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This chapter presents an overview of the development of the minority party in the US. It addresses changes in House minority party tactics, especially with the rise of a more partisan, media-centric Congress. It also highlights the four basic types of tactics the minority in the House uses to address the party's collective concerns. It then describes common obstacles to implementing tactics successfully and emphasizes the role of innovators and entrepreneurs in developing and implementing those tactics.

This chapter looks at the basic politics of House minority party legislating. It explores how the lawmaking activity of the party has changed since 1970 as its opportunities to shape legislation have slowly weakened. It also discusses some of the important legislative procedures and tactics available to the minority to bring about change both positive, like passing bills, and negative, like blocking them. It reveals that, by using legislative tactics, policy can be shaped by the minority. Legislative procedures and tactics can sometimes win floor votes, pass motions to recommit, employ discharge petitions to release bills from the majority party's grip, and get amendments and bills approved.

This chapter examines the effects of US House minority party messaging. It specifically explores how minority messaging may shape public opinion, especially toward Congress. It reveals that the one-minute floor speech is a useful tool for minority parties trying to address their collective concerns. It shows the politics and centrality of messaging as a strategy of the House minority.

This chapter focuses on the electioneering of the House minority party in the US. Electioneering is the most direct way to win elections. The chapter highlights three activities in electioneering: raising and spending money on campaigns, developing election-year platforms, and recruiting strong challengers. It also discusses the development and use of the three basic campaign tactics used since 1971, concentrating on the role of entrepreneurial members, party campaign committees, and party leaders. This chapter reveals how these three activities in electioneering win power by achieving immediate goals of getting good candidates into the field, funding them sufficiently, and having a national platform on which those candidates can run.

This chapter focuses on obstructing floor proceedings. It starts with three noteworthy instances in which delay was significant and obstruction was the minority party's clear intent, discussing why these happened and what benefits these yielded the minority, if any. The chapter also describes two particular floor procedures that were used clearly and constantly to delay the US House minority and whether they had any impact on political outcomes. It briefly addresses the politics of minority party obstruction in the House and the reasoning behind such as tactic. It presents a brief review of changes in House obstructive tactics and strategy since the mid-20th century. It reviews three noteworthy cases of procedural delay by the minority party since the late 1960s, namely the Election Debate Bill in October 1968, the Foreign Aid Bill in July 1997 and the Housing and Iraq Spending Bills in May 2008. The data and analysis presented in this chapter reveals that minority parties are eager to depend on their procedural toolbox to delay Congress.

This chapter discusses the second premiership of Lord Derby from 1858 to 1859. Derby became Great Britain's prime minister for the second time in February 1858. However, like his first term in office, Derby was confronted with several political problems. His Conservative Party remained a minority in the House of Commons, the country's internal and external relations were in a most delicate and complicated position, and there was armed conflict in India and China, and a crisis with France. The Queen noted that the forbearance and support of some of Derby's opponents would be needed for him to carry on any government.

This chapter examines the majority party's use of motions to table as a means of killing unwanted amendments. It does so as part of a larger project in which a new theoretical framework is proposed for thinking about legislative parties' influence over legislative decisions generally—one that is particularly well suited to the Senate, inasmuch as it leads to important modifications of the conventional wisdom. This framework revolves around the premise that the majority and minority parties face costs in getting measures onto the legislative agenda (i.e., getting a final-passage vote) and that these costs are higher for the minority party than for the majority party.

Chapter 2 examines which members of Congress are likely to succeed in getting news coverage, the issues they focus on, and how strategies and approaches have changed over time. In general, party leaders and minority party members seem to have become more successful in going public, subject to the political context, particularly whether there is unified or divided government. The issues members are able to communicate through the national media have remained remarkably consistent during the past forty years. Budgets and taxes, foreign affairs, defense, government affairs, and political appointments are the most common topics for members of Congress trying to go public.

Chapter 1 considers why members of Congress may want to use media to influence policy in the wake of several historical developments and the obstacles members may face. The decline of traditional intermediaries between government and the public, presidents’ increasing use of media, and growing individualism and political polarization in Congress have increased the attractiveness and even necessity of public strategies in Congress. At the same time, congressional members must overcome challenges created by journalists’ definition of what is newsworthy, by the political context—notably whether a member is in the majority or minority in Congress and which party controls the White House—as well as by increasing polarization in their efforts to attract media attention. To the extent they are able to overcome these challenges, members will turn to the media to move beyond their institutional weaknesses.

This chapter initially recounts the life of Minority Leader Martin Olav Sabo, leading up to his involvement in politics. Sabo’s legislative life started when he was elected into the Minnesota legislature, gaining experience through observation and learning from his older colleagues such as Wendell Anderson, Bob Latz, and Lloyd Duxbury. After being reelected as minority leader in 1970, Sabo intended to assemble a team that could win control of the House, and reform legislative procedures. Sabo and his new caucus colleagues Joe Graba, Bill Kelly, Ray Faricy, Tom Berg, and assistant minority leader L. J. Lee often held legislative meetings, discussing issues such as the governor’s staff and various committee chairs. Sabo’s ten-year legislative career was all about eliminating unfair legislative rules.