Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation

You are looking at 1-20 of 20 items

  • Keywords: mind‐independence x
Clear All Modify Search

View:

The Problem of Perception

John Foster

in A World for Us: The Case for Phenomenalistic Idealism

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
May 2008
ISBN:
9780199297139
eISBN:
9780191711398
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199297139.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

There are two rival views of the nature of physical-item perception: the fundamentalist view, which takes the perceptual relationship between the subject and the perceived physical item to be ... More


So Where's the Explanation?

Chris Daly

in Truthmakers: The Contemporary Debate

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
May 2010
ISBN:
9780199283569
eISBN:
9780191712708
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199283569.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Language

Some proponents of the truthmaker principle claim that it has an explanatory power, such as that of explaining why idealism is false, or explaining the mind-independence of truth. Other proponents of ... More


Metaphysics

Alan Weir

in Truth Through Proof: A Formalist Foundation for Mathematics

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
January 2011
ISBN:
9780199541492
eISBN:
9780191594915
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199541492.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics

This chapter elucidates some aspects of the tangled notion of realism. A distinction is drawn between metaphysical realism and ontological realism. The latter affirms the mind-independent existence ... More


REALITY AND VALUE

GRAHAM ODDIE

in Value, Reality, and Desire

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
July 2005
ISBN:
9780199273416
eISBN:
9780191602658
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199273413.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

This chapter presents a map of the territory in which the varieties of realism and antirealism are located. Topics covered include realism, the connection between realism and truth, presuppositional ... More


Subject and Object in the Contents of Experience

Susanna Siegel

in The Contents of Visual Experience

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
May 2011
ISBN:
9780195305296
eISBN:
9780199894277
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195305296.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

The traditional distinction between visual sensation and visual perception is reconceptualised. It is argued in this chapter using the method of phenomenal contrast that certain perceptual relations ... More


Realism and Explanation in Perception

Bill Brewer

in Perception, Causation, and Objectivity

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
September 2011
ISBN:
9780199692040
eISBN:
9780191729713
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199692040.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind

Philosophers of perception face a problem in combining two intuitively compelling ideas about physical objects and our perceptual relation with them: first, empiricism, the thesis that physical ... More


A New Kind of Platonism

Richard Tieszen

in After Gödel: Platonism and Rationalism in Mathematics and Logic

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
May 2011
ISBN:
9780199606207
eISBN:
9780191725500
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199606207.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, History of Philosophy

On the basis of the combination of ideas described in chapter 1, and expanded in chapters 2 and 3, this chapter presents a novel type of platonism that I call “constituted platonism.” The chapter ... More


Realism and Explanation

Bill Brewer

in Perception and its Objects

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
May 2011
ISBN:
9780199260256
eISBN:
9780191725470
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199260256.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

The motivation and defence of (OV) is completed by a detailed engagement with the question how the mind-independence of the physical objects that we perceive shows up from our own perspective as ... More


Berkeley's Puzzle: What Does Experience Teach Us?

John Campbell and Quassim Cassam

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
October 2014
ISBN:
9780198716259
eISBN:
9780191784989
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198716259.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Sensory experience seems to be the foundation of our knowledge of mind-independent things. But how can that be? Sensory experience provides knowledge of nothing but sensory experience itself. What ... More


Evaluative Cognitivism

Simon Kirchin

in Thick Evaluation

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
December 2017
ISBN:
9780198803430
eISBN:
9780191841613
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198803430.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This final chapter considers what implication this study’s account of thin and thick concepts has for metaethics more generally. If one thinks that thick concepts are basic and fundamental concepts, ... More


Relationalism, Berkeley’s Puzzle, and Phenomenological Externalism

Jonathan Knowles

in Acquaintance: New Essays

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
December 2019
ISBN:
9780198803461
eISBN:
9780191841644
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198803461.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Relationalism, also called ‘the Relational View’, is a theory of perceptual experience which sees at least a central core of such experience as consisting in a non-representational relation between ... More


Rationality in Stoic Thought: Grasping Lekta

Ada Bronowski

in The Stoics on Lekta: All There Is to Say

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
October 2019
ISBN:
9780198842880
eISBN:
9780191878794
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198842880.003.0004
Subject:
Classical Studies, Ancient Greek, Roman, and Early Christian Philosophy

This chapter focuses on lekta as the objects of ordinary teaching. What there is to teach, and what there is to learn are lekta, say the Stoics. This claim leads to affirming the mind-independence of ... More


Values and Normative Judgment

Bosko Tripkovic

in The Metaethics of Constitutional Adjudication

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
February 2018
ISBN:
9780198808084
eISBN:
9780191845833
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198808084.003.0005
Subject:
Law, Constitutional and Administrative Law

The chapter develops an account of value and normative judgment by exploring the tension between the theoretical and practical perspective. The theoretical perspective explains moral values as ... More


A Straightforward Solution to Berkeley’s Puzzle

John Campbell and Quassim Cassam

in Berkeley's Puzzle: What Does Experience Teach Us?

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
October 2014
ISBN:
9780198716259
eISBN:
9780191784989
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198716259.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Our understanding of sensory experience is by way of imagination. This chapter introduces a conception of de re imagining, on which knowledge of a shared environment is the platform for imaginative ... More


Representationalism

John Campbell and Quassim Cassam

in Berkeley's Puzzle: What Does Experience Teach Us?

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
October 2014
ISBN:
9780198716259
eISBN:
9780191784989
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198716259.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter argues that the representational view of sensory experience has a ready-made solution to Berkeley’s Puzzle. Sensory experience can ground concepts of mind-independent objects because it ... More


Campbell’s Epilogue

John Campbell and Quassim Cassam

in Berkeley's Puzzle: What Does Experience Teach Us?

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
October 2014
ISBN:
9780198716259
eISBN:
9780191784989
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198716259.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter contrasts what Cassam calls ‘persistence and constancy’ analyses of experience of mind-independence with the idea that experience makes available the categorical, causally autonomous ... More


Objects and the Explanation of Perception

Bill Brewer

in In the Light of Experience: New Essays on Perception and Reasons

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
July 2018
ISBN:
9780198809630
eISBN:
9780191846908
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198809630.003.0011
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind

Persisting macroscopic material objects play a fundamental role in our commonsense understanding of the world around us, and this is central to our appreciation of their status as mind-independent ... More


Introduction: Naïve Realist Theories of Colour

Keith Allen

in A Naïve Realist Theory of Colour

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
December 2016
ISBN:
9780198755364
eISBN:
9780191816659
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198755364.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind

Discussions of the nature and existence of colour typically centre around two main issues: what is the relationship of colours to colour perception, and what is the relationship of colours to the ... More


Mind-Independence

Keith Allen

in A Naïve Realist Theory of Colour

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
December 2016
ISBN:
9780198755364
eISBN:
9780191816659
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198755364.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter argues for Mind-Independence, the claim that colours are properties of things in our environment whose essential nature is constitutively independent of the experiences of perceiving ... More


Perceptual Variation

Keith Allen

in A Naïve Realist Theory of Colour

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
December 2016
ISBN:
9780198755364
eISBN:
9780191816659
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198755364.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter defends Mind-Independence against a prominent line of objection: the Argument from Perceptual Variation. Coloured objects appear differently to different perceivers and in different ... More


View: