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This book has focused primarily on the combat capabilities of infantrymen and their direct support organizations: the artillery, air cavalry, assault helicopters, Air Force, and Navy. Many other units not specifically mentioned—such as the 45th Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog), the 65th Infantry Platoon (Combat Tracker), the Air Cushion Vehicle Platoon, the 1097th Transportation Company (Medium Boat), and the 15th Engineer Combat Battalion—also participated in ferreting out and destroying the enemy. Yet, all units of the division contributed to its combat success. The importance of the medical battalion needs no explanation. The 9th Signal Battalion provided outstanding communications. The aircraft and other equipment were maintained and repaired by the 709th Maintenance Battalion. The unflinching dedication to duty and the outstanding performance of all the brave men and women of the 9th Infantry Division and its supporting units in Vietnam contributed to its unsurpassed combat record from February 1967 through July 1969.

This chapter investigates Assad's allies, particularly Iran, and their support for the regime. From the beginning of Syria's civil war, Assad's allies were more willing to ensure the regime's survival than those states that wished to hasten its fall. For the first four years, Iran was by far Assad's most important ally. Major General Qassem Suleimani led a major reorganisation of the regime's forces, brought in Hezbollah and other Shia militias, and directed key aspects of military strategy. Financial and military support prevented the regime from collapsing under pressure, while Iran and Hezbollah's role significantly contributed to sectarianising the conflict. Such deep involvement by Assad's allies greatly impacted the shape of the Syrian civil war.

The Tibetan government, for its part, was also pursuing a two-track approach. On the one hand, its main effort was focused on securing military and diplomatic support for its de facto independence. To this end Tibet sent appeals to Western nations such as Britain and the United States and started reinforcing its army along the Chinese border. In December 1949, for example, it decided to send three high-level missions to the United States and India, Great Britain, and Nepal to explain its precarious situation and seek assistance. On the other hand, it also decided to make contact with China and formed a fourth mission for this purpose. This mission, led by Tsipön Shakabpa and the monk official Mindrubu, arrived in Kalimpong on 7 March 1950. The internal instructions reveal the tremendous gap still existing between the views of the leaders of Tibet and those of China.

This chapter reviews how the development of UK policing has been influenced by domestic and foreign counter-insurgencies and the need to interact with the military to counter them. It commenced in Ireland in the nineteenth century and then occurred extensively overseas. Police counter-insurgency techniques were used and developed in Palestine from 1921, then in Malaya and elsewhere after the Second World War and, by the 1970s, in Northern Ireland. The role of police in gathering human intelligence from within communities was central to COIN successes. However, in both Iraq and Afghanistan, building capacity in partner nation police forces was dominated by the military, thus minimizing the role of the UK police and producing negative consequences for both short-term COIN HUMINT requirements and the longer-term objective of creating an effective and sustainable local police force.

This chapter describes the final ordinances passed by the delegates of the Mississippi Secession Convention before adjourning. By this time, the delegates realized that the last major item remaining before the Convention was economic in nature. They knew that the state needed additional funds in the event of war against the Federal Union. The first important ordinance that they tackled was the Ways and Means Committee's bill that would raise revenue to support the military. Debates focused on amendments that would tax slaves separately from other property and the taxation of money loaned out of state as a possible source of funds for the war effort.

This chapter explores Britain and the United States' success in keeping Spain from joining the Axis in 1940 to 1941. Spain nearly entered World War II on the Axis side in late 1940. Yet, at the most crucial decision point — in December of 1940 — Spain's dictator Francisco Franco rebuffed the Axis alliance offers. Franco's decision was due in large part to an Anglo-American effort — initiated and led by Britain — to use inducements to keep Spain sidelined. When Hitler and Franco were converging on an alliance, Spain desperately needed not just military support to fight, but also economic aid — to recover from the civil war, survive severe shortages of food, and secure other basic economic necessities. The concerted Anglo-American policy convinced Franco that Spain's economic needs could best be met through British and U.S. largesse, which could only be obtained if Spain remained nonbelligerent. The British and Americans agreed on the goal (to keep Spain nonbelligerent), on the way to achieve it (inducements), and most of all, about Spain's high strategic weight. This produced a powerful wedge strategy, because the duo was in a good position to influence Spain through coordinated inducements.