Colin McGinn
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199267606
- eISBN:
- 9780191601798
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019926760X.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This book features collection of essays on consciousness. It is intended as a sequel to the author’s 1991 book, The Problem of Consciousness. Although the author has not modified his views in the ...
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This book features collection of essays on consciousness. It is intended as a sequel to the author’s 1991 book, The Problem of Consciousness. Although the author has not modified his views in the last decade, he has included his position under the label ‘mysterianism’, in the canon of positions regarding the mind-body problem. Chapters 1-3 focus on the mind-body problem. Chapters 4-6 deal with the concept of matter. Chapter 7 features a dialogue on consciousness and cosmology. Chapter 8 discusses the problem of philosophy. Chapter 9 questions the first person authority theory. Chapter 10 analyses the objects of intentionality.Less
This book features collection of essays on consciousness. It is intended as a sequel to the author’s 1991 book, The Problem of Consciousness. Although the author has not modified his views in the last decade, he has included his position under the label ‘mysterianism’, in the canon of positions regarding the mind-body problem. Chapters 1-3 focus on the mind-body problem. Chapters 4-6 deal with the concept of matter. Chapter 7 features a dialogue on consciousness and cosmology. Chapter 8 discusses the problem of philosophy. Chapter 9 questions the first person authority theory. Chapter 10 analyses the objects of intentionality.
Daniel Stoljar
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195306583
- eISBN:
- 9780199786619
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195306589.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The problem to be discussed is the logical problem of experience, which focuses on three inconsistent theses: there are experiential truths; if there are experiential truths, every truth is entailed ...
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The problem to be discussed is the logical problem of experience, which focuses on three inconsistent theses: there are experiential truths; if there are experiential truths, every truth is entailed by, or supervenes on, some non-experiential truth; and if there are experiential truths, not every truth is entailed by, or supervenes on, some non-experiential truth. This problem is distinguished from two others: the empirical problem and the traditional mind-body problem.Less
The problem to be discussed is the logical problem of experience, which focuses on three inconsistent theses: there are experiential truths; if there are experiential truths, every truth is entailed by, or supervenes on, some non-experiential truth; and if there are experiential truths, not every truth is entailed by, or supervenes on, some non-experiential truth. This problem is distinguished from two others: the empirical problem and the traditional mind-body problem.
Steven Nadler
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198250081
- eISBN:
- 9780191712586
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198250081.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter is an examination of the myth that occasionalism arose as an ad hoc response to the mind-body problem bequeathed by Descartes. In fact, there are a number of arguments and motivations ...
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This chapter is an examination of the myth that occasionalism arose as an ad hoc response to the mind-body problem bequeathed by Descartes. In fact, there are a number of arguments and motivations for the doctrine, none of which appeal to the alleged difficulty of explaining how, for the dualist, mind and matter can interact. This thesis is pursued by looking at the philosophers Malebranche, La Forge, Cordemoy, Geulincx, and Clauberg.Less
This chapter is an examination of the myth that occasionalism arose as an ad hoc response to the mind-body problem bequeathed by Descartes. In fact, there are a number of arguments and motivations for the doctrine, none of which appeal to the alleged difficulty of explaining how, for the dualist, mind and matter can interact. This thesis is pursued by looking at the philosophers Malebranche, La Forge, Cordemoy, Geulincx, and Clauberg.
Colin McGinn
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199267606
- eISBN:
- 9780191601798
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019926760X.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
The source and nature of the mind-body problem – the problem of relating consciousness and the brain – is diagnosed. With Russell’s distinction between knowledge by description and knowledge by ...
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The source and nature of the mind-body problem – the problem of relating consciousness and the brain – is diagnosed. With Russell’s distinction between knowledge by description and knowledge by acquaintance in mind, McGinn suggests that our knowledge of the essence of consciousness is acquired by acquaintance, and that this justifiably produces our sense of the problem. Since knowledge by acquaintance is complete but not reducible to propositional knowledge, it may be that our knowledge of consciousness gives us insight into its essence which cannot be formulated propositionally: we know the nature of consciousness but cannot say what it is in the form of truths about consciousness. It is further argued that the properties of consciousness, which make it problematically related to the brain – its subjectivity and intentionality, its being essentially reflective and known infallibly – are consequential rather than intrinsic aspects of the nature of consciousness. It is explained how the fact that we know by this form of introspective self-consciousness that there is a mind-body problem means that we shall be unable in principle to solve the problem with our current cognitive faculties (‘mysterianism’).Less
The source and nature of the mind-body problem – the problem of relating consciousness and the brain – is diagnosed. With Russell’s distinction between knowledge by description and knowledge by acquaintance in mind, McGinn suggests that our knowledge of the essence of consciousness is acquired by acquaintance, and that this justifiably produces our sense of the problem. Since knowledge by acquaintance is complete but not reducible to propositional knowledge, it may be that our knowledge of consciousness gives us insight into its essence which cannot be formulated propositionally: we know the nature of consciousness but cannot say what it is in the form of truths about consciousness. It is further argued that the properties of consciousness, which make it problematically related to the brain – its subjectivity and intentionality, its being essentially reflective and known infallibly – are consequential rather than intrinsic aspects of the nature of consciousness. It is explained how the fact that we know by this form of introspective self-consciousness that there is a mind-body problem means that we shall be unable in principle to solve the problem with our current cognitive faculties (‘mysterianism’).
Paul Marshall
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199279432
- eISBN:
- 9780191603440
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199279438.003.0009
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
Spiritual approaches to mystical experience can be fleshed out with insights from the sciences and philosophy. Two overlapping ways of understanding the consciousness expansions of mystical ...
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Spiritual approaches to mystical experience can be fleshed out with insights from the sciences and philosophy. Two overlapping ways of understanding the consciousness expansions of mystical experience are distinguished. Filtration theorists, such as Henri Bergson, William James, and Aldous Huxley, believe that access to previously subconscious material takes place when neurological or psychological valves open. Psychophysical theorists draw on mind-body metaphysics to explain how consciousness can reach into the world at large. Several metaphysical alternatives are considered, including dualism, dual-aspect theory, and neutral monism, but idealism emerges as best suited to the task. J. E. Mercer and Edward Carpenter proposed idealist explanations, and more recently, T. L. S. Sprigge has raised idealism in connection with nature mysticism. A panpsychic form of idealism that reworks Leibniz’s monadology is a particularly fertile option. It not only addresses the deeper unitive and noetic facets of extrovertive experience but may also shed light on the relativity and holism of modern physics.Less
Spiritual approaches to mystical experience can be fleshed out with insights from the sciences and philosophy. Two overlapping ways of understanding the consciousness expansions of mystical experience are distinguished. Filtration theorists, such as Henri Bergson, William James, and Aldous Huxley, believe that access to previously subconscious material takes place when neurological or psychological valves open. Psychophysical theorists draw on mind-body metaphysics to explain how consciousness can reach into the world at large. Several metaphysical alternatives are considered, including dualism, dual-aspect theory, and neutral monism, but idealism emerges as best suited to the task. J. E. Mercer and Edward Carpenter proposed idealist explanations, and more recently, T. L. S. Sprigge has raised idealism in connection with nature mysticism. A panpsychic form of idealism that reworks Leibniz’s monadology is a particularly fertile option. It not only addresses the deeper unitive and noetic facets of extrovertive experience but may also shed light on the relativity and holism of modern physics.
Helen Steward
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198250647
- eISBN:
- 9780191681318
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198250647.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book puts forward a radical critique of the foundations of contemporary philosophy of mind, arguing that it relies too heavily on insecure assumptions about the nature of some of the sorts of ...
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This book puts forward a radical critique of the foundations of contemporary philosophy of mind, arguing that it relies too heavily on insecure assumptions about the nature of some of the sorts of mental entities it postulates: the nature of events, processes, and states. The book offers an investigation of these three categories, clarifying the distinction between them, and argues specifically that the assumption that states can be treated as particular, event-like entities has been a huge and serious mistake. The book argues that the category of token state should be rejected, and develops an alternative way of understanding those varieties of causal explanation which have sometimes been thought to require an ontology of token states for their elucidation. The book contends that many current theories of mind are rendered unintelligible once it is seen how these explanations really work. A number of prominent features of contemporary philosophy of mind token identity theories, the functionalists conception of causal role, a common form of argument for eliminative materialism, and the structure of the debate about the efficacy of mental content are impugned by the book's arguments. The book concludes that the modern mind-body problem needs to be substantially rethought.Less
This book puts forward a radical critique of the foundations of contemporary philosophy of mind, arguing that it relies too heavily on insecure assumptions about the nature of some of the sorts of mental entities it postulates: the nature of events, processes, and states. The book offers an investigation of these three categories, clarifying the distinction between them, and argues specifically that the assumption that states can be treated as particular, event-like entities has been a huge and serious mistake. The book argues that the category of token state should be rejected, and develops an alternative way of understanding those varieties of causal explanation which have sometimes been thought to require an ontology of token states for their elucidation. The book contends that many current theories of mind are rendered unintelligible once it is seen how these explanations really work. A number of prominent features of contemporary philosophy of mind token identity theories, the functionalists conception of causal role, a common form of argument for eliminative materialism, and the structure of the debate about the efficacy of mental content are impugned by the book's arguments. The book concludes that the modern mind-body problem needs to be substantially rethought.
C. Thomas Powell
- Published in print:
- 1990
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198244486
- eISBN:
- 9780191680779
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198244486.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
The Fourth Paralogism in A more or less refutes the thesis that nobody can be sure of the existence of the external world. The Fourth Paralogism in B appears to be reduced to a few remarks on what ...
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The Fourth Paralogism in A more or less refutes the thesis that nobody can be sure of the existence of the external world. The Fourth Paralogism in B appears to be reduced to a few remarks on what has been termed Immanuel Kant's ignorabimus about the mind-body problem. There is a good deal of philosophical material in this Paralogism that goes beyond that of the Refutation of Idealism and that is directly relevant to Kant's view of the self. This chapter examines two versions of the Fourth Paralogism, beginning with the formal presentation of the syllogism, in order to determine what Kant takes the Fourth Paralogism to be, to suggest likely sources for this Paralogism, and to consider in what way the discussion of the Fourth Paralogism contributes to Kant's attack on rational psychology.Less
The Fourth Paralogism in A more or less refutes the thesis that nobody can be sure of the existence of the external world. The Fourth Paralogism in B appears to be reduced to a few remarks on what has been termed Immanuel Kant's ignorabimus about the mind-body problem. There is a good deal of philosophical material in this Paralogism that goes beyond that of the Refutation of Idealism and that is directly relevant to Kant's view of the self. This chapter examines two versions of the Fourth Paralogism, beginning with the formal presentation of the syllogism, in order to determine what Kant takes the Fourth Paralogism to be, to suggest likely sources for this Paralogism, and to consider in what way the discussion of the Fourth Paralogism contributes to Kant's attack on rational psychology.
Robert Kirk
- Published in print:
- 1996
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198236795
- eISBN:
- 9780191679353
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198236795.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book asks the question: how could processes in the brain amount to conscious experiences? The mind–body problem is mystifying, even after decades of philosophical activity with the benefit of ...
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This book asks the question: how could processes in the brain amount to conscious experiences? The mind–body problem is mystifying, even after decades of philosophical activity with the benefit of progress in psychology and the neurosciences. Previous attempts to remove the mystery have been developed. Behaviourism is a good example. Behaviourists maintain that mental states are determined entirely by behaviour and behavioural dispositions: it doesn't matter at all what goes on inside the head as long as it produces the right patterns of behaviour. This book sets out a view of the most troublesome philosophical problems in this area, and offers solutions. The title of this book comes from Tolman's expression ‘raw feels’ in his book Purposive Behaviour in Animals and Men (1932) which he used to refer to certain features of our mental life which thought science could not capture. Tolman's expression has been modified to avoid any hint that being conscious is a matter of being related to a special class of entities. Raw feeling is not a thing but a process, which this book suggests is purely physical.Less
This book asks the question: how could processes in the brain amount to conscious experiences? The mind–body problem is mystifying, even after decades of philosophical activity with the benefit of progress in psychology and the neurosciences. Previous attempts to remove the mystery have been developed. Behaviourism is a good example. Behaviourists maintain that mental states are determined entirely by behaviour and behavioural dispositions: it doesn't matter at all what goes on inside the head as long as it produces the right patterns of behaviour. This book sets out a view of the most troublesome philosophical problems in this area, and offers solutions. The title of this book comes from Tolman's expression ‘raw feels’ in his book Purposive Behaviour in Animals and Men (1932) which he used to refer to certain features of our mental life which thought science could not capture. Tolman's expression has been modified to avoid any hint that being conscious is a matter of being related to a special class of entities. Raw feeling is not a thing but a process, which this book suggests is purely physical.
Galen Strawson
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199267422
- eISBN:
- 9780191708343
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199267422.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter discusses the following statements: materialists hold that every real, concrete phenomenon in the universe is a wholly physical phenomenon and consciousness (‘what-it's-likeness’, etc.) ...
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This chapter discusses the following statements: materialists hold that every real, concrete phenomenon in the universe is a wholly physical phenomenon and consciousness (‘what-it's-likeness’, etc.) is the most certainly existing real, concrete phenomenon there is. It follows that all serious materialists must grant that consciousness is a wholly physical phenomenon. This leads on to this question: how can consciousness possibly be physical, given what we know about the physical? To ask this question is already to have gone wrong. We have no good reason (as Priestley, Eddington, Russell, and others observe) to think that we know anything about the physical that gives us any reason to find any problem in the idea that consciousness is wholly physical.Less
This chapter discusses the following statements: materialists hold that every real, concrete phenomenon in the universe is a wholly physical phenomenon and consciousness (‘what-it's-likeness’, etc.) is the most certainly existing real, concrete phenomenon there is. It follows that all serious materialists must grant that consciousness is a wholly physical phenomenon. This leads on to this question: how can consciousness possibly be physical, given what we know about the physical? To ask this question is already to have gone wrong. We have no good reason (as Priestley, Eddington, Russell, and others observe) to think that we know anything about the physical that gives us any reason to find any problem in the idea that consciousness is wholly physical.
Colin McGinn
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199267606
- eISBN:
- 9780191601798
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019926760X.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Against those who appeal to the necessary a posteriori in responding to the mind-body problem, it is argued that a solution to the problem must take the form of an analytic rather than an empirical ...
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Against those who appeal to the necessary a posteriori in responding to the mind-body problem, it is argued that a solution to the problem must take the form of an analytic rather than an empirical identity statement, which is to say that a conceptual rather than an a posteriori reduction of consciousness must be provided. Frege showed that true identity statements need not link synonyms, which disposes of some epistemic objections to physicalism, but Kripke’s recognition that all identity statements are necessary (though some are a posteriori) means that if psychophysical identity statements are contingent, as they appear to be, we have good reason to believe that they are false. It is argued that only a conceptual reduction can remove the need to introduce irreducibly psychic properties if the identity statements that are characteristic of physicalism are to be informative. The consequences of this thesis for our prospects of solving the mind-body problem and its implications for arguments against physicalism are discussed. In particular, it is suggested that the only alternative to property dualism is a conceptually true statement identifying body and mind containing radically innovative concepts of body and mind.Less
Against those who appeal to the necessary a posteriori in responding to the mind-body problem, it is argued that a solution to the problem must take the form of an analytic rather than an empirical identity statement, which is to say that a conceptual rather than an a posteriori reduction of consciousness must be provided. Frege showed that true identity statements need not link synonyms, which disposes of some epistemic objections to physicalism, but Kripke’s recognition that all identity statements are necessary (though some are a posteriori) means that if psychophysical identity statements are contingent, as they appear to be, we have good reason to believe that they are false. It is argued that only a conceptual reduction can remove the need to introduce irreducibly psychic properties if the identity statements that are characteristic of physicalism are to be informative. The consequences of this thesis for our prospects of solving the mind-body problem and its implications for arguments against physicalism are discussed. In particular, it is suggested that the only alternative to property dualism is a conceptually true statement identifying body and mind containing radically innovative concepts of body and mind.
Eric T. Olson
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195176421
- eISBN:
- 9780199872008
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195176421.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter explains what it means to ask what we are. It begins by breaking the question up into smaller ones, such as what we are made of, what parts we have, and whether we are substances. It ...
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This chapter explains what it means to ask what we are. It begins by breaking the question up into smaller ones, such as what we are made of, what parts we have, and whether we are substances. It makes clear that the question is not about people in general, but only about us human people. It considers two ways of rephrasing the question: What do our personal pronouns and proper names refer to? and What sorts of beings think our thoughts and perform our actions? The question is distinguished from the question of personal identity over time and from the mind‐body problem. It is then argued that thinking about personal identity without considering what we are leads to metaphysical trouble.Less
This chapter explains what it means to ask what we are. It begins by breaking the question up into smaller ones, such as what we are made of, what parts we have, and whether we are substances. It makes clear that the question is not about people in general, but only about us human people. It considers two ways of rephrasing the question: What do our personal pronouns and proper names refer to? and What sorts of beings think our thoughts and perform our actions? The question is distinguished from the question of personal identity over time and from the mind‐body problem. It is then argued that thinking about personal identity without considering what we are leads to metaphysical trouble.
Tyler Burge
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199556182
- eISBN:
- 9780191721014
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199556182.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter begins with a detailed response to the previous chapter's review of Burge's previous work on the mind-body problem, centering on empirical doubts about compositional materialism ...
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This chapter begins with a detailed response to the previous chapter's review of Burge's previous work on the mind-body problem, centering on empirical doubts about compositional materialism regarding psychological states. It then presents a new argument for a modest mind-body dualism. The argument centers on the point that propositional structures that support rational transactions, such as formal deductive inference, are constitutive aspects of propositional psychological states, but that since Newton, it has been a fundamental feature of physical science that the physical world is not constitutively propositional in structure. It follows from these premises, both defended briefly, that propositional psychological states and events are not physical states or events. Contrasts with traditional Cartesian dualism are sketched.Less
This chapter begins with a detailed response to the previous chapter's review of Burge's previous work on the mind-body problem, centering on empirical doubts about compositional materialism regarding psychological states. It then presents a new argument for a modest mind-body dualism. The argument centers on the point that propositional structures that support rational transactions, such as formal deductive inference, are constitutive aspects of propositional psychological states, but that since Newton, it has been a fundamental feature of physical science that the physical world is not constitutively propositional in structure. It follows from these premises, both defended briefly, that propositional psychological states and events are not physical states or events. Contrasts with traditional Cartesian dualism are sketched.
Thomas Nagel
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199919758
- eISBN:
- 9780199980369
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199919758.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General, Philosophy of Science
This book argues that the widely accepted world view of materialist naturalism is untenable. The mind-body problem cannot be confined to the relation between animal minds and animal bodies. If ...
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This book argues that the widely accepted world view of materialist naturalism is untenable. The mind-body problem cannot be confined to the relation between animal minds and animal bodies. If materialism cannot accommodate consciousness and other mind-related aspects of reality, then we must abandon a purely materialist understanding of nature in general, extending to biology, evolutionary theory, and cosmology. Since minds are features of biological systems that have developed through evolution, the standard materialist version of evolutionary biology is fundamentally incomplete. And the cosmological history that led to the origin of life and the coming into existence of the conditions for evolution cannot be a merely materialist history. An adequate conception of nature would have to explain the appearance in the universe of materially irreducible conscious minds, as such. No such explanation is available, and the physical sciences, including molecular biology, cannot be expected to provide one. The book explores these problems through a general treatment of the obstacles to reductionism, with more specific application to the phenomena of consciousness, cognition, and value. The conclusion is that physics cannot be the theory of everything.Less
This book argues that the widely accepted world view of materialist naturalism is untenable. The mind-body problem cannot be confined to the relation between animal minds and animal bodies. If materialism cannot accommodate consciousness and other mind-related aspects of reality, then we must abandon a purely materialist understanding of nature in general, extending to biology, evolutionary theory, and cosmology. Since minds are features of biological systems that have developed through evolution, the standard materialist version of evolutionary biology is fundamentally incomplete. And the cosmological history that led to the origin of life and the coming into existence of the conditions for evolution cannot be a merely materialist history. An adequate conception of nature would have to explain the appearance in the universe of materially irreducible conscious minds, as such. No such explanation is available, and the physical sciences, including molecular biology, cannot be expected to provide one. The book explores these problems through a general treatment of the obstacles to reductionism, with more specific application to the phenomena of consciousness, cognition, and value. The conclusion is that physics cannot be the theory of everything.
Nicholas Jolley
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198238195
- eISBN:
- 9780191597824
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198238193.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
The concept of an idea plays a central role in seventeenth‐century theories of mind and knowledge. However, philosophers of the period were seriously divided over the nature of ideas. The Light of ...
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The concept of an idea plays a central role in seventeenth‐century theories of mind and knowledge. However, philosophers of the period were seriously divided over the nature of ideas. The Light of the Soul examines the important but neglected debate on this issue between Leibniz, Malebranche, and Descartes. In reaction to Descartes, Malebranche argues that ideas are not mental but abstract, logical entities. Leibniz in turn replies to Malebranche by reclaiming ideas for psychology. Nicholas Jolley explores the theological dimension of the debate by showing how the three philosophers make use of biblical and patristic teaching. The debate has important implications for such major issues in early modern philosophy as innate ideas, self‐knowledge, scepticism, the mind–body problem, and the creation of the eternal truths. Jolley goes on to consider the relevance of the seventeenth‐century controversy to modern discussions of the relation between logic and psychology.Less
The concept of an idea plays a central role in seventeenth‐century theories of mind and knowledge. However, philosophers of the period were seriously divided over the nature of ideas. The Light of the Soul examines the important but neglected debate on this issue between Leibniz, Malebranche, and Descartes. In reaction to Descartes, Malebranche argues that ideas are not mental but abstract, logical entities. Leibniz in turn replies to Malebranche by reclaiming ideas for psychology. Nicholas Jolley explores the theological dimension of the debate by showing how the three philosophers make use of biblical and patristic teaching. The debate has important implications for such major issues in early modern philosophy as innate ideas, self‐knowledge, scepticism, the mind–body problem, and the creation of the eternal truths. Jolley goes on to consider the relevance of the seventeenth‐century controversy to modern discussions of the relation between logic and psychology.
Stephen Yablo
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199266487
- eISBN:
- 9780191594274
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199266487.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
Some essential properties are of course causal, as it is essential to footprints to have been caused by feet. But this chapter is less in causation's role in essence than the reverse: the bearing a ...
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Some essential properties are of course causal, as it is essential to footprints to have been caused by feet. But this chapter is less in causation's role in essence than the reverse: the bearing a thing's essence has on its causal powers. That essence might be causally relevant is hinted already by the counterfactual element in causation; and the hint is confirmed by the explanation essence offers of something otherwise mysterious, namely, how events exactly alike in every ordinary respect, like the bolt's suddenly snapping and its snapping per se, manage to disagree in what they cause. Some prior difference must exist between these events to make their causal powers unlike. Paradoxically, though, it can only be in point of a property, suddenness, which both events possess in common. Only by postulating a difference in the manner — essential or accidental — of the property's possession is the paradox resolved. Next, we need an account of causation in which essence plays an explicit determinative role. That account, based on the idea that causes should be commensurate with their effects, is that x causes y only if nothing essentially poorer would have done, and nothing essentially richer was needed.Less
Some essential properties are of course causal, as it is essential to footprints to have been caused by feet. But this chapter is less in causation's role in essence than the reverse: the bearing a thing's essence has on its causal powers. That essence might be causally relevant is hinted already by the counterfactual element in causation; and the hint is confirmed by the explanation essence offers of something otherwise mysterious, namely, how events exactly alike in every ordinary respect, like the bolt's suddenly snapping and its snapping per se, manage to disagree in what they cause. Some prior difference must exist between these events to make their causal powers unlike. Paradoxically, though, it can only be in point of a property, suddenness, which both events possess in common. Only by postulating a difference in the manner — essential or accidental — of the property's possession is the paradox resolved. Next, we need an account of causation in which essence plays an explicit determinative role. That account, based on the idea that causes should be commensurate with their effects, is that x causes y only if nothing essentially poorer would have done, and nothing essentially richer was needed.
Thomas Nagel
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199241279
- eISBN:
- 9780191597107
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199241279.003.0018
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Thomas Nagel investigates the status of a priori knowledge in the context of the mind‐body problem. A priori reflection on the concepts of mental and physical properties seems to show that mental ...
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Thomas Nagel investigates the status of a priori knowledge in the context of the mind‐body problem. A priori reflection on the concepts of mental and physical properties seems to show that mental state and event types could not be identical with physical state event types. Nagel wishes to block the conclusion that it really does show this because he finds the resultant property dualism profoundly unsatisfactory.Less
Thomas Nagel investigates the status of a priori knowledge in the context of the mind‐body problem. A priori reflection on the concepts of mental and physical properties seems to show that mental state and event types could not be identical with physical state event types. Nagel wishes to block the conclusion that it really does show this because he finds the resultant property dualism profoundly unsatisfactory.
William Hirstein
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199231904
- eISBN:
- 9780191738319
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231904.003.0002
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology, Social Psychology
This chapter presents the following hypothesis: There is a perfectly sensible conception of the mind, consciousness, the self, what we mean by ‘I,’ how we perceive and know, and how we remember and ...
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This chapter presents the following hypothesis: There is a perfectly sensible conception of the mind, consciousness, the self, what we mean by ‘I,’ how we perceive and know, and how we remember and decide, all of which cohere amongst one another as well as with what we know about the brain, according to which it is possible for one person to experience directly the conscious states of another person. Not only can one person be directly aware of the conscious states of another person, he can be more aware of them than their original owner. He can even be aware of them when their original owner will never be aware of them. Mindmelding is possible, and this possibility removes much of the force from the mind-body problem by removing the impasse caused by the belief in privacy. It removes what some philosophers saw as a need to posit strange metaphysical categories. The subject's sense of self can be separated from the object of her conscious awareness which can be bound to another's sense of self.Less
This chapter presents the following hypothesis: There is a perfectly sensible conception of the mind, consciousness, the self, what we mean by ‘I,’ how we perceive and know, and how we remember and decide, all of which cohere amongst one another as well as with what we know about the brain, according to which it is possible for one person to experience directly the conscious states of another person. Not only can one person be directly aware of the conscious states of another person, he can be more aware of them than their original owner. He can even be aware of them when their original owner will never be aware of them. Mindmelding is possible, and this possibility removes much of the force from the mind-body problem by removing the impasse caused by the belief in privacy. It removes what some philosophers saw as a need to posit strange metaphysical categories. The subject's sense of self can be separated from the object of her conscious awareness which can be bound to another's sense of self.
Helen Steward
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198250647
- eISBN:
- 9780191681318
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198250647.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This introductory chapter opens with a discussion of the philosophy and mind and the mind-body problem. It argues that philosophers have been surprisingly slow to ask about the distinctions between ...
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This introductory chapter opens with a discussion of the philosophy and mind and the mind-body problem. It argues that philosophers have been surprisingly slow to ask about the distinctions between the categories in terms of which they characterize the mind. It is not, of course, that nobody has ever investigated the differences between events, states, and processes. It is rather that work specifically in philosophy of mind has largely proceeded as though it could simply afford to ignore these discriminations, thinking them perhaps to be too subtle to be of any great moment, or too tightly rooted in linguistic considerations to matter much to metaphysics. But this neglect has been a mistake. Indeed, it is argued that the category of state has been so grossly misunderstood that some theories of mind which are supposed to encompass entities traditionally regarded as falling under the category, e.g. beliefs and desires, cannot so much as be sensibly formulated, once we are clearer about the nature of states. An overview of the subsequent chapters is presented.Less
This introductory chapter opens with a discussion of the philosophy and mind and the mind-body problem. It argues that philosophers have been surprisingly slow to ask about the distinctions between the categories in terms of which they characterize the mind. It is not, of course, that nobody has ever investigated the differences between events, states, and processes. It is rather that work specifically in philosophy of mind has largely proceeded as though it could simply afford to ignore these discriminations, thinking them perhaps to be too subtle to be of any great moment, or too tightly rooted in linguistic considerations to matter much to metaphysics. But this neglect has been a mistake. Indeed, it is argued that the category of state has been so grossly misunderstood that some theories of mind which are supposed to encompass entities traditionally regarded as falling under the category, e.g. beliefs and desires, cannot so much as be sensibly formulated, once we are clearer about the nature of states. An overview of the subsequent chapters is presented.
Colin McGinn
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199267606
- eISBN:
- 9780191601798
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019926760X.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
It is often assumed that mental states must be known introspectively just as material objects must be known perceptually, and that this mode of knowing is especially authoritative; this chapter ...
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It is often assumed that mental states must be known introspectively just as material objects must be known perceptually, and that this mode of knowing is especially authoritative; this chapter controverts this assumption. It is argued that a subject might introspect physical facts and perceive mental ones; and that a strong conception of the first-person authority of introspection – non-criterial, non-inferential, direct, infallible, incorrigible, certain – might apply instead to perception. The implications of the logical possibility of such an inverted subject for scepticism and the mind-body problem are discussed. The tension between the view of this chapter, which would make it possible for a subject to have a concept of pain without having introspective acquaintance with it, and the view that this is impossible is discussed.Less
It is often assumed that mental states must be known introspectively just as material objects must be known perceptually, and that this mode of knowing is especially authoritative; this chapter controverts this assumption. It is argued that a subject might introspect physical facts and perceive mental ones; and that a strong conception of the first-person authority of introspection – non-criterial, non-inferential, direct, infallible, incorrigible, certain – might apply instead to perception. The implications of the logical possibility of such an inverted subject for scepticism and the mind-body problem are discussed. The tension between the view of this chapter, which would make it possible for a subject to have a concept of pain without having introspective acquaintance with it, and the view that this is impossible is discussed.
Paul Marshall
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199279432
- eISBN:
- 9780191603440
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199279438.003.0010
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
Two general approaches to the explanation of extrovertive mystical experience have emerged as tenable, centred respectively on the intrapersonal psychological and biological factors of naturalistic ...
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Two general approaches to the explanation of extrovertive mystical experience have emerged as tenable, centred respectively on the intrapersonal psychological and biological factors of naturalistic science, and the transpersonal factors of religious and metaphysical thought. The contributions of religious and cultural context undoubtedly have a supporting role, but they do not appear to be fundamental. At present, it is not possible to decide between naturalistic or transpersonal explanation, but evidence from parapsychology, neuroscience, and physics may help to swing the matter one way or the other. The author favours explanation in which transpersonal factors are made fundamental, with intrapersonal, contextual, and collective factors given supporting roles.Less
Two general approaches to the explanation of extrovertive mystical experience have emerged as tenable, centred respectively on the intrapersonal psychological and biological factors of naturalistic science, and the transpersonal factors of religious and metaphysical thought. The contributions of religious and cultural context undoubtedly have a supporting role, but they do not appear to be fundamental. At present, it is not possible to decide between naturalistic or transpersonal explanation, but evidence from parapsychology, neuroscience, and physics may help to swing the matter one way or the other. The author favours explanation in which transpersonal factors are made fundamental, with intrapersonal, contextual, and collective factors given supporting roles.
