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The Traditional Issue

John Foster

in The Nature of Perception

Published in print:
2000
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780198237693
eISBN:
9780191597442
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198237693.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Let us provisionally assume a realist view of the physical world, which takes the world to be mind‐independent and metaphysically fundamental. Within the framework of this assumption, there are two ... More


Perception and its Objects

Bill Brewer

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
May 2011
ISBN:
9780199260256
eISBN:
9780191725470
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199260256.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This book presents, motivates, and defends a new solution to a fundamental problem in the philosophy of perception. What is the correct theoretical conception of perceptual experience, and how should ... More


The Purpose of Sensations

Ryan Nichols

in Thomas Reid's Theory of Perception

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
May 2007
ISBN:
9780199276912
eISBN:
9780191707759
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199276912.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, History of Philosophy

This chapter focuses on the relationship between Reidian sensation and perception. It considers whether sensations are intentional objects of other mental states and, if so, what type of mental ... More


Frege on Knowing the Third Realm (1992)

TYLER BURGE

in Truth, Thought, Reason: Essays on Frege

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
May 2010
ISBN:
9780199278534
eISBN:
9780191706943
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199278534.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Philosophy of Language

Frege regarded the foundations of mathematics as self-evident. He maintained that reason could enable one to know of the existence and nature of both mind-independent abstract objects, such as the ... More


Three Major Themes of Schopenhauer's Philosophy: Transcendental Idealism, Panpsychism, and Determinism

Barbara Hannan

in The Riddle of the World: A Reconsideration of Schopenhauer's Philosophy

Published in print:
2009
Published Online:
May 2009
ISBN:
9780195378948
eISBN:
9780199869589
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195378948.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, History of Philosophy

In this chapter, the following are explained in detail and evaluated: (1) Schopenhauer's transcendental idealism; (2) Schopenhauer's metaphysics of Will, which may be described as a kind of animism ... More


Science

Thomas Nagel

in The Last Word

Published in print:
2003
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780195149838
eISBN:
9780199872206
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0195149831.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, General

To refute subjectivism about science, we must begin, Nagel says, with the idea that there is some way the world is and aim to show that even the subjectivist cannot rise above this idea. Nagel ... More


Tackling Berkeley's Puzzle

Quassim Cassam

in Perception, Causation, and Objectivity

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
September 2011
ISBN:
9780199692040
eISBN:
9780191729713
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199692040.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind

It seems that we have the conception of objects of experience as mind-independent. Berkeley argues that it is possible for us to have this conception only if it is made available to us by experience ... More


The Inconsistent Triad

Bill Brewer

in Perception and its Objects

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
May 2011
ISBN:
9780199260256
eISBN:
9780191725470
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199260256.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

The dialectical framework for the whole discussion is set out as an inconsistent triad. (I) Physical objects are mind-independent. (II) Physical objects are the direct objects of perception. (III) ... More


Nietzsche's Perspectival Theory of Knowledge

Tsarina Doyle

in Nietzsche on Epistemology and Metaphysics: The World in View

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
March 2012
ISBN:
9780748628070
eISBN:
9780748652594
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Edinburgh University Press
DOI:
10.3366/edinburgh/9780748628070.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter investigates how we can have objective knowledge of mind-independent reality without violating the anthropocentric conditions of our knowledge. It discusses Friedrich Nietzsche's ... More


A Naïve Realist Theory of Colour

Keith Allen

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
December 2016
ISBN:
9780198755364
eISBN:
9780191816659
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198755364.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind

This book develops and defends the view that colours are mind-independent properties of things in the environment that are distinct from properties identified by the physical sciences. This view ... More


The B-theory and the passage of time

M. Joshua Mozersky

in Time, Language, and Ontology: The World from the B-Theoretic Perspective

Published in print:
2015
Published Online:
March 2015
ISBN:
9780198718161
eISBN:
9780191787508
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198718161.003.0008
Subject:
Linguistics, Semantics and Pragmatics, Psycholinguistics / Neurolinguistics / Cognitive Linguistics

Most B-theorists defend the reality of both time and change. Overwhelmingly, however, they deny that time genuinely passes, insisting that the passage of time is some kind of cognitive illusion. In ... More


Arguments Against the Representational View

Berit Brogaard

in Seeing and Saying: The Language of Perception and the Representational View of Experience

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
June 2018
ISBN:
9780190495251
eISBN:
9780190495275
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780190495251.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, General

This chapter defends the representational view of visual experience against objections by Brewer, Siegel, Johnston, and Travis. Four problems are discussed: (1) the generality problem, or how to ... More


Causation

Keith Allen

in A Naïve Realist Theory of Colour

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
December 2016
ISBN:
9780198755364
eISBN:
9780191816659
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198755364.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter considers a common line of objection to Distinctness: the Causal Exclusion Argument. According to the Causal Exclusion Argument, distinct mind-independent colours are causally excluded ... More


Structural Properties of the Colours

Keith Allen

in A Naïve Realist Theory of Colour

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
December 2016
ISBN:
9780198755364
eISBN:
9780191816659
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198755364.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind

Colours appear to instantiate a number of characteristic ‘structural’, or ‘higher-order’, properties: for instance, they stand in distinctive relations of similarity and difference, and admit of a ... More


Realism

Keith Allen

in A Naïve Realist Theory of Colour

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
December 2016
ISBN:
9780198755364
eISBN:
9780191816659
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198755364.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind

Something in the vicinity of a naïve realist theory of colour is often defended by philosophers who are attracted towards some form of philosophical quietism. To say of such philosophers that they ... More


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