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The Resurrection of the Dead

Stephen T. Davis

in Christian Philosophical Theology

This chapter discusses the general resurrection. It first establishes that classical mind/body dualism — a theory seen (in different forms) in Plato and Descartes — is not the Christian position. ... More

This chapter discusses the general resurrection. It first establishes that classical mind/body dualism — a theory seen (in different forms) in Plato and Descartes — is not the Christian position. Temporary disembodiment, which is the theory of life after death and the interim state held by most theologians, is discussed. The nature of the disembodied interim state, the reunification of body and soul at the Parousia, and the nature of the gloried body are also explored. It is argued that contrary to certain philosophers, this overall picture of the general resurrection is coherent. Christian theologians differ on whether the new glorified body consists of the same matter as the pre-mortem body, but both theories are possible. John Perry’s arguments against survival of death are answered.Less

Avoiding Cartesian Materialism

Nancey Murphy and Warren S. Brown

in Did My Neurons Make Me Do It?: Philosophical and Neurobiological Perspectives on Moral Responsibility and Free Will

This chapter explores the legacy of Descartes in attempting to understand the human mind, a legacy often referred to as Cartesian materialism. An account is given of the many ways in which Cartesian ... More

This chapter explores the legacy of Descartes in attempting to understand the human mind, a legacy often referred to as Cartesian materialism. An account is given of the many ways in which Cartesian assumptions about human nature are embedded in most versions of physicalism. The chapter criticizes the tendency to substitute brain-body dualism for mind-body dualism, the assumption that emotion is opposed to rationality, and the idea of mental processes as occurring in an inner space — no longer the ‘Cartesian theater’ but nonetheless inside the head. In contrast, this chapter emphasizes that mind is embodied, not merely ‘embrained’, and that mental events must be understood as contextualized brain events.Less

Mind-Body Dualism and the Two Cultures

Edward Slingerland

in Creating Consilience: Integrating the Sciences and the Humanities

The distinction between the humanities and the natural sciences is often described in terms of two types of description, “thick” versus “thin,” or two modes of apprehension, “interpretation” ... More

The distinction between the humanities and the natural sciences is often described in terms of two types of description, “thick” versus “thin,” or two modes of apprehension, “interpretation” (Verstehen) versus “explanation” (Erklären). This chapter argues that, although it is rarely made explicit, these distinctions are themselves fundamentally based upon the metaphysical assumption of mind-body dualism: humanistic meaning cannot be captured by physical description because it involves the mind, which belongs to an ontological realm separate and independent from the realm of the merely physical or bodily. One of the primary rationales for bridging the science-humanities divide is that, in light of work over the past few decades in various branches of the cognitive sciences, the mind-body dualism is growing increasingly empirically untenable. However, it would also appear that such dualism is a human cognitive default, which means that, for creatures like us, the chain of science-humanities integration will never be seamless: We will always feel a jolt when we cross from the physical to the mental, from the merely biological to the human, from ultimate evolutionary reasons to proximate psychological mechanisms. Understanding this fact will help us to see why the humanities-science divide continues to prove so difficult to negotiate, as well as why something like this divide will always have some traction in human psychology.Less

The Metaphysical Realities of the Unphysical Sciences: Or Why Vertical Integration Seems Unrealistic to Ontological Pluralists 1

Richard A. Shweder

in Creating Consilience: Integrating the Sciences and the Humanities

Reality testing is unavoidably grounded on metaphysical assumptions. Among reflective reality testers, a rather unconciliatory clash of metaphysical traditions has been going on for a very long time; ... More

Reality testing is unavoidably grounded on metaphysical assumptions. Among reflective reality testers, a rather unconciliatory clash of metaphysical traditions has been going on for a very long time; perhaps for 2,500 years. So it is not at all surprising that the contemporary state of the art in the human sciences is in fact not all that different from what it was in 1913 when Emile Durkheim presented his paper on “The Religious Problem and the Duality of Nature” to the Societe de Philosophie in Paris, summarizing his famous book The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life. As noted by Durkheim's intellectual biographer Stephen Lukes, alluding to the apparent dualisms and unconciliatory oppositions that were up for discussion at Durkheim's lecture: “Philosophers had no genuine solution: empiricists, materialists, and utilitarians, on the one hand, and absolute idealists on the other, simply denied these antinomies without accounting for them; ontological dualists simply reaffirmed them without explaining them.” One suspects that is pretty much the way it has always been and still is today, despite the ecumenical “good news” from those in the academy who advocate unity of knowledge, who fancy theory-of-everything notions, or who believe that ultimately it all comes down to this or that. This chapter tries to explain why ontological dualists, including Descartes and Karl Popper, care to affirm such oppositions; and why ontological pluralists in general worry that vertical integration is a form of destructive integrity in which several orders of reality (the everyday experience of mental causation, the feeling of respect for transcendental moral obligation, concerns about the existence of evil) will be portrayed as reified illusions or fetishized figments of a collective imagination, and hence as somewhat less than really real.Less

Melancholia and the Passions 1643–1650

Stephen Gaukroger

in Descartes: An Intellectual Biography

Examines Descartes's later years through the large volume of correspondence from that period, much of it with Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia. This correspondence was mainly concerned with the ... More

Examines Descartes's later years through the large volume of correspondence from that period, much of it with Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia. This correspondence was mainly concerned with the passions, mind/body dualism, the nature of the soul, automata, and the doctrine of substantial union. Mind/body dualism is discussed in the usual seventeenth‐century context of the passions, in his work Passions, which also deals at length with the problem of evil. Reviews the work Descartes undertook at the end of his life—unfinished works on botany (no longer extant), anatomy, physiology, and a reply to Regius’ disagreement with him on the need for a metaphysical grounding for natural philosophy that expanded on his doctrine of innate ideas.Less

Dualism and Doctrine

Dov Fox and Alex Stein

in Philosophical Foundations of Law and Neuroscience

This chapter argues that remnants of substance dualism or the ‘Cartesian’ theory of mind remain entrenched in legal doctrine in torts, criminal law, and constitutional criminal procedure. It contends ... More

This chapter argues that remnants of substance dualism or the ‘Cartesian’ theory of mind remain entrenched in legal doctrine in torts, criminal law, and constitutional criminal procedure. It contends that neuroscience reveals that dualism is both conceptually bankrupt and empirically flawed. As other chapters in this book argue, advances in neuroscience are putting pressure (or worse) on existing legal doctrines in ways that will force much-needed change. This chapter provides an alternate account of human action, one that avoids the errors of dualism without compromising the law’s goals in these areas, and it suggests changes to correct the doctrine accordingly. The chapter then concludes by bringing the doctrinal and normative implications of this integrationist account full circle.Less

Introduction

Edward Slingerland

in Mind and Body in Early China: Beyond Orientalism and the Myth of Holism

The Introduction makes the case that the study of China is still dominated by “neo-Orientialism,” a combination of classic Orientalism with postmodern cultural relativism and a normatively positive ... More

The Introduction makes the case that the study of China is still dominated by “neo-Orientialism,” a combination of classic Orientalism with postmodern cultural relativism and a normatively positive view of the exotic East. It would be better to adopt an “embodied” stance that takes as its starting point basic commonalities among human beings and explores cultural difference against this shared background. The idea of a “holistic” early China, seen through the specific lens of mind-body holism, can serve as a good case example of how an embodied, science-humanities integrated approach is more helpful.Less

Hermeneutical Constraints: Minds in Our Bodies and Our Feet on the Ground

Edward Slingerland

in Mind and Body in Early China: Beyond Orientalism and the Myth of Holism

The topic of this chapter is a body of work from various branches of the cognitive sciences suggesting that the tendency to distinguish qualitatively between bodies and minds—between physical objects ... More

The topic of this chapter is a body of work from various branches of the cognitive sciences suggesting that the tendency to distinguish qualitatively between bodies and minds—between physical objects subject to mechanical causality and agents capable of free will, planning, and intentionality—is a human cognitive universal. It develops reliably and early in human beings, a genetic inheritance shaped by the powerful adaptive pressures of social living. In addition, there is good evidence that this distinction between objects and agents reliability kicks off mind-body dualism, afterlife and soul beliefs, a perception of “meaning” in the world, and concepts of supernatural agency that share broad features across cultures and throughout history. These universals create suspicion of any claim that the early Chinese were strong mind-body holists. Relevant cognitive universals include Theory of Mind, concepts of psychological interiority, and basic supernatural, afterlife and soul beliefs.Less

Theories of the Mind

E. Brian Davies

in Science in the Looking Glass: What Do Scientists Really Know?

This chapter discusses the beliefs of Plato and Descartes. It starts with a discussion of Plato, because many mathematicians declare themselves to be Platonists. It then turns to Descartes' argument ... More

This chapter discusses the beliefs of Plato and Descartes. It starts with a discussion of Plato, because many mathematicians declare themselves to be Platonists. It then turns to Descartes' argument that mind/soul and body/matter are entirely different types of entity. The final section of the chapter looks at the current debate about the problem of the existence of consciousness. It explains why current computers should not be regarded as conscious, and that we ourselves are conscious of only a small proportion of the activity in our brains.Less

Mind–Body Interactionism

Andrew R. Platt

in One True Cause: Causal Powers, Divine Concurrence, and the Seventeenth-Century Revival of Occasionalism

Chapter 3 argues that Descartes’ views about mind–body interaction are internally consistent, and compatible with his more general views about causation; thus neither Descartes nor his followers were ... More

Chapter 3 argues that Descartes’ views about mind–body interaction are internally consistent, and compatible with his more general views about causation; thus neither Descartes nor his followers were forced to reject interactionism to maintain mind–body dualism. In some later works, Descartes says that corporeal motions “give occasion” to the mind to form ideas, which are innate to the mind. Section 3.3 argues that these remarks are consistent with his claims in earlier texts that corporeal motions produce or bring about ideas in the mind. This causal theory of sensation seems to be inconsistent with general causal principles that Descartes endorses elsewhere—such as the principle that a cause must contain, “formally or eminently,” whatever it brings about in its effect. But sections 3.3 and 3.4 show that Descartes’ general statements about efficient causation are compatible with the view that bodily motions have the power to elicit sensations in the mind.Less

Embracing the Digital Humanities: New Methods for Analyzing Texts and Sharing Scholarly Knowledge

Edward Slingerland

in Mind and Body in Early China: Beyond Orientalism and the Myth of Holism

This chapter argues that, now that we have the texts of our traditions in fully searchable, digitized form, we can begin to read them in new ways. Basic quantitative textual analysis methods are ... More

This chapter argues that, now that we have the texts of our traditions in fully searchable, digitized form, we can begin to read them in new ways. Basic quantitative textual analysis methods are introduced, as well as more sophisticated methods such as word collocation, hierarchical cluster analysis, and topic modeling. The use of online databases to share scholarly knowledge is also explored. Although digital humanities techniques have thus far been of only marginal use, their potential is huge, and they can provide entirely new and important perspectives on our corpora. Quantitative textual analysis of the early Chinese corpus confirms and deepens the conclusion from qualitative analysis that the early Chinese were mind-body dualists.Less

Mind and Body

in Silencing the Demon's Advocate: The Strategy of Descartes' Meditations

This chapter examines Rene Descartes' argument for mind–body dualism in Meditation VI, and discusses essence in the argument for dualism and the mind–body composite. It explains that Descartes' view ... More

This chapter examines Rene Descartes' argument for mind–body dualism in Meditation VI, and discusses essence in the argument for dualism and the mind–body composite. It explains that Descartes' view of God has designed the relation of mind to body in such a way that our minds will immediately act to promote the interests of the mind–body composite. The chapter also mentions that Descartes believed that while the mind and body are distinct entities, the mind experiences embodiment.Less

Loving the Body, Loving the Soul: Conway’s Vitalist Critique of Cartesian and Morean Dualism

Julia Borcherding

in Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy, Volume IX

This chapter examines Anne Conway’s ‘argument from love’ in her Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy. This argument, supported by a further argument, the ‘argument from pain’, ... More

This chapter examines Anne Conway’s ‘argument from love’ in her Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy. This argument, supported by a further argument, the ‘argument from pain’, undermines the dualist dichotomy between mind and matter by appealing to a vitalist similarity principle. The goal is two-fold: first, to contribute to a close systematic reconstruction and analysis of Conway’s arguments, which so far is largely lacking in the literature; second, to establish that these arguments are richer and more compelling than commentators have thought. The chapter shows that Conway’s case against the dualist poses a considerable challenge to the dualisms of Henry More and Descartes.Less

The Myth of Holism in Early China

Edward Slingerland

in Mind and Body in Early China: Beyond Orientalism and the Myth of Holism

This chapter documents the various forms of holist claims made about early China, showing how they are grounded in the sort of extreme cultural and linguistic relativism that is characteristic of ... More

This chapter documents the various forms of holist claims made about early China, showing how they are grounded in the sort of extreme cultural and linguistic relativism that is characteristic of postmodernity. It then focuses on mind-body concepts because this binary in particular tends to be the locus of holistic claims about early China and therefore serves as a helpful lens for viewing holism in general. The chapter characterizes what I refer to as the radical, or “strong,” mind-body holist position, which holds that any sort of distinction between mind and body is entirely foreign to early Chinese thought. The chapter concludes with a brief review of both textual and extra-textual evidence against the various flavors of holist claims about early China.Less

Mind-Body Dualism in the Textual Record

Edward Slingerland

in Mind and Body in Early China: Beyond Orientalism and the Myth of Holism

The xin is most commonly characterized in pre-Qin texts as a locus of thought and decision making, sometimes linked to cognition or moral emotions like worry or compassion, but primarily concerned ... More

The xin is most commonly characterized in pre-Qin texts as a locus of thought and decision making, sometimes linked to cognition or moral emotions like worry or compassion, but primarily concerned with what we could very well call “reason.” Especially once we enter the Warring States, it is represented as at most only vaguely located in the body, with an extremely tenuous relationship to both the body itself and other bodily parts. It is reasonable to describe the xin as metaphysical, somehow free of the limitations of the physical world. Focusing on the term xin (heart, heart-mind, mind), this chapter uses qualitative textual analysis to make the case that early Chinese texts were written by people who embraced, at least implicitly, a “weak” form of mind-body dualism. This includes the idea that the mind is at least somewhat immaterial, qualitatively different from the other organs, and the seat of reason, free will, and the individual self.Less

Into Other Minds:: William and Henry James

Meghan Marie Hammond

in Empathy and the Psychology of Literary Modernism

Chapter One, “Into Other Minds: William and Henry James,” examines empathy during the transition to modernism via Henry James, William James, and the experimental psychologist E. B. Titchener. This ... More

Chapter One, “Into Other Minds: William and Henry James,” examines empathy during the transition to modernism via Henry James, William James, and the experimental psychologist E. B. Titchener. This chapter focuses on the works of Henry James’s “fourth phase” (published 1907-1917), which are marked by striking instances of temporal slow-down and sensory overlap between different minds. These narrative developments are a notable turn away from sympathetic representation that requires distance between subjects and toward empathic structures of fellow feeling that seek to disguise or obliterate such psychological distance. This textual empathy mirrors the rejection of mind-body dualism that marks the work of William James and Titchener. But Henry James’s autobiography also features a persistent use of ghostly language that deals with the ambivalence and anxiety about fellow feeling that both William James and Titchener exhibit but avoid confronting.Less

Digital Dualism and the “Speech as Thought” Paradox

Katharine Gelber and Susan J. Brison (eds)

in Free Speech in the Digital Age

This chapter critiques the view, expressed in the 1996 Barlow Declaration and elsewhere, that the digital realm—“cyberspace”—is a disembodied space for pure thought. This chapter shows that the view ... More

This chapter critiques the view, expressed in the 1996 Barlow Declaration and elsewhere, that the digital realm—“cyberspace”—is a disembodied space for pure thought. This chapter shows that the view that speech online is disconnected from the material realm echoes the same idea in traditional free speech theory, which has long considered speech to be something nonmaterial. Given the agent-driven nature of online communications, the materiality of internet technology, and the very real, often physical, effects of online speech on users and audiences, the chapter argues that the view that the digital realm has its own ontological status, distinct from that of the material world, is unsupportable. The chapter concludes that it is incorrect to hold that online communications are, in their causal capacity, more akin to thought than to non-speech conduct, just as it is incorrect to hold that offline communications are, in their causal capacity, more akin to thought than to non-speech conduct.Less