Garry Hagberg
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199234226
- eISBN:
- 9780191715440
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199234226.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Language
The voluminous writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein contain some of the most profound reflections of our time on the nature of the human subject and self-understanding — the human condition, ...
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The voluminous writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein contain some of the most profound reflections of our time on the nature of the human subject and self-understanding — the human condition, philosophically speaking. This book mimes those extensive writings for a conception of the self. And more specifically, the book offers a discussion of Wittgenstein's later writings on language and mind as they hold special significance for the understanding and clarification of the distinctive character of self-descriptive or autobiographical language. The book also undertakes a philosophical investigation of selected autobiographical writings — among the best examples we have of human selves exploring themselves — as they cast new and special light on the critique of mind-body dualism and its undercurrents in particular, and on the nature of autobiographical consciousness more generally. The chapters take up in turn the topics of self-consciousness, what Wittgenstein calls ‘the inner picture’; mental privacy and the picture of metaphysical seclusion; the very idea of our observation of the contents of consciousness; first-person expressive speech; reflexive or self-directed thought and competing pictures of introspection; the nuances of retrospective self-understanding, person-perception, and the corollary issues of self-perception (itself an interestingly dangerous phrase); self-defining memory; and the therapeutic conception of philosophical progress as it applies to all of these issues. The cast of characters interwoven throughout the discussion include, in addition to Wittgenstein centrally, Augustine, Goethe, Dostoevsky, Kierkegaard, Iris Murdoch, Donald Davidson, and Stanley Cavell, among others.Less
The voluminous writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein contain some of the most profound reflections of our time on the nature of the human subject and self-understanding — the human condition, philosophically speaking. This book mimes those extensive writings for a conception of the self. And more specifically, the book offers a discussion of Wittgenstein's later writings on language and mind as they hold special significance for the understanding and clarification of the distinctive character of self-descriptive or autobiographical language. The book also undertakes a philosophical investigation of selected autobiographical writings — among the best examples we have of human selves exploring themselves — as they cast new and special light on the critique of mind-body dualism and its undercurrents in particular, and on the nature of autobiographical consciousness more generally. The chapters take up in turn the topics of self-consciousness, what Wittgenstein calls ‘the inner picture’; mental privacy and the picture of metaphysical seclusion; the very idea of our observation of the contents of consciousness; first-person expressive speech; reflexive or self-directed thought and competing pictures of introspection; the nuances of retrospective self-understanding, person-perception, and the corollary issues of self-perception (itself an interestingly dangerous phrase); self-defining memory; and the therapeutic conception of philosophical progress as it applies to all of these issues. The cast of characters interwoven throughout the discussion include, in addition to Wittgenstein centrally, Augustine, Goethe, Dostoevsky, Kierkegaard, Iris Murdoch, Donald Davidson, and Stanley Cavell, among others.
Stephen T. Davis
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199284597
- eISBN:
- 9780191603778
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199284598.003.0015
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
This chapter discusses the general resurrection. It first establishes that classical mind/body dualism — a theory seen (in different forms) in Plato and Descartes — is not the Christian position. ...
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This chapter discusses the general resurrection. It first establishes that classical mind/body dualism — a theory seen (in different forms) in Plato and Descartes — is not the Christian position. Temporary disembodiment, which is the theory of life after death and the interim state held by most theologians, is discussed. The nature of the disembodied interim state, the reunification of body and soul at the Parousia, and the nature of the gloried body are also explored. It is argued that contrary to certain philosophers, this overall picture of the general resurrection is coherent. Christian theologians differ on whether the new glorified body consists of the same matter as the pre-mortem body, but both theories are possible. John Perry’s arguments against survival of death are answered.Less
This chapter discusses the general resurrection. It first establishes that classical mind/body dualism — a theory seen (in different forms) in Plato and Descartes — is not the Christian position. Temporary disembodiment, which is the theory of life after death and the interim state held by most theologians, is discussed. The nature of the disembodied interim state, the reunification of body and soul at the Parousia, and the nature of the gloried body are also explored. It is argued that contrary to certain philosophers, this overall picture of the general resurrection is coherent. Christian theologians differ on whether the new glorified body consists of the same matter as the pre-mortem body, but both theories are possible. John Perry’s arguments against survival of death are answered.
Nancey Murphy and Warren S. Brown
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199215393
- eISBN:
- 9780191707025
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199215393.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter explores the legacy of Descartes in attempting to understand the human mind, a legacy often referred to as Cartesian materialism. An account is given of the many ways in which Cartesian ...
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This chapter explores the legacy of Descartes in attempting to understand the human mind, a legacy often referred to as Cartesian materialism. An account is given of the many ways in which Cartesian assumptions about human nature are embedded in most versions of physicalism. The chapter criticizes the tendency to substitute brain-body dualism for mind-body dualism, the assumption that emotion is opposed to rationality, and the idea of mental processes as occurring in an inner space — no longer the ‘Cartesian theater’ but nonetheless inside the head. In contrast, this chapter emphasizes that mind is embodied, not merely ‘embrained’, and that mental events must be understood as contextualized brain events.Less
This chapter explores the legacy of Descartes in attempting to understand the human mind, a legacy often referred to as Cartesian materialism. An account is given of the many ways in which Cartesian assumptions about human nature are embedded in most versions of physicalism. The chapter criticizes the tendency to substitute brain-body dualism for mind-body dualism, the assumption that emotion is opposed to rationality, and the idea of mental processes as occurring in an inner space — no longer the ‘Cartesian theater’ but nonetheless inside the head. In contrast, this chapter emphasizes that mind is embodied, not merely ‘embrained’, and that mental events must be understood as contextualized brain events.
Edward Slingerland
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199794393
- eISBN:
- 9780199919338
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199794393.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General, Philosophy of Science
The distinction between the humanities and the natural sciences is often described in terms of two types of description, “thick” versus “thin,” or two modes of apprehension, “interpretation” ...
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The distinction between the humanities and the natural sciences is often described in terms of two types of description, “thick” versus “thin,” or two modes of apprehension, “interpretation” (Verstehen) versus “explanation” (Erklären). This chapter argues that, although it is rarely made explicit, these distinctions are themselves fundamentally based upon the metaphysical assumption of mind-body dualism: humanistic meaning cannot be captured by physical description because it involves the mind, which belongs to an ontological realm separate and independent from the realm of the merely physical or bodily. One of the primary rationales for bridging the science-humanities divide is that, in light of work over the past few decades in various branches of the cognitive sciences, the mind-body dualism is growing increasingly empirically untenable. However, it would also appear that such dualism is a human cognitive default, which means that, for creatures like us, the chain of science-humanities integration will never be seamless: We will always feel a jolt when we cross from the physical to the mental, from the merely biological to the human, from ultimate evolutionary reasons to proximate psychological mechanisms. Understanding this fact will help us to see why the humanities-science divide continues to prove so difficult to negotiate, as well as why something like this divide will always have some traction in human psychology.Less
The distinction between the humanities and the natural sciences is often described in terms of two types of description, “thick” versus “thin,” or two modes of apprehension, “interpretation” (Verstehen) versus “explanation” (Erklären). This chapter argues that, although it is rarely made explicit, these distinctions are themselves fundamentally based upon the metaphysical assumption of mind-body dualism: humanistic meaning cannot be captured by physical description because it involves the mind, which belongs to an ontological realm separate and independent from the realm of the merely physical or bodily. One of the primary rationales for bridging the science-humanities divide is that, in light of work over the past few decades in various branches of the cognitive sciences, the mind-body dualism is growing increasingly empirically untenable. However, it would also appear that such dualism is a human cognitive default, which means that, for creatures like us, the chain of science-humanities integration will never be seamless: We will always feel a jolt when we cross from the physical to the mental, from the merely biological to the human, from ultimate evolutionary reasons to proximate psychological mechanisms. Understanding this fact will help us to see why the humanities-science divide continues to prove so difficult to negotiate, as well as why something like this divide will always have some traction in human psychology.
Richard A. Shweder
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199794393
- eISBN:
- 9780199919338
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199794393.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General, Philosophy of Science
Reality testing is unavoidably grounded on metaphysical assumptions. Among reflective reality testers, a rather unconciliatory clash of metaphysical traditions has been going on for a very long time; ...
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Reality testing is unavoidably grounded on metaphysical assumptions. Among reflective reality testers, a rather unconciliatory clash of metaphysical traditions has been going on for a very long time; perhaps for 2,500 years. So it is not at all surprising that the contemporary state of the art in the human sciences is in fact not all that different from what it was in 1913 when Emile Durkheim presented his paper on “The Religious Problem and the Duality of Nature” to the Societe de Philosophie in Paris, summarizing his famous book The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life. As noted by Durkheim's intellectual biographer Stephen Lukes, alluding to the apparent dualisms and unconciliatory oppositions that were up for discussion at Durkheim's lecture: “Philosophers had no genuine solution: empiricists, materialists, and utilitarians, on the one hand, and absolute idealists on the other, simply denied these antinomies without accounting for them; ontological dualists simply reaffirmed them without explaining them.” One suspects that is pretty much the way it has always been and still is today, despite the ecumenical “good news” from those in the academy who advocate unity of knowledge, who fancy theory-of-everything notions, or who believe that ultimately it all comes down to this or that. This chapter tries to explain why ontological dualists, including Descartes and Karl Popper, care to affirm such oppositions; and why ontological pluralists in general worry that vertical integration is a form of destructive integrity in which several orders of reality (the everyday experience of mental causation, the feeling of respect for transcendental moral obligation, concerns about the existence of evil) will be portrayed as reified illusions or fetishized figments of a collective imagination, and hence as somewhat less than really real.Less
Reality testing is unavoidably grounded on metaphysical assumptions. Among reflective reality testers, a rather unconciliatory clash of metaphysical traditions has been going on for a very long time; perhaps for 2,500 years. So it is not at all surprising that the contemporary state of the art in the human sciences is in fact not all that different from what it was in 1913 when Emile Durkheim presented his paper on “The Religious Problem and the Duality of Nature” to the Societe de Philosophie in Paris, summarizing his famous book The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life. As noted by Durkheim's intellectual biographer Stephen Lukes, alluding to the apparent dualisms and unconciliatory oppositions that were up for discussion at Durkheim's lecture: “Philosophers had no genuine solution: empiricists, materialists, and utilitarians, on the one hand, and absolute idealists on the other, simply denied these antinomies without accounting for them; ontological dualists simply reaffirmed them without explaining them.” One suspects that is pretty much the way it has always been and still is today, despite the ecumenical “good news” from those in the academy who advocate unity of knowledge, who fancy theory-of-everything notions, or who believe that ultimately it all comes down to this or that. This chapter tries to explain why ontological dualists, including Descartes and Karl Popper, care to affirm such oppositions; and why ontological pluralists in general worry that vertical integration is a form of destructive integrity in which several orders of reality (the everyday experience of mental causation, the feeling of respect for transcendental moral obligation, concerns about the existence of evil) will be portrayed as reified illusions or fetishized figments of a collective imagination, and hence as somewhat less than really real.
Stephen Gaukroger
- Published in print:
- 1997
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198237242
- eISBN:
- 9780191597480
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198237243.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Examines Descartes's later years through the large volume of correspondence from that period, much of it with Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia. This correspondence was mainly concerned with the ...
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Examines Descartes's later years through the large volume of correspondence from that period, much of it with Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia. This correspondence was mainly concerned with the passions, mind/body dualism, the nature of the soul, automata, and the doctrine of substantial union. Mind/body dualism is discussed in the usual seventeenth‐century context of the passions, in his work Passions, which also deals at length with the problem of evil. Reviews the work Descartes undertook at the end of his life—unfinished works on botany (no longer extant), anatomy, physiology, and a reply to Regius’ disagreement with him on the need for a metaphysical grounding for natural philosophy that expanded on his doctrine of innate ideas.Less
Examines Descartes's later years through the large volume of correspondence from that period, much of it with Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia. This correspondence was mainly concerned with the passions, mind/body dualism, the nature of the soul, automata, and the doctrine of substantial union. Mind/body dualism is discussed in the usual seventeenth‐century context of the passions, in his work Passions, which also deals at length with the problem of evil. Reviews the work Descartes undertook at the end of his life—unfinished works on botany (no longer extant), anatomy, physiology, and a reply to Regius’ disagreement with him on the need for a metaphysical grounding for natural philosophy that expanded on his doctrine of innate ideas.
Dov Fox and Alex Stein
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- August 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780198743095
- eISBN:
- 9780191802980
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198743095.003.0007
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law, Medical Law
This chapter argues that remnants of substance dualism or the ‘Cartesian’ theory of mind remain entrenched in legal doctrine in torts, criminal law, and constitutional criminal procedure. It contends ...
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This chapter argues that remnants of substance dualism or the ‘Cartesian’ theory of mind remain entrenched in legal doctrine in torts, criminal law, and constitutional criminal procedure. It contends that neuroscience reveals that dualism is both conceptually bankrupt and empirically flawed. As other chapters in this book argue, advances in neuroscience are putting pressure (or worse) on existing legal doctrines in ways that will force much-needed change. This chapter provides an alternate account of human action, one that avoids the errors of dualism without compromising the law’s goals in these areas, and it suggests changes to correct the doctrine accordingly. The chapter then concludes by bringing the doctrinal and normative implications of this integrationist account full circle.Less
This chapter argues that remnants of substance dualism or the ‘Cartesian’ theory of mind remain entrenched in legal doctrine in torts, criminal law, and constitutional criminal procedure. It contends that neuroscience reveals that dualism is both conceptually bankrupt and empirically flawed. As other chapters in this book argue, advances in neuroscience are putting pressure (or worse) on existing legal doctrines in ways that will force much-needed change. This chapter provides an alternate account of human action, one that avoids the errors of dualism without compromising the law’s goals in these areas, and it suggests changes to correct the doctrine accordingly. The chapter then concludes by bringing the doctrinal and normative implications of this integrationist account full circle.
Edward Slingerland
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- January 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780190842307
- eISBN:
- 9780190922955
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190842307.003.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Religious Studies
The Introduction makes the case that the study of China is still dominated by “neo-Orientialism,” a combination of classic Orientalism with postmodern cultural relativism and a normatively positive ...
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The Introduction makes the case that the study of China is still dominated by “neo-Orientialism,” a combination of classic Orientalism with postmodern cultural relativism and a normatively positive view of the exotic East. It would be better to adopt an “embodied” stance that takes as its starting point basic commonalities among human beings and explores cultural difference against this shared background. The idea of a “holistic” early China, seen through the specific lens of mind-body holism, can serve as a good case example of how an embodied, science-humanities integrated approach is more helpful.Less
The Introduction makes the case that the study of China is still dominated by “neo-Orientialism,” a combination of classic Orientalism with postmodern cultural relativism and a normatively positive view of the exotic East. It would be better to adopt an “embodied” stance that takes as its starting point basic commonalities among human beings and explores cultural difference against this shared background. The idea of a “holistic” early China, seen through the specific lens of mind-body holism, can serve as a good case example of how an embodied, science-humanities integrated approach is more helpful.
Edward Slingerland
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- January 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780190842307
- eISBN:
- 9780190922955
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190842307.003.0006
- Subject:
- Religion, Religious Studies
The topic of this chapter is a body of work from various branches of the cognitive sciences suggesting that the tendency to distinguish qualitatively between bodies and minds—between physical objects ...
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The topic of this chapter is a body of work from various branches of the cognitive sciences suggesting that the tendency to distinguish qualitatively between bodies and minds—between physical objects subject to mechanical causality and agents capable of free will, planning, and intentionality—is a human cognitive universal. It develops reliably and early in human beings, a genetic inheritance shaped by the powerful adaptive pressures of social living. In addition, there is good evidence that this distinction between objects and agents reliability kicks off mind-body dualism, afterlife and soul beliefs, a perception of “meaning” in the world, and concepts of supernatural agency that share broad features across cultures and throughout history. These universals create suspicion of any claim that the early Chinese were strong mind-body holists. Relevant cognitive universals include Theory of Mind, concepts of psychological interiority, and basic supernatural, afterlife and soul beliefs.Less
The topic of this chapter is a body of work from various branches of the cognitive sciences suggesting that the tendency to distinguish qualitatively between bodies and minds—between physical objects subject to mechanical causality and agents capable of free will, planning, and intentionality—is a human cognitive universal. It develops reliably and early in human beings, a genetic inheritance shaped by the powerful adaptive pressures of social living. In addition, there is good evidence that this distinction between objects and agents reliability kicks off mind-body dualism, afterlife and soul beliefs, a perception of “meaning” in the world, and concepts of supernatural agency that share broad features across cultures and throughout history. These universals create suspicion of any claim that the early Chinese were strong mind-body holists. Relevant cognitive universals include Theory of Mind, concepts of psychological interiority, and basic supernatural, afterlife and soul beliefs.
E. Brian Davies
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199219186
- eISBN:
- 9780191711695
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199219186.003.0002
- Subject:
- Physics, History of Physics
This chapter discusses the beliefs of Plato and Descartes. It starts with a discussion of Plato, because many mathematicians declare themselves to be Platonists. It then turns to Descartes' argument ...
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This chapter discusses the beliefs of Plato and Descartes. It starts with a discussion of Plato, because many mathematicians declare themselves to be Platonists. It then turns to Descartes' argument that mind/soul and body/matter are entirely different types of entity. The final section of the chapter looks at the current debate about the problem of the existence of consciousness. It explains why current computers should not be regarded as conscious, and that we ourselves are conscious of only a small proportion of the activity in our brains.Less
This chapter discusses the beliefs of Plato and Descartes. It starts with a discussion of Plato, because many mathematicians declare themselves to be Platonists. It then turns to Descartes' argument that mind/soul and body/matter are entirely different types of entity. The final section of the chapter looks at the current debate about the problem of the existence of consciousness. It explains why current computers should not be regarded as conscious, and that we ourselves are conscious of only a small proportion of the activity in our brains.
Edward Slingerland
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- January 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780190842307
- eISBN:
- 9780190922955
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190842307.003.0005
- Subject:
- Religion, Religious Studies
This chapter argues that, now that we have the texts of our traditions in fully searchable, digitized form, we can begin to read them in new ways. Basic quantitative textual analysis methods are ...
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This chapter argues that, now that we have the texts of our traditions in fully searchable, digitized form, we can begin to read them in new ways. Basic quantitative textual analysis methods are introduced, as well as more sophisticated methods such as word collocation, hierarchical cluster analysis, and topic modeling. The use of online databases to share scholarly knowledge is also explored. Although digital humanities techniques have thus far been of only marginal use, their potential is huge, and they can provide entirely new and important perspectives on our corpora. Quantitative textual analysis of the early Chinese corpus confirms and deepens the conclusion from qualitative analysis that the early Chinese were mind-body dualists.Less
This chapter argues that, now that we have the texts of our traditions in fully searchable, digitized form, we can begin to read them in new ways. Basic quantitative textual analysis methods are introduced, as well as more sophisticated methods such as word collocation, hierarchical cluster analysis, and topic modeling. The use of online databases to share scholarly knowledge is also explored. Although digital humanities techniques have thus far been of only marginal use, their potential is huge, and they can provide entirely new and important perspectives on our corpora. Quantitative textual analysis of the early Chinese corpus confirms and deepens the conclusion from qualitative analysis that the early Chinese were mind-body dualists.
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- June 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780804758161
- eISBN:
- 9780804779661
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Stanford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.11126/stanford/9780804758161.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This chapter examines Rene Descartes' argument for mind–body dualism in Meditation VI, and discusses essence in the argument for dualism and the mind–body composite. It explains that Descartes' view ...
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This chapter examines Rene Descartes' argument for mind–body dualism in Meditation VI, and discusses essence in the argument for dualism and the mind–body composite. It explains that Descartes' view of God has designed the relation of mind to body in such a way that our minds will immediately act to promote the interests of the mind–body composite. The chapter also mentions that Descartes believed that while the mind and body are distinct entities, the mind experiences embodiment.Less
This chapter examines Rene Descartes' argument for mind–body dualism in Meditation VI, and discusses essence in the argument for dualism and the mind–body composite. It explains that Descartes' view of God has designed the relation of mind to body in such a way that our minds will immediately act to promote the interests of the mind–body composite. The chapter also mentions that Descartes believed that while the mind and body are distinct entities, the mind experiences embodiment.
Edward Slingerland
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- January 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780190842307
- eISBN:
- 9780190922955
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190842307.003.0002
- Subject:
- Religion, Religious Studies
This chapter documents the various forms of holist claims made about early China, showing how they are grounded in the sort of extreme cultural and linguistic relativism that is characteristic of ...
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This chapter documents the various forms of holist claims made about early China, showing how they are grounded in the sort of extreme cultural and linguistic relativism that is characteristic of postmodernity. It then focuses on mind-body concepts because this binary in particular tends to be the locus of holistic claims about early China and therefore serves as a helpful lens for viewing holism in general. The chapter characterizes what I refer to as the radical, or “strong,” mind-body holist position, which holds that any sort of distinction between mind and body is entirely foreign to early Chinese thought. The chapter concludes with a brief review of both textual and extra-textual evidence against the various flavors of holist claims about early China.Less
This chapter documents the various forms of holist claims made about early China, showing how they are grounded in the sort of extreme cultural and linguistic relativism that is characteristic of postmodernity. It then focuses on mind-body concepts because this binary in particular tends to be the locus of holistic claims about early China and therefore serves as a helpful lens for viewing holism in general. The chapter characterizes what I refer to as the radical, or “strong,” mind-body holist position, which holds that any sort of distinction between mind and body is entirely foreign to early Chinese thought. The chapter concludes with a brief review of both textual and extra-textual evidence against the various flavors of holist claims about early China.
Eric Reinders
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780520241718
- eISBN:
- 9780520931084
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- University of California Press
- DOI:
- 10.1525/california/9780520241718.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, History of Christianity
To the Victorians, the Chinese were invariably “inscrutable”. The meaning and provenance of this impression—and, most importantly, its workings in nineteenth-century Protestant missionary encounters ...
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To the Victorians, the Chinese were invariably “inscrutable”. The meaning and provenance of this impression—and, most importantly, its workings in nineteenth-century Protestant missionary encounters with Chinese religion—are at the center of this book, which looks at how missionaries' religious identity, experience, and physical foreignness produced certain representations of China between 1807 and 1937. The book first introduces the imaginative world of Victorian missionaries and outlines their application of mind-body dualism to the dualism of self and other. It then explores Western views of the Chinese language, especially ritual language, and Chinese ritual, particularly the kowtow. This work offers surprising and valuable insight into the visceral nature of the Victorian response to the Chinese—and, more generally, into the nineteenth-century Western representation of China.Less
To the Victorians, the Chinese were invariably “inscrutable”. The meaning and provenance of this impression—and, most importantly, its workings in nineteenth-century Protestant missionary encounters with Chinese religion—are at the center of this book, which looks at how missionaries' religious identity, experience, and physical foreignness produced certain representations of China between 1807 and 1937. The book first introduces the imaginative world of Victorian missionaries and outlines their application of mind-body dualism to the dualism of self and other. It then explores Western views of the Chinese language, especially ritual language, and Chinese ritual, particularly the kowtow. This work offers surprising and valuable insight into the visceral nature of the Victorian response to the Chinese—and, more generally, into the nineteenth-century Western representation of China.
Julia Borcherding
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- February 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780198852452
- eISBN:
- 9780191886911
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198852452.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter examines Anne Conway’s ‘argument from love’ in her Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy. This argument, supported by a further argument, the ‘argument from pain’, ...
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This chapter examines Anne Conway’s ‘argument from love’ in her Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy. This argument, supported by a further argument, the ‘argument from pain’, undermines the dualist dichotomy between mind and matter by appealing to a vitalist similarity principle. The goal is two-fold: first, to contribute to a close systematic reconstruction and analysis of Conway’s arguments, which so far is largely lacking in the literature; second, to establish that these arguments are richer and more compelling than commentators have thought. The chapter shows that Conway’s case against the dualist poses a considerable challenge to the dualisms of Henry More and Descartes.Less
This chapter examines Anne Conway’s ‘argument from love’ in her Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy. This argument, supported by a further argument, the ‘argument from pain’, undermines the dualist dichotomy between mind and matter by appealing to a vitalist similarity principle. The goal is two-fold: first, to contribute to a close systematic reconstruction and analysis of Conway’s arguments, which so far is largely lacking in the literature; second, to establish that these arguments are richer and more compelling than commentators have thought. The chapter shows that Conway’s case against the dualist poses a considerable challenge to the dualisms of Henry More and Descartes.
Edward Slingerland
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- January 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780190842307
- eISBN:
- 9780190922955
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190842307.003.0004
- Subject:
- Religion, Religious Studies
The xin is most commonly characterized in pre-Qin texts as a locus of thought and decision making, sometimes linked to cognition or moral emotions like worry or compassion, but primarily concerned ...
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The xin is most commonly characterized in pre-Qin texts as a locus of thought and decision making, sometimes linked to cognition or moral emotions like worry or compassion, but primarily concerned with what we could very well call “reason.” Especially once we enter the Warring States, it is represented as at most only vaguely located in the body, with an extremely tenuous relationship to both the body itself and other bodily parts. It is reasonable to describe the xin as metaphysical, somehow free of the limitations of the physical world. Focusing on the term xin (heart, heart-mind, mind), this chapter uses qualitative textual analysis to make the case that early Chinese texts were written by people who embraced, at least implicitly, a “weak” form of mind-body dualism. This includes the idea that the mind is at least somewhat immaterial, qualitatively different from the other organs, and the seat of reason, free will, and the individual self.Less
The xin is most commonly characterized in pre-Qin texts as a locus of thought and decision making, sometimes linked to cognition or moral emotions like worry or compassion, but primarily concerned with what we could very well call “reason.” Especially once we enter the Warring States, it is represented as at most only vaguely located in the body, with an extremely tenuous relationship to both the body itself and other bodily parts. It is reasonable to describe the xin as metaphysical, somehow free of the limitations of the physical world. Focusing on the term xin (heart, heart-mind, mind), this chapter uses qualitative textual analysis to make the case that early Chinese texts were written by people who embraced, at least implicitly, a “weak” form of mind-body dualism. This includes the idea that the mind is at least somewhat immaterial, qualitatively different from the other organs, and the seat of reason, free will, and the individual self.
Meghan Marie Hammond
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- May 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780748690985
- eISBN:
- 9781474406376
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Edinburgh University Press
- DOI:
- 10.3366/edinburgh/9780748690985.003.0002
- Subject:
- Literature, 20th-century Literature and Modernism
Chapter One, “Into Other Minds: William and Henry James,” examines empathy during the transition to modernism via Henry James, William James, and the experimental psychologist E. B. Titchener. This ...
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Chapter One, “Into Other Minds: William and Henry James,” examines empathy during the transition to modernism via Henry James, William James, and the experimental psychologist E. B. Titchener. This chapter focuses on the works of Henry James’s “fourth phase” (published 1907-1917), which are marked by striking instances of temporal slow-down and sensory overlap between different minds. These narrative developments are a notable turn away from sympathetic representation that requires distance between subjects and toward empathic structures of fellow feeling that seek to disguise or obliterate such psychological distance. This textual empathy mirrors the rejection of mind-body dualism that marks the work of William James and Titchener. But Henry James’s autobiography also features a persistent use of ghostly language that deals with the ambivalence and anxiety about fellow feeling that both William James and Titchener exhibit but avoid confronting.Less
Chapter One, “Into Other Minds: William and Henry James,” examines empathy during the transition to modernism via Henry James, William James, and the experimental psychologist E. B. Titchener. This chapter focuses on the works of Henry James’s “fourth phase” (published 1907-1917), which are marked by striking instances of temporal slow-down and sensory overlap between different minds. These narrative developments are a notable turn away from sympathetic representation that requires distance between subjects and toward empathic structures of fellow feeling that seek to disguise or obliterate such psychological distance. This textual empathy mirrors the rejection of mind-body dualism that marks the work of William James and Titchener. But Henry James’s autobiography also features a persistent use of ghostly language that deals with the ambivalence and anxiety about fellow feeling that both William James and Titchener exhibit but avoid confronting.
Edward Slingerland and Mark Collard (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199794393
- eISBN:
- 9780199919338
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199794393.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General, Philosophy of Science
Calls for a “consilient” or “vertically integrated” approach to the study of human mind and culture have, for the most part, been received by scholars in the humanities with either indifference or ...
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Calls for a “consilient” or “vertically integrated” approach to the study of human mind and culture have, for the most part, been received by scholars in the humanities with either indifference or hostility. One reason for this is that consilience has often been framed as bringing the study of humanistic issues into line with the study of nonhuman phenomena, rather than as something to which humanists and scientists contribute equally. The other major reason that consilience has yet to catch on in the humanities is a dearth of compelling examples of the benefits of adopting a consilient approach. This book is the product of a workshop that brought together international scholars from a variety of fields to address both these issues. It includes representative work from workshop speakers and participants that examine how adopting such a consilient stance—informed by cognitive science and grounded in evolutionary theory—would concretely impact specific topics in the humanities, studying each topic in a manner that not only cuts across the humanities-natural science divide, but also across individual humanistic disciplines. By taking seriously the fact that science-humanities integration is a two-way exchange, this volume seeks to facilitate the creation of a new, shared framework for the sciences and humanities.Less
Calls for a “consilient” or “vertically integrated” approach to the study of human mind and culture have, for the most part, been received by scholars in the humanities with either indifference or hostility. One reason for this is that consilience has often been framed as bringing the study of humanistic issues into line with the study of nonhuman phenomena, rather than as something to which humanists and scientists contribute equally. The other major reason that consilience has yet to catch on in the humanities is a dearth of compelling examples of the benefits of adopting a consilient approach. This book is the product of a workshop that brought together international scholars from a variety of fields to address both these issues. It includes representative work from workshop speakers and participants that examine how adopting such a consilient stance—informed by cognitive science and grounded in evolutionary theory—would concretely impact specific topics in the humanities, studying each topic in a manner that not only cuts across the humanities-natural science divide, but also across individual humanistic disciplines. By taking seriously the fact that science-humanities integration is a two-way exchange, this volume seeks to facilitate the creation of a new, shared framework for the sciences and humanities.
Jonathan Goldberg
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- March 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780823230662
- eISBN:
- 9780823235827
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Fordham University Press
- DOI:
- 10.5422/fso/9780823230662.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Aesthetics
John Milton is famous for his nonconforming convictions, evident in his refusal of the concepts of Trinity, afterlife, and the delineation between the spirit and the physical world. Another viewpoint ...
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John Milton is famous for his nonconforming convictions, evident in his refusal of the concepts of Trinity, afterlife, and the delineation between the spirit and the physical world. Another viewpoint is his respect to gender differences as the central element that influences the mind/body dualism of an individual. At the top of it all, Milton conceptualizes the angels, which are viewed by C.S. Lewis to have similar features to us except for sex, due to their non-reproductive purposes. These creatures are brought into the picture to set a euphoric stance that would alleviate the human condition from the wounds inflicted by the original sin. Notwithstanding the fact that the exploration of the creation of nature has its foundational forms of variation, the root of it all shall be recognized as the “one,” even if it is the opposite.Less
John Milton is famous for his nonconforming convictions, evident in his refusal of the concepts of Trinity, afterlife, and the delineation between the spirit and the physical world. Another viewpoint is his respect to gender differences as the central element that influences the mind/body dualism of an individual. At the top of it all, Milton conceptualizes the angels, which are viewed by C.S. Lewis to have similar features to us except for sex, due to their non-reproductive purposes. These creatures are brought into the picture to set a euphoric stance that would alleviate the human condition from the wounds inflicted by the original sin. Notwithstanding the fact that the exploration of the creation of nature has its foundational forms of variation, the root of it all shall be recognized as the “one,” even if it is the opposite.
Edward Slingerland
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- January 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780190842307
- eISBN:
- 9780190922955
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190842307.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Religious Studies
Drawing upon cutting-edge knowledge and techniques from the sciences and digital humanities, Mind and Body in Early China employs the lens of mind-body concepts to critique Orientalist accounts of ...
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Drawing upon cutting-edge knowledge and techniques from the sciences and digital humanities, Mind and Body in Early China employs the lens of mind-body concepts to critique Orientalist accounts of early China. Views of China as the radical, “holistic” Other are unsupportable for a variety of reasons. The idea that the early Chinese saw no qualitative difference between mind and body (the “strong” holist view) has long been contradicted by traditional archaeological and qualitative textual evidence. New digital humanities methods, such as large-scale textual analysis, make this position even less tenable. Finally, a large body of empirical evidence suggests that “weak” mind-body dualism is a psychological universal, and that human sociality would be fundamentally impossible without it. More broadly, this book argues that the humanities need to move beyond social constructivist views of culture and embrace instead a view of human cognition and culture that integrates the sciences and the humanities. Methodologically, it attempts to broaden the scope of humanistic methodologies by employing team-based qualitative coding and computer-aided “distant reading” of texts, while also drawing upon current best understanding of human cognition to transform the basic interpretative starting point. It has implications for anyone interested in comparative religion, early China, cultural studies, digital humanities, or science-humanities integration.Less
Drawing upon cutting-edge knowledge and techniques from the sciences and digital humanities, Mind and Body in Early China employs the lens of mind-body concepts to critique Orientalist accounts of early China. Views of China as the radical, “holistic” Other are unsupportable for a variety of reasons. The idea that the early Chinese saw no qualitative difference between mind and body (the “strong” holist view) has long been contradicted by traditional archaeological and qualitative textual evidence. New digital humanities methods, such as large-scale textual analysis, make this position even less tenable. Finally, a large body of empirical evidence suggests that “weak” mind-body dualism is a psychological universal, and that human sociality would be fundamentally impossible without it. More broadly, this book argues that the humanities need to move beyond social constructivist views of culture and embrace instead a view of human cognition and culture that integrates the sciences and the humanities. Methodologically, it attempts to broaden the scope of humanistic methodologies by employing team-based qualitative coding and computer-aided “distant reading” of texts, while also drawing upon current best understanding of human cognition to transform the basic interpretative starting point. It has implications for anyone interested in comparative religion, early China, cultural studies, digital humanities, or science-humanities integration.
