Search Results

Divided government in the case of Finland has resulted not just from its ‘semi‐presidential’ division of power between the president and the government, but also from the frequency with which the electorate has failed to return decisive majorities. The frequency of minority governments and the qualified majorities who needed to pass legislation have often made it necessary to establish a ‘cohabitation’ arrangement between the government and the legislature.

Denmark is close to an ideal-typical model of parliamentary democracy; however, the picture is complicated by at least five general features of Danish politics. First, Denmark is a small state, heavily constrained by international ties. Second, Denmark has frequent minority governments, which affects the chain of parliamentary delegation. Third, the delegative chain can be circumvented by direct democracy (referendums). Fourth, interest organizations strongly influence policy outcomes in Denmark. Fifth, strong party discipline enables political parties to structure delegation and accountability between voters, Parliament, and government.

While far from perfect, for much of the post-war period the Swedish chain of democratic delegation and accountability has not been affected by serious agency problems. Fierce electoral competition between two clearly defined blocs and two alternative visions of society allowed voters to be reasonably sure that elections would impact on the direction of national politics. At the same time, the minority status of most cabinets allowed for moderation in policy decisions. Since the late 1980s, however, Swedish politicians have increasingly been faced with distrust, lower electoral turnout, and a loss of party members. It is possible that the growing discrepancy between de facto power relations and the ideal-typical Constitution contributes to a declining popular trust in politicians and political parties.

The book ends by revisiting the standard problems of semi-presidentialism that were identified in Chapter 1 and placing them in the context of the findings about premier-presidentialism and president-parliamentarism that were identified over the course of the book as a whole. Why was so little support found for the problem of cohabitation and a divided executive? To what extent is minority government a problem for semi-presidential countries? What is the relationship between presidential power and the form of semi-presidentialism? Addressing these questions helps to generate a research agenda for the next generation of semi-presidential studies.

Denmark has a very inclusive electoral system, combining high proportionality, low thresholds, and meaningful voter choice among candidates. Its multi-party system results in coalition governments, many of them minority governments. Parliament is more representative socio-demographically of the population than most of its counterparts in other countries, with women forming a high percentage of MPs. The current system is widely regarded as working well, and there are few pressures for electoral reform.

This chapter discusses a second type of political system where individual leaders are empowered: parliamentary systems with a single party controlling the government. Great Britain and Canada have been important players in Afghanistan, with both showing significant variation in what they were willing to do over time. One key difference is that Canada was led by a minority government for nearly all of its time in Afghanistan. Thus, these two countries have very similar institutions, similar political cultures, and large variations in how they have performed in Afghanistan and how they have been governed at home. These differences allow one to distinguish the key forces shaping decision making when prime ministers are unencumbered by the requirements of maintaining a domestic political coalition. This chapter then touches on two other countries in this category: Spain and Turkey.

The most important variable facilitating the Swedish parties' consensus on state funding was the constitutional reform of 1970. The constitutional reform strengthened the position of the bourgeois parties since it rendered minority governments (during which the centre-right opposition parties enjoyed more influence both in parliamentary committees and commissions of enquiry) more likely. Furthermore, the constitutional reform was an incentive for the bourgeois parties to cooperate more closely. Put differently, they could adopt an office-seeking strategy, which in turn facilitated a consensus on state funding to political parties. Prior to 1970, the Social Democrats electorally and organizationally dominated to an extent that allowed them to marginalize its competitors in questions of party funding. Exploiting the coordinative discourse on political corruption, the Social Democrats were able to discredit business donations to the bourgeois parties, leaving these no other choice than to agree to state funding.

This chapter outlines the basic economic, social, historical, and international factors that affect the performance of democracy. It reviews the literature about the so-called perils of presidentialism and the virtues of parliamentarism. It sets out the standard wisdom about semi-presidentialism, showing that while semi-presidentialism has its supporters, there is a broad consensus that the disadvantages of semi-presidentialism, including the problems of cohabitation, divided minority government, and the divided executive, outweigh the advantages.

This chapter sets out the methodological framework, demonstrating through the study that there is a distinctive British tradition of minority government: parties in a hung parliament usually preferring minority to coalition governance, grounded in majoritarian rule and relying on examples from British history when formulating strategy, but open to pragmatic innovations in order to stay in power. Popular and scholarly myths surrounding the 1970s British Minority Governments show how some of the conclusions of existing historical and political science studies, documentaries, and television news, have helped to form and perpetuate these false assumptions. It is argued that this book’s interface with and challenges to existing international minority government theory provide the basis for a new perspective on British political history and minority governance globally.

The chapter offers an overview of the historical development and ideological background of the idea of minority autonomy arrangements in Hungary. Minorities in Hungary—except for the Roma—are small and largely assimilated. The adoption of a specific law on minority rights was a unique development in Central and Eastern Europe. The law created a special system of ‘minority self-governments’ both at local and at national levels, offering a directly elected representative structure with some autonomous competencies. Various problems emerged regarding the electoral procedures of these bodies and the respect for the free choice of identity. After 2010 a new constitution and a new law were adopted, making attempts to offer better guarantees, but leaving unchanged the system of minority autonomies. The chapter gives a critical evaluation of the new legal regulation and the experiences of the past twenty years of minority autonomy arrangements.

This chapter identifies and analyses previously neglected strategic dilemmas confronted at the outset of the formation of Minority Governments by Wilson in 1974 and Callaghan in 1976. Challenging pre-existing myths and assumptions, it shows that their establishment or continuation as Minority Governments were not necessarily inevitable. It is argued that alternative courses of action were considered by policymakers, including the prospects of an early election or a possible Labour coalition with the SDLP in 1976. The Conservative Opposition also played an important role in the formation of these different minority governments, from calls for institutional reform to contemplating a prospective Government of National Unity.

This chapter aims to demonstrate that both Labour and the Conservatives were far more strategically proactive when approaching Minority Government in the 1970s than has been assumed in popular and scholarly accounts. The analysis of the strategy-making processes in both main parties provides new insights by drawing on a combination of recently released papers of bodies including Cabinet and Shadow Cabinet meetings, the No. 10 Policy Unit, the Conservative Research Department (CRD), and correspondence between party leaders and their respective advisers. The examination of the often-overlooked impact of Minority Governments on the formation of strategy ranges from the transformation of established institutions to such innovations as Conservative leader Edward Heath’s ‘Party Strategy Group’, created primarily as a response to the Wilson Minority Government in 1974.

This chapter reveals Labour’s, and especially the Conservatives’, embryonic secret plans for future minority or coalition governments during the 1970s, devised in response to the possible absence of an overall majority in a general election. Both main parties considered or rejected wide-ranging proposals, from pre-electoral pacts to reforms aimed at facilitating minority or coalition government. Some of the new sources explored include Callaghan’s personal reflections on post-electoral strategy following a meeting with Steel in 1978, and papers from his political advisers, setting out starting points for prospective post-electoral coalition negotiations. Discussion of declassified Opposition research papers shows even more radical possibilities under consideration, whether the prospect of the Conservatives making a coalition deal with the UUP, SNP, or even a Grand Coalition with Labour.

The rereading of Minority Governments in 1970s Britain, through declassified papers and a wide range of publicly available sources, provides an invaluable perspective on subsequent British political history and, in particular, on the Conservative Minority Government formed, with DUP support, in June 2017. This chapter offers lessons from history on the potential challenges and opportunities confronting Theresa May’s Minority Government and the Labour Opposition led by Jeremy Corbyn. This study concludes by highlighting the significant longer-term implications for future political decision-making in Britain and other countries, as well as the potential impact on future scholarship and international minority government theory.

This chapter examines the role of independents in parliament, specifically in terms of their contribution to the formation and maintenance of governments, because this is where their influence is most obviously exhibited. There is a thick-descriptive account of each of the minority administrations that needed the votes of independents, in terms of the leverage wielded by the latter, and the consequences for the former, with a focus on their longevity and stability. Parliamentary roll-call data is used to measure the participation levels of the independents, to what extent they worked collectively as a team, and what level of support was offered to individual minority administrations. The analysis of the dynamics between independents and minority governments indicates that there is no one-size-fits-all model to describe such relationships. Instead, there have been four different types of arrangements, each of which are described in detail. In general, the stronger the working relationship between independents and the parties, the higher the level of support received from independents and the more stable the government.

As a direct result of the state of minority government, both main parties in 1970s Britain, contrary to popular perceptions, conducted extensive planning for an election being called across a range of different dates. This chapter reveals the evolving strategic dialogues through internal papers, including Callaghan ordering the preparation of contingency plans from 1977 onwards, in the event of an unexpected major legislative defeat and forced election. At the same time, it examines the wide-ranging efforts by the Conservatives to anticipate and plan for possible election dates. The chapter also addresses, in depth, the subject of electoral timing, which has generally been confined to brief discussions within overarching political histories or concise references in works on election campaigns.