumming, Na Dai, and Sofia A. Johan
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- May 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199862566
- eISBN:
- 9780199332762
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199862566.003.0009
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Financial Economics
Chapter 9 discusses the idea that performance persistence can either be enhanced or mitigated by financial regulation. An analysis of data from 48 countries spanning determines that international and ...
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Chapter 9 discusses the idea that performance persistence can either be enhanced or mitigated by financial regulation. An analysis of data from 48 countries spanning determines that international and time-series differences in hedge fund regulation exist for minimum capitalization requirements, restrictions on the location of key service providers, and permissible distribution channels. Overall, the analysis within this chapter supports for the idea that minimum capitalization enhances performance persistence, while restrictions on location mitigate performance persistence.Less
Chapter 9 discusses the idea that performance persistence can either be enhanced or mitigated by financial regulation. An analysis of data from 48 countries spanning determines that international and time-series differences in hedge fund regulation exist for minimum capitalization requirements, restrictions on the location of key service providers, and permissible distribution channels. Overall, the analysis within this chapter supports for the idea that minimum capitalization enhances performance persistence, while restrictions on location mitigate performance persistence.
Maria D. Molina and S. Shyam Sundar
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- August 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780190900250
- eISBN:
- 9780190900298
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190900250.003.0013
- Subject:
- Political Science, Democratization
The nature of news reporting and data gathering has changed with the advent of social media, equipping journalists with new methods of uncovering news stories and providing the necessary background ...
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The nature of news reporting and data gathering has changed with the advent of social media, equipping journalists with new methods of uncovering news stories and providing the necessary background and context for their readers. Even though a presence online is indispensable for journalists, there are risks from these practices. Affordances of media technologies can influence a journalist´s decision to cover an event, select sources, or engage in conversations, but they also result in cues and residues that can reduce a journalist’s credibility. In this chapter, we use the four classes of technological affordances outlined by the MAIN model (Sundar 2008)—modality, agency, interactivity, and navigability—to examine the various actions and cues in social media that both aid and ensnare journalists. We discuss how interface cues trigger cognitive heuristics (or mental shortcuts) that lure journalists, sometimes to their detriment. We provide recent examples of journalistic misadventure and potential solutions.Less
The nature of news reporting and data gathering has changed with the advent of social media, equipping journalists with new methods of uncovering news stories and providing the necessary background and context for their readers. Even though a presence online is indispensable for journalists, there are risks from these practices. Affordances of media technologies can influence a journalist´s decision to cover an event, select sources, or engage in conversations, but they also result in cues and residues that can reduce a journalist’s credibility. In this chapter, we use the four classes of technological affordances outlined by the MAIN model (Sundar 2008)—modality, agency, interactivity, and navigability—to examine the various actions and cues in social media that both aid and ensnare journalists. We discuss how interface cues trigger cognitive heuristics (or mental shortcuts) that lure journalists, sometimes to their detriment. We provide recent examples of journalistic misadventure and potential solutions.
Charles C. Moul and John V. C. Nye
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691147611
- eISBN:
- 9781400866595
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691147611.003.0013
- Subject:
- Mathematics, Probability / Statistics
This chapter surveys applications of Benford's law within economics, such as its use in investigating the validity of macroeconomic data series. It argues that, given the strong interest in strategic ...
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This chapter surveys applications of Benford's law within economics, such as its use in investigating the validity of macroeconomic data series. It argues that, given the strong interest in strategic behavior in economics, it makes sense to use Benford's law to investigate possible anomalies that suggest manipulation or other interference, especially when incentives increase for such tampering. The chapter then considers how a first-digit analysis informs Value at Risk (VAR) data from the U.S. financial sector over the past ten years. It finds that Benford's law fits precrisis data very well but is rejected for postcrisis data. Opportunities and incentives for such misreporting are then discussed.Less
This chapter surveys applications of Benford's law within economics, such as its use in investigating the validity of macroeconomic data series. It argues that, given the strong interest in strategic behavior in economics, it makes sense to use Benford's law to investigate possible anomalies that suggest manipulation or other interference, especially when incentives increase for such tampering. The chapter then considers how a first-digit analysis informs Value at Risk (VAR) data from the U.S. financial sector over the past ten years. It finds that Benford's law fits precrisis data very well but is rejected for postcrisis data. Opportunities and incentives for such misreporting are then discussed.
