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Approaches to Testing the Theory with Case Studies

Keren Yarhi-Milo

in Who Fights for Reputation

This chapter explores historical case studies as part of a layered methodological approach. It uses three observable implications to code a president as believing strongly in the efficacy of force: a ... More

This chapter explores historical case studies as part of a layered methodological approach. It uses three observable implications to code a president as believing strongly in the efficacy of force: a preference for higher military spending, a preference for covert military action, and a preference for military solutions over diplomatic ones. Beliefs about the effectiveness of military force capture the president's views regarding use of force in general. Thus, as the theory suggests, those views might affect the propensity to fight for reputation, but that effect is deterministic, because it interacts with the president's self-monitoring disposition. The chapter then explains how evaluating the self-monitoring, hawkishness, and policy recommendations of the presidents' main advisors offers several significant benefits to the research design.Less

Russian Hard Power

Kathryn E. Stoner

in Russia Resurrected: Its Power and Purpose in a New Global Order

This chapter examines Russia’s renewed defensive and offensive capabilities. It defines hard power as conventional and nuclear forces. The chapter compares Russian military power to that of the ... More

This chapter examines Russia’s renewed defensive and offensive capabilities. It defines hard power as conventional and nuclear forces. The chapter compares Russian military power to that of the United States and China. The material in this chapter demonstrates that Russia has rebuilt and modernized its hard power resources considerably since the 2008 military reform. In some areas, by 2020, Russia was capable of seriously challenging NATO’s combined capabilities. The chapter covers the New Look military reforms that began in 2008 in Russia. It looks also at Russian spending on the military in dollar and ruble terms in order to get a more complete understanding of how much Russia actually spends compared to the United States and China. It provides a detailed overview of Russia’s existing conventional capabilities in land, sea, and air, as well as comparative nuclear upgrades.Less

Revealing Evidence: Support, Spending, and Success

Michael P. Colaresi

in Democracy Declassified: The Secrecy Dilemma in National Security

Chapter 9 includes three sets of investigations on how oversight affects support, spending, and success in democratic foreign policy. The first set of analyses explores how specific changes in ... More

Chapter 9 includes three sets of investigations on how oversight affects support, spending, and success in democratic foreign policy. The first set of analyses explores how specific changes in retrospective institutions mobilize public support for military conflict, or do not, in France, the United States and Great Britain. The second set of analyses provides evidence of the paradoxical but productive influence of oversight on military spending. The final set of analyses illustrates that the partial solution to the secrecy dilemma outlined leads to better outcomes for democracies that have strong national security institutions. When crises break out, democracies with national security oversight win a greater number of their foreign policy disputes as compared to democracies that lack these institutions.Less

The Allocation of Resources between Defense and Health

in War and the Health of Nations

This chapter addresses the question of how the economic consequences of conflict affect public health, and how resource allocation decisions during and after conflict have a detrimental effect on ... More

This chapter addresses the question of how the economic consequences of conflict affect public health, and how resource allocation decisions during and after conflict have a detrimental effect on public health through budgetary trade-offs. It explains that war often results in economic decline and a decrease in overall resources available to a state, and evaluates the hypothesis that states lower their social spending and increase military spending due to involvement in armed conflict. The analysis of relationships among war, national income, government spending, and public health for the period from 1970 to 2000 provides evidence for a negative effect of war on public health through economic decline and resource diversion.Less

Does American Military Power Attract Foreign Investment?

Daniel W. Drezner and Nancy F. Hite-Rubin

in Sustainable Security: Rethinking American National Security Strategy

A welter of domestic and international factors have been associated with private capital inflows—and yet, the causal role of military spending has not been closely examined. This is curious, since ... More

A welter of domestic and international factors have been associated with private capital inflows—and yet, the causal role of military spending has not been closely examined. This is curious, since there have been numerous articulated pathways through which military power can affect private sector investment decisions. Some argue that the greater a country's military capabilities, the more it acts as an attractor for private capital seeking security in an insecure world. Others argue that defense spending "crowds out" foreign direct investment by revealing a less friendly business environment for investors. This chapter empirically tests the effect of defense spending on FDI inflows for the post-Cold War era on a set of developed economies, with a special emphasis on North America. The results suggest that military power does not lead to geoeconomic favoritismLess

The Military Nexus, I

John Kenneth Galbraith

in The Culture of Contentment

This chapter examines the role of the military in the community of contentment. During the past half century, Communism was considered the most obtrusive threat to contentment. The perception that ... More

This chapter examines the role of the military in the community of contentment. During the past half century, Communism was considered the most obtrusive threat to contentment. The perception that the military was a bulwark against Communism was the most significant support to the deeply embedded position of the military establishment in the culture of contentment. Fear of Communism was deep and fundamental in the psyche of the contented. Imperiled freedom, loss of liberty, was much cited; especially acute was the threat to private property. The chapter considers how the fear of Communism gave rise to a major development in the military power as that existed in the political economy of contentment: a further enormous increase in military and defense spending as the constituency of contentment gained full power in the 1980s—the arms buildup under Ronald Reagan.Less

Exit Made in America: The Trump Presidency

Alexander Cooley and Daniel Nexon

in Exit from Hegemony: The Unraveling of the American Global Order

Donald Trump and Trumpism are less the cause of the current crisis in the American system than a symptom and accelerant of underlying trends. This chapter examines the continuities and differences ... More

Donald Trump and Trumpism are less the cause of the current crisis in the American system than a symptom and accelerant of underlying trends. This chapter examines the continuities and differences between Trump foreign policy and that of his predecessors. It demonstrates that Trump is, in fact, unusual in the scope and scale of his dismissal of multilateralism, ability to raise doubts about American alliance commitments, and rejection of liberal internationalism. These policies magnify the longer-term tendency of the United States to adopt policies that undermine its geopolitical position, such as fiscally irresponsible tax cuts, underinvestment in domestic infrastructure and human capital, democratic backsliding, and overreliance on military instruments. In short, even if Trump had never been elected the United States would still face the erosion of its leadership from inevitable shifts in relative power, and still be failing to pursue domestic policies that might mitigate those shifts.Less

Fall Down Seven Times Get Up Eight?: Takahashi Korekiyo in Japan, 1934–5

Alan Bollard

in Economists at War: How a Handful of Economists Helped Win and Lose the World Wars

The chapter opens in 1936 with rebel soldiers of the Japanese Army creeping through the snow to assassinate the elderly Japanese Minister of Finance, Takahashi Korekiyo. He was a remarkable ... More

The chapter opens in 1936 with rebel soldiers of the Japanese Army creeping through the snow to assassinate the elderly Japanese Minister of Finance, Takahashi Korekiyo. He was a remarkable self-taught Japanese, many times Minister of Finance, who learned his economic and financial skills raising funding in European markets to finance the Japanese-Russian War. He managed bank crises and saved his country from the Great Depression with an innovative range of pre-Keynesian macroeconomic policies. However his attempts to cut military spending ran into intense opposition from the Japanese military who were intent on invading Manchuria, and a group of fanatic soldiers ultimately assassinated him.Less

Human Destiny Is a Choice

Khadija Haq (ed.)

in Economic Growth with Social Justice: Collected Writings of Mahbub ul Haq

In this chapter, Haq outlines his optimistic outlook for global world order. For him the end of the Cold War had opened up many more choices for the global community. For the first time global ... More

In this chapter, Haq outlines his optimistic outlook for global world order. For him the end of the Cold War had opened up many more choices for the global community. For the first time global military spending was seen to be declining every year. He saw potential to reallocate ODA aid funds, which were previously tilted in favour of cold war allies. For Haq the challenge is to link economic growth as the means to human development as an objective. He stresses on the need to reform institutions of global governance to translate globalization into opportunities for people.Less

Guns and Jobs

Helmut Norpoth

in Unsurpassed: The Popular Appeal of Franklin Roosevelt

Full recovery from the Depression was the unintended consequence of FDR’s policy to prepare the nation for war in the two years leading up to the U.S. entry into it. The spending entailed by his ... More

Full recovery from the Depression was the unintended consequence of FDR’s policy to prepare the nation for war in the two years leading up to the U.S. entry into it. The spending entailed by his requests for a massive buildup of the army and navy in 1940 alone surpassed anything that had been laid out for New Deal programs. A major reason why the U.S. economy made only a partial recovery from the Depression during FDR’s first two terms was devotion to the principle of balanced budgets. It was held dearly, as polls show, by the American people and was embraced by FDR as well. To incur deficits as a means of overcoming the Depression was simply unthinkable. It took the sense of national unity created by a threat from abroad to void any misgivings about debt and deficits.Less

Imposing the International Bolivarian Project

María Teresa Romero

in Venezuela's Petro-Diplomacy: Hugo Chavez's Foreign Policy

This chapter explores the strategic actions implemented by President Hugo Chávez on both domestic and foreign fronts in imposing the international Bolivarian Project. It also discusses the Bolivarian ... More

This chapter explores the strategic actions implemented by President Hugo Chávez on both domestic and foreign fronts in imposing the international Bolivarian Project. It also discusses the Bolivarian government's main foreign policy initiatives to advance its domestic and international objectives. Chávez's foreign policy goals are defined according to geographic zone and are based on political affinity with sympathetic governments with expansionism and interventionism being the two prominent characteristics of Bolivarian diplomacy and foreign policy. This chapter also recounts Chávez's commitment to Venezuela to the strengthening of revolutionary governments and alternative movements around the world, through a strategy of “people's diplomacy.” The chapter describes how the Chávez government has reactivated thousands of militia and reservists and created a national police force to protect against alleged aggressions from the United States, Colombia, and others. The chapter also mentions the importance of the increase in military spending.Less

The Ironies of Disarmament

in Apocalypse Management: Eisenhower and the Discourse of National Insecurity

This chapter elaborates the ironies of apocalypse management as they were apparent in the approach of President Dwight Eisenhower to disarmament. The fear of an apocalyptic surprise attack was one of ... More

This chapter elaborates the ironies of apocalypse management as they were apparent in the approach of President Dwight Eisenhower to disarmament. The fear of an apocalyptic surprise attack was one of Eisenhower's main motives of for pursuing disarmament. His desire for an arms-control agreement was determined by his hope for limiting military spending. Eisenhower also agreed to separate a test ban in 1959 from other disarmament issues. This test ban might cost the United States valuable allies. Eisenhower asserted that there was no danger from the tests. The test ban turned out to be the main symbol of the government's ability to meet its promise of apocalypse management. It is observed that the pursuit of national security through nuclear weaponry pushed the nation yet further into a state of national insecurity.Less

To Kill a Nation

Edward Kaplan

in To Kill Nations: American Strategy in the Air-Atomic Age and the Rise of Mutually Assured Destruction

This chapter examines the interaction of national policy under the Eisenhower administration with the new nuclear reality, in plans for nuclear war and through real world crises. During the 1950s, ... More

This chapter examines the interaction of national policy under the Eisenhower administration with the new nuclear reality, in plans for nuclear war and through real world crises. During the 1950s, the US Air Force's transition from early to the late air-atomic strategy benefited from the vigorous support of President Eisenhower. His administration carefully studied atomic weapons and their implications, and integrated them into national security policy. Eisenhower backed late air-atomic ideas with all of its terrors and rejected conflicting schools of thought, although in crises he steered clear from the danger of world war. Through National Security Council (NSC) paper 162/2 and subsequent Basic National Security Policies (BNSP), Eisenhower articulated a clear declaratory policy, which the action policy—air-atomic strategy—suited well. Eisenhower sought to reduce military spending so to fuel economic growth for a long struggle with the USSR, balancing the “great equation” and avoiding a “garrison state.” His military strategy sought to provide unambiguous destructive potential at low cost. The air-atomic action policy did so.Less

Th e Post Facto State

Peter Baldwin

in The Narcissism of Minor Differences: How Europe and America are Alike

Some Critics Of America turn out to be bean counters. They admit that the American outcomes in certain fields are comparable to what is found in Europe, only to point ... More

Some Critics Of America turn out to be bean counters. They admit that the American outcomes in certain fields are comparable to what is found in Europe, only to point out that the cost has been higher. The fundamental premise of the recently published American Human Development Report is not so much that the United States is doing poorly in comparison with other nations, though of course some outcomes are nothing short of shameful. More annoying to the authors is that the United States is being inefficient and has not been able to parlay its front-running GDP status into an equivalently primary position in other respects. Tony Judt argues that, “for every dollar the United States spends on education it gets worse results than any other industrial nation.” Indeed, the United States spends more per pupil than anyone else, but gets results that are only in the middle of the European spectrum. From a cost-benefit analysis, America should be getting better value for its money. Th e same is oft en said of health care, where the United States spends disproportionately even more, yet gets only moderately good results. On three out of four of the fundamental activities of modern government— education, health, social insurance, and defense—America turns out to be a big spender. For education and health, the U.S. state spends as much as any country in Europe, for defense much more so, but for social insurance, it is at the bottom of the European scale. If we look at how American society as a whole—privately and publicly—allocates its resources, however, by European standards it spends lavishly on health, education, and defense, and at about the European average for social insurance. Perhaps there is a pattern here. Consider high spending for a moment, not from the bookkeeper’s vantage, but from the political theorist’s. A nation with a high GDP per head has more wiggle room than poorer countries. It may be that America’s choice to spend freely is in fact a tactical political decision rather than a slothful financial one—to be generous, rather than profligate. For one thing, as James Galbraith has argued, high levels of American spending on education, health care, the military, and even domestic security translate ultimately into high employment. Less

A Meeting of the Twain?

Peter Baldwin

in The Narcissism of Minor Differences: How Europe and America are Alike

So Where Does This Leave Us? There are, of course, differences between America and Europe. But in almost all cases, they are no greater, and oft en smaller, than the ... More

So Where Does This Leave Us? There are, of course, differences between America and Europe. But in almost all cases, they are no greater, and oft en smaller, than the differences among European nations. The span of European circumstance is such that the United States tends to fall comfortably within it. Therefore, either no coherent Europe exists, or the United States is a European nation. Formulated in a more sensible way, the similarities across the North Atlantic are at least as salient as the divergences. Yes, there are differences between Europe and America: murder and incarceration rates, as well as gun ownership and, more arguably, relative poverty rates on the one hand; the strength of civil society, assimilatory abilities, and some aspects of religious belief on the other. Other differences are ones of degree rather than kind: social policy, taxation, labor regulation, inequality, environmental policies. Other much-remarked Atlantic divides can easily be exaggerated—the death penalty, for example. Popular opinion probably does not diverge across the Atlantic as much as official policy. A joint YouGov/Economist poll found almost identical responses between Americans and the British, with about one-fifth of respondents always in favor of death for murder and about the same number always opposed. The United States still enforces the death penalty, and most Americans support it under some circumstances. Yet, 12 states do not have it, and another five have not carried it out for the last 30 years. If we add those states that have executed only five or fewer people since 1976, we find that over half the states, in effect, do not have capital punishment. It could, in theory, be revoked tomorrow. Would America then be radically different? Did France change profoundly when it abolished the death penalty in 1981? Did the UK in 1998, Belgium in 1996, Spain in 1995, Italy in 1994, or Greece in 2004? Did they only then become truly European? Less