Search Results

The Ideal Language Project and the Non‐discrete

Henry Laycock

in Words without Objects: Semantics, Ontology, and Logic for Non-Singularity

The notion of an ‘ideal language’ or ‘concept-script’ is explicated and defended, and constraints upon formal systems imposed by the ideal of transparency are explored. It is argued that non-singular ... More

The notion of an ‘ideal language’ or ‘concept-script’ is explicated and defended, and constraints upon formal systems imposed by the ideal of transparency are explored. It is argued that non-singular symbolisms, including non-singular variables, largely fail to satisfy such constraints. In general, the semantics of non-singular expressions do not transparently reflect the corresponding ontic categories. The conditions for the possibility of transparent non-singular assertions, freed from the concept of identity, are briefly explored. The questionable influence within philosophy of the ‘Classical’ Weltanschaung is highlighted.Less

Remembering without Knowing

Sven Bernecker

in Memory: A Philosophical Study

This chapter argues against the widespread epistemic theory of memory which consists of two interrelated claims. The first claim is that to remember a proposition is to know it, where this knowledge ... More

This chapter argues against the widespread epistemic theory of memory which consists of two interrelated claims. The first claim is that to remember a proposition is to know it, where this knowledge was previously acquired and preserved. The second claim is that memory can only preserve knowledge from one time to another but cannot generate new justification and knowledge. Both aspects of the epistemic theory of memory are shown to be mistaken. It is possible to remember something in the present that one didn't justifiably believe in the past. Likewise one may acquire in the meantime some plausible but misleading evidence that destroys the status as justified belief of the once‐genuine justified belief that one still remembers. Moreover, cases of ignorant remembering show that one can remember something that one doesn't believe. In sum then, knowledge supervenes on some but not all cases of propositional remembering. Unlike knowledge, memory implies neither belief nor justification. But the epistemic theory of memory is not only wrong in holding that memory is a form of knowledge. It is also mistaken in assuming that memory cannot alter the epistemic status of a belief. Memory doesn't merely have the capacity to preserve epistemic features generated by other sources but that it is also a generative epistemic source.Less

Misleading Defeaters

Richard Foley

in When Is True Belief Knowledge?

This chapter proposes a game in a similar vein to the Gettier game: when a subject has a true belief but seems not to have knowledge, it looks for some key aspect of the situation about which the ... More

This chapter proposes a game in a similar vein to the Gettier game: when a subject has a true belief but seems not to have knowledge, it looks for some key aspect of the situation about which the subject lacks true beliefs. Defeasibility theorists make a strikingly similar recommendation. When confronted with cases in which a subject intuitively lacks knowledge despite having a justified true belief, they too recommend looking for a truth about the situation that the subject lacks, but because they are committed to the Gettier game, they link the subject's ignorance of this truth with the justification requirement. The chapter examines a story discussed by a leading proponent of the defeasibility theory, Peter Klein, before positing its own solution to the game.Less

Questioning Techniques

Kathleen Coulborn Faller

in Interviewing Children about Sexual Abuse: Controversies and Best Practice

A hotly debated aspect of the child interview relates to the questions employed by the interviewer. The core of the debate is whether a particular type of question elicits accurate information from ... More

A hotly debated aspect of the child interview relates to the questions employed by the interviewer. The core of the debate is whether a particular type of question elicits accurate information from the child or not. The types of questions discussed are invitational, open, closed, open-ended, close-ended, leading, multiple choice, direct, specific, misleading, option-posing, and coercive. A great deal of research has been undertaken on questioning procedures, although most of this is analogue research. Question types are divided into three general categories from preferred, to less preferred, and least preferred. Each type of question is described and illustrated, and differing opinions about the appropriateness of each type of question are discussed.Less

Lying

Jennifer M. Saul

in Lying, Misleading, and What is Said: An Exploration in Philosophy of Language and in Ethics

This chapter carves out a working definition of lying (as opposed to merely misleading) that will be used throughout the book.

The Problem of What Is Said

Jennifer M. Saul

in Lying, Misleading, and What is Said: An Exploration in Philosophy of Language and in Ethics

This chapter canvasses current accounts of what is said and related notions, seeking a notion of what is said that can be used to draw the distinction between lying and merely misleading. It argues ... More

This chapter canvasses current accounts of what is said and related notions, seeking a notion of what is said that can be used to draw the distinction between lying and merely misleading. It argues that no current account is suited to this purpose. This does not mean that these accounts are wrong, as this is not the purpose for which they were formulated. Instead, it means simply that there is a problem to be solved.Less

What Is Said

Jennifer M. Saul

in Lying, Misleading, and What is Said: An Exploration in Philosophy of Language and in Ethics

This chapter attempts to sketch out the sort of account of what is said that could do the job needed for the lying/misleading distinction.

Is Lying Worse than Merely Misleading? 1

Jennifer M. Saul

in Lying, Misleading, and What is Said: An Exploration in Philosophy of Language and in Ethics

This chapter examines the moral preference for merely misleading over lying. It argues that no such preference can be adequately defended: acts of merely misleading are not, in general, morally ... More

This chapter examines the moral preference for merely misleading over lying. It argues that no such preference can be adequately defended: acts of merely misleading are not, in general, morally better than acts of lying. However, it nonetheless offers a way of making sense of the significance that we assign this distinction in our moral lives, and it also carves out certain special circumstances in which merely misleading genuinely is morally preferable to lying.Less

Deception

STUART P GREEN

in Lying, Cheating, and Stealing: A Moral Theory of White-Collar Crime

This chapter describes the formal structure of deception, rather than explaining why it is morally wrong. In particular, it describes the difference between four analytically distinct kinds of ... More

This chapter describes the formal structure of deception, rather than explaining why it is morally wrong. In particular, it describes the difference between four analytically distinct kinds of deception referred to, respectively, as ‘lying’, ‘merely misleading’, ‘falsely exculpating’, and ‘falsely inculpating’.Less

Trust, Cooperation, and Insincerity

Chris Heffer

in All Bullshit and Lies?: Insincerity, Irresponsibility, and the Judgment of Untruthfulness

This chapter teases out some key theoretical issues relating to the scope, ethics, and situated analysis of insincerity, as one of the two faces of untruthfulness. It begins by grounding sincerity in ... More

This chapter teases out some key theoretical issues relating to the scope, ethics, and situated analysis of insincerity, as one of the two faces of untruthfulness. It begins by grounding sincerity in an indispensable human need for trust and cooperation and notes how insincerity can breach trust. It then gives arguments for why the TRUST framework does not focus on deception. Grice’s implicature is considered fundamental to understanding insincerity within a framework of communicative cooperation, but his sincerity maxim unnecessarily narrows its scope. Instead, insincerity is viewed as the disruption of inquiry. By drawing on a psychological account of how untruthfulness works in situated discursive practice, the chapter argues that the concept of insincerity needs to be extended to cases of “editing out” where there is no textual clue to omission. This broadened conception of insincerity, which subsumes misleading and lying under withholding, is termed discursive insincerity.Less

Insincere Discourse Strategies

Chris Heffer

in All Bullshit and Lies?: Insincerity, Irresponsibility, and the Judgment of Untruthfulness

This chapter sets out a framework for analyzing insincere discourse strategies. Though not equivalent, there is sufficient overlap between insincerity and deception to begin by considering typologies ... More

This chapter sets out a framework for analyzing insincere discourse strategies. Though not equivalent, there is sufficient overlap between insincerity and deception to begin by considering typologies of deception based on Grice’s Cooperative Principle and the speaker’s communicative intentions and goals. However, the chapter argues for an approach to insincere discourse based on a number of communicative variables relating to pursuit of inquiry. Accordingly, the underlying insincere discourse strategy is considered to be withholding (failing to disclose what you believe you should disclose), while misleading involves linguistically leading the interlocutor astray with regard to that concealed knowledge either by suggestion (misleading without lying) or explicit assertion (lying). The insincere discourse strategies may be realized through sub-strategies (e.g., omitting, evading, and blocking) or more general pragmatic tactics (e.g., equivocating and falsely implicating). Insincere discourse becomes unethical or wrong when it is willful (i.e., it breaches trust and is not justifiably suspended).Less

Discourse and Democracy: The TRUST Heuristic and Sample Analyses

Chris Heffer

in All Bullshit and Lies?: Insincerity, Irresponsibility, and the Judgment of Untruthfulness

This chapter summarizes the main analytical moves in the TRUST heuristic for analyzing untruthfulness. It then applies the heuristic to three short texts that have been widely called out as lies: ... More

This chapter summarizes the main analytical moves in the TRUST heuristic for analyzing untruthfulness. It then applies the heuristic to three short texts that have been widely called out as lies: Trump’s tweet about large-scale voter fraud just before the 2016 presidential elections; the “Brexit Battle Bus” claim that the United Kingdom sent £350 million per week to the European Union; and Tony Blair’s 2002 statement to Parliament about Iraq possessing weapons of mass destruction. The cases share a common theme: the capacity of untruthful public discourse to undermine democratic legitimacy by, respectively, questioning the integrity of electoral procedures, harming the capacity of voters to make a rational choice, and undermining faith in the rational and responsible deliberation of one’s leaders. The chapter troubles the simple attribution of lying in these cases and shows how a TRUST analysis can lead to a deeper understanding of the types and ethical value of untruthfulness.Less

Poisoning and Partisanship: An Analysis of the Salisbury Nerve Agent Attack

Chris Heffer

in All Bullshit and Lies?: Insincerity, Irresponsibility, and the Judgment of Untruthfulness

This chapter demonstrates an alternative “holistic” method of TRUST analysis in which the focus is not on individual claims or short sections of text with a few related claims, but on the general ... More

This chapter demonstrates an alternative “holistic” method of TRUST analysis in which the focus is not on individual claims or short sections of text with a few related claims, but on the general manifestation of untruthfulness with respect to a particular case. The chapter provides an extensive analysis of multiple claims regarding the poisoning of the Russian spy Sergei Skripal and his daughter Yulia in Salisbury, England, in March 2018. It opens with the prime minister’s short statement to Parliament just after the attack, which superficially but confusingly reminds us of Blair’s Preface, but this is used as a springboard for exploring various types of untruthful discourse that have emerged in relation to this international crisis. The framework thus becomes a way of structuring a much broader analysis of untruthfulness in international discourse. The study also demonstrates very clearly the role of social media in promoting epistemic partisanship.Less

Controversial Communication

Charles Forceville

in Visual and Multimodal Communication: Applying the Relevance Principle

Although neutral about ethics and ideologies, RT acknowledges that while claiming to be optimally relevant to their envisaged audiences, communicators may not be entirely truthful—or may shamelessly ... More

Although neutral about ethics and ideologies, RT acknowledges that while claiming to be optimally relevant to their envisaged audiences, communicators may not be entirely truthful—or may shamelessly lie through their teeth—by accommodating the issue of trust in its model. More specifically, RT distinguishes between addressees believing (1) that a communicator is both competent and benevolent; (2) that the communicator is benevolent but not necessarily competent; or (3) that the communicator may be less than benevolent. This chapter examines a number of misleading mass-communicative visual and multimodal messages and shows how their contentious nature can be accounted for in RT terms. It further argues that the RT concept of “echoic mention,” developed to theorize irony, can be extended to other types of transformative use of original messages, and thereby is a cognate of what in other paradigms is called “intertextuality.”Less

Illusions and Hallucinations as Evidence for Sense Data

E. J. Lowe

in The Case for Qualia

This chapter focuses on the evidence for sense data that is provided by illusions and hallucinations. An illusion occurs when a person perceives an “external,” public object, but has an experience ... More

This chapter focuses on the evidence for sense data that is provided by illusions and hallucinations. An illusion occurs when a person perceives an “external,” public object, but has an experience like that of perceiving a public object with properties different from those of the object that he or she actually perceives. A hallucination occurs when a person does not in fact perceive an “external,” public object of a certain kind and yet has an experience like that of perceiving just such an object. It must be noted that these characterizations carry no implication that the subject of an illusion or hallucination is in any way deceived by it. At most, illusions and hallucinations involve misleading experiences: the subject need not actually be misled by them.Less

Challenging the Media-Incarceration Complex through Media Education

Bill Yousman

in Working for Justice: A Handbook of Prison Education and Activism

This chapter argues that the United States faces a crisis of representation, for while crime rates remain stable, the TV and other corporate-controlled mass media bury viewers beneath an avalanche of ... More

This chapter argues that the United States faces a crisis of representation, for while crime rates remain stable, the TV and other corporate-controlled mass media bury viewers beneath an avalanche of fear-based spectacles in which crime and violence are portrayed as escalating, even life-threatening crises. It then outlines a new program of media education that enables consumers of mass media to develop more informed and empowering views of the complexities of crime and violence. Focusing on prime-time dramatic television as the most prevalent source of fictional images of violence, crime, and incarceration, the chapter addresses the distorted narratives and images that saturate popular television dramas. Drawing upon interviews with ex-prisoners, it also shows how media representations of imprisonment, though inaccurate and misleading, shape the perceptions even of those who have themselves been incarcerated.Less

E & ¬H*

Jonathan Vogel

in Scepticism and Perceptual Justification

Suppose you have evidence E for H. What reason do you have for believing that your evidence isn’t misleading? That is, what reason do you have for believing (E & H)? Two very plausible, related ... More

Suppose you have evidence E for H. What reason do you have for believing that your evidence isn’t misleading? That is, what reason do you have for believing (E & H)? Two very plausible, related principles imply that E itself can’t provide empirical justification for believing (E & H). The Entailment Principle says that if Y entails X, X can’t justify Y. The Confirmation Principle says that X can’t justify Y unless X raises the probability of Y. The chapter argues that E can indeed justify (E & H), and that both principles are false. Further conclusions are: Epistemic closure withstands recent criticisms due to Fred Dretske; we don’t have a priori reasons for rejecting (E & H); the dogmatist reply to scepticism is unscathed by a challenge posed by Roger White; and there is a promising response to the New Riddle of Induction.Less

The Lies We Tell Each Other Together

Eliot Michaelson

in Lying: Language, Knowledge, Ethics, and Politics

A great deal of attention has been directed at the question of what exactly is required for an utterance to count as a lie. At the center of recent discussion stand bald-faced lies, which have proven ... More

A great deal of attention has been directed at the question of what exactly is required for an utterance to count as a lie. At the center of recent discussion stand bald-faced lies, which have proven to be remarkably resistant to philosophical analysis. This chapter focuses on a related, yet curiously under-explored, set of cases: lies that we construct together, as friends, families, colleagues, and communities. This sort of lie exhibits a degree of moral and linguistic complexity not found in more standard examples of lying. That moral complexity will ultimately put pressure on the enduring thesis that the distinctive wrong of lying is that it threatens to undermine the potential for communication. The linguistic complexity, in contrast, will stand as a challenge to standard theories of conversational dynamics.Less