Emma Borg
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199588374
- eISBN:
- 9780191741487
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199588374.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Mind
This book examines some recent answers to the questions of how and where to draw the divide between semantics (roughly, features of the literal meaning of linguistic items) and pragmatics (roughly, ...
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This book examines some recent answers to the questions of how and where to draw the divide between semantics (roughly, features of the literal meaning of linguistic items) and pragmatics (roughly, features emerging from the context within which such items are being used). In particular, the book defends what is commonly known as ‘minimal semantics’ (aka ‘semantic invariantism’ or ‘insensitive semantics’). Minimal semantics, as the name suggests, offers a pretty minimal account of the inter-relation between semantics and pragmatics. Specifically, it holds that while context can affect literal semantic content in the case of genuine (i.e. lexically or syntactically marked) context-sensitive items (e.g. indexicals, demonstratives, tense markers), this is the extent of pragmatic influence within the semantic realm. Minimalism, then, prohibits what are here called ‘free pragmatic effects’: putative effects on semantic content which are not required by any lexico‐syntactic item in a sentence. The book opens with an exploration of the current positions in this debate, introducing the main approaches of minimalism, indexicalism, contextualism, relativism, and occasionalism and offers some initial reasons for being concerned about many of the positions opposing minimalism. The main arguments against minimalism are then explored, looking at the argument that minimal contents are explanatorily irrelevant, the argument that at least some sentences fail to express minimal contents, and the argument that the kinds of word meanings which minimalism requires are either impossible or explanatorily inadequate. The ultimate conclusion of the book is that none of these arguments are compelling and that minimalism in fact provides an attractive and plausible account of the literal meanings of natural language sentences.Less
This book examines some recent answers to the questions of how and where to draw the divide between semantics (roughly, features of the literal meaning of linguistic items) and pragmatics (roughly, features emerging from the context within which such items are being used). In particular, the book defends what is commonly known as ‘minimal semantics’ (aka ‘semantic invariantism’ or ‘insensitive semantics’). Minimal semantics, as the name suggests, offers a pretty minimal account of the inter-relation between semantics and pragmatics. Specifically, it holds that while context can affect literal semantic content in the case of genuine (i.e. lexically or syntactically marked) context-sensitive items (e.g. indexicals, demonstratives, tense markers), this is the extent of pragmatic influence within the semantic realm. Minimalism, then, prohibits what are here called ‘free pragmatic effects’: putative effects on semantic content which are not required by any lexico‐syntactic item in a sentence. The book opens with an exploration of the current positions in this debate, introducing the main approaches of minimalism, indexicalism, contextualism, relativism, and occasionalism and offers some initial reasons for being concerned about many of the positions opposing minimalism. The main arguments against minimalism are then explored, looking at the argument that minimal contents are explanatorily irrelevant, the argument that at least some sentences fail to express minimal contents, and the argument that the kinds of word meanings which minimalism requires are either impossible or explanatorily inadequate. The ultimate conclusion of the book is that none of these arguments are compelling and that minimalism in fact provides an attractive and plausible account of the literal meanings of natural language sentences.
Alvin I. Goldman
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195138924
- eISBN:
- 9780199786480
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195138929.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
How people assign mental states to others and how they represent or conceptualize such states in the first place are topics of interest to philosophy of mind, developmental psychology, and cognitive ...
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How people assign mental states to others and how they represent or conceptualize such states in the first place are topics of interest to philosophy of mind, developmental psychology, and cognitive neuroscience. Three competing answers to the question of how people impute mental states to others have been offered: by rationalizing, by theorizing, or by simulating. Simulation theory says that mindreaders produce mental states in their own minds that resemble, or aim to resemble, those of their targets; these states are then imputed to, or projected onto, the targets. In low-level mindreading, such as reading emotions from faces, simulation is mediated by automatic mirror systems. More controlled processes of simulation, here called “enactment imagination”, are used in high-level mindreading. Just as visual and motor imagery are attempts to replicate acts of seeing and doing, mindreading is characteristically an attempt to replicate the mental processes of a target, followed by projection of the imagination-generated state onto the target. Projection errors are symptomatic of simulation, because one’s own genuine states readily intrude into the simulational process. A nuanced form of introspection is introduced to explain self-attribution and also to address the question of how mental concepts are represented. A distinctive cognitive code involving introspective representations figures prominently in our concepts of mental states. The book concludes with an overview of the pervasive effects on social life of simulation, imitation, and empathy, and charts their possible roles in moral experience and the fictive arts.Less
How people assign mental states to others and how they represent or conceptualize such states in the first place are topics of interest to philosophy of mind, developmental psychology, and cognitive neuroscience. Three competing answers to the question of how people impute mental states to others have been offered: by rationalizing, by theorizing, or by simulating. Simulation theory says that mindreaders produce mental states in their own minds that resemble, or aim to resemble, those of their targets; these states are then imputed to, or projected onto, the targets. In low-level mindreading, such as reading emotions from faces, simulation is mediated by automatic mirror systems. More controlled processes of simulation, here called “enactment imagination”, are used in high-level mindreading. Just as visual and motor imagery are attempts to replicate acts of seeing and doing, mindreading is characteristically an attempt to replicate the mental processes of a target, followed by projection of the imagination-generated state onto the target. Projection errors are symptomatic of simulation, because one’s own genuine states readily intrude into the simulational process. A nuanced form of introspection is introduced to explain self-attribution and also to address the question of how mental concepts are represented. A distinctive cognitive code involving introspective representations figures prominently in our concepts of mental states. The book concludes with an overview of the pervasive effects on social life of simulation, imitation, and empathy, and charts their possible roles in moral experience and the fictive arts.
Peter Gardenfors
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780198528517
- eISBN:
- 9780191689543
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198528517.001.0001
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
Our ability to think is one of our most puzzling characteristics. What would it be like to be unable to think? What would it be like to lack self-awareness? The complexity of this activity is ...
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Our ability to think is one of our most puzzling characteristics. What would it be like to be unable to think? What would it be like to lack self-awareness? The complexity of this activity is striking. Thinking involves the interaction of a range of mental processes — attention, emotion, memory, planning, self-consciousness, free will, and language. So where did these processes arise? What evolutionary advantages were bestowed upon those with an ability to deceive, to plan, to empathize, or to understand the intentions of others? In this compelling work, the author embarks on an evolutionary detective story to try and solve one of the big mysteries surrounding human existence — how has the modern human being's way of thinking come into existence? He starts by taking in turn the more basic cognitive processes, such as attention and memory, then builds upon these to explore more complex behaviours, such as self-consciousness, mindreading, and imitation. Having done this, he examines the consequences of ‘putting thought into the world’, using external media like cave paintings, drawings and writing.Less
Our ability to think is one of our most puzzling characteristics. What would it be like to be unable to think? What would it be like to lack self-awareness? The complexity of this activity is striking. Thinking involves the interaction of a range of mental processes — attention, emotion, memory, planning, self-consciousness, free will, and language. So where did these processes arise? What evolutionary advantages were bestowed upon those with an ability to deceive, to plan, to empathize, or to understand the intentions of others? In this compelling work, the author embarks on an evolutionary detective story to try and solve one of the big mysteries surrounding human existence — how has the modern human being's way of thinking come into existence? He starts by taking in turn the more basic cognitive processes, such as attention and memory, then builds upon these to explore more complex behaviours, such as self-consciousness, mindreading, and imitation. Having done this, he examines the consequences of ‘putting thought into the world’, using external media like cave paintings, drawings and writing.
Jennifer Nagel
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199693702
- eISBN:
- 9780191741265
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693702.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Metaphysics/Epistemology
To what extent should we trust our natural instincts about knowledge? The question has special urgency for epistemologists who want to draw evidential support for their theories from certain ...
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To what extent should we trust our natural instincts about knowledge? The question has special urgency for epistemologists who want to draw evidential support for their theories from certain intuitive epistemic assessments while discounting others as misleading. The focus is on the viability of endorsing the legitimacy of Gettier intuitions while resisting the intuitive pull of skepticism — a combination of moves that most mainstream epistemologists find appealing. Awkwardly enough, the ‘good’ Gettier intuitions and the ‘bad’ skeptical intuitions seem to be equally strong. The chapter argues that it is not a coincidence that these two types of intuition register with equal force: they are generated by a common mechanism. However, the input to this mechanism is interestingly different in the two types of case, and different in a way that can support the mainstream view that Gettier cases tell us something about knowledge where skeptical intuitions involve systematic error.Less
To what extent should we trust our natural instincts about knowledge? The question has special urgency for epistemologists who want to draw evidential support for their theories from certain intuitive epistemic assessments while discounting others as misleading. The focus is on the viability of endorsing the legitimacy of Gettier intuitions while resisting the intuitive pull of skepticism — a combination of moves that most mainstream epistemologists find appealing. Awkwardly enough, the ‘good’ Gettier intuitions and the ‘bad’ skeptical intuitions seem to be equally strong. The chapter argues that it is not a coincidence that these two types of intuition register with equal force: they are generated by a common mechanism. However, the input to this mechanism is interestingly different in the two types of case, and different in a way that can support the mainstream view that Gettier cases tell us something about knowledge where skeptical intuitions involve systematic error.
Emma Borg
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199588374
- eISBN:
- 9780191741487
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199588374.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter examines the role of speaker intentions in issues of reference determination for context-sensitive expressions, focusing on demonstratives. Intuitively, the referent of a token utterance ...
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This chapter examines the role of speaker intentions in issues of reference determination for context-sensitive expressions, focusing on demonstratives. Intuitively, the referent of a token utterance of ‘that’ is fixed (at least in part) by the speaker's intentions. However, if this is right it causes a potential problem for semantic minimalism. The chapter begins by setting out the nature of this problem and proceeds to explore three putative solutions. First, the assumption that speaker intentions fix reference in these cases may be rejected; second, it may be held that current speaker intentions are relevant but that they can be accommodated within a formal semantic theory; third, reference determination and semantic content may be held strictly apart. The first two of these moves, termed respectively ‘conventionalism’ and ‘non-inferentialism’, are rejected. However it is shown that the third move provides an appealing way for the minimalist to accommodate the content of context-sensitive expressions.Less
This chapter examines the role of speaker intentions in issues of reference determination for context-sensitive expressions, focusing on demonstratives. Intuitively, the referent of a token utterance of ‘that’ is fixed (at least in part) by the speaker's intentions. However, if this is right it causes a potential problem for semantic minimalism. The chapter begins by setting out the nature of this problem and proceeds to explore three putative solutions. First, the assumption that speaker intentions fix reference in these cases may be rejected; second, it may be held that current speaker intentions are relevant but that they can be accommodated within a formal semantic theory; third, reference determination and semantic content may be held strictly apart. The first two of these moves, termed respectively ‘conventionalism’ and ‘non-inferentialism’, are rejected. However it is shown that the third move provides an appealing way for the minimalist to accommodate the content of context-sensitive expressions.
William Hirstein
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199231904
- eISBN:
- 9780191738319
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231904.003.0009
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology, Social Psychology
This chapter explains how mindmelding — the direct experience by one person of another's conscious representations — is in fact possible. The temporal lobes causally interact with the prefrontal ...
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This chapter explains how mindmelding — the direct experience by one person of another's conscious representations — is in fact possible. The temporal lobes causally interact with the prefrontal lobes by way of fiber bundles that run underneath the cortical surface. This provides the perfect first experiment in mindmelding: to ‘branch’ those fiber bundles and run the other end into the brain of another person. Evidence is provided that these bundles have close connections to consciousness, in that whatever affects them has immediate effects on consciousness. Then, before responding to several objections, the chapter considers another issue brought up by these experiments — the question of the relation between mindmelding and mindreading. Is mindmelding similar to mindreading? Does the existence of a mindreading system help us achieve mindmelding?Less
This chapter explains how mindmelding — the direct experience by one person of another's conscious representations — is in fact possible. The temporal lobes causally interact with the prefrontal lobes by way of fiber bundles that run underneath the cortical surface. This provides the perfect first experiment in mindmelding: to ‘branch’ those fiber bundles and run the other end into the brain of another person. Evidence is provided that these bundles have close connections to consciousness, in that whatever affects them has immediate effects on consciousness. Then, before responding to several objections, the chapter considers another issue brought up by these experiments — the question of the relation between mindmelding and mindreading. Is mindmelding similar to mindreading? Does the existence of a mindreading system help us achieve mindmelding?
Shaun Nichols
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780195169348
- eISBN:
- 9780199835041
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195169344.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
A large tradition of work in moral psychology explores the capacity for moral judgment by focusing on the basic capacity to distinguish moral violations (e.g., hitting another person) from ...
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A large tradition of work in moral psychology explores the capacity for moral judgment by focusing on the basic capacity to distinguish moral violations (e.g., hitting another person) from conventional violations (e.g., playing with your food). This method plausibly reveals a capacity for a kind of coremoral judgment. Recent evidence indicates that affect plays a crucial role in mediating the capacity to draw the moral/conventional distinguish. However, the prevailing account of the role of affect in moral judgment is problematic. This chapter argues that the capacity to draw the moral/conventional distinction depends on both a body of information about which actions are prohibited (“a normative theory”) and an affective mechanism that confers a special status on the norms.Less
A large tradition of work in moral psychology explores the capacity for moral judgment by focusing on the basic capacity to distinguish moral violations (e.g., hitting another person) from conventional violations (e.g., playing with your food). This method plausibly reveals a capacity for a kind of coremoral judgment. Recent evidence indicates that affect plays a crucial role in mediating the capacity to draw the moral/conventional distinguish. However, the prevailing account of the role of affect in moral judgment is problematic. This chapter argues that the capacity to draw the moral/conventional distinction depends on both a body of information about which actions are prohibited (“a normative theory”) and an affective mechanism that confers a special status on the norms.
Shaun Nichols
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780195169348
- eISBN:
- 9780199835041
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195169344.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter explores in detail the nature of the affective response to suffering in others. Humans exhibit importantly different kinds of response, each of which apparently emerges fairly early in ...
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This chapter explores in detail the nature of the affective response to suffering in others. Humans exhibit importantly different kinds of response, each of which apparently emerges fairly early in development. The psychological underpinnings of altruistic motivation are especially complex, and the chapter argues that altruistic motivation depends on a basic affective system, a “Concern Mechanism,” which requires only a minimal capacity for understanding other minds.Less
This chapter explores in detail the nature of the affective response to suffering in others. Humans exhibit importantly different kinds of response, each of which apparently emerges fairly early in development. The psychological underpinnings of altruistic motivation are especially complex, and the chapter argues that altruistic motivation depends on a basic affective system, a “Concern Mechanism,” which requires only a minimal capacity for understanding other minds.
Robert W. Lurz
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- August 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780262016056
- eISBN:
- 9780262298339
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262016056.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
On the basis of the arguments presented in this book, it cannot be determined with certainty whether animals are capable of mindreading or complementary behavior reading. It is also not clear whether ...
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On the basis of the arguments presented in this book, it cannot be determined with certainty whether animals are capable of mindreading or complementary behavior reading. It is also not clear whether animals predict other agents’ behaviors by attributing cognitive states to them, such as seeing, hearing, knowing, and believing. However, there is a way forward to elucidating these issues. Researchers now have the experimental protocols that could help them determine whether animals can attribute such mental states or just the observable grounds associated with them. These protocols put the field of animal social cognition research in a position to answer its strongest methodological challenge—the logical problem.Less
On the basis of the arguments presented in this book, it cannot be determined with certainty whether animals are capable of mindreading or complementary behavior reading. It is also not clear whether animals predict other agents’ behaviors by attributing cognitive states to them, such as seeing, hearing, knowing, and believing. However, there is a way forward to elucidating these issues. Researchers now have the experimental protocols that could help them determine whether animals can attribute such mental states or just the observable grounds associated with them. These protocols put the field of animal social cognition research in a position to answer its strongest methodological challenge—the logical problem.
Tim Bayne
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199596492
- eISBN:
- 9780191745669
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199596492.003.0004
- Subject:
- Neuroscience, Techniques, Development
Most animals have mental states of one sort or another, but few species share our capacity for self-awareness. We are aware of our own mental states via introspection, and we are aware of the mental ...
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Most animals have mental states of one sort or another, but few species share our capacity for self-awareness. We are aware of our own mental states via introspection, and we are aware of the mental states of our fellow human beings on the basis of what they do and say. This chapter is concerned with the prospects of a rather different and significantly more recent ‘mindreading’ capacity: the capacity to ascribe mental states to a creature based on information derived from neuroimaging. It analyzes the foundational issues that are likely to confront the use of any neuroimaging technology to read minds, no matter how sophisticated it may be.Less
Most animals have mental states of one sort or another, but few species share our capacity for self-awareness. We are aware of our own mental states via introspection, and we are aware of the mental states of our fellow human beings on the basis of what they do and say. This chapter is concerned with the prospects of a rather different and significantly more recent ‘mindreading’ capacity: the capacity to ascribe mental states to a creature based on information derived from neuroimaging. It analyzes the foundational issues that are likely to confront the use of any neuroimaging technology to read minds, no matter how sophisticated it may be.
Sarah Richmond
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199596492
- eISBN:
- 9780191745669
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199596492.003.0014
- Subject:
- Neuroscience, Techniques, Development
This chapter focuses on the possible impact of neuroscientific technological development on one area of privacy in particular: the privacy that we enjoy in relation to the contents of our minds or, ...
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This chapter focuses on the possible impact of neuroscientific technological development on one area of privacy in particular: the privacy that we enjoy in relation to the contents of our minds or, as it has come to be called, ‘mental privacy’. Many people are horrified by the thought that we might develop mindreading capability. An informal survey generated adjectives such as ‘appalling’, ‘invasive’, ‘intrusive’, and ‘terrifying’; it has been suggested that having one's thoughts exposed was akin to ‘mental rape’; allusions have been made to Big Brother and thought police. The chapter considers whether this immediate ‘gut’ reaction is justified. It shows that when the possibility of mental transparency is examined more carefully, and without prejudicial assumptions, it turns out to be less completely alarming than we think. It examines the potential impact of transparency in various situations, and finds that there might even be some ‘pros’, alongside the obvious ‘cons’.Less
This chapter focuses on the possible impact of neuroscientific technological development on one area of privacy in particular: the privacy that we enjoy in relation to the contents of our minds or, as it has come to be called, ‘mental privacy’. Many people are horrified by the thought that we might develop mindreading capability. An informal survey generated adjectives such as ‘appalling’, ‘invasive’, ‘intrusive’, and ‘terrifying’; it has been suggested that having one's thoughts exposed was akin to ‘mental rape’; allusions have been made to Big Brother and thought police. The chapter considers whether this immediate ‘gut’ reaction is justified. It shows that when the possibility of mental transparency is examined more carefully, and without prejudicial assumptions, it turns out to be less completely alarming than we think. It examines the potential impact of transparency in various situations, and finds that there might even be some ‘pros’, alongside the obvious ‘cons’.
Robert W. Lurz
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- August 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780262016056
- eISBN:
- 9780262298339
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262016056.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Animals live in a world of other minds, human and nonhuman, and their well-being and survival often depends on what is going on in the minds of these other creatures. But do animals know that other ...
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Animals live in a world of other minds, human and nonhuman, and their well-being and survival often depends on what is going on in the minds of these other creatures. But do animals know that other creatures have minds? And how would we know if they do? This book offers a fresh approach to the hotly debated question of mental-state attribution in nonhuman animals. Some empirical researchers and philosophers claim that some animals are capable of anticipating other creatures’ behaviors by interpreting observable cues as signs of underlying mental states; others claim that animals are merely clever behavior-readers, capable of using such cues to anticipate others’ behaviors without interpreting them as evidence of underlying mental states. The book argues that neither position is compelling, and proposes a way to move the debate, and the field, forward. It presents a new approach to understanding what mindreading in animals might be, offering a bottom-up model of mental-state attribution that is built upon cognitive abilities which animals are known to possess rather than on a preconceived view of the mind applicable to mindreading abilities in humans. It goes on to describe an innovative series of new experimental protocols for animal mindreading research that overcome a persistent methodological problem in the field, known as the “logical problem” or “Povinelli’s challenge.” These protocols show in detail how various types of animals—from apes to monkeys to ravens to dogs—can be tested for perceptual state and belief attribution.Less
Animals live in a world of other minds, human and nonhuman, and their well-being and survival often depends on what is going on in the minds of these other creatures. But do animals know that other creatures have minds? And how would we know if they do? This book offers a fresh approach to the hotly debated question of mental-state attribution in nonhuman animals. Some empirical researchers and philosophers claim that some animals are capable of anticipating other creatures’ behaviors by interpreting observable cues as signs of underlying mental states; others claim that animals are merely clever behavior-readers, capable of using such cues to anticipate others’ behaviors without interpreting them as evidence of underlying mental states. The book argues that neither position is compelling, and proposes a way to move the debate, and the field, forward. It presents a new approach to understanding what mindreading in animals might be, offering a bottom-up model of mental-state attribution that is built upon cognitive abilities which animals are known to possess rather than on a preconceived view of the mind applicable to mindreading abilities in humans. It goes on to describe an innovative series of new experimental protocols for animal mindreading research that overcome a persistent methodological problem in the field, known as the “logical problem” or “Povinelli’s challenge.” These protocols show in detail how various types of animals—from apes to monkeys to ravens to dogs—can be tested for perceptual state and belief attribution.
Peter Carruthers
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199596195
- eISBN:
- 9780191731549
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199596195.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
It is widely believed in philosophy that people have privileged and authoritative access to their own thoughts, and many theories have been proposed to explain this supposed fact. This book ...
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It is widely believed in philosophy that people have privileged and authoritative access to their own thoughts, and many theories have been proposed to explain this supposed fact. This book challenges the consensus view and subjects the theories in question to critical scrutiny, while showing that they are not protected against the findings of cognitive science by belonging to a separate “explanatory space”. The book argues that our access to our own thoughts is almost always interpretive, grounded in perceptual awareness of our own circumstances and behavior, together with our own sensory imagery (including inner speech). In fact our access to our own thoughts is no different in principle from our access to the thoughts of other people, utilizing the conceptual and inferential resources of the same “mindreading” faculty, and relying on many of the same sources of evidence. The book proposes and defends the Interpretive Sensory-Access (ISA) theory of self-knowledge. This is supported through comprehensive examination of many different types of evidence from across cognitive science, integrating a diverse set of findings into a single well-articulated theory. One outcome is that there are hardly any kinds of conscious thought. Another is that there is no such thing as conscious agency.Less
It is widely believed in philosophy that people have privileged and authoritative access to their own thoughts, and many theories have been proposed to explain this supposed fact. This book challenges the consensus view and subjects the theories in question to critical scrutiny, while showing that they are not protected against the findings of cognitive science by belonging to a separate “explanatory space”. The book argues that our access to our own thoughts is almost always interpretive, grounded in perceptual awareness of our own circumstances and behavior, together with our own sensory imagery (including inner speech). In fact our access to our own thoughts is no different in principle from our access to the thoughts of other people, utilizing the conceptual and inferential resources of the same “mindreading” faculty, and relying on many of the same sources of evidence. The book proposes and defends the Interpretive Sensory-Access (ISA) theory of self-knowledge. This is supported through comprehensive examination of many different types of evidence from across cognitive science, integrating a diverse set of findings into a single well-articulated theory. One outcome is that there are hardly any kinds of conscious thought. Another is that there is no such thing as conscious agency.
Peter Carruthers
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199596195
- eISBN:
- 9780191731549
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199596195.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter examines one of the main predictions made by all forms of inner sense theory. This is that there should exist dissociations between capacities for self-knowledge and for other-knowledge, ...
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This chapter examines one of the main predictions made by all forms of inner sense theory. This is that there should exist dissociations between capacities for self-knowledge and for other-knowledge, in one or both directions. The interpretive sensory-access (ISA) theory, in contrast, predicts an absence of dissociations, since it holds that there is just one metarepresentational faculty with a single mode of access to the domain of mental states. Evidence from schizophrenia, autism, and alexithymia (blindness to one's own emotions) is examined. In addition, the chapter inquires whether brain imaging data show any difference between the regions of the brain that process one's own mental states and the regions involved when one attributes mental states to other people.Less
This chapter examines one of the main predictions made by all forms of inner sense theory. This is that there should exist dissociations between capacities for self-knowledge and for other-knowledge, in one or both directions. The interpretive sensory-access (ISA) theory, in contrast, predicts an absence of dissociations, since it holds that there is just one metarepresentational faculty with a single mode of access to the domain of mental states. Evidence from schizophrenia, autism, and alexithymia (blindness to one's own emotions) is examined. In addition, the chapter inquires whether brain imaging data show any difference between the regions of the brain that process one's own mental states and the regions involved when one attributes mental states to other people.
Marco Iacoboni
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199539956
- eISBN:
- 9780191730931
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199539956.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Aesthetics
The chapter discusses neural mechanisms of mirroring in the primate brain and their potential role in empathy. In monkeys, motor neurons that fire while the animal perform an action, also fire when ...
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The chapter discusses neural mechanisms of mirroring in the primate brain and their potential role in empathy. In monkeys, motor neurons that fire while the animal perform an action, also fire when the animal observes another individual performing the same action, or an action that achieves the same goal or is logically related to the performed action. In humans, neural systems active during action execution and action observation, seem to provide a bio‐marker of sociality. Indeed, their activity correlates with the tendency to empathize of the subject and with her/his social competence. Furthermore, recent single cell recordings in humans demonstrate that mirroring neurons are present in many human brain areas, suggesting that this neural system provides a rich mirroring of the actions of other people, and of the emotions and intentions associated with them. It is possible that these neuronal responses have been selected because they provide an effortless, automatic form of intersubjectivity.Less
The chapter discusses neural mechanisms of mirroring in the primate brain and their potential role in empathy. In monkeys, motor neurons that fire while the animal perform an action, also fire when the animal observes another individual performing the same action, or an action that achieves the same goal or is logically related to the performed action. In humans, neural systems active during action execution and action observation, seem to provide a bio‐marker of sociality. Indeed, their activity correlates with the tendency to empathize of the subject and with her/his social competence. Furthermore, recent single cell recordings in humans demonstrate that mirroring neurons are present in many human brain areas, suggesting that this neural system provides a rich mirroring of the actions of other people, and of the emotions and intentions associated with them. It is possible that these neuronal responses have been selected because they provide an effortless, automatic form of intersubjectivity.
Peter Carruthers
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199596195
- eISBN:
- 9780191731549
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199596195.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter further develops and supports the interpretive sensory-access (ISA) account of the nature and sources of self-knowledge. One goal is expository—it is to develop and explain the ISA ...
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This chapter further develops and supports the interpretive sensory-access (ISA) account of the nature and sources of self-knowledge. One goal is expository—it is to develop and explain the ISA theory in more detail than has been done up to this point in the book. But another goal is to show that the ISA account draws significant support from three well-established theories in cognitive science. These are global broadcasting theory, theories of sensory-based working memory, and theories that see the evolution of metarepresentational capacities as driven by the demands of living in complex social groups.Less
This chapter further develops and supports the interpretive sensory-access (ISA) account of the nature and sources of self-knowledge. One goal is expository—it is to develop and explain the ISA theory in more detail than has been done up to this point in the book. But another goal is to show that the ISA account draws significant support from three well-established theories in cognitive science. These are global broadcasting theory, theories of sensory-based working memory, and theories that see the evolution of metarepresentational capacities as driven by the demands of living in complex social groups.
Peter Carruthers
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199596195
- eISBN:
- 9780191731549
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199596195.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The goal of this chapter is to explain and provide a preliminary evaluation of so-called “inner sense” accounts of self-knowledge, contrasting them with the interpretive sensory-access (ISA) theory. ...
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The goal of this chapter is to explain and provide a preliminary evaluation of so-called “inner sense” accounts of self-knowledge, contrasting them with the interpretive sensory-access (ISA) theory. There are a trio of such accounts to be considered. These are distinguished from one another by the varied relationships that they postulate between inner sense and other-directed mindreading. The predictions made by each are extracted and compared with those of the ISA theory. Evidence relating to the developmental emergence of self-knowledge and other-knowledge is evaluated, as is evidence that recognition of the emotions of others depends upon awareness of the corresponding emotion in ourselves. In addition, introspection-sampling evidence of amodal “unsymbolozed” thinking is considered.Less
The goal of this chapter is to explain and provide a preliminary evaluation of so-called “inner sense” accounts of self-knowledge, contrasting them with the interpretive sensory-access (ISA) theory. There are a trio of such accounts to be considered. These are distinguished from one another by the varied relationships that they postulate between inner sense and other-directed mindreading. The predictions made by each are extracted and compared with those of the ISA theory. Evidence relating to the developmental emergence of self-knowledge and other-knowledge is evaluated, as is evidence that recognition of the emotions of others depends upon awareness of the corresponding emotion in ourselves. In addition, introspection-sampling evidence of amodal “unsymbolozed” thinking is considered.
Peter Carruthers
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199596195
- eISBN:
- 9780191731549
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199596195.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The topic of mindreading is central to the interpretive sensory-access (ISA) theory of self-knowledge. This chapter lays out the issues and options, and examines some of the pertinent evidence. The ...
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The topic of mindreading is central to the interpretive sensory-access (ISA) theory of self-knowledge. This chapter lays out the issues and options, and examines some of the pertinent evidence. The goal of the chapter is to lay bare the assumptions about mindreading that either support the ISA theory, or to which that theory is independently committed, and to show that those assumptions are at least defensible, if not highly plausible. Theorizing-theory and simulationist accounts of mindreading are discussed and found to be problematic, and recent evidence of very early mindreading in infants is reviewed and evaluated. It is argued that this supports a broadly modular conception of our mindreading competence. Evidence of simple forms of mindreading in non-human primates is also considered.Less
The topic of mindreading is central to the interpretive sensory-access (ISA) theory of self-knowledge. This chapter lays out the issues and options, and examines some of the pertinent evidence. The goal of the chapter is to lay bare the assumptions about mindreading that either support the ISA theory, or to which that theory is independently committed, and to show that those assumptions are at least defensible, if not highly plausible. Theorizing-theory and simulationist accounts of mindreading are discussed and found to be problematic, and recent evidence of very early mindreading in infants is reviewed and evaluated. It is argued that this supports a broadly modular conception of our mindreading competence. Evidence of simple forms of mindreading in non-human primates is also considered.
Peter Carruthers and J. Brendan Ritchie
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199646739
- eISBN:
- 9780191745867
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199646739.003.0006
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology, Developmental Psychology
This chapter situates the dispute over the metacognitive capacities of non-human animals in the context of wider debates about the phylogeny of metarepresentational abilities. This chapter clarifies ...
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This chapter situates the dispute over the metacognitive capacities of non-human animals in the context of wider debates about the phylogeny of metarepresentational abilities. This chapter clarifies the nature of the dispute, before contrasting two different accounts of the evolution of metarepresentation. One is first-person-based, claiming that it emerged initially for purposes of metacognitive monitoring and control. The other is social in nature, claiming that metarepresentation evolved initially to monitor the mental states of others. These accounts make differing predictions about what we should expect to find in non-human animals: the former predicts that metacognitive capacities in creatures incapable of equivalent forms of mindreading should be found, whereas the latter predicts that they should not. The chapter elaborates and defend the latter form of account, drawing especially on what is known about decision-making and metacognition in humans. In doing so the chapter shows that so-called ‘uncertainty-monitoring’ data from monkeys can just as well be explained in non-metarepresentational affective terms, as might be predicted by the social-evolutionary account.Less
This chapter situates the dispute over the metacognitive capacities of non-human animals in the context of wider debates about the phylogeny of metarepresentational abilities. This chapter clarifies the nature of the dispute, before contrasting two different accounts of the evolution of metarepresentation. One is first-person-based, claiming that it emerged initially for purposes of metacognitive monitoring and control. The other is social in nature, claiming that metarepresentation evolved initially to monitor the mental states of others. These accounts make differing predictions about what we should expect to find in non-human animals: the former predicts that metacognitive capacities in creatures incapable of equivalent forms of mindreading should be found, whereas the latter predicts that they should not. The chapter elaborates and defend the latter form of account, drawing especially on what is known about decision-making and metacognition in humans. In doing so the chapter shows that so-called ‘uncertainty-monitoring’ data from monkeys can just as well be explained in non-metarepresentational affective terms, as might be predicted by the social-evolutionary account.
Joëlle Proust
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199646739
- eISBN:
- 9780191745867
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199646739.003.0015
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology, Developmental Psychology
Given disagreements about the architecture of the mind, the nature of self-knowledge, and its epistemology, the question of how to understand the function and scope of metacognition — the control of ...
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Given disagreements about the architecture of the mind, the nature of self-knowledge, and its epistemology, the question of how to understand the function and scope of metacognition — the control of one’s cognition — is still a matter of hot debate. A dominant view, the self-ascriptive view (or one-function view), has been that metacognition necessarily requires representing one’s own mental states as mental states, and, therefore, necessarily involves an ability to read one’s own mind. The self-evaluative view (or two-function view), in contrast, takes metacognition to involve a procedural form of knowledge that is generated by actually engaging in a first-order cognitive task, and monitoring its success. The comparative and developmental arguments supporting, respectively, each of these views are discussed in the light of Hampton’s operational definition of metacognition. New arguments are presented in favour of the two-function view. Recent behavioural and neuroscientific evidence suggests that metacognitive assessment relies on dedicated implicit mechanisms, which are wholly independent, and indeed dissociable, from theory-based self-attribution. The two-function view is claimed to be the best interpretation of these findings.Less
Given disagreements about the architecture of the mind, the nature of self-knowledge, and its epistemology, the question of how to understand the function and scope of metacognition — the control of one’s cognition — is still a matter of hot debate. A dominant view, the self-ascriptive view (or one-function view), has been that metacognition necessarily requires representing one’s own mental states as mental states, and, therefore, necessarily involves an ability to read one’s own mind. The self-evaluative view (or two-function view), in contrast, takes metacognition to involve a procedural form of knowledge that is generated by actually engaging in a first-order cognitive task, and monitoring its success. The comparative and developmental arguments supporting, respectively, each of these views are discussed in the light of Hampton’s operational definition of metacognition. New arguments are presented in favour of the two-function view. Recent behavioural and neuroscientific evidence suggests that metacognitive assessment relies on dedicated implicit mechanisms, which are wholly independent, and indeed dissociable, from theory-based self-attribution. The two-function view is claimed to be the best interpretation of these findings.
