J.R. LUCAS
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780197264898
- eISBN:
- 9780191754074
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- British Academy
- DOI:
- 10.5871/bacad/9780197264898.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter presents a response to Solomon Feferman's discussion in Chapter 6. Feferman is right to dismiss logical determinism perfunctorily, although it puzzled Aristotle and the mediaeval ...
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This chapter presents a response to Solomon Feferman's discussion in Chapter 6. Feferman is right to dismiss logical determinism perfunctorily, although it puzzled Aristotle and the mediaeval Schoolmen and many people still. Feferman also gives a careful account of the much-criticized Gödelian argument against mechanism. Like many other critics he highlights the assumption that any plausible mechanical model of the mind must be consistent. It is shown that both Feferman's Formalist-Mechanist Thesis I aand the general mechanist thesis are false.Less
This chapter presents a response to Solomon Feferman's discussion in Chapter 6. Feferman is right to dismiss logical determinism perfunctorily, although it puzzled Aristotle and the mediaeval Schoolmen and many people still. Feferman also gives a careful account of the much-criticized Gödelian argument against mechanism. Like many other critics he highlights the assumption that any plausible mechanical model of the mind must be consistent. It is shown that both Feferman's Formalist-Mechanist Thesis I aand the general mechanist thesis are false.
Daniel Stoljar
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195306583
- eISBN:
- 9780199786619
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195306589.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book advances a novel way to resolve the central philosophical problem about the mind: how it is that consciousness or experience fits into a larger naturalistic picture of the world. The ...
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This book advances a novel way to resolve the central philosophical problem about the mind: how it is that consciousness or experience fits into a larger naturalistic picture of the world. The correct response to the problem, it is argued, is not to posit a realm of experience distinct from the physical, nor to deny the reality of phenomenal experience, nor even to rethink our understanding of consciousness and the language we use to talk about it. Instead, we should view the problem itself as having its origin in our ignorance of the relevant physical facts. This change of orientation is shown to be well motivated historically, empirically, and philosophically, and to have none of the side effects it is sometimes thought to have. The result is a philosophical perspective on the mind that has a number of far-reaching consequences: for consciousness studies, for our place in nature, and for the way we think about the relationship between philosophy and science.Less
This book advances a novel way to resolve the central philosophical problem about the mind: how it is that consciousness or experience fits into a larger naturalistic picture of the world. The correct response to the problem, it is argued, is not to posit a realm of experience distinct from the physical, nor to deny the reality of phenomenal experience, nor even to rethink our understanding of consciousness and the language we use to talk about it. Instead, we should view the problem itself as having its origin in our ignorance of the relevant physical facts. This change of orientation is shown to be well motivated historically, empirically, and philosophically, and to have none of the side effects it is sometimes thought to have. The result is a philosophical perspective on the mind that has a number of far-reaching consequences: for consciousness studies, for our place in nature, and for the way we think about the relationship between philosophy and science.
Walter Glannon
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195307788
- eISBN:
- 9780199867431
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195307788.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This epilogue presents a synthesis of discussions in the preceding chapters. It emphasizes five general points that should frame any discussion of what measures of or interventions in the brain can ...
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This epilogue presents a synthesis of discussions in the preceding chapters. It emphasizes five general points that should frame any discussion of what measures of or interventions in the brain can or cannot tell us about human mentality, thought, and behavior, and whether or to what extent we should use them. These are (i) that no two brains are alike; (ii) that although the brain generates and sustains the mind, the mind is not reducible to the brain; (iii) that before we consider manipulating the brain to alter mental capacities, we should consider how these capacities may be adaptive; (iv) that neuroscience can inform our ethical judgments; and (v) that whole-brain death is not the same as the death of a person.Less
This epilogue presents a synthesis of discussions in the preceding chapters. It emphasizes five general points that should frame any discussion of what measures of or interventions in the brain can or cannot tell us about human mentality, thought, and behavior, and whether or to what extent we should use them. These are (i) that no two brains are alike; (ii) that although the brain generates and sustains the mind, the mind is not reducible to the brain; (iii) that before we consider manipulating the brain to alter mental capacities, we should consider how these capacities may be adaptive; (iv) that neuroscience can inform our ethical judgments; and (v) that whole-brain death is not the same as the death of a person.
Steven Horst
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195317114
- eISBN:
- 9780199871520
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195317114.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Contemporary debates in philosophy of mind‐between reductionists, dualists, nonreductive materialists, and eliminativists‐have been based upon the perception that mental phenomena like consciousness ...
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Contemporary debates in philosophy of mind‐between reductionists, dualists, nonreductive materialists, and eliminativists‐have been based upon the perception that mental phenomena like consciousness and intentionality are uniquely irreducible. The “explanatory gap” between mind and body seems to be an urgent and fascinating problem if one assumes that intertheoretic reductions are the rule in the special sciences, with the mind as the lone exception. While this debate was going on in philosophy of mind, however, philosophers of science were rejecting this very sort of reductionism: intertheoretic reductions are not ubiquitous but rare. This book argues that post‐reductionist philosophy of science poses problems for all the familiar positions in philosophy of mind and calls for a deep rethinking of the problematic. To this end, a new perspective, Cognitive Pluralism, is urged.Less
Contemporary debates in philosophy of mind‐between reductionists, dualists, nonreductive materialists, and eliminativists‐have been based upon the perception that mental phenomena like consciousness and intentionality are uniquely irreducible. The “explanatory gap” between mind and body seems to be an urgent and fascinating problem if one assumes that intertheoretic reductions are the rule in the special sciences, with the mind as the lone exception. While this debate was going on in philosophy of mind, however, philosophers of science were rejecting this very sort of reductionism: intertheoretic reductions are not ubiquitous but rare. This book argues that post‐reductionist philosophy of science poses problems for all the familiar positions in philosophy of mind and calls for a deep rethinking of the problematic. To this end, a new perspective, Cognitive Pluralism, is urged.
John Marenbon (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- January 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780197265499
- eISBN:
- 9780191760310
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- British Academy
- DOI:
- 10.5871/bacad/9780197265499.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
The usual division of philosophy into ‘medieval’ and ‘modern’ obscures the continuities in philosophy up until 1700. This book examines three areas where these continuities are particularly clear: ...
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The usual division of philosophy into ‘medieval’ and ‘modern’ obscures the continuities in philosophy up until 1700. This book examines three areas where these continuities are particularly clear: knowledge, the mind, and language. It does so through three chapters, by different authors, each followed by a detailed response. The first chapter shows how Descartes attacked faculty psychology and thus separated himself from one strand of the medieval tradition, represented by Suárez. At the same time, Descartes was closely following another strand, found in Ockham. Thus, the discontinuity between medieval and modern may not be as sharp as first appears. The second chapter considers discussions of whether knowledge should be kept for the elite. In the Christian world medieval and seventeenth-century thinkers alike rarely advocated esotericism, but Jewish and Muslim scholars such as al-Ghazâlî, Averroes, and Maimonides strongly defended it. The main chapter of Part III argues that a version of such esotericism may be a defensible philosophical position today. The main chapter of Part II shows how Locke's philosophy of language fits into a long medieval tradition of thought based on Aristotle's On Interpretation. Locke introduced the requirement that a word be linked to an idea in the speaker's mind, but the chapter argues that this does not mean that Locke was proposing that we each have a private language.Less
The usual division of philosophy into ‘medieval’ and ‘modern’ obscures the continuities in philosophy up until 1700. This book examines three areas where these continuities are particularly clear: knowledge, the mind, and language. It does so through three chapters, by different authors, each followed by a detailed response. The first chapter shows how Descartes attacked faculty psychology and thus separated himself from one strand of the medieval tradition, represented by Suárez. At the same time, Descartes was closely following another strand, found in Ockham. Thus, the discontinuity between medieval and modern may not be as sharp as first appears. The second chapter considers discussions of whether knowledge should be kept for the elite. In the Christian world medieval and seventeenth-century thinkers alike rarely advocated esotericism, but Jewish and Muslim scholars such as al-Ghazâlî, Averroes, and Maimonides strongly defended it. The main chapter of Part III argues that a version of such esotericism may be a defensible philosophical position today. The main chapter of Part II shows how Locke's philosophy of language fits into a long medieval tradition of thought based on Aristotle's On Interpretation. Locke introduced the requirement that a word be linked to an idea in the speaker's mind, but the chapter argues that this does not mean that Locke was proposing that we each have a private language.
Ryan Nichols
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199276912
- eISBN:
- 9780191707759
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199276912.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
The thesis that the mind cannot directly apprehend features of the physical world — what Thomas Reid calls the Way of Ideas — is a staple of Early Modern philosophical tradition. This commitment to ...
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The thesis that the mind cannot directly apprehend features of the physical world — what Thomas Reid calls the Way of Ideas — is a staple of Early Modern philosophical tradition. This commitment to the direct awareness of, and only of, mental representations unifies the otherwise divergent philosophical systems of Rationalists and Empiricists. Thomas Reid battles against this thesis on many fronts, in particular over the nature of perception. This book lays the groundwork for Reid's theory of perception by developing Reid's unheralded argument against a representational theory of thought, which this book applies to the discussion of the intentionality of perceptual states and Reid's appeal to ‘signs’. Reid's efforts to preserve common sense epistemic commitments also lead him to adopt unique theories about our concepts of primary and secondary qualities, and about original and acquired perceptions. About the latter pair, the book argues that most perceptual beliefs depend for their justification upon inferences. The Way of Ideas holds that sensations are objects of awareness and that our senses are not robustly unified. This book develops Reid's counter-proposals by examining his discussion of the evolutionary purpose of sensations, and the nature of our awareness of sensations, as well as his intriguing affirmative answer to Molyneux's questions.Less
The thesis that the mind cannot directly apprehend features of the physical world — what Thomas Reid calls the Way of Ideas — is a staple of Early Modern philosophical tradition. This commitment to the direct awareness of, and only of, mental representations unifies the otherwise divergent philosophical systems of Rationalists and Empiricists. Thomas Reid battles against this thesis on many fronts, in particular over the nature of perception. This book lays the groundwork for Reid's theory of perception by developing Reid's unheralded argument against a representational theory of thought, which this book applies to the discussion of the intentionality of perceptual states and Reid's appeal to ‘signs’. Reid's efforts to preserve common sense epistemic commitments also lead him to adopt unique theories about our concepts of primary and secondary qualities, and about original and acquired perceptions. About the latter pair, the book argues that most perceptual beliefs depend for their justification upon inferences. The Way of Ideas holds that sensations are objects of awareness and that our senses are not robustly unified. This book develops Reid's counter-proposals by examining his discussion of the evolutionary purpose of sensations, and the nature of our awareness of sensations, as well as his intriguing affirmative answer to Molyneux's questions.
Lucy O'Brien
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199261482
- eISBN:
- 9780191718632
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199261482.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This book argues that a satisfactory account of first-person reference and self-knowledge needs to concentrate on our nature as agents. It considers two main questions. First, what account of ...
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This book argues that a satisfactory account of first-person reference and self-knowledge needs to concentrate on our nature as agents. It considers two main questions. First, what account of first-person reference can we give that respects the guaranteed nature of such reference? Second, what account can we give of our knowledge of our mental and physical actions?Less
This book argues that a satisfactory account of first-person reference and self-knowledge needs to concentrate on our nature as agents. It considers two main questions. First, what account of first-person reference can we give that respects the guaranteed nature of such reference? Second, what account can we give of our knowledge of our mental and physical actions?
Quassim Cassam
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199208319
- eISBN:
- 9780191708992
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199208319.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
How is knowledge of the external world possible? How is knowledge of other minds possible? How is a priori knowledge possible? These are all examples of ‘how-possible’ questions in epistemology. In ...
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How is knowledge of the external world possible? How is knowledge of other minds possible? How is a priori knowledge possible? These are all examples of ‘how-possible’ questions in epistemology. In general, we ask how knowledge, or knowledge of some specific kind, is possible when we encounter obstacles to its existence or acquisition. So the question is: how is knowledge possible given the various factors that make it look impossible? A satisfactory answer to such a question will therefore need to do several different things. In essence, explaining how a particular kind of knowledge is possible is a matter of identifying ways of acquiring it, overcoming or dissipating obstacles to its acquisition, and figuring out what makes it possible to acquire it. To respond to a how-possible question in this way is to go in for what might be called a ‘multi-levels’ approach. The aim of this book is to develop and defend this approach.Less
How is knowledge of the external world possible? How is knowledge of other minds possible? How is a priori knowledge possible? These are all examples of ‘how-possible’ questions in epistemology. In general, we ask how knowledge, or knowledge of some specific kind, is possible when we encounter obstacles to its existence or acquisition. So the question is: how is knowledge possible given the various factors that make it look impossible? A satisfactory answer to such a question will therefore need to do several different things. In essence, explaining how a particular kind of knowledge is possible is a matter of identifying ways of acquiring it, overcoming or dissipating obstacles to its acquisition, and figuring out what makes it possible to acquire it. To respond to a how-possible question in this way is to go in for what might be called a ‘multi-levels’ approach. The aim of this book is to develop and defend this approach.
Geoffrey Lloyd
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199214617
- eISBN:
- 9780191706493
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199214617.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This book presents a study of the problems posed by the unity and diversity of the human mind. On the one hand, as humans we all share broadly the same anatomy, physiology, biochemistry, and certain ...
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This book presents a study of the problems posed by the unity and diversity of the human mind. On the one hand, as humans we all share broadly the same anatomy, physiology, biochemistry, and certain psychological capabilities — the capacity to learn a language, for instance. On the other, different individuals and groups have very different talents, tastes, and beliefs, for instance about how they see themselves, other humans and the world around them. These issues are highly charged, for any denial of psychic unity savours of racism, while many assertions of psychic diversity raise the spectres of arbitrary relativism, the incommensurability of beliefs systems, and their mutual unintelligibility. The book examines where different types of arguments, scientific, philosophical, anthropological and historical, can take us. It discusses colour perception, spatial cognition, animal and plant taxonomy, the emotions, ideas of health and well-being, concepts of the self, agency and causation, varying perceptions of the distinction between nature and culture, and reasoning itself. It pays attention to the multidimensionality of the phenomena to be apprehended and to the diversity of manners, or styles, of apprehending them. The weight to be given to different factors, physical, biological, psychological, cultural, ideological, varies as between different subject areas and sometimes even within a single area. The book uses recent work in social anthropology, linguistics, cognitive science, neurophysiology, and the history of ideas to redefine the problems and clarify how our evident psychic diversity can be reconciled with our shared humanity.Less
This book presents a study of the problems posed by the unity and diversity of the human mind. On the one hand, as humans we all share broadly the same anatomy, physiology, biochemistry, and certain psychological capabilities — the capacity to learn a language, for instance. On the other, different individuals and groups have very different talents, tastes, and beliefs, for instance about how they see themselves, other humans and the world around them. These issues are highly charged, for any denial of psychic unity savours of racism, while many assertions of psychic diversity raise the spectres of arbitrary relativism, the incommensurability of beliefs systems, and their mutual unintelligibility. The book examines where different types of arguments, scientific, philosophical, anthropological and historical, can take us. It discusses colour perception, spatial cognition, animal and plant taxonomy, the emotions, ideas of health and well-being, concepts of the self, agency and causation, varying perceptions of the distinction between nature and culture, and reasoning itself. It pays attention to the multidimensionality of the phenomena to be apprehended and to the diversity of manners, or styles, of apprehending them. The weight to be given to different factors, physical, biological, psychological, cultural, ideological, varies as between different subject areas and sometimes even within a single area. The book uses recent work in social anthropology, linguistics, cognitive science, neurophysiology, and the history of ideas to redefine the problems and clarify how our evident psychic diversity can be reconciled with our shared humanity.
Richard Crouter
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195379679
- eISBN:
- 9780199869169
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195379679.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Religion and Society
This book is a primer on the political prophet and Christian social ethicist Reinhold Niebuhr (1892–1971), who is widely cited for his political realism in the aftermath of George W. Bush’s ...
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This book is a primer on the political prophet and Christian social ethicist Reinhold Niebuhr (1892–1971), who is widely cited for his political realism in the aftermath of George W. Bush’s presidency. His works are on the favorite reading list of Barack Obama. In addition to mapping the “Niebuhr revival” on the political left and right, the book’s seven chapters acquaint readers with the central teachings and ways of thinking behind this fresh interest. The core of Niebuhr’s Christian realism and the role of irony in his thought are made accessible to non-specialists in ways that explain his appeal to secular as well as deeply religious minds. The book begins with an account of the fresh interest in the Protestant thinker and argues for Niebuhr’s sense of history as a prelude to explaining how his view of the human self as sinful and self-preoccupied (individually and in groups) relates to his passion for social justice. Three chapters then examine Niebuhr’s teaching as a preacher and writer with uncommon literary sensitivity, take up his classic 1952 title, The Irony of American History as an expression of his Christian realism, and probe the reasons for his mixed reception in contemporary Christian circles, both popular and academic. A final chapter examines the ways that Niebuhr’s legacy invites levels of self-reflection that judiciously illumine the personal, political, and religious challenges that we face in the contemporary world.Less
This book is a primer on the political prophet and Christian social ethicist Reinhold Niebuhr (1892–1971), who is widely cited for his political realism in the aftermath of George W. Bush’s presidency. His works are on the favorite reading list of Barack Obama. In addition to mapping the “Niebuhr revival” on the political left and right, the book’s seven chapters acquaint readers with the central teachings and ways of thinking behind this fresh interest. The core of Niebuhr’s Christian realism and the role of irony in his thought are made accessible to non-specialists in ways that explain his appeal to secular as well as deeply religious minds. The book begins with an account of the fresh interest in the Protestant thinker and argues for Niebuhr’s sense of history as a prelude to explaining how his view of the human self as sinful and self-preoccupied (individually and in groups) relates to his passion for social justice. Three chapters then examine Niebuhr’s teaching as a preacher and writer with uncommon literary sensitivity, take up his classic 1952 title, The Irony of American History as an expression of his Christian realism, and probe the reasons for his mixed reception in contemporary Christian circles, both popular and academic. A final chapter examines the ways that Niebuhr’s legacy invites levels of self-reflection that judiciously illumine the personal, political, and religious challenges that we face in the contemporary world.
Fred Lerdahl
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195178296
- eISBN:
- 9780199870370
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195178296.001.0001
- Subject:
- Music, Theory, Analysis, Composition
This book builds on and in many ways completes the project of Fred Lerdahl and Ray Jackendoff's influential A Generative Theory of Tonal Music. Like the earlier volume, this book is both a ...
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This book builds on and in many ways completes the project of Fred Lerdahl and Ray Jackendoff's influential A Generative Theory of Tonal Music. Like the earlier volume, this book is both a music-theoretic treatise and a contribution to the cognitive science of music. After presenting some modifications to Lerdahl and Jackendoff's original framework, the book develops a quantitative model of listeners' intuitions of the relative distances of pitches, chords, and regions from a given tonic. The model is used to derive prolongational structure, trace paths through pitch space at multiple prolongational levels, and compute patterns of tonal tension and attraction as musical events unfold. The consideration of pitch-space paths illuminates issues of musical narrative, and the treatment of tonal tension and attraction provides a technical basis for studies of musical expectation and expression. These investigations lead to a fresh theory of tonal function and reveal an underlying parallel between tonal and metrical structures. Later portions of the book apply these ideas to highly chromatic tonal as well as atonal music. In response to stylistic differences, the shape of pitch space changes and psychoacoustic features become increasingly important, while underlying features of the theory remain constant, reflecting unvarying features of the musical mind. The theory is illustrated throughout by analyses of music from Bach to Schoenberg, and frequent connections are made to the music-theoretic and psychological literature.Less
This book builds on and in many ways completes the project of Fred Lerdahl and Ray Jackendoff's influential A Generative Theory of Tonal Music. Like the earlier volume, this book is both a music-theoretic treatise and a contribution to the cognitive science of music. After presenting some modifications to Lerdahl and Jackendoff's original framework, the book develops a quantitative model of listeners' intuitions of the relative distances of pitches, chords, and regions from a given tonic. The model is used to derive prolongational structure, trace paths through pitch space at multiple prolongational levels, and compute patterns of tonal tension and attraction as musical events unfold. The consideration of pitch-space paths illuminates issues of musical narrative, and the treatment of tonal tension and attraction provides a technical basis for studies of musical expectation and expression. These investigations lead to a fresh theory of tonal function and reveal an underlying parallel between tonal and metrical structures. Later portions of the book apply these ideas to highly chromatic tonal as well as atonal music. In response to stylistic differences, the shape of pitch space changes and psychoacoustic features become increasingly important, while underlying features of the theory remain constant, reflecting unvarying features of the musical mind. The theory is illustrated throughout by analyses of music from Bach to Schoenberg, and frequent connections are made to the music-theoretic and psychological literature.
Hagit Borer
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199263905
- eISBN:
- 9780191718182
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199263905.001.0001
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Semantics and Pragmatics
This book explores the difference between words however defined and structures however constructed. It sets out to demonstrate over three volumes — of which this is the first — that the explanation ...
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This book explores the difference between words however defined and structures however constructed. It sets out to demonstrate over three volumes — of which this is the first — that the explanation of linguistic competence should be shifted from lexical entry to syntactic structure, from memory of words to manipulation of rules. Its reformulation of how grammar and lexicon interact has profound implications for linguistic, philosophical, and psychological theories about human mind and language. The book departs from both language specific constructional approaches and lexicalist approaches to argue that universal hierarchical structures determine interpretation, and that language variation emerges from the morphological and phonological properties of inflectional material. This volume applies this radical approach to nominal structure. Integrating research in syntax, semantics, and morphology, the volume argues that nominal structure is based on the syntactic realization of semantic notions such as classifier, quantity, and reference. In the process, this volume seeks to do away with lexical ambiguity and type-shifting. Among the topics the volume considers are the interpretation of proper names, the mass-count distinction, the weak-strong interpretation of quantifiers, partitive and measure phrases, and the structural representation of the definite article. In the process, the volume explores inter-language variation through the properties of the morpho-phonological system. The languages discussed include English, Chinese, Italian, and Hebrew.Less
This book explores the difference between words however defined and structures however constructed. It sets out to demonstrate over three volumes — of which this is the first — that the explanation of linguistic competence should be shifted from lexical entry to syntactic structure, from memory of words to manipulation of rules. Its reformulation of how grammar and lexicon interact has profound implications for linguistic, philosophical, and psychological theories about human mind and language. The book departs from both language specific constructional approaches and lexicalist approaches to argue that universal hierarchical structures determine interpretation, and that language variation emerges from the morphological and phonological properties of inflectional material. This volume applies this radical approach to nominal structure. Integrating research in syntax, semantics, and morphology, the volume argues that nominal structure is based on the syntactic realization of semantic notions such as classifier, quantity, and reference. In the process, this volume seeks to do away with lexical ambiguity and type-shifting. Among the topics the volume considers are the interpretation of proper names, the mass-count distinction, the weak-strong interpretation of quantifiers, partitive and measure phrases, and the structural representation of the definite article. In the process, the volume explores inter-language variation through the properties of the morpho-phonological system. The languages discussed include English, Chinese, Italian, and Hebrew.
Michael D. Rugg and Michael G. H. Coles (eds)
- Published in print:
- 1996
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780198524168
- eISBN:
- 9780191706639
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198524168.001.0001
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Neuroscience
This book reviews a productive period of research aimed at connecting brain and mind through the use of scalp-recorded brain potentials to chart the temporal course of information processing in the ...
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This book reviews a productive period of research aimed at connecting brain and mind through the use of scalp-recorded brain potentials to chart the temporal course of information processing in the human brain. The book serves as both as a summary of where we have been and as a pointer of the way ahead. Event-related potential (ERP) methodology has long been used in neuroscience to measure electrical activity in the brain. It has become clear, however, that it can be a powerful tool in studying and illuminating central psychological issues relating to attention, information, processing, dynamics, memory, and language. Linking this technology to newer imaging techniques such as positron emission tomography (PET) and functional magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), it becomes possible to build up a spatial and temporal picture of the brain during the performance of high-level skills. This book provides strong evidence that cognitive psychology can benefit from the use of brain electrical activity.Less
This book reviews a productive period of research aimed at connecting brain and mind through the use of scalp-recorded brain potentials to chart the temporal course of information processing in the human brain. The book serves as both as a summary of where we have been and as a pointer of the way ahead. Event-related potential (ERP) methodology has long been used in neuroscience to measure electrical activity in the brain. It has become clear, however, that it can be a powerful tool in studying and illuminating central psychological issues relating to attention, information, processing, dynamics, memory, and language. Linking this technology to newer imaging techniques such as positron emission tomography (PET) and functional magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), it becomes possible to build up a spatial and temporal picture of the brain during the performance of high-level skills. This book provides strong evidence that cognitive psychology can benefit from the use of brain electrical activity.
Joseph Almog
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195337716
- eISBN:
- 9780199868704
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195337716.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
Decartes' maxim Cogito, Ergo Sum (from his Meditations) is perhaps the most famous philosophical expression ever coined. The author of this book, Joseph Almog, is a Descartes scholar whose last book ...
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Decartes' maxim Cogito, Ergo Sum (from his Meditations) is perhaps the most famous philosophical expression ever coined. The author of this book, Joseph Almog, is a Descartes scholar whose last book What Am I? focused on the second half of this expression asking who is the “I”, who is thinking, and how does this entity somehow incorporate both body and mind? This book looks at the first half of the proposition — cogito. The book calls this the “thinking man's paradox”: how can there be, in and part of the natural world, a creature that thinks? Descartes' proposition declares that such a fact maintains and is self-evident; but as this book points out, from the point of view of Descartes' own skepticism it is far from obvious. How can it be that a thinking human can be both part of the natural world and yet somehow distinct and separate from it? How did “thinking” arise in an otherwise “thoughtless” universe and what does it mean for beings like us to be thinkers? The book goes back to the Meditations, and using Descartes' own methodology — and his naturalistic, scientific worldview — tries to answer the question.Less
Decartes' maxim Cogito, Ergo Sum (from his Meditations) is perhaps the most famous philosophical expression ever coined. The author of this book, Joseph Almog, is a Descartes scholar whose last book What Am I? focused on the second half of this expression asking who is the “I”, who is thinking, and how does this entity somehow incorporate both body and mind? This book looks at the first half of the proposition — cogito. The book calls this the “thinking man's paradox”: how can there be, in and part of the natural world, a creature that thinks? Descartes' proposition declares that such a fact maintains and is self-evident; but as this book points out, from the point of view of Descartes' own skepticism it is far from obvious. How can it be that a thinking human can be both part of the natural world and yet somehow distinct and separate from it? How did “thinking” arise in an otherwise “thoughtless” universe and what does it mean for beings like us to be thinkers? The book goes back to the Meditations, and using Descartes' own methodology — and his naturalistic, scientific worldview — tries to answer the question.
Katalin Farkas
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199230327
- eISBN:
- 9780191710629
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230327.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This book defends a conception of the mind that is inspired by some of Descartes's writings. The crucial feature of the Cartesian view defended is not dualism — which is not adopted here — but ...
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This book defends a conception of the mind that is inspired by some of Descartes's writings. The crucial feature of the Cartesian view defended is not dualism — which is not adopted here — but internalism about the mind. Internalism is opposed to the widely accepted thesis of externalism, which states that some mental features constitutively depend on features of our physical and social environment. In contrast, this book defends the minority internalist view that the mind is autonomous with respect to its environment: although it is obviously influenced by things in the environment, this influence is merely contingent and does not delimit what is thinkable in principle. The first part of the book argues that privileged accessibility is the mark of the mental, and that this thesis is strongly tied to criteria of personhood. The second part argues that internalism is best formulated as the thesis that mental features are determined by the phenomenal properties of our conscious mental life, and that the externalist denial of this thesis is incompatible with privileged self-knowledge. Hence, externalism is in conflict with the conception of the mind and personhood defended in the first part of the book. Supporters of the externalist view often present their theory as the most thoroughgoing criticism of the Cartesian conception of the mind; this book answers these criticisms and argues for an uncompromising internalist Cartesian theory of the mind.Less
This book defends a conception of the mind that is inspired by some of Descartes's writings. The crucial feature of the Cartesian view defended is not dualism — which is not adopted here — but internalism about the mind. Internalism is opposed to the widely accepted thesis of externalism, which states that some mental features constitutively depend on features of our physical and social environment. In contrast, this book defends the minority internalist view that the mind is autonomous with respect to its environment: although it is obviously influenced by things in the environment, this influence is merely contingent and does not delimit what is thinkable in principle. The first part of the book argues that privileged accessibility is the mark of the mental, and that this thesis is strongly tied to criteria of personhood. The second part argues that internalism is best formulated as the thesis that mental features are determined by the phenomenal properties of our conscious mental life, and that the externalist denial of this thesis is incompatible with privileged self-knowledge. Hence, externalism is in conflict with the conception of the mind and personhood defended in the first part of the book. Supporters of the externalist view often present their theory as the most thoroughgoing criticism of the Cartesian conception of the mind; this book answers these criticisms and argues for an uncompromising internalist Cartesian theory of the mind.
Garry Hagberg
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199234226
- eISBN:
- 9780191715440
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199234226.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Language
The voluminous writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein contain some of the most profound reflections of our time on the nature of the human subject and self-understanding — the human condition, ...
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The voluminous writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein contain some of the most profound reflections of our time on the nature of the human subject and self-understanding — the human condition, philosophically speaking. This book mimes those extensive writings for a conception of the self. And more specifically, the book offers a discussion of Wittgenstein's later writings on language and mind as they hold special significance for the understanding and clarification of the distinctive character of self-descriptive or autobiographical language. The book also undertakes a philosophical investigation of selected autobiographical writings — among the best examples we have of human selves exploring themselves — as they cast new and special light on the critique of mind-body dualism and its undercurrents in particular, and on the nature of autobiographical consciousness more generally. The chapters take up in turn the topics of self-consciousness, what Wittgenstein calls ‘the inner picture’; mental privacy and the picture of metaphysical seclusion; the very idea of our observation of the contents of consciousness; first-person expressive speech; reflexive or self-directed thought and competing pictures of introspection; the nuances of retrospective self-understanding, person-perception, and the corollary issues of self-perception (itself an interestingly dangerous phrase); self-defining memory; and the therapeutic conception of philosophical progress as it applies to all of these issues. The cast of characters interwoven throughout the discussion include, in addition to Wittgenstein centrally, Augustine, Goethe, Dostoevsky, Kierkegaard, Iris Murdoch, Donald Davidson, and Stanley Cavell, among others.Less
The voluminous writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein contain some of the most profound reflections of our time on the nature of the human subject and self-understanding — the human condition, philosophically speaking. This book mimes those extensive writings for a conception of the self. And more specifically, the book offers a discussion of Wittgenstein's later writings on language and mind as they hold special significance for the understanding and clarification of the distinctive character of self-descriptive or autobiographical language. The book also undertakes a philosophical investigation of selected autobiographical writings — among the best examples we have of human selves exploring themselves — as they cast new and special light on the critique of mind-body dualism and its undercurrents in particular, and on the nature of autobiographical consciousness more generally. The chapters take up in turn the topics of self-consciousness, what Wittgenstein calls ‘the inner picture’; mental privacy and the picture of metaphysical seclusion; the very idea of our observation of the contents of consciousness; first-person expressive speech; reflexive or self-directed thought and competing pictures of introspection; the nuances of retrospective self-understanding, person-perception, and the corollary issues of self-perception (itself an interestingly dangerous phrase); self-defining memory; and the therapeutic conception of philosophical progress as it applies to all of these issues. The cast of characters interwoven throughout the discussion include, in addition to Wittgenstein centrally, Augustine, Goethe, Dostoevsky, Kierkegaard, Iris Murdoch, Donald Davidson, and Stanley Cavell, among others.
Toshimasa Yasukata
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195144949
- eISBN:
- 9780199834891
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195144945.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729–81) is held in high esteem as one who marks the cutting edge of the German Enlightenment. He was the very first German to achieve a spiritually and intellectually ...
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Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729–81) is held in high esteem as one who marks the cutting edge of the German Enlightenment. He was the very first German to achieve a spiritually and intellectually mature state of being, the hallmark of which is independent and responsible use of one's own reason. He also stands as a key figure in German intellectual history, a bridge joining Luther, Leibniz, and German idealism. Yet despite his well‐recognized importance in the history of thought, and despite a substantial body of in‐depth studies, Lessing as theologian or philosopher of religion remains an enigmatic figure. Even today, his theology or philosophy of religion is a subject of dispute. With regard to the genuine core of his theological or religious‐philosophical thought, researchers hold diametrically opposed interpretations. It is not without reason that scholars refer to the “riddle” or “mystery” of Lessing, a mystery that has proved intractable because of his reticence on the subject of the final conclusions of his intellectual project. Confronted with this perplexity in Lessing studies, this book seeks to resolve the enigma. On the basis of intensive study of the entire corpus of Lessing's philosophical and theological writings as well as the extensive secondary literature, it leads the reader into the systematic core of Lessing's highly elusive religious thought. From a detailed and thoroughgoing analysis of Lessing's developing position on Christianity and reason, there emerges a fresh image of Lessing as a creative modern mind, both shaped by and giving shape to the Christian heritage.Less
Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729–81) is held in high esteem as one who marks the cutting edge of the German Enlightenment. He was the very first German to achieve a spiritually and intellectually mature state of being, the hallmark of which is independent and responsible use of one's own reason. He also stands as a key figure in German intellectual history, a bridge joining Luther, Leibniz, and German idealism. Yet despite his well‐recognized importance in the history of thought, and despite a substantial body of in‐depth studies, Lessing as theologian or philosopher of religion remains an enigmatic figure. Even today, his theology or philosophy of religion is a subject of dispute. With regard to the genuine core of his theological or religious‐philosophical thought, researchers hold diametrically opposed interpretations. It is not without reason that scholars refer to the “riddle” or “mystery” of Lessing, a mystery that has proved intractable because of his reticence on the subject of the final conclusions of his intellectual project. Confronted with this perplexity in Lessing studies, this book seeks to resolve the enigma. On the basis of intensive study of the entire corpus of Lessing's philosophical and theological writings as well as the extensive secondary literature, it leads the reader into the systematic core of Lessing's highly elusive religious thought. From a detailed and thoroughgoing analysis of Lessing's developing position on Christianity and reason, there emerges a fresh image of Lessing as a creative modern mind, both shaped by and giving shape to the Christian heritage.
Mitchell S. Green
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199283781
- eISBN:
- 9780191712548
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199283781.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Language
This book offers a general theory of expressive behavior, including but not limited to such behavior as it occurs in our own species. At the core of the project is the thesis that self-expression is ...
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This book offers a general theory of expressive behavior, including but not limited to such behavior as it occurs in our own species. At the core of the project is the thesis that self-expression is a matter of showing a cognitive, affective, or qualitative state in such a way that the showing is a product of design. Design may be the result of conscious intention, natural selection, artificial selection, or convention. Showing comes in three forms: showing that something is so, showing something in such a way as to make it perceptible, and showing how an object appears or how an experience or affect feels. This elucidation of self-expression as designed showing of something inner sheds light on such issues as the distinction between saying and showing, the nature of speaker meaning, speech acts, the problem of other minds, implicature, the psychology and evolutionary biology of facial expression, idiosyncratic and conventional aspects of expressive behavior, empathy, qualia, and artistic expression, particularly expression in music. The work blends insights from evolutionary game theory, ethology, experimental psychology, neuroscience, pragmatics, and the philosophies of mind and language.Less
This book offers a general theory of expressive behavior, including but not limited to such behavior as it occurs in our own species. At the core of the project is the thesis that self-expression is a matter of showing a cognitive, affective, or qualitative state in such a way that the showing is a product of design. Design may be the result of conscious intention, natural selection, artificial selection, or convention. Showing comes in three forms: showing that something is so, showing something in such a way as to make it perceptible, and showing how an object appears or how an experience or affect feels. This elucidation of self-expression as designed showing of something inner sheds light on such issues as the distinction between saying and showing, the nature of speaker meaning, speech acts, the problem of other minds, implicature, the psychology and evolutionary biology of facial expression, idiosyncratic and conventional aspects of expressive behavior, empathy, qualia, and artistic expression, particularly expression in music. The work blends insights from evolutionary game theory, ethology, experimental psychology, neuroscience, pragmatics, and the philosophies of mind and language.
Roger Teichmann
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199299331
- eISBN:
- 9780191715068
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199299331.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
One of the most important philosophers of recent times, Elizabeth Anscombe wrote books and articles on a wide range of topics, including the ground-breaking monograph Intention. This book studies ...
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One of the most important philosophers of recent times, Elizabeth Anscombe wrote books and articles on a wide range of topics, including the ground-breaking monograph Intention. This book studies Anscombe's philosophical oeuvre. It presents Anscombe's main ideas, bringing out their interconnections, elaborating and discussing their implications, pointing out objections and difficulties, and aims to give a unified overview of her philosophy. Many of Anscombe's arguments are relevant to contemporary debates, and on a number of topics, what Anscombe has to say constitutes a powerful alternative to dominant or popular views. Among the writings discussed are Intention, ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’, ‘Rules, Rights and Promises’, ‘On Brute Facts’, ‘The First Person’, ‘The Intentionality of Sensation’, ‘Causality and Determination’, An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus, ‘The Question of Linguistic Idealism’, and a number of other pieces, including some that are little known or hard to obtain. A complete bibliography of Anscombe's writings is also included. Ranging from the philosophy of action, through ethics, to philosophy of mind, metaphysics, and the philosophy of logic and language, this book is a study of one of the most significant bodies of work in modern philosophy, spanning more than fifty years, and one which is as pertinent today as ever.Less
One of the most important philosophers of recent times, Elizabeth Anscombe wrote books and articles on a wide range of topics, including the ground-breaking monograph Intention. This book studies Anscombe's philosophical oeuvre. It presents Anscombe's main ideas, bringing out their interconnections, elaborating and discussing their implications, pointing out objections and difficulties, and aims to give a unified overview of her philosophy. Many of Anscombe's arguments are relevant to contemporary debates, and on a number of topics, what Anscombe has to say constitutes a powerful alternative to dominant or popular views. Among the writings discussed are Intention, ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’, ‘Rules, Rights and Promises’, ‘On Brute Facts’, ‘The First Person’, ‘The Intentionality of Sensation’, ‘Causality and Determination’, An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus, ‘The Question of Linguistic Idealism’, and a number of other pieces, including some that are little known or hard to obtain. A complete bibliography of Anscombe's writings is also included. Ranging from the philosophy of action, through ethics, to philosophy of mind, metaphysics, and the philosophy of logic and language, this book is a study of one of the most significant bodies of work in modern philosophy, spanning more than fifty years, and one which is as pertinent today as ever.
John Foster
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199297139
- eISBN:
- 9780191711398
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199297139.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
The aim of the book is to refute physical realism and establish in its place a form of phenomenalistic idealism. Physical realism, in the relevant sense, takes the physical world to be something ...
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The aim of the book is to refute physical realism and establish in its place a form of phenomenalistic idealism. Physical realism, in the relevant sense, takes the physical world to be something whose existence is both logically independent of the human mind and philosophically fundamental. There are a number of problems for this realist view, but the main objection is that it does not accord the world the empirical immanence it needs if it is to qualify as our world, as a world for us. Phenomenalistic idealism rejects the realist view in both its aspects. It takes the world to be something whose existence is ultimately constituted by facts about human sensory experience, or by some richer complex of non-physical facts in which such experiential facts centrally feature. The book seeks to establish a specific version of this idealism, in which the experiential facts that centrally feature in the constitutive creation of the world concern the organization of human sensory experience. The basic idea of this version is that, in the context of certain other constitutively relevant factors, this sensory organization creates the physical world by disposing things to appear systematically worldwise at the human empirical viewpoint. Chief among the other relevant factors is the role of God as the one who is responsible for the sensory organization and ordains the system of appearance it yields. It is this that gives the idealistically created world its objectivity and allows it to qualify as a real world.Less
The aim of the book is to refute physical realism and establish in its place a form of phenomenalistic idealism. Physical realism, in the relevant sense, takes the physical world to be something whose existence is both logically independent of the human mind and philosophically fundamental. There are a number of problems for this realist view, but the main objection is that it does not accord the world the empirical immanence it needs if it is to qualify as our world, as a world for us. Phenomenalistic idealism rejects the realist view in both its aspects. It takes the world to be something whose existence is ultimately constituted by facts about human sensory experience, or by some richer complex of non-physical facts in which such experiential facts centrally feature. The book seeks to establish a specific version of this idealism, in which the experiential facts that centrally feature in the constitutive creation of the world concern the organization of human sensory experience. The basic idea of this version is that, in the context of certain other constitutively relevant factors, this sensory organization creates the physical world by disposing things to appear systematically worldwise at the human empirical viewpoint. Chief among the other relevant factors is the role of God as the one who is responsible for the sensory organization and ordains the system of appearance it yields. It is this that gives the idealistically created world its objectivity and allows it to qualify as a real world.
